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In multiple sclerosis (MS), some patients are said to present with unawareness of deficit, and 
positive mood and optimism that is out of place or incongruous given the patient’s 
circumstances.  The history of these symptoms, collectively known as euphoria, however, is 
characterised by marked inconsistencies regarding a number of aspects of these symptoms.  
This research attempted to investigate both the constructs, and the symptoms themselves, 
with the aim of better defining and broadening our understanding of euphoria.  Results 
revealed that a change in the definition of euphoria appears to have occurred since the 
concept was introduced by Cottrell and Wilson.  Different operational definitions appear to 
be partly responsible for the very different incidence rates reported throughout the literature.  
Instead of the classical three types of euphoria identified by the classical authors, or the single 
type utilised in the contemporary literature, the current research revealed two types of 
euphoria in MS (viz. positivity and unawareness).  Positivity appears to be a subjective 
mood/outlook experienced by the patient and not an outward façade projected by the 
euphoric individual, and was defined in fairly subtle terms. Unawareness appears to relate to 
a number of domains (including physical, cognitive and mood or behavioural deficits), and 
was measured via participant/informant discrepancies on self-report questionnaires.  Both 
positivity and unawareness were represented on a continuum and appeared to have different 
demographic, disease and cognitive correlates.  Positivity was significantly predicted by a 
medical history of conditions that can affect neuropsychological functioning.  Unawareness 
of physical deficits was associated with a female gender, a younger age, a lower income, 
relapsing-remitting course, a current disease state of relapse or exacerbation, a shorter disease 
duration, but a greater disease severity in terms of physical disability.  Severity of the disease 
and the cognitive composite representing cognitive functions sub-served by the orbitobasal 
frontal cortex were also significant individual predictors of unawareness of physical deficits.  
Visuospatial ability significantly predicted unawareness of cognitive deficits.  No 
demographic, disease or cognitive correlates of unawareness of mood or behavioural deficits 
were identified.  Finally, no indisputable single cause underlying the two types of euphoria in 
MS identified by this research was isolated by the exploratory investigations undertaken; 
however interesting preliminary findings that may tentatively implicate executive dysfunction 
as well as, possibly, immunological disease processes in the etiology of euphoria in MS were 
revealed.  These results have broadened our understanding of euphoria in MS and may shape 





Positive mood and optimism as to the future and recovery that is incongruous with a patient’s 
circumstances, as well as unawareness of increasing difficulties or impairment are symptoms 
(collectively known as euphoria) that occur within a sub-group of individuals with multiple 
sclerosis (MS). A wealth of literature regarding the historical development of the constructs 
relating to these symptoms is available within this body of research (Finger, 1998), but this 
brings with it an extensive array of inconsistencies, regarding the definition of these 
symptoms, which types constitute euphoria, the incidence with which they occur, which MS 
patients might be expected to present with these symptoms, and the cause underlying the 
symptoms.   
A re-investigation of each of the constructs that underpin these symptoms is, 
therefore, of value, as without clear and consistent definition of the constructs, it is not 
possible to generate reliable knowledge about these symptoms.  Following on from this, an 
investigation of the symptoms themselves, improved by a better understanding of their 
underlying constructs, may enrich our understanding of euphoria and enable us to better 
predict at what stage, and with which disease and/or cognitive parameters, these symptoms 
are likely to present. 
 Although not the focus of this research, euphoric symptoms can also impact 
significantly on a patient’s work and social life, as well as on their family and the social 
support they are able or willing to provide (Benedict et al., 2000; Clarke, Lovegrove, 
Williams, & Machperson, 2000; Minden, 2000). Conversely, the identification, and direct 
treatment and management of these symptoms, as well as of being cognisant of them when 
treating the patient’s disease in general, can improve the quality of life both for these patients 
and their loved-ones, as well as the quality of care received by these patients (Minden, 2000; 
Rabins et al., 1986).  Even if treatment is not pursued, family members can benefit greatly 
simply by understanding that such symptoms (i.e. euphoric mood, optimism regarding a 
recovery that will probably not take place, and unawareness of increasing impairment) are the 
result of an underlying disease process and not due to the patient being stubborn, unrealistic, 
or unhelpful, and this can vastly improve their quality of life and allow them to better provide 
and care for their loved-one (Rabins et al., 1986). Thus, a potential application of an 
investigation of euphoria (i.e. unawareness of deficit and positive mood and optimism that is 






In order to contextualise this research, a review of the relevant literature follows.  This 
provides an overview of (a) the definitions of and theory in which the individual symptoms of 
positive mood, unawareness of deficit and optimism (collectively known within the MS 
literature as euphoria) are grounded; (b) the disease of MS; and (c) what is known about these 
symptoms within MS. A thorough understanding of the symptoms of positive mood, 
unawareness of deficit and optimism, as well as the historical development of the description 
of these euphoric symptoms within MS, allows for a specific examination of the constructs 
underpinning them, and a more in-depth exploration of ideas concerning their definition and 
number of types.  It is, furthermore, important in the investigation and broadening of our 
knowledge of the euphoric symptoms themselves.  Additionally, an understanding of the 
disease in which they commonly occur can assist us in better understanding their cause.  
 
Euphoric symptoms: positive mood, unawareness of deficit and optimism 
As noted above, the symptoms of positive mood, unawareness of deficit and optimism 
constituted the central focus of this research.  A review of the literature most relevant to the 
definitions, descriptions and underlying mechanisms of each of these phenomena, in general, 
is presented below.  
 
Positive mood. Even though definitions of euphoria in MS vary, what is clear is that 
euphoria is distinct from a number of other, similar appearing, symptoms of mood and affect.  
For example, euphoria (i.e. positive mood) should not be confused with hypomania or mania. 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th edition 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), a manic episode is characterised by elevated or 
irritable mood and increased energy or goal-directed activity, that persists for the period of at 
least one week, and is accompanied by three or more of the following symptoms: (a) 
exaggerated self-esteem or grandiosity, (b) less need for sleep, (c) racing thoughts, (d) a need 
to keep talking, (e) distractibility, (f) an increase in goal-directed activity or psychomotor 
agitation, and (g) an increased and extreme involvement in activities that may have harmful 
consequences. A hypomanic episode is defined by the same criteria as a manic episode, but 
lasts for a shorter period of time (it needs to have been present for at least four consecutive 
days; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Euphoria is also different from pathological 
laughing, which is defined as brief, uncontrollable expressions of intense affect (i.e. laughing 
or crying) that may be congruent or incongruent with the underlying feelings of the patient as 
21 
 
well as the context that appeared to trigger them, and that do not produce a change in the 
mood of the patient, but are the result of neurological involvement (Wortzel, Oster, 
Anderson, & Arciniegas, 2008). Emotional lability and emotional incontinence are also 
different: The former refers to rapid mood swings, while the latter involves exaggerated 
expressions of emotion that are out of proportion to the situation (Harel, Barak, & Achiron, 
2007). In contrast, euphoric mood, in terms of a lay understanding, is defined as “a feeling of 
excited happiness” by the South African Student’s Dictionary (1999), “a feeling of intense 
happiness” by The Oxford Concise Dictionary (1999), and as “a feeling of extreme happiness 
and wellbeing” by the Chambers Concise Dictionary (2004). The definitions of euphoria in 
MS and the discrepancies between them will be addressed in much more depth later in this 
section. 
An issue that has received greater attention, than that of a generally accepted 
definition of euphoria, is that of the neuroanatomical correlates of positive mood.  While in 
MS, the cause of euphoric mood largely remains unknown, in terms of general mood, for 
many years, the right hemisphere (RH) has been considered to be responsible for the 
processing of emotion, while the left hemisphere was considered to be more analytical, being 
responsible for particular cognitive processes.  Cortical processing of emotion was, thus, 
thought to be lateralised to the RH and this was known as the RH hypothesis (Borod, 1992; 
Borod, Bloom, Brickman, Nakhutina, & Curko, 2002; Tondowski, Kovacs, Morin, & 
Turnbull, 2007). Evidence for this hypothesis came from research which found that RH 
patients performed poorly with regard to facial affect recognition (Borod et al., 2002), and 
processing of the emotional prosody of speech (Borod et al., 2002; Kucharska-Pietura, 
Phillips, Gernand, & David, 2003; Ross & Monnot, 2008).  
This hypothesis, however, does not present an explanation for an increase in positive 
or negative mood following unilateral brain damage, and, in 1912, Babinski noted that 
euphoria, as opposed to depressed mood change, could occur with damage to the RH 
(Starkstein & Robinson, 1989). This eventually led to the valence hypothesis which, in 
contrast to the RH hypothesis, stated that both hemispheres are responsible for emotional 
processing, but that they process it in different ways. While the dominant (left) hemisphere 
was specialised for the expression of positive emotion, the non-dominant (right) hemisphere 
was responsible for the expression of negative emotion (Borod, 1992; Borod et al., 2002; 
Silberman & Weingartner, 1986).  Thus, damage to, or inactivation of, one side allowed the 
other to triumph and was said to result in “euphoric-maniacal” mood change with 
involvement of the RH and “depressive-catastrophic” reactions with involvement of the left 
(Gainotti, 1972, p. 41). These ideas persisted for many years. For example, Rowe (1937) 
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found that complete removal of the RH was linked to an increase in positive mood. Sackeim 
et al. (1982) reported on three studies that found right-sided damage to be associated with 
euphoric mood change. And, even as late as 1990, Starkstein and colleagues published a 
study on eight patients who all demonstrated euphoric and/or manic symptoms following 
right sided brain injury. 
More recently, however, the valence hypotheses has been replaced by the approach-
withdrawal hypothesis, and Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, and Friesen (1990) 
hypothesise that the left hemisphere activates an “approach” system, which can result in 
positive emotion, while the RH activates a “withdrawal” system, which can result in negative 
emotions. Therefore, rather than focusing on mood, they focus on systems of behaviour that 
may result in particular mood states. Furthermore, instead of the more general hypotheses of 
the past, they associate the approach-withdrawal systems with the anterior cortical regions of 
both the left and right hemispheres (Davidson et al., 1990).  This may account for increases in 
positive mood which have been demonstrated in a number of other patient groups, including 
that of Alzheimer’s disease and frontotemporal dementias (Bozeat, Gregory, Ralph, & 
Hodges, 2000; Cummings et al., 1994), neurosyphilis (Roberts & Emsley, 1992), frontal 
meningioma (Avery, 1971), and, perhaps, MS. 
Determining the causes or underlying mechanisms of positive emotion is important in 
better understanding the symptom of euphoria in MS; and in addition to the neuroanatomical 
correlates, there may be relevant aspects related to immunological processes.  We know that 
positive affect can improve our immune functioning and general health (Barak, 2006; 
Dockray & Steptoe, 2010; Stone, Cox, Valdimarsdottir, Jandorf, & Neale, 1987), while 
negative affect can have a detrimental effect (Kemeny et al., 1995; Stone et al., 1987).  But, 
our immune systems can also influence our emotions, and this phenomenon has been 
particularly well researched within the depression literature (see, e.g., Capuron et al., 2001; 
Harrison et al., 2009; Pollak & Yirmiya, 2002).  A dysregulation of fatty acids, an immune 
modulated process, has also been implicated in mania (Horrobin & Bennett, 1999). In 
addition, manic and euthymic bipolar patients have shown increased levels of 
proinflammatory cytokines (another immunological marker) compared with healthy controls 
(HC; Brietzke et al., 2009). Immunological correlates have been implicated in the study of 
positive mood in general, and may, thus, also be relevant in our understanding of euphoria in 





 Unawareness of deficit.  Originally described in 1912 by Babinski to refer to a very 
specific unawareness of left sided paraplegia following a RH stroke (Amador, Strauss, Yale, 
& Gorman, 1991; Hartman-Maeir, Soroker, & Katz, 2001), the term anosognosia has been 
broadened and is now often used to denote other forms of unawareness (Jenkinson, Preston, 
& Ellis, 2011). It has, thus, been demonstrated in a variety of patient groups other than only 
patients with RH damage.  These include Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias such as 
Huntington’s disease (Flashman, 2002; Seltzer, Vasterling, Yoder, & Thompson, 1997), 
cortical blindness as in the case of Anton’s syndrome (Goldenberg, Müllbacher, & Nowak, 
1995), schizophrenia (Amador et al., 1991), bipolar mood disorder, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, traumatic brain injury (TBI; Flashman, 2002; Toglia & Kirk, 2000) and in patients 
with MS (Cottrell & Wilson, 1926; Finger, 1998).  In Alzheimer’s disease an unawareness of 
memory and other cognitive deficits is seen (Barrett, Eslinger, Ballentine, & Heilman, 2005; 
Seltzer et al., 1997; Starkstein, Sabe, Chemerinski, Jason, & Leiguarda, 1996).  Barrett et al. 
(2005) refer to this as “cognitive anosognosia”.  Anosognosia in schizophrenia is more broad 
and refers to an unawareness of the illness and its symptoms (Amador et al., 1991), and 
anosognosia in Huntington’s disease and TBI can often relate to an unawareness of physical, 
cognitive and emotional or behavioural deficits (Flashman, 2002; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). 
Therefore, anosognosia no longer refers purely to unawareness of a physical deficit, and there 
is a broad array of symptom domains about which various patient groups can be unaware. 
Defining the use of the term in research is therefore of particular importance as it may present 
differently, and be brought about by different underlying mechanisms (Amador et al., 1991; 
Jenkinson et al., 2011).   
 Unawareness in MS, however, has historically been circumscribed to the physical 
domain, and descriptions appear similar in nature to that of anosognosia for hemiplegia.  For 
example, Surridge’s (1969) description of the reduction in intensity of euphoric MS patients’ 
self-reported positive mood upon confrontation with reality will be described in a later sub-
section; but this appears similar to the distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge of 
deficit which can be revealed in an anosognosic (for hemiplegia) patient during confrontation 
with the reality of their deficits (Turnbull, Jones, & Reed-Screen, 2002).  Furthermore, 
hemiplegic patients often reveal delusional ideas regarding their paralysed limb and may 
insist, for example, that it belongs to someone else (Amador et al., 1991), or that it is “just 
tired because I was playing tennis so much this morning” (Turnbull et al., 2002, p. 69).  For 
these patients, the new reality that is created almost always appears more positive than the 
patients’ actual reality at the time (Fotopoulou, Solms, & Turnbull, 2004). This may lead one 
to think that these patients are unduly happy, which may be similar to the presentation of the 
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MS patient.  However, unawareness in MS may well be a different type of unawareness to 
that of anosognosia for hemiplegia, and not at all governed by damage to the RH, and 
although described using the same terminology may represent a very different construct. 
 Anosognosia for hemiplegia typically occurs following damage to the RH, and 
frontoparietal cortical regions, and basal ganglia and thalamic subcortical structures are often 
implicated (Jenkinson et al., 2011; Pia, Neppi-Modona, Ricci, & Berti, 2004). However, in 
terms of the other types of anosognosia discussed at the beginning of this sub-section, such as 
unawareness of cognitive or mood and behavioual changes, Flashman (2002), whose ideas 
were later supported by the findings of Sherman, Rapport and Ryan (2008), noted that there 
does not appear to be a single mechanism underlying all types of unawareness. Underlying 
mechanisms of unawareness may, therefore, be domain specific with the cause of 
unawareness of physical deficit being quite different from that of the cause underlying 
unawareness of cognitive deficits.  However, Flashman (2002) did state that there is 
evidence, from neuropsychological testing, of frontal and parietal involvement in 
unawareness across a number of patient groups. In contrast to mood (addressed above) and 
optimism (to follow), no research could be found on any immunological correlates of 
unawareness.  The information presented above, however, is important in terms of gaining a 
deeper understanding of unawareness in general, in order to be better able to understand 
unawareness in MS.  
 
Optimism.  Optimism that is out of place to the patient’s circumstances is a symptom 
that has also been described in MS patients (Cottrell & Wilson, 1926; Finger, 1998).  
However, while unawareness, for example, has been researched in other patient groups, 
general research on optimism appears most often to be conducted in non-neurological 
populations (Goodin & Bulls, 2013).  Thus, while dispositional optimism, including more 
transient state optimism influenced by environmental factors, or more stable trait optimism 
reflective of one’s general outlook (Burke, Joyner, Czech, & Wilson, 2000) may be 
considered abnormal within MS patients, it is often only unrealistic optimism which is 
considered to be abnormal and harmful in the general literature.  Unrealistic optimism, 
defined as an individual’s tendency to underestimate his/her chances of experiencing negative 
events and to overestimate his/her chances of experiencing positive events in relation to other 
people in similar circumstances (Clarke et al., 2000; McKenna, 1993; Sparks, Shepherd, 
Wieringa, & Zimmermanns, 1995), can have a negative impact, particularly on one’s health.  
For example, Clarke et al. (2000) found both men and women to have unrealistic optimism 
regarding their risk of developing cancer which impacted on cancer screening behaviour. 
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Sparks et al. (1995) found that people were unrealistically optimistic about the healthiness of 
their diets and of their risk for developing diseases related to poor diet. Thus, in these studies, 
unrealistic optimism resulted in harmful behaviours and ideas that prevented the participants 
from taking protective actions that would benefit their health.  But, these were healthy 
individuals who were deemed relatively entitled to experience optimism.  Thus, optimism at 
less extreme levels amongst MS patients may be considered to be just as abnormal with 
potentially detrimental effects as unrealistic optimism is amongst the healthy population. 
In connecting this symptom with the others reviewed above, little could be found 
relating unrealistic optimism with euphoric mood, except for a possible case for mild hypoxia 
(see Gilbey et al., 2010). Unrealistic optimism does, however, appear to be linked somehow 
with anosognosia for hemiplegia, as anosognosic patients often over-emphasise their abilities, 
or are overly optimistic about their condition (Turnbull, Evans, & Owen, 2005).  In addition, 
vestibular stimulation via left-ear caloric irrigation has been shown to reduce both 
anosognosia for hemiplegia in RH patients, as well as unrealistic optimism in healthy 
individuals, although this effect is transient (Cappa, Sterzi, Vallar, & Bisiach, 1987; Tamagni 
et al., 2010).  
Studies of the actual neuroanatomical correlates of general optimism and/or 
unrealistic optimism are scarce though, and some are confounded by other factors. For 
example, Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps (2007) found enhanced activation in the amygdala 
and anterior cingulate cortex during a functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study of 
unrealistic optimism.  But, they read their participants descriptions of events such as winning 
an award or the ending of a romantic relationship and then asked them to remember either the 
actual experience of this event in the past, or to imagine such an event in the future. Not only 
are these descriptions not obviously related to optimism or pessimism, but brain areas 
involved in memory, imagination, and emotion, among countless others, may also be 
activated in such a paradigm. 
In contrast, immunological processes may be an area that could be of relevance in the 
etiology of optimism, as increased optimism has been related to higher numbers of helper T 
cells (Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998), which are central to the inflammatory 
immune response (Boyce, 1998). Thus, again since MS is an auto-immune disease, 
immunological correlates may be of relevance. 
A general introduction to the constructs and symptoms of positive mood, unawareness 
of deficit and (unrealistic) optimism was presented above.  Since a sub-group of patients with 
MS is known to demonstrate varying combinations of cheerful and positive mood, 
unawareness of or indifference to their condition, and an optimism regarding the future and 
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prospects for recovery that is disproportionate to their situation (Cottrell & Wilson, 1926; 
Finger, 1998), a review of the disease of MS is also important in order to contextualise the 
possible cause of these symptoms.   
 
Multiple sclerosis 
The inflammatory response is the body’s natural protective reaction against invading 
pathogens such as viruses and bacteria (Jones, 2011). However, in autoimmune disease, an 
abnormal immune response occurs whereby the body’s own tissues are mistaken for foreign 
infectious agents, and instead of attacking an invader, the immune system attacks itself and 
can result in the injury or destruction of multiple organ systems (Jones, 2011; Wraith, 
Goldman, & Lambert, 2003). A notable number of auto-immune disorders exist, including 
systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE), myasthenia gravis (MG) and MS. 
MS is a chronic, inflammatory, degenerative disease of the central nervous system 
(CNS), of unknown etiology (DeSousa, Albert, & Kalman, 2002; Mohr et al., 1999; 
Savettieri et al., 2004). It results in demyelination and wide-spread lesions, or plaques, which 
affect the myelin sheath surrounding the axons, resulting in a disruption of nerve conduction 
(Chalk, 2007; Chiaravalloti & DeLuca, 2008; Mohr et al., 1999). The disease is one of the 
most common causes of neurological1 disability in young and middle-aged adults 
(Chiaravalloti & DeLuca, 2003; Miller & Leary, 2007), usually being diagnosed between the 
ages of 20 and 40 (Mohr, Hart, & Goldberg, 2003).  It affects women twice as often as men 
(Mohr et al., 1999) and has a prevalence rate of approximately 13 per 100,000 in South 
Africa (SA; Kurtzke, 2000; Rosati, 2001).   
MS is a complicated disease to diagnose.  However, a diagnosis of MS, as opposed to 
possible MS, according to the “McDonald criteria”, requires (a) the exclusion of other 
diseases that may simulate MS, and (b) objective evidence of at least 2 lesions or physical 
events involving different parts of the CNS that are indicative of MS, which last at least 24 
hours each and occur at least 30 days apart, or objective evidence, over the period of one 
year, of “insidious neurological progression suggestive of MS” (McDonald et al., 2001, p. 
124; Polman et al., 2011). 
 
                                                 
1 The term “neurological” is used in the MS literature to refer to both spinal, cranial and peripheral 
nerve involvement (e.g. optic neuritis) as well as brain involvement (e.g. white matter lesion load 
and/or atrophy). Therefore, in order to avoid confusion within this dissertation, the term “physical” 
will be used to describe the former and “cerebral” the latter. 
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Disease courses and/or sub-types. Once diagnosed, the clinical course of MS is 
variable and difficult to predict. Four clinical courses, or sub-types, are accepted today.  
The most common form, relapsing-remitting MS (RRMS) is characterised by clearly 
defined acute attacks, or relapses, which involve either the appearance of a new symptom or 
lesion, or the reappearance of a previous symptom or evidence of re-involvement of a 
previously affected part of the CNS. These attacks may remit with either full recovery or with 
residual deficit upon recovery.  There is a stable course, and a lack of disease progression, 
between attacks. Primary progressive MS (PPMS) does not present with relapses, and is 
rather characterised by a gradual, but continuous, progression of disease and disability from 
onset; either with or without occasional plateaus or remissions. Secondary progressive MS 
(SPMS) initially follows an RRMS course but is then characterised by progression, either 
with or without occasional relapses and remissions.  Although approximately 85% of patients 
begin with an RRMS course, many eventually progress to the SPMS sub-type.  Finally, 
relapsing-progressive MS (RPMS) is characterised by progression of disease and disability 
from onset, with clearly defined acute relapses, either with or without full recovery. Although 
similar to RRMS, in RPMS the periods between relapses are characterised by disease 
progression (Jones, 2011; Lublin & Reingold, 1996).  
 
The pathology of multiple sclerosis. Demyelination (i.e. an inflammatory response 
whereby the body’s own immune system attacks the myelin sheath surrounding the axons in 
the CNS), reactive gliosis (i.e. the formation of hard plaques or lesions at the site of 
inflammation), and atrophy (i.e. the loss of neurons and the connections between them) have 
traditionally been viewed as the main disease processes in MS (Jones, 2011; Rich et al., 2008; 
Schapira et al., 2007), and are routinely detected using conventional MRI techniques, such as 
T2 weighted images (Polman et al., 2011; Zivadinov & Bakshi, 2004a, 2004b). 
Demyelination and the destruction of oligodendrocytes (i.e. the brain cells responsible for the 
production and maintenance of the myelin sheath) result in a lack of neuronal insulation and a 
disruption of nerve conduction, causing a relapse or exacerbation of symptoms. This 
impairment in nerve conduction can be caused by either a thinning or complete loss of 
myelin, or the inflammatory processes associated with MS (Jones, 2011; Schapira et al., 
2007). Remyelination, along with a remission of symptoms, occurs up to a point, but repeated 
attacks, or a progressive disease course, can eventually lead to a cessation of this process, 
plaques being built around the damaged axons, or the remyelinated areas being re-affected by 
demyelination (Jones, 2011; Patrikios et al., 2006; Prineas, Barnard, Kwon, Sharer, & Cho, 
1993). As the disease advances, cutting, or transection, of axons also occurs, followed by 
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Wallerian degeneration (i.e. a process occurring after axonal transection resulting in axonal 
degeneration and loss) and this damage results in atrophy, mainly of the axonal regions (Rich 
et al., 2008; Schapira et al., 2007; Trapp et al., 1998). Thus, because all of the above disease 
processes primarily affect the axons, MS has traditionally been viewed as a subcortical, white 
matter disease (Ge, Law, & Grossman, 2005; Jones, 2011). However, developments in 
imaging techniques, which reveal more subtle abnormalities (Ge et al., 2005; Lazeron et al., 
2000; Rovaris et al., 2005), have identified additional disease processes affecting more than 
just the axons or subcortical white matter. Processes, such as the cutting or severing of 
dendrites (i.e. dendritic transection) and apoptosis (i.e. a process of programmed cell death 
whereby cells either commit suicide upon receiving a signal, or simply do not receive the 
signal to remain alive) particularly in the cortex (Jones, 2011; Peterson, Bö, Mörk, Chang, & 
Trapp, 2001), as well as damage to cortical, juxtacortical and deep grey matter structures 
(Bakshi, Ariyaratana, Benedict, & Jacobs, 2001; De Stefano et al., 2003; Lazeron et al., 2000; 
Pirko, Lucchinetti, Sriram, & Bakshi, 2007) and subtle damage to normal appearing grey 
matter (Davies et al., 2004; Oreja-Guevara et al., 2005; Rovaris et al., 2005), have also been 
demonstrated and reveal a more widespread picture of cerebral involvement. Despite these 
findings, however, MS predominantly affects the white matter and appears to have a 
propensity for the spinal cord, brainstem, cerebellum, optic nerve, corpus callosum, 
periventricular regions, and the white matter of frontoparietal regions (Barnard & Triggs, 
1974; Figved et al., 2005; Narayanan et al., 1997; Sperling et al., 2001). 
A basic understanding of the immunological disease processes in MS is also 
important.  White blood cells are central to the immune system and consist of B-cells and T-
cells. There are various kinds of each, but the helper T-cells are responsible for recognising 
the foreign (or in the case of MS, mistaken) pathogens and for producing cytokines (Boyce, 
1998), and are thus important in the inflammatory response. In MS, due to this response, 
there is an increase in cytokines, including interferons, tumour necrosis factor and 
interleukins; and tumour necrosis factor has, in particular, been related to the damage of 
oligodendrocytes and the myelin sheath, as well as disease exacerbation and progression 
(Horrobin & Bennett, 1999; Jones, 2011; Sharief & Hentges, 1991).  A process affecting the 
fatty acids in MS patients appears to occur concurrently and the resulting abnormal levels 
affect not only the immune system, but the neurons directly (Horrobin & Bennett, 1999). 
Polyunsaturated acids appear to decrease and are replaced by saturated and nonessential fatty 
acids in the plasma, red blood cells and adipose tissues (Holman, Johnson, & Kokmen, 1989; 
Horrobin & Bennett, 1999; Nightingale et al., 1990). This leads to a dysregulation of 
phospholipid-based signal transduction, which results in a break-down of the transmission of 
29 
 
the molecular signals that trigger a particular cell response (Horrobin & Bennett, 1999). As 
immunological processes have such a fundamental involvement in this disease, it is important 
to be aware of them and their possible involvement in the symptoms of MS. 
 
The sequelae of multiple sclerosis. Although MS appears to favour particular 
regions, it can affect any part of the CNS. Thus, it can produce a wide variety of symptoms 
relating to the domains of physical, cognitive, as well as those of mood, affect and behaviour 
(Finger, 1998; Jones, 2011). These will each be addressed individually below. 
 
Physical sequelae. Physical impairment is common in MS and damage to the CNS 
areas involved can result in a wide range of symptoms. Table 1, below, provides a 
comprehensive list of the physical symptoms of MS. 
 
Table 1 
The Physical Sequelae of MS 
Domain Symptom 
Visual Optic neuritis, diplopia, nystagmus, blindnessa 
Auditory Partial or transient loss of hearing, deafnessb 
Motor Limb weakness, paraplegia, spasticity, spasms, cramps, facial 
palsy, loss of dexterity, hyperreflexiac, seizuresb, dysphagiab, 
dysarthria, inability to control breathinga 
Sensory Proprioceptive loss, paraesthesias (including pins and needles, 
buzzing or tingling, electric shock sensations, partial or complete 
loss of feeling in limbs and/or face)a, dysthesias, hyperthesiasc, 
“useless hand syndrome”b 
Balance and coordination Ataxia, intention tremors, dysmetria, vertigo, loss of balancea, 
telekinetic tremor, dysrhythmiac 
Autonomic Hypothermia, paroxysmal atrial fibrillation, orthostatic 
hypotension, exercise-induced tachycardia, breathlessnessa b 
Bowel, bladder and sexual 
symptoms 
Urinary and faecal urgency, frequency and incontinence, 
constipation, erectile dysfunctiona 
Other Fatiguea, sleep disturbances, pain, headachesb 
Note. a = Jones (2011).  
b = Schapira et al. (2007). 
c = Rich et al. (2008). 
 
Cognitive sequelae. Cognitive impairment in MS has been well researched and is said 
to occur in approximately 45% to 65% of MS patients (Bobholz & Rao, 2003; Rao, 1995; 
Schulz, Kopp, Kunkel, & Faiss, 2006). It can occur early in the disease along with little or no 
physical disability (Rovaris et al., 2002; Schulz et al., 2006; Simioni, Ruffieux, Bruggimann, 
Annoni, & Schluep, 2007) but is more often present, or tends to worsen, with a progressive 
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course, longer disease duration, and increased physical impairment and cerebral involvement 
(Beatty, W., Goodkin, Monson, & Beatty, P., 1989; Heaton, Nelson, Thompson, Burks, & 
Franklin, 1985; Henry & Beatty, 2006). MS patients are also more likely to experience 
cognitive impairment than healthy controls (Amato, Ponziani, Siracusa, & Sorbi, 2001; 
Ruggieri et al., 2003), and patients with other non-CNS neurological diseases such as 
muscular dystrophy (Jambor, 1969; Surridge, 1969). Accordingly, cognitive dysfunction in 
MS is regarded as being a consequence of cerebral involvement, often of the white matter 
(Benedict, Carone, & Bakshi, 2004; Benedict, Weinstock-Guttman et al., 2004; Reischies, 
Baum, Bräu, Hedde, & Schwindt, 1988).  In line with this, the domains most commonly 
affected in MS, in order of most to least frequent, include the following (Amato et al., 2001; 
Comi et al., 1995; Foong et al., 1997; Ruggieri et al., 2003; Ryan, Clark, Klonoff, Li, & Paty, 
1996): 
 
 Attention  
 Information processing speed 
 Working memory (WM) 
 Verbal and visuospatial learning and memory  
 Verbal fluency 
 Visuospatial processing or perception 
 Abstract reasoning  
 Problem solving 
 
Left cortical deficits such as aphasias, apraxias, and agnosias (DeSousa et al., 2002; Jeffery, 
Absher, Pfeiffer, & Jackson, 2000; Kujala, Portin, & Ruutiainen, 1996), as well as RH 
cortical deficits, such as unilateral spatial neglect (Gilad, Sadeh, Boaz, & Lampl, 2006; Graff-
Radford & Rizzo, 1987), and/or difficulties with visuospatial construction (Asghar-Ali, 
Taber, Hurley, & Hayman, 2004), theory of mind (Banati et al., 2010; Ouellet et al., 2010) 
and emotion perception (Phillips et al., 2011) have also been noted in MS patients.  
 
 Neuropsychiatric sequelae. MS can also be associated with in a number of 
neuropsychiatric symptoms.  Similar to cognitive impairment, the majority of these are 
considered to result from cerebral involvement (Fermo et al., 2010; Joffe, Lippert, Gray, 
Sawa, & Horvath, 1987; Minden & Schiffer, 1990; Rabins et al., 1986; Rodgers & Bland, 
1996; Schiffer, Wineman, & Weitkamp, 1986).  In addition, many can occur both early 
(Arnett, Barwick, & Beeney, 2008; Fermo et al., 2010) and late (Jannsens et al., 2006; 
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McIvor, Riklan, & Reznikoff, 1984; Zorzon et al., 2001) in the disease course, either with 
(Baretz & Stephenson,1981; Figved et al., 2005; Zorzon et al., 2001) or without (Gilchrist & 
Creed,1994; Zorzon et al., 2001) physical disability, as well as occurring either with (Arnett, 
Higginson, Voss, Randolph, & Grandey, 2002; Gilchrist & Creed, 1994; Simioni et al., 2007) 
or without (Korostil & Feinstein, 2007; Krupp, Sliwinski, Masur, Friedberg, & Coyle, 1994) 
cognitive impairment.  Listed from most to least prevalent, the common disorders of mood, 
affect and behaviour include (Cummings et al., 2006; Jannsens et al., 2006; Joffe et al., 1987, 
Korostil & Feinstein, 2007; Patten, Svenson, & Metz, 2005; Schiffer et al., 1986; Simioni et 




 Bipolar mood disorder 
 Affective dysregulation (pseudobulbar palsy, pseudobulbar affect, pathological 




The final of the most recognised symptoms of mood, affect and behaviour in MS, and the 
focus of this review, is that of euphoria.  In the sections to follow, I shall present a review of 
the literature regarding these symptoms specifically within MS. Literature regarding the 
definitions, types of euphoria, and frequencies of those types will be presented first.  What is 
known about the disease and cognitive correlates of the euphoric symptoms will then be 
presented, followed by literature on the causes of the euphoric symptoms. 
 
Euphoria in Multiple Sclerosis 
Since the hallmarks of MS include physical impairments such as motor and sensory 
abnormalities, visual impairment, bladder dysfunction and debilitating fatigue (Rich et al., 
2008; Schapira et al., 2007), one may reasonably anticipate that people suffering from this 
disease would be likely to become depressed. However, although depression is a common 
neuropsychiatric symptom of MS, some patients appear cheerful, some optimistic about their 
recovery, and some unconcerned about their condition, claiming that they feel good (Cottrell 
& Wilson, 1926; Finger, 1998). This “happy state of mind”, a term coined by J. C. Morris in 
1868 (Finger, 1998, p. 249), refers to the euphoria experienced by a subgroup of patients with 
MS. However, the constructs of these symptoms are not as simple as they may appear, and 
32 
 
the history of research into positive mood, unawareness of deficit and (unrealistic) optimism 
in MS is fraught with substantially differing ideas concerning their definitions, the rate at 
which they can be found amongst MS patients, their clinical correlates and their causes.  
 
 Definitions, types and incidence rates of euphoria. Before one can investigate 
something, a thorough understanding of the object of investigation is required. The review 
below, therefore, focuses on the historical development of the constructs relating to euphoria 
and the ways in which they have been described and defined. 
 
 The definitions and types of euphoria.  Accounts of MS can be found dating back to 
the early 1800’s, but most were based on autopsies and described the cerebral pathology of 
the disease, and, in some cases, its sensory and motor symptoms. From about the 1830’s, 
however, descriptions of the emotional symptoms that accompany this disease began to 
appear. Before these can be discussed, it must be mentioned that no review of euphoria would 
be complete without highlighting the confusion between these symptoms and that of 
emotional lability, pathological laughing and crying and even bipolar mood disorder and 
mania. The difference between these symptoms was addressed at the beginning of the 
literature review, but there is often overlap and confusion of these concepts within the MS 
literature too. Thus, as the constructs are reviewed below, one may notice descriptions 
relating to these other symptoms being included in some definitions of euphoria and many 
authors present a picture of euphoria that includes quite clearly erroneous elements.  The 
history presented below, however, focuses as closely as possible only on the elements 
relating to euphoria and literature on mania, pathological laughing and crying, and emotional 
lability or incontinence is not presented. 
From as early as 1850 Wilhelm Valentiner noted the difficulty in evaluating the disease 
progression of MS patients who “den[y] their deteriorating condition and clearly 
overestimate… their abilities” (Finger, 1998, p. 242). William Moxon, in around 1875, 
echoed these concerns, but added a description of accompanying mood, by stating: 
The patients, who, as a rule, are cheerful and thankful for what is done on their 
behalf, are apt to declare themselves generally rather better, so that the report of 
the clinical clerk putting down their answers may read like a statement of 
continual good progress toward recovery.  But the general result has been that, 
after many months stay in the hospital, the poor people are found to have grown 




The work of Jean-Martin Charcot, the physician most credited with making the medical 
community aware of the characteristics of MS, then began to emerge. In a famous quote, he 
noted that:  
There is marked enfeeblement of the memory; conceptions are formed slowly; the 
intellectual and emotional faculties are blunted in their totality. The dominant 
feeling in the patients appears to be a sort of almost stupid indifference in 
reference to all things. It is not rare to see them give way to foolish laughter for 
no cause, and sometimes, on the contrary, to melt into tears without reason. Nor is 
it rare, amid this state of mental depression, to find psychic disorders arise which 
assume one or other of the classic forms of mental alienation (Charcot, 1877, pp. 
194-195). 
 
While one may notice descriptions of pathological laughing and crying in this excerpt, the 
“stupid indifference” to which Charcot referred is often portrayed as the first description of 
euphoria (see, e.g., Carone, Benedict, Munschauer, Fishman, & Weinstock-Guttman, 2005; 
Sherman et al., 2008). Interest into euphoric symptoms then increased and in 1878 Samuel 
Wilks noted that “patients with MS often seem happy and are much more likely to laugh than 
cry spontaneously” (Finger, 1998, p. 244). In 1886 Alfred Vulpian observed a “morbid 
optimism” amongst patients with MS (Surridge, 1969, p. 749), and in 1893 William Gowers 
reiterated Wilks’ notion of cheerful mood and noted, “an undue complacency and 
contentment, which, under the increasing disability, is distinctly unnatural” (Finger, 1998, p. 
245). Gowers also went on to say that although MS patients may not overtly state an 
improvement in their symptoms, they will exaggerate any remission or cessation of 
symptoms (Finger, 1998). In 1904, interest into these phenomena continued with a review by 
Eduard Müller noting that one would be more likely to witness euphoria than depression in 
MS patients and that these patients often lacked insight into their physical state (Finger, 
1998). However, these reports were still largely based on anecdotal case studies. 
 In the 1920’s, these early descriptions were expanded upon and investigated using 
larger sample sizes. In 1922, Sanger Brown and Thomas Davis conducted a study on the 
emotional symptoms of MS patients and described their patients as having elevated mood and 
a tendency to, “not think of their condition as serious, nor… seem deeply concerned about it” 
(Brown & Davis, 1922, p. 629).  They distinguished, however, between a “slight elevation of 
mood” and the “delusions of grandeur similar to those seen in patients with paresis… 
generally occur[ing] as a terminal stage [of MS] associated with considerable dementia” 
(Brown & Davis, 1922, p.630).   
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In 1926, Samuel Cottrell and Kinnier Wilson specifically studied euphoria amongst 
100 patients with MS.  They distinguished between three types and thereby provided by far 
the most comprehensive definition of euphoria.  They operationalised them as follows: 
(1) Euphoria sclerotica related to a state of emotional well-being, and was defined as 
“the mental state of cheerfulness, happiness, ease... in which the prevailing mood 
is one of serenity and cheerfulness”.  
(2) Eutonia sclerotica was used in the sense of a feeling of physical well-being, and 
was defined as feeling “physically well tuned up, [as though] the [patient] ‘could 
do anything’” and where patients “are not conscious of physical disability”.  
(3) Spes sclerotica, by contrast, referred more to a cognitive state, defined as “an 
optimism as to the future and the prospects of ultimate recovery which is out of 
place and incongruous” (p. 8). 
These constructs were viewed as separate symptoms that could occur independently 
of one another, and this distinction was maintained for a number of years until the focus of 
MS research began to shift. The cognitive, rather than affective, sequelae of MS began to 
receive attention and euphoria was dismissed as unimportant (Surridge, 1969).  In addition, 
Lord Brain, in 1930, emphasised the lack of research on disorders of personality, as well as 
other psychological and psychiatric symptoms of MS, such as hysteria.  As a result, these 
began to receive greater attention, and the few accounts of euphoria in MS that did surface 
during this time appeared to reflect this shift.  The euphoric patient was, for example, defined 
as having “an unusually attractive personality” (Langworthy, Kolb, & Androp, 1941, p. 243). 
Further, euphoria was defined as “the upper end of a continuum, characterized by a mood of 
optimism and exuberance that may have a hypomanic flavour… in the most severe cases, it 
may be associated with overt psychotic symptoms such as delusions” (Baretz & Stephenson, 
1981, p. 119), and, continuing with this manic reference point, as “a lesser degree of elation 
which does not impair the patient’s judgement” (Ron and Logsdail, 1989, p. 888).  These 
descriptions or definitions reflect ideas of personality disorders as well as of mood disorders 
such as mania and appear to focus only on positive mood, largely neglecting the ideas of 
optimism and unawareness of deficit. 
A great renewed interest in the affective sequelae of MS returned in the mid to late 
1990’s and this resulted in a growth of contemporary literature on euphoria. However, the 
loss of conceptual clarity that occurred during the shift of research focus appears to have 
endured and few contemporary researchers continue to recognise the distinction between 
euphoria sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica and spes sclerotica described so clearly by Cottrell and 
Wilson (1926), an omission that has been noted by others (see, e.g., Rabins, 1990; Sherman 
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et al., 2008).  Instead, there is a marked lack of clarity in the MS literature regarding what 
constitutes euphoria today.   
Some appear to amalgamate all three types into a single symptom.  This is evidenced 
by a number of recent reviews on the mood and affective disorders of MS which use all three 
of Cottrell and Wilson’s constructs in one sentence to describe the term euphoria. For 
example, Ghaffar and Feinstein (2007) define euphoria as, “an overly optimistic state of 
mental and physical well-being in the presence of significant neurologic disability” (p. 280). 
Although somewhat confused regarding eutonia, Rodgers and Bland (1996) describe 
euphoria as, “a persistent cheerfulness and optimism about the future despite awareness of 
disability” (p. 442). And, Minden (2000) even quotes Cottrell and Wilson in his definition of 
euphoria, but instead of differentiating between the types, states that euphoria is present 
under all three conditions.  
Others appear to have abandoned the ideas of both eutonia and spes sclerotica and 
describe euphoria in terms of positive mood alone. For example, Kesselring and Klement 
(2001) describe euphoria as “a type of mood characterised by inappropriate/inadequate 
serenity (in view of the patients’ physical disability)” (p. 182). 
Others still appear to acknowledge eutonia sclerotica but dismiss it (along with spes 
sclerotica) and measure only positive mood. For example, Diaz-Olavarrieta, Cummings, 
Velazquez, & de al Cadena (1999) define euphoria as an “unusual cheerfulness and lack of 
concern about disability” (p. 55), but measure it using only the Neuropsychiatric Inventory 
(NPI; Cummings et al., 1994), which solely asks informants about their loved-one’s mood.  
Still others appear to acknowledge both euphoria sclerotica and eutonia sclerotica 
(and at times spes sclerotica), but define and measure them in a way that is no longer the 
same as the classical descriptions of these phenomena. For example, Feinstein (2007) notes 
euphoric patients’ “fixed state of well-being”, their “conviction that all is well and that they 
will walk again”, but goes onto describe this as a “lack of insight” (p.75). This latter 
description relating to insight may have different connotations to the former descriptions of 
well-being.  Benedict et al. (2005) state that, “there is a sub-group of MS patients who are 
severely cognitively impaired yet cheery or indifferent to their circumstances, exemplified by 
the so-called euphoria sclerotica syndrome” (p. 32), substituting cognitive impairment for 
physical impairment. In addition, Benedict, Priore, Miller, Munschauer, and Jacobs (2001) 
state that euphoria “may be more accurately construed as a change in trait or character that 
includes rapid vacillations in mood (including anger, dysphoria, and euphoria), unrealistic 
optimism, denial, and/or inappropriate social behaviour” (p. 75) but somewhat astonishingly 
cite both Finger (1998) and Cottrell and Wilson (1926) as references for this statement, 
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despite a complete lack of mention of mood swings, anger or inappropriate behaviour in 
relation to euphoria within these articles. The same research group actually refer to the term 
euphoria sclerotica in a later article and call it “a syndrome characterized by euphoric mood 
state, social disinhibition, impulsivity, and emotional lability” (sic. Carone et al., 2005, p. 
574) and this time, but again without basis, cite Brown and Davis (1922), Cottrell and Wilson 
(1926) and Surridge (1969) as references for this. They confuse the terminology even further 
by suggesting that patient/informant discrepancies on cognitive testing and/or tests of 
personality change could be used as predictors of “euphoric behavioural disinhibition” 
(Carone et al., 2005, p. 574).  Here they are using patient/informant discrepancies as 
measures of unawareness, but instead of referring to the original domain of physical 
unawareness, they are referring to unawareness of cognitive and personality domains, thereby 
muddling the terminology related to eutonia sclerotica or unawareness.  They also state that 
these discrepancies can predict “euphoric behavioural disinhibition”.  Firstly, this equates 
“euphoric behavioural disinhibition” with the original euphoria sclerotica, but their term was 
coined by performing a factor analysis on items of the NPI within a sample of MS patients, 
which grouped euphoria, disinhibition, agitation and irritability in one factor.  This 
constitutes a different definition of this symptom than that of the original, again highlighting 
confusion of the terminology.  Secondly, this implies that eutonia (unawareness) and 
euphoria are one and the same thing, which is also a confusion of the original terminology. 
This group of researchers go onto say that patients with this symptom are characterised as  
“impatient, inconsiderate, and quarrelsome” which they say “resemble[s] the syndrome as 
described in the classic literature” for which they again reference the 1998 article by Finger 
(Fishman, Benedict, Bakshi, Priore, & Weinstock-Guttman, 2004, p. 354).  Since the 
definitions of euphoria within Finger’s (1998) review do not include any mention of MS 
patients being impatient, inconsiderate or quarrelsome, this further highlights confusion of 
the constructs.  
Therefore, not only does the distinction between the three classical euphoric types (in 
terms of them being regarded as separate and equally important symptoms) appear to have 
been lost by contemporary literature, but the way in which these symptoms are being 
described appears to have changed as well. 
Another aspect concerning the definition of euphoria warrants discussion: that is 
whether it is an objective or subjective phenomenon.  It has been noted that some euphoric 
patients appear happy and content when in fact they are subjectively very depressed (Baretz 
& Stephenson, 1981).  Surridge (1969) even noted that euphoric patients may report 
subjective feelings of positive mood and optimism, but when provoked, or confronted with 
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reality, these emotions sometimes become less intense or even disappear completely. One of 
the first accounts of a discrepancy between inner feelings and outward expression of emotion 
was given by Barbellion in 1919 who, as a sufferer of MS himself, noted that despite an inner 
feeling of sadness he presented an “unforced and quite natural” picture of “almost constant 
gaiety” (Finger, 1998, p. 245).  This poses a problem as some researchers, particularly the 
early ones, rely purely on objective observation of the patient’s appearance, while others 
question the patient and rely on their subjective report. Surridge (1969) investigated this 
conundrum in depth and, remarkably similar to the idea of implicit versus explicit awareness 
described in relation to anosognosia above (Jenkinson et al., 2011), presented four states of 
euphoria. In the mixed state, patients appeared objectively euphoric, but were subjectively 
depressed. Those diagnosed with slight euphoria were initially euphoric (both objectively and 
subjectively) when interviewed, but their mood disappeared when confronted with the reality 
of their condition and it did not return. In moderate euphoria, patients were euphoric until 
confronted or provoked; at which time the euphoric mood disappeared, but then returned 
when provocation was stopped. Finally, in the severe euphoria state, patients were 
objectively and subjectively euphoric and remained that way even after confronted with their 
reality. 
 
The incidence of euphoria in MS. Possibly even more controversial than the 
definitions of these symptoms, are the frequencies with which these symptoms can be found 
amongst patients with MS.  Dating back to 1877, Charcot’s famous description of the 
cognitive and affective sequelae of MS patients referred to “most of the patients” (Charcot, 
1877, p. 194); and Paul Hoffman, in 1904, stated that euphoria was a “characteristic feature 
of the mental state” of MS patients (Surridge, 1969, p. 749). In the 1870’s and ‘80’s, Wilk’s 
characterisation of MS patients also applied to “many patients” (Finger, 1998, p. 244), and 
the accounts of Moxon and Gowers, of the mood and optimism amongst MS patients, were 
“as a rule” and “especially frequent” (Finger, 1998, p. 245).  These early case studies gave 
the impression that euphoria was the predominant mood state of patients with MS, and 
although they often gave examples from particular cases, the authors did not readily state the 
total number of patients on which these assumptions about the frequencies of euphoria were 
based. The 1920’s saw larger sample sizes beginning to be reported, as well as the 
introduction of tests for syphilis which could mean the exclusion of these patients (who were 
likely to present with euphoria for non-MS reasons and confound the findings) and, hence, 
purer samples of patients with only MS (Reiser [1975] as cited in Baretz & Stephenson, 
1981; Surridge, 1969). However the earlier suppositions continued to be confirmed. Brown 
38 
 
and Davis (1922), for example, found 71% (10/14) of their MS patients with “mental 
symptoms” to be euphoric (p. 629); while Cottrell and Wilson (1926) found 63% (63/100) of 
their MS patients to be euphoric, 84% (84/100) to be eutonic (i.e. to have a sense of physical 
well-being) and 84% (84/100) to be optimistic about their future.  In 1938, in a review of the 
literature, David Arbuse also emphasised the high rates of euphoria that had been found until 
that point by stating that, “by far the most constant emotional state is one of euphoria or mild 
elation… It is present in the great majority of cases” (Finger, 1998, p. 248). By the 1940’s the 
perception remained the same. Orthello Langworthy and colleagues, for example, wrote this 
of the MS patient’s personality: it “is dependent largely upon the euphoric outlook and 
emotional instability which are so frequently encountered in the disease”, and, in their review 
of clinical notes found at least 26 of 199 (13%) of patients where the euphoria was so marked 
that a note was specifically made in the medical folder (Langworthy et al., 1941, p. 243). In 
1943, Carl Sugar and Raymond Nadell attempted to replicate the earlier findings of Cottrell 
and Wilson and found euphoria sclerotica in 53.6%, eutonia sclerotica in 50%, and spes 
sclerotica in 50% of their 28 MS patients (Sugar & Nadell, 1943). Although slightly lower 
than the original frequencies found by Cottrell and Wilson (1926), they still found high 
incidences of the euphoric types and maintained it was the prevailing mood state amongst MS 
patients (Sugar & Nadell, 1943).  
In about the 1950’s, however, things began to change. Braceland and Giffin, in 1950 
for example, reported that euphoria was rare and found it in only in 10% of 75 patients (Pratt, 
1951; Rabins, 1990). Thygesen contradicted this in 1953 by reporting that 77% of his 60 
patients experienced euphoria (Rabins, 1990). But then Gall and colleagues, in 1958, again 
only reported four out of 40 patients (10%) as being euphoric (Salguero, Itabashi, & 
Gutierrez, 1969). Surridge (1969) then found rates of 25.9% (28/108) for euphoria, and 
41.6% for eutonia (45/108). Baretz and Stephenson (1981) and Ron and Logsdail (1989) 
again echoed Braceland, Giffin and Gall et al. and found “elevated mood” and “elation” in 
only 10% (4/40) and 13.8% (16/116) of their MS patients respectively. But then, Rabins and 
colleagues measured both euphoria and eutonia and found either one or both of these in 48% 
(42/87) of their MS sample (Rabins et al., 1986). 
Modern rates of euphoria, in contrast, are far less variable and the symptom is 
considered to be dramatically less common than in the literature described above. In fact the 
majority of authors report a frequency of between 9% and 13%, even though slightly higher 
rates have been found by some contemporary researchers.   
All of the contemporary studies determined their incidence rates by using the NPI and 
refer to positive mood or euphoria sclerotica alone.  With specific reference to the main 
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contemporary studies investigating frequency of euphoria in MS, Figved et al. (2005) found 
euphoria in 4.7% of their sample of 86 MS patients. Diaz-Olavarrieta et al. (1999), found a 
frequency of 13%, within a sample of 44 MS patients. And, Fishman et al. (2004) found 
euphoria, in terms of the NPI, to be present in 14.6% (11/75) of MS patients, but considered 
their euphoria/disinhibition factor, which they demonstrated in only 9% of their sample, to be 
more representative of euphoria sclerotica.  
 
 The correlates and causes of euphoria in MS. The review above focussed largely 
on the development of the constructs relating to euphoria.  While this is important for our 
understanding of what the concepts of euphoria refer to, the symptoms themselves, as well as 
their correlates and causes are also of interest. 
 
 The correlates of euphoria. Early accounts such as those of Morris and Seguin in the 
late 1800’s, referred to a positive state of mind even after the disease had progressed and the 
patients were severely disabled (Finger, 1998).  This demonstrates that the mood persisted 
with a longer disease duration, but does not address the issue of when it began. Other early 
descriptions are equally vague, but information regarding the disease correlates of euphoria 
can be found from about the 1920’s when more scientific investigations began to be 
conducted. Perhaps the first is that of Cottrell and Wilson (1926) who believed that (a) 
euphoria sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica and spes sclerotica could occur independently of one 
other, and (b) the three euphoric constructs could occur independently of the clinical type of 
MS, disease duration and/or disease severity, with these symptoms often preceding physical 
symptoms, or occurring early on in the disease course. Later, in the 1940’s Sugar and Nadell 
appear to have agreed with the idea of euphoria occurring early in the disease course as they 
believed that the longer disease duration of their sample (10.5 years versus 6.6 years in that of 
Cottrell and Wilson’s) accounted for the lower frequencies found within their sample (Sugar 
& Nadell, 1943). Had they believed that euphoria correlated with advanced disease, they 
would have expected a higher frequency within their sample.  Further, Borberg and Zahle, in 
1946, agreed that euphoria could occur early on, but went even further to say that it could 
change or even disappear as the disease progressed (Finger, 1998). 
During this same time, contrasting opinions, however, also existed. For example, in 
1924 Claude considered euphoria to be a relatively common feature of advanced MS (Finger, 
1998), and Langworthy et al. (1941) and Surridge (1969) noted that it seemed to occur more 
readily in patients with severe physical disability.  Later, Rabins et al. (1986) found it to 
correlate with a progressive course and greater physical disability.  
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Disagreement also existed surrounding the cognitive correlates of euphoria. Cottrell 
and Wilson (1926), for example, believed that the euphoric types did not co-occur with 
cognitive decline, finding intellectual deterioration in only 2% of their MS sample. Similarly, 
Sai-Halász, in 1956, only found intellectual deterioration in 10%, but emotional changes in 
nearly 50% of his MS sample and concluded that the two did not necessarily co-occur 
(Surridge, 1969). But cognitive impairment was measured as a patient’s insight into changes 
in mood by Cottrell and Wilson (1926) and by the use of the Rorschach test by Sai-Halász 
(Surridge, 1969), neither of which may be appropriate measures of cognition, particularly (in 
the case of Cottrell and Wilson [1926]) when one considers that unawareness is a symptom of 
MS patients. 
Meanwhile, during this time, experiments employing better measures of cognition, 
including tests of memory, logic and mathematics, were being conducted; and Brown and 
Davis, Runge, Ombredane, as well as Braceland and Giffin all found that euphoria was 
present predominantly in cognitively impaired MS patients and concluded that it was most 
likely secondary to cognitive deterioration (Brown & Davis, 1922; Finger, 1998; Surridge, 
1969). Here again, however, problems emerge as Ombredane has been criticised for being too 
willing to link affective and cognitive symptoms, and for possibly overestimating the extent 
of cognitive impairment in his sample by including fatigue as a cognitive deficit (Finger, 
1998). 
Later, agreement appears to occur again and Surridge (1969) and Rabins et al. (1986) 
both found evidence of greater cognitive impairment amongst euphoric as opposed to 
noneuphoric MS patients.  We know that discrepancies between classical and contemporary 
researchers existed, but it is clear from the above that disagreement regarding the disease and 
cognitive correlates of euphoria occurred even between classical researchers. 
In contrast to a number of the classical investigators, today’s authors are not of the 
opinion that euphoria can occur independently of clinical course or severity, and, also in 
contrast to classical times, are in general agreement.  The majority appear to concur that it 
correlates with (a) a progressive course (Diaz-Olavarrieta et al., 1999; Fishman et al., 2004), 
(b) advanced physical disability (DeSousa et al., 2002, Diaz-Olavarrieta et al.,1999), and (c) 
significant cognitive involvement or dementia (DeSousa et al., 2002; Diaz-Olavarrieta et 
al.,1999; Fishman et al., 2004), characterised by executive dysfunction (Benedict et al., 2001; 
Benedict, Carone et al., 2004; Fishman et al., 2004).  
 
The causes of euphoria in MS.  While some classical authors, for example Braceland 
and Giffin, as well as the psychoanalyst Jelliffe, believed that euphoria could be due to 
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psychological factors, most agreed that these symptoms were the result of organic brain 
involvement (Brown & Davis, 1922; Cottrell & Wilson, 1926; Langworthy et al., 1941; 
Rabins et al., 1986; Surridge, 1969). Further evidence for this emerged in the 1950’s when 
researchers began to include control groups. Surridge (1969), for example, found that patients 
with MS were significantly more likely to be euphoric than patients with muscular dystrophy 
(a degenerative muscular disease that does not affect the brain).  
However, many of the early studies did not have the means to include measures of 
cerebral involvement, such as lesion load and atrophy, which are popular today, and Cottrell 
and Wilson (1926) even conceded that “the study of emotions has not advanced far enough to 
enable any conclusions to be drawn... that are other than purely hypothetical” (p. 28). But this 
did not stop them from hypothesising.  Dercum, in 1912 for example, put forward a rather 
broad suggestion: that the euphoria in his patient was the result of lesions in both the cortical 
and subcortical areas of the frontal, temporal and parietal lobes (Salguero et al., 1969). Also 
early on, Barbu purported meningofibrosis and cortical atrophy as the underlying 
mechanisms of these types of symptoms (Sugar & Nadell, 1943). Cottrell and Wilson (1926) 
proposed a disruption or dysfunction of periventricular cortico-thalamic pathways, as well as 
some sort of invasion of the paleothalamus (which they believed was responsible for 
emotional expression), perhaps early on by an MS-related toxic process. Langworthy et al. 
(1941) suggested that euphoria may be the result of an interruption of the subcortical white 
matter (projection fibres) of the frontal lobes. Later, Rabins et al. (1986) found euphoria to 
correlate with enlarged ventricles, Reischies et al. (1988) with periventricular and frontal 
lesions, and Ron and Logsdail (1989) found it to correlate with a greater total lesion load. 
Lesion load and atrophy were therefore ideas that dominated the recent literature; however 
there was some disagreement as to the location of these processes. 
Although it is now known that manic and euphoric episodes can also result from 
corticosteroid use (Brown, Khan, & Nejtek, 1999; Patten & Neutel, 2000), euphoria in MS 
today (as a persisting disorder of mood or affect and not simply a transient state related to 
treatment) is still found to occur with cerebral, and not spinal cord, involvement (Diaz-
Olavarrieta et al., 1999). Therefore, in agreement with classical authors, it is typically 
regarded as an organic symptom of MS, and not a psychological reaction to the disease 
(Rodgers & Bland, 1996; Sanfilipo, Benedict, Weinstock-Guttman & Bakshi, 2006), although 
this assumption has not been proven unequivocally since the cause remains unknown. 
Modern authors also still report findings regarding both lesions and atrophy; however, instead 
of differing views regarding the location of these elements, they more often agree that 
euphoria is correlated with (a) periventricular atrophy and enlarged ventricles (Benedict, 
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Carone et al., 2004; Diaz-Olavarrieta et al., 1999), and (b) frontotemporal lesion load on MRI 
(Diaz-Olavarrieta et al., 1999). In addition, due to its correlations with executive dysfunction, 
some have proposed that euphoria may be due either to a disconnection of the frontal cortex 
and limbic structures by white matter lesions (Fishman et al., 2004), or to grey matter atrophy 
of the frontal cortex (Fishman et al., 2004; Sanfilipo et al., 2006). 
 
Rationale, aims and hypotheses 
 
It is clear from the review of the literature presented above that large discrepancies exist in 
the literature between classical and contemporary researchers concerning the definitions, 
types, frequencies and correlates and causes of the euphoric symptoms.  The main aims of 
this study were therefore to address these obscurities and investigate the constructs of these 
symptoms, as well as to investigate the symptoms themselves within an adequate sample of 
MS participants.  
I attempted this by dividing the research into three parts. The first part related to the 
definitions, types, and frequencies of euphoria, and investigated the constructs of the 
euphoric types by examining, amongst other things, some of the discrepancies in the 
literature.  The second part aimed to gain a deeper understanding of the euphoric types 
identified by part one, and investigated the demographic, disease and cognitive correlates of 
these symptoms.  Finally, the third part revolved around a very preliminary investigation of 
the causes of the euphoric types identified by this research, and comparisons were made 
between the MS participants and other patient control groups.  The rationales, aims and 
hypotheses for each of these parts are presented below. 
 
Part one.  Addressing discrepancies and defining euphoria 
Part one was concerned with the investigation of the constructs of the euphoric symptoms 
(i.e. positive mood, unawareness of deficit and optimism).  A thorough investigation of the 
literature (and its discrepancies) and comparisons between the most popular measures used 
were conducted in order to examine issues regarding the number of types of euphoria, the 
definitions of those types, and the frequencies of those types.  The rationale, aims and 
hypotheses related to part one are presented below. 
 
 Rationale for part one.  The marked differences in definitions, types, and incidence 
rates of euphoria between the classical and contemporary researchers beg the questions: Why 
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did these discrepancies occur?  Have they been incorrectly described?  Do we currently have 
the correct understanding of the constructs?  What is the real nature of these symptoms?  
The main way in which this study attempted to address these questions was to reinvestigate 
euphoria in terms of both the classical and contemporary view regarding these aspects.  
Firstly, it is important to note that the loss of the classical definition of three types of 
euphoria, and the apparent discrepancies between classical and contemporary definitions, 
does not appear to have resulted from an inappropriateness or demonstrated invalidity of the 
classical constructs, as the distinction between Cottrell and Wilson’s (1926) three euphoric 
concepts was maintained by authors such as Sugar and Nadell, Pratt, and Surridge for at least 
40 years after they were first created.  Thus, the classical definition may still be of value and 
worth including in an investigation of euphoria. 
With regard to the rationale, reinvestigating euphoria in terms of both the classical 
taxonomy and contemporary definitions may be important both in terms of the number of 
types of euphoria described, and also in relation to the ways in which those types are defined.  
That is, changing the description of these symptoms may (a) alter the actual symptoms 
elicited and the euphoria measured today may not be the euphoria first described so many 
years ago, and (b) have an impact on the frequencies of euphoria found.  For example, 
Cottrell and Wilson (1926) considered there to be three types of euphoria, described positive 
mood in terms of “cheerfulness, happiness, ease, serenity” (p. 8), and found high frequencies 
of this symptom amongst their sample.  In contrast, contemporary researchers typically report 
only one type, describe it in terms of a persistent and abnormally good mood (Cummings et 
al., 1994), and find low frequencies of between approximately 4.7% and 14.6% (Diaz-
Olavarrieta et al., 1999; Figved et al., 2005; Fishman et al., 2004).   
While various reasons for these discrepancies have been put forward, differences in 
operational definitions (Baretz and Stephenson, 1981; Finger, 1998; Minden & Schiffer, 
1990; Pratt, 1951; Rabins, 1990), the lack of objective, standardised measures of mood 
(Minden & Schiffer, 1990; Reischies et al., 1988), and different measurement instruments 
(Finger, 1998; Minden, 2000) may be the most relevant. If the way in which euphoria 
sclerotica is defined and/or measured today is more restrictive, it may account for the lower 
frequencies found today, and the demonstration of only one type. Conversely, approaching 
the investigation of euphoria from the perspective of the original definitions of these 
constructs (by Cottrell and Wilson, 1926) may result in larger frequencies being found, and 
more types of euphoria.  A change in definition also means that we are no longer looking for 
or measuring what was originally deemed to be euphoria sclerotica, and the classical quality 
of this symptom may have been lost, which is also important.  Thus, a re-investigation of the 
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symptoms, from both the classical and contemporary perspectives, may highlight important 
changes that may have occurred in the definition of these symptoms, as well as important 
characteristics regarding the constructs of positive mood, unawareness of deficit, and 
optimism that may, otherwise, have been lost.  Moreover, all this can now be done using 
modern research methodologies and technologies. 
 
Aims and hypotheses for part one. Given the above, the main aim of part one was to 
investigate the constructs of the symptoms in question to gain a deeper and clearer 
understanding of what they entail.  The specific aims and hypotheses of part one revolved 
around the following: 
 
Aim 1.  To investigate the discrepancies found in the literature between 
classical and contemporary authors.   
 
Proposition 1.  A change in the number of types of euphoria has occurred. 
Proposition 2. A change in definition has occurred and the euphoria measured today 
does not have the same quality as that of the classical literature. 
Hypothesis 1. Using different measurement instruments (based on different 
definitions) will influence the incidence rates of euphoria found. 
Hypothesis 2. High rates of euphoria will be replicated using the classical measure. 
Hypothesis 3. Low rates of euphoria will be replicated using the NPI. 
 
Aim 2. To investigate the constructs of euphoria from a modern perspective, using 
measures other than that of Cottrell and Wilson (1926) or the NPI. 
 
Hypothesis 4.  More than one type of euphoria exists. 
Hypothesis 5. The incidence rates of euphoria found using these measures will be 
higher than those demonstrated today. 
 
Part two.  Describing and predicting positivity and unawareness 
Part two was concerned with gaining a deeper understanding of the actual euphoric 
symptoms, within an MS population.  The euphoric types identified by part one were 
described in more depth, and the ability to predict which MS participants might present with 
these types was investigated via an examination of the disease and cognitive correlates of the 




Rationale for part two.  Part two aimed to build on the understanding of euphoria 
gained in part one and to better define and predict these symptoms.  Therefore, in addition to 
expanding the description of euphoria, the disease and cognitive correlates of the euphoric 
types were investigated.  Similar correlates have been addressed by other recent research 
(see, e.g., Benedict et al., 2001; Diaz-Olavarrieta et al., 1999; Figved et al., 2005; Fishman et 
al., 2004; Sherman et al., 2008), but this study was different for two reasons.  The first was 
that euphoria in the current research was defined differently from that of other modern 
investigations of these symptoms, and was approached from the classical perspective using 
more inclusive types and definitions of euphoria.  This, therefore, provides a rationale for the 
inclusion of variables that have been investigated before, such as disease severity, disease 
course, duration of disease, and tests of executive functioning.  Secondly, following a review 
of the literature, a number of factors were found to be missing from previous research of the 
various correlates, and a more comprehensive investigation of the disease and cognitive 
correlates was therefore undertaken.  
A number of studies have investigated the disease correlates of euphoria, however 
few have included demographic variables in this investigation.  Gender, however, may be a 
relevant variable to include based on the findings of low rates of euphoria amongst 
predominantly female MS samples (Figved et al., 2005) and high rates of euphoria amongst 
male MS patients (Fishman et al., 2004).  Thus, gender was included in the current study as a 
potential demographic covariate. 
In terms of the disease correlates, in addition to the variables explored by other 
research, current disease state was included based on Rabins et al.’s (1986) suggestion that 
disease state may be a reason for the discrepancy between the frequencies of euphoria found 
by various researchers.  They were of this opinion based on the findings of Dalos, Rabins, 
Brooks and O’Donnell (1983) who demonstrated high rates (i.e. 90%) of emotional 
disturbances during exacerbating or progressing disease states, and a greater number of 
bodily complaints during remission.  Furthermore, because an increase in cytokine 
production occurs during relapses, and because elevated levels of cytokines have been 
associated with mood disorders (Horrobin, & Bennett, 1999), a link may be present between 
euphoria and exacerbations.  Therefore, it was thought that a more comprehensive 
investigation of the disease correlates of euphoria, in terms of the additional variable of 
current disease state, may be highly relevant and may aid considerably in our understanding 
of euphoria in MS. 
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Regarding additional cognitive variables, while most 21st century researchers have 
found that euphoria correlates with severe cognitive impairment (see, e.g., Benedict, Carone 
et al., 2004; DeSousa et al., 2002; Diaz-Olavarrieta et al., 1999; Fishman et al., 2004), most 
have measured cognitive impairment by assessing the well-known dysexecutive MS picture 
reviewed earlier in this section (i.e. the domains of attention, information processing speed, 
WM, learning and memory, verbal fluency, and abstract reasoning), and have neglected to 
investigate the possible contributions made by additional cortical involvement.  However, 
also as reviewed earlier in this section, grey matter involvement is increasingly being 
recognised in MS due to the advancement of MRI techniques (De Stefano et al., 2003; Pirko 
et al., 2007), and cortical deficits such as aphasia, apraxia, agnosia (DeSousa et al., 2002; 
Jeffery et al., 2000; Kujala et al., 1996) unilateral spatial neglect (Gilad et al., 2006; Graff-
Radford & Rizzo, 1987), as well as deficits in visuospatial construction (Asghar-Ali et al., 
2004; Beatty & Aupperle, 2002; Calabrese, 2006), and prosodic comprehension (Beatty, 
Orbelo, Sorocco, & Ross, 2003), have also been demonstrated in MS patients.  
Furthermore, grey matter atrophy has been found to correlate with the modern 
definition of euphoria (Benedict, Weinstock-Guttman et al., 2004; Sanfilipo et al., 2006), and 
euphoric mood has been demonstrated in other patient groups with cortical involvement such 
as Alzheimer’s disease, Wernicke’s aphasia and neurosyphilis (Reiser [1975] as cited in 
Baretz & Stephenson, 1981).  However, as far as I am aware, although measures of cortical 
executive functions have been included in past research, (see, e.g. Benedict et al., 2001; 
Fishman et al., 2004; Sherman et al., 2008), they have not specifically been differentiated 
from subcortical measures. Thus, a re-investigation of the euphoric constructs and the extent 
to which they correlate with cortical cognitive variables may contribute greatly to our 
understanding of these symptoms. 
In addition, of those authors above who do include, but do not particularly emphasise, 
cortical variables, few appear to differentiate between left and right hemispheric functioning.  
However, a number of the cortical deficits mentioned above are known to be related to RH 
involvement in other patient populations (e.g. unilateral spatial neglect [Gilad et al., 2006; 
Graff-Radford & Rizzo, 1987], visuospatial construction difficulties [Asghar-Ali et al., 2004; 
Beatty & Aupperle, 2002; Calabrese, 2006], and impaired prosodic comprehension [Beatty, 
Orbelo, Sorocco, & Ross, 2003]).   
The terminology used to describe the unawareness of deficit in today’s form of 
euphoria may also reflect slightly different processes to what was originally meant by eutonia 
sclerotica.  For example, phrases used in connection with ideas of eutonia sclerotica, such as 
“poor self-awareness” (Benedict et al., 2001, p. 74), and a “lack of insight” (Feinstein, 2007, 
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p. 75), have been found to correlate with executive dysfunction (Benedict et al., 2001), 
thereby “proving” an executive basis for euphoria. However, whilst these particular 
descriptions may refer to symptoms that are indeed moderated by executive dysfunction, the 
original descriptions, such as feeling “physically well tuned up”, feeling as if the patient 
could “do anything” and “not [being] conscious of physical disability” (Cottrell & Wilson, 
1926, p. 8) appear to be remarkably similar to the syndromes of anosognosia or 
anosodiaphoria for hemiplegia, which refer to a denial or unawareness, or an indifference to a 
physical deficit respectively (Amador et al., 1991; Devinsky, 2000; Jenkinson et al., 2011), 
and which are associated with damage to the RH (Devinsky, 2000; Jenkinson et al., 2011; Pia 
et al., 2004).   
Further, Surridge’s (1969) idea of there being different levels of euphoria that can 
disappear on provocation also resembles these syndromes.  Finally, damage to the RH has 
also been demonstrated to result in euphoric (and sometimes manic) mood change (Devinsky, 
2000; Gainotti, 1972; Starkstein et al., 1990), even though the valence hypothesis has largely 
been replaced now.   
Despite the above, as far as I am aware, RH impairment, based on cognitive testing, 
has not specifically been included in research on euphoria.  Thus, while I recognise that 
unawareness in MS may well be a different type of unawareness to that of anosognosia for 
hemiplegia, and not at all governed by damage to the RH, due to the emphasis on 
unawareness of physical deficits (as opposed to other types of unawareness) amongst this 
patient group, and to the additional apparent links to the RH, this aspect deserves attention 
and investigating the euphoric symptoms and the extent to which they correlate with RH 
impairment on neuropsychological testing may further contribute to our understanding of 
these symptoms. 
 
 Aims and hypotheses for part two. Given the above, the main aim of part two was 
to further describe and define, and to predict the euphoric types.  The specific aims and 
hypotheses of part two were to: 
 
Aim 1.  Further describe and define the euphoric types 
 
Aim 2. Investigate the demographic, disease and cognitive correlates of the euphoric 





Hypothesis 1. The demographic and disease correlates of the euphoric types will 
differ. 
Hypothesis 2. The cognitive correlates of the euphoric types will differ. 
Hypothesis 3.  The different types of euphoria will occur both early and late in the 
disease, with either little or severe physical disability 
Hypothesis 4.  At least one type of euphoria will correlate with gender 
Hypothesis 5.  At least one type of euphoria will correlate with current disease state 
Hypothesis 6.  At least one type of euphoria (most likely that of positive 
mood/euphoria sclerotica) will correlate with cortical involvement on 
neuropsychological testing 
Hypothesis 7.  At least one type of euphoria (most like that of unawareness/eutonia 
sclerotica) will correlate with RH involvement on neuropsychological testing 
 
Part three.  The causes of euphoria 
Part three was also concerned with an investigation of the actual symptoms themselves.  
Despite a long history of interest concerning this symptom, the cause of euphoria in MS 
remains unclear.  Thus, the MS participants were compared with control patients of other 
groups in order to attempt to investigate four hypotheses regarding the cause of these 
symptoms.  However, I must draw attention to a very important point: These investigations 
were preliminary and provisional as the sample sizes of the patient control groups were 
extremely limited.  Precise conclusions cannot be drawn from these analyses and any 
interpretations must be both made and received with caution.  Thus, this section (i.e. part 
three) formed a pilot investigation that was supplementary to the main analyses of this 
research. 
Two of the hypotheses investigated currently exist in the literature and were addressed 
in the literature review.  These refer to euphoria being (a) a psychological reaction to a 
disabling disease (which was tested using a group of patients with MG), and (b) the result of 
executive dysfunction (which was tested using a group of patients with TBI as a result of a 
motor vehicle accident [MVA]).  The second two hypotheses are new ideas.  These refer to 
euphoria being the result of (a) immunological disease processes of auto-immune diseases 
affecting the CNS and brain (which was tested using a group of patients with 
neuropsychiatric systemic lupus erythematosus [NP-SLE]), and (b) RH dysfunction (which 




 A psychological reaction. Although general agreement exists that euphoria in MS is 
the result of cerebral involvement and not a psychological reaction to a chronic disabling 
disease (see Rabins et al., 1986; Rodgers & Bland, 1996; Sanfilipo et al., 2006), this has yet 
to be demonstrated empirically.  To test this hypothesis a group of patients with MG (a 
chronic disease that does not affect the CNS) was included. 
MG is an acquired autoimmune disorder, with a fluctuating course, where 
autoantibodies interrupt the signalling process at the neuromuscular junction, situated where 
the peripheral nerves meet the muscles, and cause a weakening or failure of muscle 
contraction by the nerve impulses.  Sensory-motor deficits are therefore something MS and 
MG have in common, and MG is characterised by a progressive weakening of muscles during 
exercise followed by quick recovery when exertion is stopped (Cantor, 2010; Dönmez et al., 
2004; Wolfe, Meriggioli, Ciafaloni, & Ruff, 2012). 
In MG, the disease does not affect the CNS, and cognitive impairment is not generally 
regarded to be a feature (Bartel & Lotz, 1995).  Some cognitive impairment has been 
reported, but results have been mixed and often discounted due to inadequate sample sizes, 
the use of non-standardised neuropsychological tests, and a lack of control of confounding 
factors such as effects of sleep apnea, depression, medication use and so on (Paul, Cohen, 
Zawacki, Gilchrist, & Aloia, 2001). Paul, Cohen, Goldstein, and Gilchrist (2000) have also 
documented increased cognitive fatigue amongst MG patients which may lead to a 
misdiagnosis of cognitive impairment.   
Mood symptoms such as depression, anxiety and outbursts of rage and frustration are, 
however, common, although euphoria appears to be rare except as a reaction to corticosteroid 
treatment (Cantor, 2010; Kulaksizoglu, 2007). 
Given that MG patients have a similar chronic, debilitating disease of unpredictable 
course, but that does not affect the CNS or brain, it was thought that a thorough investigation 
of their mood, awareness and outlook may yield important findings concerning the cause of 
euphoria (i.e. is it related to a psychological reaction to a chronic debilitating disease, or is it 
MS specific?) and may contribute to our understanding of these symptoms. 
 
Executive dysfunction. Euphoria, in MS, is largely believed to be the result of 
executive dysfunction (Benedict et al., 2001; Benedict, Carone et al., 2004; Diaz-Olavarrieta 
et al., 1999; Fishman et al., 2004). To test this hypothesis, a group of patients with motor 
vehicle accident traumatic brain injuries (MVA TBIs) was included. While it is recognised 
that the mechanism underlying the damage in these two patient groups differs, this group has 
damage to similar neuroanatomical areas (i.e. subcortical white matter), resulting in a similar 
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dysexecutive syndrome to patients with MS and were considered to be the closest or best 
representative group by which to test this hypothesis. 
MVA TBIs most often involve diffuse damage to subcortical areas, due to the inertial 
forces of acceleration and deceleration which lead to widespread shearing or tearing of the 
axons (i.e. diffuse axonal injury) and, later, white matter atrophy (Bigler & Maxwell, 2012; 
Parizel et al., 1998).  Thus, the neuroanatomical areas most often affected in MVA TBI 
include the subcortical white matter (particularly that of the frontal lobe), the grey-white 
matter interface, the corpus callosum, periventricular areas, the basal ganglia and thalamus, 
the brainstem and cerebellum (Flashman, 2002; Parizel et al., 1998; Smith, Meaney, & Shull, 
2003).  
Due to the largely subcortical damage involved, and similar to MS, TBIs are also 
often associated with executive dysfunction, affecting domains such as attention, WM, 
concentration, learning and memory, poor organisation, planning, sequencing, and set 
shifting (Hartman, Pickering, & Wilson, 1992; Rao & Lyketsos, 2000).   
However, while they can present with cognitive anosognosia (Flashman, 2002; Toglia 
& Kirk, 2000), euphoria is not a prominent symptom, and symptoms of mood and behaviour 
in TBI are rather characterised by depression, mania, apathy, irritability, insomnia, anxiety 
disorders, psychosis, and disorders of behavioural control, sometimes leading to aggressive 
and violent behaviour (Fann, Katon, Uomoto, & Esselman, 1995; Rao & Lyketsos, 2000).  
Given that MVA TBI patients have similar cerebral involvement and similar cognitive 
impairment to patients with MS, it was thought that a thorough investigation of their mood, 
awareness and outlook, may yield important findings concerning the cause of euphoria (i.e. is 
it related to executive dysfunction in general, or is it MS specific?) and contribute to our 
understanding of these symptoms.  
 
 Immunological processes affecting the brain. Although euphoria, in MS, is 
generally believed to be caused by cerebral involvement, research tends to focus on the area 
of involvement rather than the type of involvement.  Issues of auto-immunity have been 
implicated in the MS disease process, in mood disorders such as euphoria, depression and 
bipolar mood disorder (Brietzke et al., 2009; Horrobin, & Bennett, 1999), as well as in 
unrealistic optimism (Segerstrom et al., 1998).  However, to my knowledge they have not 
been addressed in relation to euphoria in MS.  Furthermore, although considered to be rare 
and often associated with psychosis, euphoric mood has been demonstrated in systemic lupus 
erythematosus (SLE) involving the CNS (i.e. neuropsychiatric systemic lupus erythematosus 
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[NP-SLE]; Alao, Chlebowski, & Chung, 2009; Hanrahan, 1954). Thus, a group of patients 
with NP-SLE were included to test this hypothesis. 
SLE is a chronic, relapsing-remitting, multisystem auto-immune disease of the 
central, peripheral, and autonomic nervous system, which affects many different tissues and 
organs. A sub-type of this disease includes that of NP-SLE, which affects the CNS (Benedict, 
Shucard, J., Zivadinov, & Shucard, D., 2008; Nived, Sturfelt, Liang, & De Pablo, 2003). Like 
MS, the neuroanatomical location of the cerebral pathology in NP-SLE is predominantly 
related to white matter changes (Benedict et al., 2008; Covey, Shucard, J., Shucard, D., 
Stegen, & Benedict, 2012); however the causes of damage are very different and advanced 
disease results in types of cerebral pathology that are quite different from MS, including an 
increased risk for cerebrovascular disease (Benedict et al., 2008; Jennekens & Kater, 2002).  
While the physical symptoms of SLE, which can involve skin rashes and arthritis, are 
also different from MS, cognitive symptoms, which can occur in any form of SLE and not 
only NP-SLE, include a pattern of executive dysfunction similar to that of MS, affecting the 
domains of attention, judgement, WM, information processing speed, and, although with less 
consensus, the domains of learning and memory (Covey et al., 2012; Skeel, Johnstone, 
Yangco, Walker, & Komatireddy, 2000). Patients with NP-SLE also often experience 
psychiatric symptoms, including psychosis, anxiety disorders, and mood disorders, including 
depression, emotional lability, and, to a far lesser extent, bipolar mood disorder and euphoria 
(Alao et al., 2009; Benedict et al., 2008; Covey et al., 2012; Hanrahan, 1954).  
Given that NP-SLE patients have a similar chronic, debilitating auto-immune disease 
that does affect the CNS or brain, it was thought that a thorough investigation of their mood, 
awareness and outlook, may yield important findings concerning the cause of euphoria (i.e. is 
it related to cerebral involvement within an auto-immune disease or is it something specific to 
MS?) and may contribute to our understanding of these symptoms. 
 
Right hemispheric dysfunction.  An extension of investigating the cognitive 
correlates of euphoria in terms of RH functioning is that of testing this hypothesis in a pilot 
study of patients with damage to only the RH.  Earlier (see the rationale pertaining to the 
cognitive correlates of euphoria), it was suggested that RH involvement may, in some way, 
be implicated in euphoria.  However, to my knowledge, RH involvement has not been 
investigated in this regard. A group of patients with RH damage, as a result of stroke, was 
therefore utilised to test this. 
Much is known about the left hemisphere; however the RH largely remains a mystery. 
Patients with damage to this hemisphere, however, are known to present with symptoms such 
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as difficulties with spatial cognition and construction (Benowitz, Moya, & Levine, 1990), 
anosognosia or anosodiaphoria (Devinsky, 2000; Jenkinson et al., 2011; Pia et al., 2004), and, 
some believe, increased positive (or manic) mood (Devinsky, 2000; Gainotti, 1972; 
Starkstein et al., 1990).  Similar symptoms of cognition and mood have been demonstrated in 
patients with MS (Asghar-Ali et al., 2004; Banati et al., 2010; Gilad et al., 2006).  
Given that RH involvement has not been researched within MS and euphoria, but 
appears to perhaps have some relevance, it was thought that a thorough investigation of the 
mood, awareness and outlook of RH patients, may yield important findings concerning the 
cause of euphoria (i.e. is it related to RH dysfunction or is it something specific to MS?) and 
may contribute to our current understanding of these symptoms. 
 
Aims and hypotheses of part three. Given the above, the main aim of part three was 
to gain a deeper understanding of the cause of euphoria, even though these were pilot 
investigations that could only yield limited preliminary results.  The specific aims and 
hypotheses of part three were, therefore, to: 
 
Aim 1.  Preliminarily investigate the cause of the various types of euphoria in terms of 
the hypotheses regarding euphoria being (a) a psychological reaction to a chronic disease, (b) 
the result of executive dysfunction, (c) the result of an immunological disease process present 
in auto-immune diseases affecting the CNS, and (d) the result of RH dysfunction. 
 
Hypothesis 1. The MG group will demonstrate better cognitive functioning than the 
MS group. 
Hypothesis 2. The MVA TBI and NP-SLE groups will demonstrate similarly 
dysexecutive impairment to the MS group. 
Hypothesis 3. The RH group will demonstrate similar impairment to the MS group on 
tests of RH functioning, but will not demonstrate impairment on tests of executive 
functioning. 
Hypothesis 4. The euphoric types will not be as prominent amongst MG controls as 
amongst MS participants. 
Hypothesis 5. At least one euphoric type will be demonstrated at similar levels within 









This study mainly gathered quantitative information.  However, one of the questionnaires 
used (see the questionnaire of Cottrell and Wilson, 1926, [CWQ], described later under 
measurement instruments) gathered both open and closed ended questions which were 
analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively.  Therefore, both quantitative and qualitative 
methods were employed within an exploratory, quasi-experimental between-subjects and 
cross-sectional design.  
The study made use of an exploratory design as it sought to increase our knowledge 
on euphoria (Neuman, 1994) and addressed the topic from a number of angles, presenting an 
inclusive investigative approach.  It was quasi-experimental because existing groups of 
predefined disease types were utilised. Furthermore, it was cross-sectional in design as data 
was collected, between January 2012 and November 2013, from participants of different ages 
and compared with one another instead of following same participants over a longer period as 
is the procedure in longitudinal research.  This was done to examine what currently exists, 
rather than to observe a change, and because it was more time-efficient (Brink, 2006).  
 
Procedure 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Cape 
Town (UCT; Faculty of Health Sciences; see Appendices A1 and A2), and Research 
Development and Support (University of Stellenbosch) for Tygerberg Hospital (TBH) 
patients (see Appendix A3).    
 
Recruitment.  Non-probability sampling techniques were employed to recruit the 
participants and controls of this study.  Purposive sampling was used in order to select 
participants and controls with specific predetermined criteria, namely their disease, and 
controls with specific sociodemographic criteria (Wilson & Maclean, 2011). Further, 
convenience and snowball sampling were utilised to recruit participants and controls who 
were readily available for the study (Brink, 2006).  Those who took part in face-to-face 
interviews were recruited from the Western Cape (WC).  In order to access more participants, 
a number of additional participants were recruited from the greater SA, predominantly 
residing in the WC, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. 
Participants and controls were recruited from the databases of private neurologists and 
public hospitals (such as Groote Schuur Hospital [GSH] and TBH) in the WC, as well as via 
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Facebook and e-mail messages sent by Multiple Sclerosis South Africa (MSSA), a non-
governmental organisation, the MG Facebook website, the Brain Injury Group, and private 
neuropsychologists in the WC.   
A number of additional avenues were explored to increase the size of the population 
from which the participants were recruited.  However, neurologists in private practise were 
unable to assist with the recruitment of the patient control groups, and those at GSH were 
concerned about research fatigue of patients, or did not have the resources to assist with 
additional recruitment of patients.  The Muscular Dystrophy Foundation was also contacted, 
however they did not have any suitable patients and could not identify any additional 
appropriate foundations.  Furthermore, no additional support groups for the patient groups 
could be found via Facebook or other hospitals such as the Panorama Medi-Clinic or 
Constantiaberg Medi-Clinic.  A number of organisations and medical health practitioners 
were contacted with reference to the TBI group.  These included the Panorama Memory 
Clinic, Cape Mental health, Community Mental Health and Psychiatry, the Western Cape 
Rehab Centre, Lentegeur Hospital, and a variety of neuropsychologists, occupational 
therapists, speech therapists, and road accident fund attorneys.  However, none of these 
organisations or practitioners were able to assist. 
 
Sample.  One hundred MS participants and 100 HCs were recruited for this study.  A 
number of patient control participants were also recruited to address specific, but very 
preliminary, research questions.  As addressed in the section pertaining to the rationale and 
aims of part three, 20 MGs were recruited with the aim of investigating the hypothesis that 
euphoria in MS is a psychological reaction to a disabling disease; 19 MVA TBIs were 
recruited in relation to the hypothesis that euphoria in MS is the result of executive 
dysfunction; 10 NP-SLE were recruited to investigate the hypothesis concerning the 
immunological contributions to euphoria in MS; and 10 RH for the hypothesis concerning the 
contributions made by RH dysfunction to euphoria in MS.  All required a confirmed 
diagnosis of their respective disease or condition, and the MVA TBIs and RHs were required 
to have experienced their brain trauma at least one year prior to involvement in this study, to 
allow for additional swelling (that may confound the results) to subside (Sbordone, Liter, & 
Pettler-Jennings, 1995).  No distinction was made regarding the severity of the TBI, or the 
neuroanatomical cite of the RH damage as this would have resulted in very small sample 
sizes per group.  Due to the limited number of patients available, exclusion criteria were not 
imposed on the abovementioned participants and were rather noted and controlled for 
statistically.   
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HCs were matched to the MS participants on the key sociodemographic variables of 
gender, age, highest level of education, and income, and these formed the inclusion criteria 
for this group.  This group was included in order to better interpret the performance of the 
MS participants on tests that have been developed and standardised on populations of 
developed countries such as the United Kingdom and United States of America, as culture, 
language, and level of education, can influence performance on neuropsychological tests 
(Alcock, Holding, Mung’ala-Odera, & Newton, 2008; Roos et al., 2010).  HCs were excluded 
from the study should they have experienced any of the following: 
 A current or past infectious, immunological or neurological disease (e.g. human 
immunodeficiency virus [HIV]/acquired immune deficiency syndrome [AIDS], 
meningitis, Addisons disease, Huntington’s disease, and Parkinson’s disease) 
 A history of other brain injury (e.g. brain tumour, head injury, stroke, epilepsy, or 
near drowning/heart attack due to their hypoxic/anoxic effects on the brain)  
 A history, or current diagnosis of psychiatric disorder 
 A history of developmental disorder or delay (e.g. attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, learning disability) 
 A history, or current abuse of alcohol or other substances 
 
Data collection. Data collection occurred between June 2012 and November 2013.  
All participants and controls were first contacted by someone in the medical field (or a family 
member or friend in the case of the HCs) and told about the research. Once verbal consent 
was attained, I contacted them and further explained the study, checked exclusion criteria (for 
HCs), and invited them to take part.  Face-to-face interviews took place in (a) the homes of 
the participants, enabling participants to feel more relaxed and less inconvenienced (Neuman, 
1994; Smith, Harré & Van Langenhove, 1995), and alleviating travelling difficulties for 
physically disabled participants; (b) the neuropsychology office (for some MS, HC and MVA 
TBI participants); (c) an office in the Rheumatology Clinic at GSH (for some NP-SLE 
participants); (d) an office in the Neurology department at TBH (for some MG participants); 
or (e) a quiet office, or boardroom, in the workplace of the participants (for some HCs).  
Participants were given, or sent, an information sheet and written (informed) consent, 
pertinent to their group, was obtained (see Appendix B1 and B2). One MVA TBI participant 
was identified by his guardian as being unable to provide informed consent.  Thus, consent 
was obtained from his guardian (see Appendix B2), and assent was obtained from the 
participant (see Appendix B3).  Participants were assured that they could withdraw from the 
research at any time without experiencing any negative consequences. 
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All participants were questioned regarding the sociodemographic, medical and 
disease/condition specific information.  All participants also completed the euphoria 
questionnaires described below. A subset of participants underwent cognitive testing, all of 
whom completed the tests in the same order, structured specifically to maintain the 
participants’ attention and limit anxiety and (to as great a degree as was possible) fatigue, by 
administering more complex measures, interspersed by easier, less anxiety-provoking 
measures. 
Visual representations of the final samples, as well as the composition of their 





Procedure for MS Participants 
 
61 MS participants recruited from we 
1 
Contacted for an interview including: 
COGNITIVE TESTS AND EUPHORlA QUESTIONNAIRES 
(in person interview) 
1 withdrew: 
work and time constraints 
INFORMED CONSENT OBTAINED: 
60 interviews proceeded 
55 MS participants recruited from anywhere in SA 
1 
Contacted for an interview including: 
EUPHORlA QUESTIONNAlRES ONLY 
(interview via e-mail) 
13 did not reply 2 excluded: 
following initial contact misdiagnosed 
INFORMED CONSENT OBTAINED: 
40 interviews proceeded 
N ~ 100 (EUPHORIA QUESTIONNAIRES) 
Sub-sample (n ~ 60) cognitive testing 
58 
 
Figure 2  
Procedure for All Control Participants 
 
36 HCs, 10 MGs, 10 MVA IBIs, 10 NP-SLEs, 
10 RHs recruited from we 
1 
Contacted for an interview including: 
COGNITIVE TESTS AND EUPHORIA QUESTIONNAIRES 
(in person interview) 
1 He withdrew: 
work and time constraints 
INFORMED CONSENT OBTAINED: 
35 HC, 10 MG, 10 MVA IBI, 10 NP-SLE, 
10 RH interviews proceeded 
69 HCs, 11 MGs, 10 MVA TBIs recruited from anywhere in SA 
1 
Contacted for an interview including : 
EUPHORIA QUESTIONNAIRES ONLY 
(interview via e-mail) 
~ \ 4 Res, I M G did not reply 
following initial contact 
I I\1V A TBI w ithdrew due to 
death in the family 
INFORMED CONSENT OBTAINED: 
65 He , 10 MG, 9 MVA TBI interviews proceeded 
N ~ 100 HC, 20 MG, 19 MVA TEl, 10 NP-SLE, 10 RH 
(EUPHORIA QUESTIONNAIRES) 




Both quantitative data, which was typed or written down, and (supplementary) qualitative 
data for the MS participants, which was either tape recorded or written down, was collected. 
To ensure confidentiality, a coding system was used whereby all participants’ names were 
removed from their testing information and only a letter and number was used. Where 
excerpts were used to qualitatively describe the nature of the euphoric MS participants, any 
identifying data was changed or removed. All information from each interview and 
assessment was kept in a locked cupboard in the home of the researcher or on a password 
protected computer and was not be available to anyone other than the researcher. Besides the 
time invested, there were no known risks or costs for the participants. If a participant was 
feeling fatigued, breaks and refreshments were given. 
Benefits to participation, for all participants except the HC, included receiving a 
pamphlet, (see Appendix C1 for an example pamphlet) containing information on the 
common neuropsychological symptoms of each disease or condition, as well as feedback (see 
Appendix C2) following participation.  All participants were also made aware that their 
participation would benefit the scientific community and increase our understanding about 
the cognitive and mood/affective symptoms of MS.   
 
Participant characteristics 
The characteristics of each of the control groups will be described in the relevant results sub-
section in which they appear so as to orientate the reader during the appropriate sub-section 
rather than describe all groups upfront.  However, relevant sociodemographic characteristics 
of the MS participants are represented in Table 2 as the majority of the results of this 
dissertation centre around this group. For the full list of group characteristics, see Table D1, 





Table 2  










Sociodemographic characteristic (n = 60) (n = 40) (n = 100) 
Gender – Male:Female 8:52 6:34 14:86 
Age 43.35 (11.48) 46.20 (10.61) 44.49 (11.17) 
     Range 19-72 26-64 19-72 
Race/ethnicity – White:Coloured2/Indian 34:26 37:3 71:29 
Educationa 13 (1.69) 13.45 (1.58) 13.18(1.65) 













Informants    
     Spouse/partner:Family member: 
     Good friend 
28:21:11 31:5:4 59:26:15 
     Living with participant    
          Yes:No 44:16 35:5 79:21 
Note. Categorical data are presented in ratios. The data on age, education, and income are presented as 
means with the standard deviations in parentheses, then minimum to maximum ranges below.  
a = Highest level of education obtained, presented in years; it excluded pre-school and grade R and 
presumed a certificate to be a one year course, a diploma to be a two year course, and capped 
“degree” at three years. 
b = Combined monthly household income. 
 
Two points of interest are that (1) although high numbers of female participants were 
expected, as MS is twice as prevalent amongst women as men (Mohr et al., 1999; Mohr et al., 
2003), 86% of the 100 MS participants were female; and (2) in SA, MS is considered to be 
rare amongst the black, Coloured and Indian communities (Dean & Kurtzke, 1971; Dean et 
al., 1994), yet 29% of the MS group was Coloured or Indian.  
The MS participants were also asked if they had ever been diagnosed by their doctor 
with a variety of medical conditions, or incidents, as well as any psychiatric disorders that 
could impact on neuropsychological functioning.  As mentioned, although excluding 
participants based on these conditions would have been ideal, due to the scarcity of MS 
patients, and to the co-existing nature of many of these conditions with MS3, these medical 
                                                 
2 In South Africa, the term “Coloured” refers to individuals with a mixed ancestry of both black African and 
white/Caucasian. 
3 MS patients have an increased risk for other medical conditions either due to the neurological involvement or 
the auto-immune nature of the disease. These can include, for example, other auto-immune diseases, seizure 
disorders or epilepsy, vascular disease and stroke (Christiansen, 2012; Olafsson, Benedikz, & Hauser, 1999; 
Somers, Thomas, Smeeth, & Hall, 2009). 
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details (see Table 3) were not used as exclusion criteria but rather noted and controlled for 
statistically. 
Table 3  
The Medical Characteristics of the MS Participants 








Medical characteristic (n = 60) (n = 40) (n = 100) 
Other neurological/ immunological 
disease 
   
     Other auto-immune disease 3 5 8 
     Meningitis/encephalitis 2 1 3 
     Tuberculosis 2 2 4 
     Malaria 1 1 2 
Other brain injury    
     Head injury 8 1 9 
     Brain tumour 1 - 1 
     Stroke 1 - 1 
     Epilepsy 2 - 2 
     Near drowning/heart attack/loss 
of  
     consciousness 
1 3 4 
Psychiatric disorder    
     Depression 15 7 22 
     Bipolar mood disorder 2 - 2 
Developmental disorder    
     Complications at birth 8 1 9 
     Attention deficit  
     hyperactivity disorder 
1 1 2 
     Learning disability 1 1 2 
     Delay in walking/talking 3 2 5 
Alcohol    
     Number of participants who  
     consumed alcohol 
30 27 57 
     Mean quantity (SD) 14.03 (15.54) 20.70.34 (25.00) 17.19 (20.84) 
     Range 1-60 1-90 1-90 
Marijuana 5 2 7 
Number of participants with a 
medical history that can affect 
neuropsychological functioning 
26 15 41 
Note. The data on quantity of alcohol (per month) are presented as means with the standard deviations 
(SD) in parentheses. 
 
Other concurrent auto-immune diseases included SLE, hypothyroidism, sarcoidosis, 
rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, antiphospholipid syndrome, rosacea, and Crohn’s disease. 
None of the tuberculosis or malaria noted were of the cerebral form.  In terms of other brain 
62 
 
injury, in four of the nine cases it was just a “bump to the head”, but included loss of 
consciousness in five. A number of conditions were thought to have been confused with an 
MS relapse.  These included one case of meningitis or encephalitis, one stroke, and one case 
of epilepsy.  Diagnosed psychiatric disorders were limited to depression in 22% and bipolar 
mood disorder in 2% of the MS sample (with 66.6% [16/24] of these disorders occurring post 
onset of MS symptoms). Complications at birth involved being born premature or having 
their cord wrapped around their neck.  Learning disabilities included only dyslexia. All 
participants had reached a high-school level of education and none reported having 
experienced any lasting effects from the incidents or conditions described above.  
Furthermore, no MS participant was deemed to abuse alcohol, however marijuana was used 
by 7% of the MS sample, regularly by some, in tea or “joint” form, but not within 48 hours of 
their being interviewed.  Medications taken by the MS group are addressed in the part two of 
the results section, where their consideration is more pertinent. 
 
Measurement instruments 
 Participant characteristics. Various sociodemographic details were recorded to 
describe the participants of the study. These included, but were not limited to (a) gender, (b) 
age, (c) race/ethnicity, (d) highest level of education, and (e) combined household income per 
month (for the full list, see Appendix E1).  
 A variety of medical questions were also asked.  Most of these formed part of the 
exclusion criteria for HC participants, and were noted for the patient groups.  Medical 
questions included, but were not limited to (a) a current or past infectious, immunological, or 
neurological disease such as HIV/AIDS or meningitis; (b) a history of other brain injury such 
as a brain tumour or stroke; (c) a history of diagnosed psychiatric disorders; and (d) a 
question concerning any other medical conditions (for full list, see Appendix E2). 
 
Disease specific measures. Disease information, in accordance with previous MS 
studies of mood and cognition (see, e.g., Heaton et al., 1985; Peyser, Edwards, & Poser, 
1980), were also obtained from the MS, MG, MVA TBI, NP-SLE, and RH groups. For the 
MS, MG and NP-SLE participants, these included: disease course or type (MS only), date of 
diagnosis, and current disease state (remission or relapse/exacerbation; see Appendices E3, 
E4, and E5). For the MVA TBI participants, these included: a brief description of what 
happened, where possible the Glasgow Coma Scale score at admission (usually obtained 
from the medical records), and the date of MVA TBI (see Appendix E6). For the RH 
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participants, these included a scan report or medical details (obtained from the medical 
records) of the type of stroke (see Appendix E7).  Information on diagnosis, disease course 
(MS, MG, NP-SLE), type and severity of brain injury (MVA TBI) and type/location of brain 
injury (RH) were confirmed with the appropriate neurologist, neuropsychologist or 
neurosurgeon. 
All participants, including HCs, were also questioned on their current medication use 
and asked whether or not they had undergone corticosteroid treatment within the last four 
weeks.  
 Much of the research investigating the correlates of mood and cognitive symptoms in 
MS includes Kurtzke’s Expanded Disability Status Scale (EDSS; Kurtzke, 1983) as a 
measure of neurological disability.  However, (a) due to time and cost considerations, (b) the 
fact that it was recommended that only a trained neurologist administer the test,  and (c) the 
fact that many researchers actually use it as a measure of physical disability, it was decided to 
rather include a scale of physical ability, which is described in-depth in the next section. 
 
 Questionnaires pertaining to euphoria. Both self-report and informant-report 
measures were used. These related to euphoria sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica and spes 
sclerotica; however depression was also measured as there are some discrepancies in the 
literature regarding outward versus inward euphoric feelings (see Surridge, 1969).   
For the informant measures (see Appendix F1), a loved-one or family member of each 
participant rated the MS participant on scales of euphoria/depression, optimism/pessimism 
and awareness/unawareness (created by myself) in order to obtain an objective view of these 
symptoms.  They also answered the questions of the Physical Ability Scale (PAS; physical), 
the Awareness Interview (AI; cognitive) and the NPI (mood/behavioural), described below, 
which were re-worded, where necessary, to make it clear that the informant was reporting on 
their loved-one’s deficits and not their own.  This was done for the purposes of determining 
patient/informant discrepancies on these measures.  
The self-report measures pertaining to euphoria (and depression) are also listed below. 
All participants and their informants were fluent in English, thus all questionnaires were 
presented in English. The majority of the measures originated in developed Western 
countries, and applying the measures to a multi-cultural context that is distinct from the 
Western culture may result in issues of applicability of the measures.  However, the majority 
of participants (or at least those from the MS and HC groups) were white/Caucasian and 
therefore, such issues not be as pronounced within this sample.   Where possible, cross-
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cultural applicability of the measures will, never-the-less, be described. 
 With specific reference to the three types of euphoria, the CWQ was, first and 
foremost, utilised as this was the measure first used in connection with the classical definition 
of euphoria. The measure most often used in contemporary research, the NPI, was also 
included. These measures were then supplemented with additional measures pertaining to 
each of the three constructs (euphoria sclerotica or positive mood, eutonia sclerotica or 
unawareness of deficit, and spes sclerotica or optimism). Each measure is discussed, 
alphabetically, below, and the specific use of the measures is depicted below that in Table 4. 
 
Awareness interview (AI). The AI4 (Anderson & Tranel, 1989) is a questionnaire, 
originally developed to assess awareness of deficit in stroke, dementia and head injury 
patients.  It consists of five specific questions, which are read out in full, pertaining to the 
cognitive domains of thinking, orientation, memory, language, and visual perception, as well 
as one question pertaining to motor impairments.  Participants are required to respond with 
one of three answers that equate to no impairment, mild impairment, or severe impairment.   
The additional questions pertaining to reason for hospitalisation and ability to return 
to work were removed as they were either not relevant to assess cognitive functioning, or 
were deemed inappropriate for the current study patient group.  The question relating to 
motor impairment was used only for the feedback form.  As is the accepted protocol in 
awareness research (Prigatano, Altman, & O’brien, 1990), both participants and informants 
were required to complete this questionnaire so that participant/informant discrepancies could 
be utilised in order to determine the participants’ awareness of their potential cognitive 
impairment.   
Inter-rater reliability of the standard AI is very high (Pearson r = .92; Anderson & 
Tranel, 1989).   Although developed in North America, the AI has been used in a study with 
predominantly African American participants with an average of 10 years of education 
(LaBuda and Lichtenberg, 1999), as well as in a study based in Israel (Hartman-Maeir, 
Soroker, Ring, & Katz, 2002) indicating its cross-cultural applicability.  
This measure was included based on its prior use among awareness of deficit research 
in MS (see Sherman et al., 2008), and because it was an appropriate measure of eutonia 
sclerotica. The dependant variable relating to the AI was defined via the discrepancy in terms 
                                                 
4 Please note that although I requested permission to reproduce this questionnaire, I never received a reply from 
S. W. Anderson and rather did not include a copy of it in the Appendix. 
65 
 
of the difference in score between the participants’ self-reports and the reports of their 
informants. Discrepancy scores could range from 0 to 10 where higher scores indicated 
greater unawareness.  
 
Beck depression inventory-fast screen (BDI-FS). The BDI-FS (Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 2000) is the most recent abbreviated version of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
and requires participants to provide self-reported answers to seven questions concerning 
symptoms of depression, independent of the features of medical illness, such as previous 
failure, self-dislike and self-criticalness. It is a four point scale measure, ranging from 0 to 3, 
with total scores ranging from 0 to 21.   
The BDI-FS has been found to have high correlations with both self (p < .001) and 
informant reports of depression/dysphoria (p < .01) amongst MS patients (Benedict, Fishman, 
McClellan, Bakshi, & Weinstock-Guttman, 2003), and has been used extensively within MS 
research (see, e.g., Beatty et al., 1989; Savettieri et al., 2004). It has also been used 
successfully in countries such as Botswana (Lawler et al., 2011), and low income 
communities of Pietermaritzburg in SA (Pillay & Sargent, 1999), indicating its 
appropriateness within the SA cultural context.  
The BDI is the gold standard amongst measures of depression for adults and 
particularly those in medical settings (Sharp & Lipsky, 2002) and was thus selected for 
inclusion to capture the level of depression amongst the various participant groups of this 
research. A shorter version was selected as, although it is important, depression is not the 
focus of this research.  This particular version was selected as it was designed to screen for 
depression amongst medical populations.  The dependant variable relating to the BDI-FS was 
defined by the total score, with higher scores indicating greater depressive symptomatology.  
 
Comparative risk judgement rating form (CRJRF). A number of researchers have 
used variations of comparative risk judgement rating forms, where participants are asked to 
rate their chances of experiencing various items, relating to both their health and other 
aspects of their lives, whilst comparing themselves to a person of similar demographic (and 
illness) standing. Questions may include, for example, “compared with other (fe)males of 
your age, economic status and with similar health as you, what are the chances that you 
would break your arm or your leg?”, or, “compared with other (fe)males that are similar to 
you, what are the chances that you would develop cancer?”, or, “compared with other 
(fe)males that are similar to you, what are the chances you’d win R100,000 in the lottery?”. 
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Participants are asked to rate their answers on a five point Likert-type scale from extremely 
below average to extremely above average. I employed this same rating technique and 
created my own form including questions that were considered relevant for this context, 
loosely based on the work of Fournier, de Ridder and Bensing (2003), Covey and Davies 
(2004), Weinstein (1983), and Warner, Schwarzer, Schüz, Wurm, & Tesch-Römer (2012) 
(see Appendix F2).  
The CRJRF was selected based on its inclusion in a study concerning the role of 
unrealistic optimism among MS patients (see Fournier, de Ridder and Bensing, 1999). The 
dependant variable relating to the CRJRF was defined by the number of answers that fell 
within the “extremely below average” category for negative items (i.e. where participants 
stated they were less likely to experience negative events) and the “extremely above average” 
category for the positive items (i.e. where participants stated they were more likely to 
experience positive events).  Possible answers ranged from 0 to 20 and higher scores 
indicated higher unrealistic optimism.  
 
Cottrell and Wilson (1926) questionnaire (CWQ). Cottrell and Wilson (1926) asked 
a number of open and closed-ended questions, which require self-reported answers, regarding 
emotional and physical well-being as well as questions pertaining to outlook (see Appendix 
F3). These questions were included based on their use by these classical researchers to elicit 
and measure the presence of euphoria sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica and spes sclerotica.  
In-depth details of the procedures used in terms of the quantitative rating of this questionnaire 
will be described in part one of the results section; however the dependant variables relating 
to the CWQ were defined in terms of the average score given by three raters where “2” 
represented a definite presence of the symptom (i.e. euphoria sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica or 
spes sclerotica), “1” represented a possible presence of the symptom, and “0” signified an 
absence of the symptom.  
 Two questions were additionally used to supplement the quantitative data of this study 
and to aid in describing the quality of euphoria within MS.  The first was an open ended 
question of this measure (i.e. “Describe in a few words your general or usual mood”).  The 
second was a question that was added (the particulars of which will be addressed in greater 
detail in part one of the results section) and that related to the definition of Cottrell and 
Wilson (1926) (i.e. How do you feel about the future?).  The answers of the MS participants 
were either tape recorded or typed by the participant and sent via e-mail.  At a later stage 




Internal state scale (ISS). The ISS (Bauer et al., 1991) consists of four subscales: (a) 
depression, (b) activation (linked to symptoms of mania), (c) perceived conflict subscale 
(which has been used to determine psychopathy in patients), and (d) a well-being sub-scale 
which is the scale most relevant for euthymia and euphoria.  The original rating scale of 0 to 
100 was modified, for consistency and simplicity, to be in line with the system used in the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) which requires participants to rate their 
answers on a Likert-type scale from one, denoting very slightly or not at all, to five,  
signifying extremely (see Appendix F4). 
There are very few self-report measures of euphoria available, thus, the ISS was 
included based on its euthymic/euphoric sub-scale.  It was additionally included as the well-
being sub-scale questions individuals about general well-being and subtle symptoms, which 
was in line with the original description and definition of the constructs in question.  The 
dependant variable relating to the ISS was defined by the total score of the well-being sub-
scale. Possible answers ranged between three and 15, where higher scores indicated greater 
positive mood/well-being (euphoria sclerotica).  A participant was considered to have high 
well-being if their score fell within the 3rd quartile (i.e. 75% or more, or 12 or more) based 
on the minimum and maximum values of the scale.  
 
Life orientation test-revised (LOT-R). The LOT-R (Scheier & Carver, 1985) requires 
participants to indicate the extent to which they agree, or disagree, with four positive, four 
negative and four filler items on a five point scale. This was adjusted to a four point scale, 
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree, so as to be consistent with the Optimism 
and Pessimism Scale (OPS) which requires a forced choice answer, thereby eliciting either 
optimism or pessimism rather than allowing for a neutral answer that does not indicate either 
outlook.   
Moderate to high internal consistency (with Cronbach’s alpha being between .74 and 
.77), and a test-retest reliability of .79 has been established (Scheier & Carver, 1985). It has 
also been utilised in countries such as Australia, Brazil, China, Estonia, Ghana, Israel, Japan, 
Korea and Turkey (Fischer & Chalmers, 2008), as well as an SA sample of English and 
Afrikaans speaking participants, predominantly with a Matric education (Rothmann & 
Essenko, 2007).  
The LOT-R was selected for inclusion due to its common usage in optimism research 
(Fournier et al., 1999), the usage of its original form, the Life Orientation Test, in previous 
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MS research (see Sinnakaruppan, Macdonald, McCafferty, & Mattison, 2010), and because it 
is a relevant measure of spes sclerotica given the more subtle nature of the original definition 
and description of this symptom.  Furthermore, Burke et al. (2000) describe it as being 
advantageous to include measures of both the more stable trait optimism, such as this one, 
and of the more transient state optimism, such as the OPS, in research concerning optimism. 
The dependant variable relating to the LOT-R was defined by the total score for the optimism 
sub-scale. Possible answered ranged from 3 to 12, where higher scores indicated greater 
optimism.  A participant was considered to have high optimism if their score fell within the 
3rd quartile (i.e. 75% or more, or 9 or more) based on the minimum and maximum values of 
the scale.   
 
Neuropsychiatric inventory (NPI). Originally developed to assess neurobehavioural 
and psychiatric disturbances in dementia, the NPI (Cummings et al., 1994) requires 
participants’ informants to provide information on twelve disturbances of mood and 
behaviour, including euphoria (in terms of only abnormally positive mood), in order to 
determine the prevalence of neuropsychiatric symptoms in the participant. A standardised 
script, for each domain, is read to the informant. Each symptom is rated based on its 
frequency, ranging from 1 (occasionally-once a week) to 4 (very frequently-once a day), and 
its severity 1 (mild) to 3 (marked), with total scores ranging from 0 to 144.  Although usually 
administered only to the informant, it was also administered to the participants themselves in 
this research so as to ascertain their perspective on their mood and/or behavioural difficulties.  
The NPI has well-established high content and concurrent validity and reliability 
(Cummings, 1997) and has been validated amongst MS patients (Benedict et al., 2001). Prior 
studies using the NPI have also been conducted using SA samples (see Feldman et al., 2010; 
Goldwurm et al., 2006; Rockwood, Mintzer, Truyen, Wessel, & Wilkinson, 2001), indicating 
the applicability of this measure within the current context.  
It was included as a measure of euphoria sclerotica due to its common usage by the 
contemporary literature in identifying the presence of “euphoria” among patients with MS 
(see, e.g., Benedict, Carone et al., 2004; Figved et al., 2005; Sanfilipo et al., 2006). 
Additionally, it was included as a measure of eutonia sclerotica, or awareness of mood and/or 
behavioural abnormalities, by way of participant/informant discrepancies on the various 
items. The dependant variable relating to the NPI as a measure of euphoria was defined by 
the presence of euphoria in terms of a yes/no answer by the informant and participant. The 
dependant variable relating to the NPI as a measure of unawareness of mood and/or 
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behavioural abnormalities was defined via the discrepancy between the participants’ self-
reports of their mood and behaviour and the informants’ perceptions of the participants’ 
behaviour. Discrepancy scores could range from 0 to 144 where higher scores indicated 
greater unawareness. 
Optimism and pessimism scale (OPS). The OPS (Dember, Martin, Hummer, Howe, 
& Melton, 1989) consists of 18 positive, 18 negative items, and 20 filler items and requires 
participants to indicate their agreement with each statement on a four point (forced choice) 
scale, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree (see Appendix F5).  
The optimism sub-scale has been shown to be both valid and reliable, with a 
coefficient alpha of .83 (Dember et al., 1989). Although created in a developed country, it has 
been used to determine optimism in a culturally diverse sample from Queensland, Australia, 
with a high school education (Creed, Patton, & Bartrum, 2002) which may indicate its 
applicability to a diverse SA context.  
It was included because it measures several optimistic areas relevant to the current 
investigation, including the participants’ outlook on life and the future, as well as their 
expectations regarding their personal situation, which is line with the original classical 
description of the construct.  Additionally, it was included based on its previous use within 
MS research on optimism (see Fournier et al., 1999).  The dependant variable relating to the 
OPS was defined by the total score for the optimism sub-scale.  Possible answers ranged from 
18 to 72, with higher scores indicating greater optimism. A participant was considered to 
have high optimism if their score fell within the 3rd quartile (i.e. 75% or more, or 58 or more) 
based on the minimum and maximum values of the scale.  
 
Physical ability scale (PAS). A simple scale of physical ability could not be located at 
the time of preparing this study.  Therefore, one was created by the researcher loosely based 
on the physical items of the Patient Competency Rating Scale (PCRS; Prigatano & Fordyce, 
1986; which is a 30-item self-reflexivity rating scale that assesses an individual’s ability to 
perform a variety of physical, cognitive and behavioural tasks), and the physical items of the 
Medical Outcomes Study 36-Item Short-Form Health Survey (SF-36; Ware & Sherbourne, 
1992, a questionnaire regarding various aspects of health) (see Appendix F6). Participants 
and informants were asked to respond to the various items by answering cannot do, a little 
problem, or no problem.  
As with the other measures of awareness, participants and informants completed this 
questionnaire in order to determine discrepancies between the two, but the informants’ 
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ratings were also used as a measure of each participant’s severity of disability. The dependant 
variable relating to the PAS in terms of disease severity was defined by the total score of the 
informants’ report. Possible answers ranged from 0 to 28, with higher scores indicating 
greater physical disability. The dependant variable relating to the PAS in terms of 
unawareness of physical deficit was defined via the discrepancy between participants’ self-
reports of their abilities and the external criterion of the informants’ perceptions of the 
participants’ physical abilities.  Discrepancy scores could range from 0 to 28, with higher 
scores indicating greater unawareness. 
 
Positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS).  The PANAS (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) requires participants to respond to 10 positive and 10 negative questions by 
rating how they are currently feeling on a five point Likert-type scale, ranging from very 
slightly or not at all to extremely.   
The positive sub-scale has high internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .89, 
and has established reliability and validity (Crawford & Henry, 2004). It has also been used 
within an SA context (see Getz, Chamorro-Premuzic, Roy, & Devroop, 2012; van Zyl & 
Rothmann, 2012).  
The PANAS was selected as it has been used in previous MS research concerning 
affect (see, e.g., Christodoulou et al., 2009; Fournier et al., 1999) and was an appropriate 
measure of euphoria sclerotica, or positive affect, as it assesses more general or subtle 
positive mood which is in line with the original description or definition of euphoria 
sclerotica. The dependant variable relating to the PANAS was defined by the total score of 
the positive sub-scale of the PANAS. Possible answers ranged between 10 and 50, with 
higher scores indicating greater positive mood.  A participant was considered to have high 
euphoria sclerotica if their score fell within the 3rd quartile (i.e. 75% or more, or 40 or more) 





Table 4  
The Neuropsychological Measures Pertaining to the Euphoria (and Depression) 
Domain Measure 
Depression BDI-FS 
Euphoria sclerotica  CWQ 
(positive mood) NPI (euphoria question only) 
 Positive sub-scale of the PANAS 
 Well-being sub-scale of the ISS 
Eutonia sclerotica CWQ 
(unawareness of deficit) Participant/informant discrepancies on: 
  PAS (physical) 
  AI (cognitive) 
  NPI (mood/behavioural) 
Spes sclerotica CWQ 
(optimism) Optimistic sub-scale of the OPS 
 Optimistic sub-scale of the LOT-R 
 Number of unrealistic responses on the CRJRF 
Note. BDI-FS = Beck Depression Inventory-Fast Screen; CWQ = Cottrell and Wilson (1926) 
questionnaire; NPI = Neuropsychiatric Inventory; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; 
ISS = Internal State Scale; PAS = Physical Ability Scale; AI = Awareness Interview; OPS = 
Optimism and Pessimism Scale; LOT-R = Life Orientation Test-Revised; CRJRF = Comparative Risk 
Judgement Rating Form. 
 
 Measures of cognition. In line with previous research as well as with the current 
aims of this research study, measures assessing the typical executive functioning domains 
found to be impaired in patients with MS were included.  As an additional aim was to 
investigate the possibility of cortical versus subcortical involvement, as well as right versus 
left hemispheric involvement, measures pertaining to both left and right cortical involvement 
were also included.   
All participants were fluent in English and were thus assessed in English. However, a 
number of participants were first language Afrikaans and three exceptions were made for 
measures heavily dependent on language: the Boston Naming Test Short Form (BNT-SF), the 
Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) and the Colour Word Interference Task 
(CWIT).  The procedure followed in each case will be discussed under each relevant 
measure.  
The measures were not being used for diagnostic purposes, but merely for comparison 
with various control groups, including the HC group which served as a normative group 
regarding performance on these tests.  Thus, although the majority of the measures were 
developed in first world countries, this was not deemed to be problematic. The majority of 
participants (or at least those from the MS and HC groups) were, again, also white/Caucasian, 
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and therefore similar to the cultures in which the measures were produced, but cross-cultural 
applicability of the measures will be described where possible.  The measures will be 
presented in alphabetical order. 
 
Aprosodia battery (ApBat). The ApBat (Ross, Thompson, & Yenkosky, 1997) is a 
test of RH functioning.  In it, participants are played pre-recorded audio clips and are 
required to either discern the appropriate emotion of the spoken speech on the audio clip, or 
to repeat the speech and affective prosody of the clip. Formal studies of the reliability and 
validity of the ApBat have not yet been conducted. The battery is, however, known to be 
sensitive to impairments associated with both left and right hemisphere stroke (Ross et al., 
1997), as well as patients with MS (Beatty et al., 2003). This was, however, within an 
American population and since the test uses audio clips of an American accent, it may not be 
entirely appropriate for an SA context.  
The ApBat was never-the-less included as a measure of RH cortical (language) 
functioning, in terms of the repetition and comprehension of the affective prosody of speech, 
as it is comparable to that of the left hemispheric structural language tests of repetition and 
comprehension, and because this is in line with the aim of investigating the right versus 
left/executive hypothesis.  In addition, it has been used in other MS research (see, e.g., Beatty 
et al., 2003). The dependent variables ‘prosodic repetition’ and ‘prosodic comprehension’ 
were defined in terms of the total number of correct responses, with prosodic repetition being 
rated by three independent raters.  Higher scores indicated a better performance. 
 
Boston naming test- short form (BNT-SF). The BNT-SF (Mack, Freed, Williams, & 
Henderson, 1992) is a measure of left hemispheric functioning.  The full measure requires 
patients to name 60 black and white line drawings; however, in order to reduce testing time, 
the short form (which includes 15 black and white line drawings and has been validated, and 
found to identify anomia equally as well as the longer version; Graves, Bezeau, Fogarty, & 
Blair, 2004) was selected. The short version has been found to correlate strongly with the 
original version (.97; Mack et al., 1992). Participants were asked to name each drawing. First 
language was taken into account and if the participant could not name the item in English, the 
Afrikaans name was accepted. If a participant was unable to name the item spontaneously in 
either language, this item was skipped until the end of the test when a choice of four words, 
one of which was the correct name, was given and participants were asked to select the 
correct name. This was done in order to ascertain, for the purposes of the feedback form for 
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each participant, whether they knew the word but could not name it, or whether they simply 
did not know the word.  
The Boston Naming Test is a well-used and well recognised test of confrontational 
naming ability and was included based on its extensive previous use in research among 
patients with MS (see, e.g., Beatty, W., Goodkin, Monson, Beatty, P., & Hertsgaard, 1988; 
Kujala et al., 1996; Henry and Beatty, 2006). This version has also been used with success 
within an SA context (Baerecke, 2013). The dependent variable ‘naming’ was defined by the 
total number of correctly named items.  Higher scores indicated a better performance.  
 
Brief visuospatial memory test-revised (BVMT-R). Assessing visual memory (i.e. RH 
cortical), the BVMT-R (Benedict, 1997; Benedict, Schretlen, Groninger, Dobraski, & 
Shpritz, 1996) requires participants to recall a matrix of six geometric designs, presented in a 
2x3 matrix for 10 seconds per trial, across three trials. Without re-presenting the designs, 
delayed recall and a forced choice yes/no recognition task of the six designs (with another six 
distractor designs) are assessed after a 25 minute delay interval. Because confounding 
variables such as weakness and incoordination may affect the drawings of the patients, no 
time limit was imposed, and, in accordance with the Minimal Assessment of Cognitive 
Function In MS (MACFIMS) recommendation, motor problems evident on a copy trial were 
taken into account when scoring design accuracy (Benedict et al., 2002). It has also been 
validated amongst MS patients as part of the MACFIMS (Benedict et al., 2006).  
The BVMT-R was selected as a measure of visuospatial memory due to its 
recommendation over other visual memory tests and its inclusion in the MACFIMS (Benedict 
et al., 2002). It has also been used in a number of studies in sub-Saharan Africa (Kanmogne 
et al., 2010; Spies, Fennema-Notestine, Archibald, Cherner, & Seedat, 2012), indicating its 
applicability for diverse cultures similar to those found in SA. In addition, it was included as 
it, like the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT), includes both a measure of learning 
as well as of recognition and will, thus, not only provide a comprehensive measure of 
visuospatial memory, but will also allow for direct comparison of performance with that of 
audio-verbal memory. The dependent variables ‘visual learning’, ‘visual memory’ and ‘visual 
recognition’ were defined as the total learning score over the three trials, the total score in 
relation to correctly recalled designs on delayed recall, and the total number of correctly 
identified designs on recognition as rated by three independent raters. Higher scores indicated 




Controlled oral word association test (COWAT). The COWAT (Benton & Hamsher, 
1989) is a measure of verbal fluency (i.e. subcortical executive functioning) and requires 
patients to generate as many words as possible, in one minute, that begin with each of the 
three specified letters (F, A, and S) which are presented individually. Although all 
participants were fluent in English, those who were first language Afrikaans were given the 
option of alternate letters (B, R, and S) which are considered to be more linguistically 
equivalent to the English letters in terms of frequency of use across the Afrikaans language 
and have been used in SA samples of Afrikaans participants (O’Leary, 2013). Patients are 
prohibited from using proper nouns or the same word with different endings (e.g. pot, pots, 
potter, potting). The COWAT has a reported reliability coefficient of approximately .70 
(Lezak, Howieson, Loring, Hannay, & Fischer, 2004). It has also been validated amongst MS 
patients as part of the MACFIMS (Benedict et al., 2006).  
Henry and Beatty (2006) demonstrated that tests of category or semantic fluency are 
able to distinguish MS patients from controls equally as well as tests of phonemic, or letter, 
fluency such as the COWAT. However, semantic measures are very often used in 
conjunction with, or secondary to, tests of phonemic fluency (Beatty, W., Goodkin, Monson, 
& Beatty, P., 1989; Kujala, Portin, & Ruutiainen, 1997). The COWAT was, therefore, 
selected for inclusion as a measure of verbal fluency or generativity, based on its use within 
MS research, often as the only measure of verbal fluency (see, e.g., Olivares et al., 2005; 
Nocentini et al., 2006), and because of its inclusion in the MACFIMS (Benedict et al., 2002). 
It is also a very popular measure of verbal fluency and in the same review of which tests 
neuropsychologists most often use, it was said to be used 81% of the time by the more than 
200 Australian neuropsychologists involved in the study (Sullivan & Bowden, 1997). 
Furthermore, applicability for an SA context has been demonstrated (Mattson, Berk & Lucas, 
1997). The dependent variable ‘verbal fluency’ was defined as the total number of permitted 
words generated across all three trials, with higher scores indicating a better performance. 
 
Cube analysis (CA). CA or the block counting test (from the Stanford-Binet 
intelligence scale; Terman & Merrill, 1973), a measure of visuospatial ability (i.e. RH 
cortical) consists of fourteen two dimensional drawings representing blocks or cubes 
arranged in two or three dimensional patterns. Participants are asked to count the number of 
blocks or cubes in each design after attempting a practice item. It was explained to them that 
if a block should be there, but is not visible, they should include it.  
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The CA test was included as a measure of visuospatial perceptual ability based on its 
prior use within research in this area among MS patients (Vleugels et al., 2000). The 
dependent variable ‘visuospatial perception 3D’ was defined via the total number of correct 
responses.  Higher scores indicated a better performance. 
 
Delis-Kaplan executive function system (D-KEFS) sorting test (DST). The DST is a 
measure of functions sub-served by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, thus it was a measure 
of cortical executive functioning.  Standard administration of the DST (Delis, Kaplan, & 
Kramer, 2001) requires patients to sort the cards into two groups, with three cards in each 
group, according to as many different concepts (either verbal-semantic or visuospatial) as 
possible, and to continue, in the recognition or cued condition, until all categories have been 
identified. However, in order to reduce testing time and to minimise anxiety and/or 
frustration that may impact on the remainder of the testing session, and in accordance with 
the MACFIMS recommendation (Benedict et al., 2002), only the free sorting condition was 
administered. The DST free sorting condition has good internal consistency, between .72 and 
.86 for adults, and moderate test-retest reliability, between .46 and .73 for adults (Delis et al., 
2001).   It has also been validated amongst MS patients (Parmenter et al., 2007b) and as part 
of the MACFIMS (Benedict et al., 2006). Furthermore it has been used previously within an 
SA context (Mosdell, 2013) indicating its appropriateness for the current sample.  
The DST was selected as a measure of abstract reasoning because (a) it was revised 
from its predecessor, the California Card Sorting Test (CCST), to include 16 possible 
concepts or categories, instead of only 8 (Beatty, Jocic, Monson, & Katzung, 1994); (b) it has 
been shown to discriminate MS patients from controls better than comparative tests such as 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Parmenter et al., 2007b); (c) use of the DST, and its 
previous version, the CCST, has been demonstrated in MS research (see, e.g., Beatty, Hames, 
Blanco, Paul, & Wilbanks, 1995; Lovera et al., 2010); and (d) it was recommended for 
inclusion in the MACFIMS, the well-known and well-used measure of cognitive dysfunction 
among MS researchers (Benedict et al., 2002). Although numerous dependent variables are 
examinable, the dependent variable ‘abstract reasoning’ was defined in terms of the scaled 
score of total number of correct card sorts, with higher scores indicating a better performance. 
 
D-KEFS colour word interference task (CWIT). The CWIT (Delis et al., 2001), a 
measure of functions sub-served by the orbitobasal frontal cortex (i.e. cortical executive 
functioning) is a modification of the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) and is made up of four trials. 
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The first two control for visual or reading impairment. The third is an inhibition trial, and 
requires participants to inhibit the propensity for reading the word by naming the ink colour 
instead when presented with the words “red”, “green” and “blue” printed incongruently in 
red, green or blue ink. The fourth is a set-shifting trial which requires participants to alternate 
between naming the ink colour as in the third trial, and reading the word when it is presented 
in a box. Afrikaans first language participants were given the option of completing this test in 
Afrikaans, however all participants chose to proceed in English. The CWIT has good internal 
consistency, between .72 and .86 for adults, and fairly good test-retest reliability, between .49 
and .86 for adults (Delis et al., 2001).   
It was included as a measure of inhibition, or the suppression of an overlearned verbal 
response, and switching or set-shifting due to its eminence as a measure of these domains 
(Spreen & Strauss, 1998), and because Fishman et al. (2004) found a correlation between 
dysexecutive disinhibition and euphoria in terms of the NPI but did not tested this 
cognitively. Its successful use has also been demonstrated in SA samples (Mattson et al., 
1997; Mosdell, 2013). The dependent variables of ‘disinhibition’ and ‘set-shifting’ were 
defined both in terms of the scaled scores of time taken for each trial having taken the first 
two trials into account, as well as in terms of the scaled score error scores for both the 
inhibition and set shifting trials.  Higher scores on all variables indicate a better performance. 
 
Judgement of line orientation test (JLO). In the JLO (Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, 
Varney, & Spreen, 1994), (i.e. RH cortical) participants are presented with a visual array of 
numbered lines covering 180 degrees as well as two stimulus lines that correspond with two 
of the lines in the array.  They are required to select a number from the array that correctly 
corresponds with each of the stimulus lines. The original JLO consists of 30 items, however 
in order to reduce testing time a short form was used. Various short forms are available, 
however many such as those using the first one to 15 items or those using only odd or even 
numbers have been criticised and excluded in favour of the Short Forms Q and S created by 
Qualls, Bliwise, and Stringer (2000). Short Form Q was utilised in the current study and has a 
reported internal consistency of .82 (Qualls et al., 2000).  
The JLO was selected as a measure of visuospatial processing based on its (a) 
sensitivity to visuospatial perception and RH damage (Benton, Varney, & Hamsher, 1978); 
(b) extensive previous use, often as the primary or only measure of visuospatial processing, 
within MS patient groups (see, e.g., Benedict et al., 2000; Vleugels et al., 2000; Woolmore et 
al., 2008); and (c) recommendation by the MACFIMS expert panel (Benedict et al., 2002). It 
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is also considered to be a “culture-fair” test and has been used extensively in SA research 
(Venter & Bham, 2003, p. 34). The dependent variable ‘visuospatial perception 2D’ was 
defined via the total number of correct responses, and higher scores indicated a better 
performance. 
 
N-back.  The Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task (PASAT) is currently one of the 
most commonly utilised measures of cognitive dysfunction in MS, and is included in MS 
cognitive batteries such as the MACFIMS (Benedict et al., 2002) and the MS Functional 
Composite (Kalkers et al., 2000).  However, it has been found to cause anxiety in patients 
with MS (Parmenter, Shucard, J., Benedict, & Shucard, D., 2006), sometimes resulting in 
them wishing to discontinue with testing (personal communication with Dr. D. Shucard, 15 
March 2011). In addition, it does not include a measure of reaction time (Parmenter et al., 
2006) and has been criticised for allowing for a “chunking strategy” that may aid or assist 
performance on the task (Fisk & Archibald, 2001). In contrast, the n-back task (Owen, 
McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005; Parmenter et al., 2006), (executive functioning) the 
primary measure within WM research, has been found to be less distressing and includes a 
measure of reaction time, which can be used to determine information processing speed 
(Parmenter et al., 2006). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated to discriminate MS patients 
from controls equally as well as the PASAT (Parmenter et al., 2006). Therefore, although it’s 
psychometric properties of reliability are relatively poor (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Perrig, & 
Meier, 2010), it was included in the proposed study based on the aforementioned reasons.  
While some MS studies have utilised the auditory version of the n-back (Form et al., 
2007; Lengenfelder, Chiaravalloti, Ricker, & DeLuca, 2003), the standard visually presented 
n-back does not appear to be confounded by visuomotor abilities and the standard version of 
the n-back has been used within this patient group before (see, e.g., Parmenter et al., 2006; 
Sweet, Rao, Primeau, Durgerian, & Cohen, 2006). The same version has also been used as 
the sole measure of WM within other developing countries such as Korea (Chang et al., 
2010), and within an SA context demonstrating its applicability for the current research 
(Human, 2010). The n-back usually involves three conditions (0-, 1-, and 2-back). The 0-back 
measures attentional abilities and also offers a reaction time for speed of information 
processing; while the 1- and 2-back conditions measure WM (and speed of information 
processing). However, the 2-back is more sensitive to WM impairments (Parmenter et al., 
2006) and due to time constraints the 1-back was not included in this study. Patients were 
required to either identify a target letter (0-back, attention), or to compare each letter with the 
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letter presented two letters previously (2-back, WM), following a practice trial, by pressing 
one of two computer keys. Reaction time on the 0-back trial represented speed of information 
processing. The dependent variables ‘attention’ and ‘WM’ were defined as the total number 
of correct responses (on 0-back, out of 21, for attention and on 2-back, out of 27, for WM). A 
higher score indicated a better performance.  The dependent variable ‘speed of information 
processing’ was defined as the total reaction time for all answered items, divided by the 
number of items answered (correct or incorrect).  A higher score indicated a poorer 
performance. 
 
Rey auditory verbal learning test (RAVLT). In the RAVLT (Lezak et al., 2004; Rey, 
1964), (verbal memory, left cortical) participants are read a list of 15 unrelated words (List 
A) five separate times and are asked to recall the list in no particular order each time. 
Following an interference trial (List B), participants are required to recall the List A again. 
Without presenting the list again, delayed recall and a forced choice yes/no recognition of 
List A (with an equal number of distractor words) are assessed after a 20 minute delay 
interval. High internal reliability (that of .90) and high test-retest reliability (that of between 
.60 and .70) are reported by Straus et al. (2006). Test re-test reliability of this measure has 
also been reported as being between .60 and .86 (Lezak et al., 2004).   
The RAVLT was selected as a measure of audio-verbal memory because it includes a 
measure of learning as well as of recognition which is important when considering executive 
dysfunction in memory. It is also a very popular measure of verbal memory and in a review 
of which tests neuropsychologists most often use, it was said to be used 77% of the time by 
the more than 200 Australian neuropsychologists involved in the study (Sullivan & Bowden, 
1997). Furthermore, it has been used within an SA sample before (Mattson et al., 1997).  The 
dependent variables ‘verbal learning’, ‘verbal memory’ and ‘verbal recognition’ were defined 
as the total learning score over the five trials, the total number of correctly recalled words on 
delayed recall, and the total number of correctly identified words on recognition. Higher 
scores indicated a better performance. 
 
Rey-osterrieth complex figure (ROCF). The standard administration of the ROCF 
(Osterrieth, 1944; Rey, 1941), (i.e. RH cortical) requires participants to copy a complex 
geometric design, by drawing it freehand (the use of rulers is prohibited) directly below the 
original, to reproduce it from memory directly after the copy trial, and to then recall it again 
following a delay. However, in the current study, only the copy trial was administered and 
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timed, both in order to minimise any distress caused by motor or memory difficulties and 
because a second measure of visuospatial memory was deemed unnecessary for this study. 
The ROCF was selected based on its versatility as a test, measuring a number of different 
abilities, its use within studies of patients with MS (see, e.g., Benedict et al., 1996; Benedict 
et al., 2000; Schulz et al., 2006), and its prior use within SA samples of similar demographics 
(Mattson et al., 1997; Mosdell, 2013). Another popular measure, it was said to be used 88% 
of the time by the Australian neuropsychologists involved in the study concerning which tests 
are used most often by neuropsychologists  (Sullivan & Bowden, 1997).  
It was included in this study to assess visuospatial construction. Because confounding 
variables associated with motor difficulties can affect drawing, in line with the BVMT-R no 
time limit was imposed and evident motor problems were taken into account when scoring 
design accuracy. Copies were scored both according to structural accuracy and placement. 
The dependent variables ‘visuospatial construction’ was, therefore, defined by the total 
construction score (out of 36), as per the scoring criteria set out by Canham, Smith, and 
Tyrrell (2000), as rated by three independent raters. Higher scores indicated a better 
performance. 
 
Western aphasia battery (WAB). The WAB (Kertesz, 1982) is a measure of language 
ability (i.e. left cortical functioning).  In the auditory repetition test of the WAB, participants 
are read words, short phrases or long sentences and asked to repeat them using the same 
words, structurally. In the auditory comprehension test, participants are read sentences such 
as ‘Is your surname are Brown?’, and ‘Do you eat a banana before you peel it?’, and are 
asked to correctly answer yes or no by listening to the structure of the words.  
These WAB sub-tests were included as they are comparable with the ApBat sub-tests 
described above. Additionally, there were included as recognised measures of left 
hemispheric cortical functioning and distinguish patients with left from those with right 
hemispheric damage (Lezak et al., 2004). They are often used by the speech therapists at 
GSH, and have been used in other SA research using similar sample demographics (Frankel, 
Penn, & Ormond-Brown, 2007; Penn, Jones, & Joffe, 1997).The dependent variables 
‘repetition’ and ‘comprehension’ were defined in terms of the total number of correct 
responses.  Higher scores indicated a better performance. 
 
 Data analysis.  The majority of the data in this study was quantitative, but a small 
qualitative component was included to supplement the largely quantitative data.  As different 
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approaches to analysis were used for these different types of data, they will be discussed 
separately below. 
 
 Quantitative data. All quantitative data analysis was run using the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS), version 21.0 (SPSS Inc., 2012).  Before beginning inferential 
analysis, I ensured that the data met the assumptions underlying each proposed statistical 
analysis, and unless specified, all of the required assumptions were upheld for each analysis.   
Before discussing the relevant statistics, I would like to mention that for all analyses I 
set my significance level to α = .01 due to the number of variables investigated in this 
research and to the increased risk for familywise error. In addition, I would like to 
acknowledge the risk of false discovery in this study due to the number of inferential tests 
included.  However, due to the exploratory nature of this research, and to the in-depth and 
complex nature of its subject matter, the number and types of analyses included were deemed 
necessary.  This issue is discussed further in the general discussion towards the end of this 
dissertation. 
 
The statistical analyses used.  Descriptive statistics were used to describe a number of 
variables.  A variety of correlational analyses were also used.  Pearson correlations were used 
when both variables were continuous, Phi correlation coefficients were calculated when both 
variables were dichotomous, and point-biserial correlation coefficients were used when one 
variable was dichotomous and the other continuous (Howell, 2004). 
For all factor analyses, a principal components method was selected, using a promax 
rotation and the suppression of coefficients of .400 or below (Field, 2005).  Two types of 
extraction methods were used based on the aims of the analysis: a fixed factor solution of 
either three or two factors, and an extraction criterion based on eigenvalues of greater than 
one. For each factor identified (made up of more than one variable), a Cronbach’s α was 
calculated to determine the internal consistency of the factor. 
Multiple regression analyses were used to determine which of a number of 
independent variables predicted one continuous dependent variable.  Various aims meant that 
I used a hierarchical regression model and entered specific variables into the model first 
(Field, 2009).  All variables were entered using the “enter” method.  When an individual 
variable was found to significantly predict the particular type of euphoria being investigated, 
that variable was tested further in a separate linear regression model. 
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When group differences were expected, I reported 1-tailed p values. Independent 
samples t-tests were used to compare two groups on continuous data that was normally 
distributed.  Mann Whitney U-tests were used to compare two groups on continuous data that 
was not normally distributed.  Chi-squared tests of independence were used to compare two 
groups on categorical data.  In terms of the independent samples t-tests, when Levene’s test 
for homogeneity of variance was significant, the results for “equal variances not assumed” 
were reported.  The relevant effect sizes (i.e. Cohen’s d and Cramer’s V) were calculated 
where appropriate. 
When two groups were compared, while controlling for pre-existing group 
differences, Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was used. While not all data was completely 
normally distributed across groups, it largely did not violate this assumption, and was used 
when all other assumptions were met as ANCOVAs are considered to be fairly robust (Levy, 
1980; Lund Research Ltd, 2013). Eta-squared values were calculated using the corrected 
total, and represented the effect size for these analyses (Field, 2009). 
 
Inter-rater reliability.  Inter-rater reliability was determined via single measures 
intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) for instances where continuous variables were rated 
by three raters.  One measure was rated according to four categories by 15 raters, and for this, 
the average percentage of agreement was calculated for the category selected by the majority 
of the raters. 
 
 Creation of composite variables.  A number of composite variables were created, both 
for some of the euphoric measures, in order to allow for analysis of the euphoric types 
identified by this research, and for the majority of the cognitive measures, in order to reduce 
the number investigated. In order to create these, a factor analysis was first run to identify 
which individual (continuous) measures loaded onto common factors.  In order to further test 
their applicability to form one composite variable, Pearson correlations were run on the 
relevant individual variables for each factor, to compare each variable with the others.  A 
composite variable was then created for well correlated variables by first adjusting the scales 
of all relevant individual variables for that factor/composite to begin at the same minimum 
value.  The variance of each scale was then determined and the scales with smaller variance 
were adjusted to have the same variance as the scale with the largest variance.  All scales 
were then added to form the composite.  Rather than taking the Beta weights or the mean of 
the z-scores, which would have resulted in differing variances across the different groups, the 
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method just described was chosen in order to be able to obtain a standardised minimum and 
maximum score for the scale, and to compare different groups on the same scale, with the 
same degree of variance. 
 
 Calculation of moderate and high levels.  Two cut-off points were imposed upon 
various continuous scales.  For this, each scale was divided into quartiles and scores falling 
within the top quartile (i.e. above the 75% cut-off point), according to the full scale’s 
minimum and maximum values, were considered to denote high levels of the symptom.  
Consequently, participants scoring within this range were termed high-scorers.  Scores 
falling between the 50% cut-off point and the 75% (high) cut-off point were considered to 
denote moderate levels of the symptom, and participants scoring within this range were 
termed moderate scorers. 
 
 Qualitative data. A small sub-section of the results section was dedicated to a 
qualitative description of the euphoric nature of the MS participants in terms of an analysis of 
open-ended questions of, and relating to, the CWQ.  These qualitative data were analysed 
using content analysis. This involved coding the qualitative data collected from the 
interviews and organising it into conceptual frameworks in order to identify common themes 
(Brink, 2006). 
Verbatim transcription of the recorded interviews allowed for a greater efficiency of 
content analysis (Smith et al., 1995), and transcripts were read and re-read to identify and 
index the themes and categories. These were then examined by constant comparison where 
each item was checked or compared with the rest of the data to set up categories (Pope & 
Mays, 1999). The steps employed in this study included (Holloway, 2008): 
1. Reading the data for meaning 
2. Making sense of the data 
3. Organising and ordering the data according to content 
4. Describing and summarising the data 
5. Dividing the data into segments 
6. Coding (labeling or naming) sections of the data 








In the following sub-sections I report the results of this research.  Due to the scale and the 
complex nature of this study, I have divided this section into three parts.  Part one pertains to 
the euphoric constructs and includes results based on the full sample of MS participants (n = 
100).  Part two better defines the symptom of euphoria in light of the findings regarding the 
constructs that underpin it.  Here results are presented based on both the full sample of MS 
participants (n = 100) and the sub-sample who underwent cognitive testing (n = 60).  The MS 
group is also compared with the full HC group (n = 100) and the sub-group of HCs who 
underwent cognitive testing (n = 35) in this sub-section.  In part three, I present the 
provisional results concerning the causes of euphoria.  First, the sub-samples of the patient 
control groups that underwent cognitive testing (i.e. 10 MGs, 10 MVA TBIs and 10 NP-
SLEs) are compared with the sub-sample of MS participants who underwent cognitive testing 
(n = 60) to assist in evaluating the suitability of these control groups to test their relevant 
research questions.  Then, the full MS group (n = 100) is compared with the full sample of 
each of these patient control groups to test the various hypotheses presented regarding the 
cause of euphoria via a limited pilot study: (a) a psychological reaction to a disabling disease, 
MG (n = 20); (b) executive dysfunction, MVA TBI (n = 19); (c) immunological disease 
processes, NP-SLE (n = 10); and (d) RH involvement, RH (n = 10). 
 
Part one.  Addressing discrepancies and defining euphoria 
The main aim of part one was to investigate the constructs of euphoria further in order to gain 
a deeper and clearer understanding of what they entail.  Differences between the classical and 
contemporary definitions of euphoria, in terms of the number of types, the definitions of 
those types, and the frequencies of those types was investigated by using a classical (i.e. the 
CWQ) and the popular contemporary measure (i.e. the NPI) of euphoria.  Since, in the first 
sub-section I compared the descriptions that have been presented in the literature, I proposed, 
rather than hypothesised in the empirical sense, that a change in the number of types has 
occurred.  I also proposed that a change in the definition of these types has occurred and that 
the euphoria measured today does not have the same quality as that described and measured 
by the classical literature.  In the latter sub-section I was able to test my suppositions using 
data gathered in this study.  Therefore, I hypothesised that differing measurement 
instruments, using these different definitions, would influence the rates of euphoria found in 
MS patients, and that high rates of euphoria would be replicated by using the classical 
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description/definition and measure, and that low rates of euphoria would be replicated by 
using the contemporary description/definition and measure. 
An attempt was then made to determine how many types of euphoria really do exist.  
Aspects surrounding the definitions of those types of euphoria were then addressed and 
further issues regarding the frequencies of those types in a sample of 100 MS participants 
were addressed.  As I approached this question from the original classical view, I 
hypothesised that more than one type of euphoria exists, and, that the frequencies of these 
types would be closer to that of Cottrell and Wilson (1926) than the frequencies found today. 
 
Classical versus contemporary measures.  First, the questions concerning the 
number of types of euphoria, the definitions of those types, and frequencies of those types 
will be addressed by using a classical and the contemporary measure. 
Descriptions and definitions of euphoria can be found dating back to 1850, however 
the most comprehensive definition, and one that was maintained for a number of years after 
its conception, was that of Cottrell and Wilson (1926). The questionnaire used to measure 
these three types, published by Cottrell and Wilson (1926), was therefore used to represent 
the classical view of euphoria in terms of number of types of euphoria, the definitions of 
those types and the frequencies of those types.  
The measure most often used today is the NPI. As it is the gold standard measure of 
euphoria in the 21st century, this measure was used to represent the contemporary view of 
euphoria in terms of the number of types of euphoria, the definitions of those types, and the 
frequencies of those types. 
 
Number of types and definitions of the types of euphoria.  A major discrepancy 
noticed in the literature relates to the definition of euphoria, both in terms of how many types 
it consists of, and in terms of the definitions of those types.  Thus, this study aimed to address 
this discrepancy and I proposed that a change in the number of types has occurred since the 
original definition of Cottrell and Wilson (1926), and that the euphoria measured today does 
not have the same quality as that described/defined and measured by the classical literature.  
This was analysed both qualitatively and later quantitatively.  The qualitative description of 
the popular measures used is presented first.  
 
The classical view.  Cottrell and Wilson (1926) described euphoria in terms of the 
following: (a) euphoria sclerotica, referred to “the mental state of cheerfulness, happiness, 
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ease... in which the prevailing mood is one of serenity and cheerfulness”; (b) eutonia 
sclerotica, referred to feeling “physically well tuned up, [as though] the [patient] ‘could do 
anything’” and where patients “are not conscious of physical disability”; and (c) spes 
sclerotica, which referred to “an optimism as to the future and the prospects of ultimate 
recovery which is out of place and incongruous” (p. 8). From this it can be seen that they 
defined three types of euphoria. 
Further definition of each of the types can be found by way of the measuring 
instrument used to measure these symptoms.  For example, for euphoria sclerotica, Cottrell 
and Wilson (1926) asked their patients: “Describe in a few words your general or usual 
mood. Do you feel consistently cheerful or happy? Do you feel consistently sad or unhappy? 
Are you easily amused by what you see?” (p. 4-5).   
Eutonia sclerotica could also be defined in terms of its questions: “Describe your 
bodily feeling as a whole. Are you conscious of any pleasant or unpleasant sensation in your 
body as a whole or a part? Is the feeling one of bodily ease?  Is the feeling one of 
contentment?  Is the feeling one of pleasure?  Is your general feeling one of malaise?” 
(Cottrell & Wilson, 1926, p. 5-6).   
Finally, spes sclerotica could be further defined via the questions used to measure this 
symptom, including, “Are you naturally optimistic?  Are you naturally pessimistic?  Are you 
optimistic or pessimistic in reference to your disease?”. 
 
The contemporary view. In contrast, researchers today present a number of differing 
views concerning euphoria.  As addressed in the literature review, reviewers such as Ghaffar 
and Feinstein (2007) amalgamate all three of the classical types into one.  Some researchers, 
like Carone et al. (2005), confuse euphoria sclerotica and eutonia sclerotica and state that 
measuring the one type means that the other type exists.  Others, for example Diaz-
Olavarrieta et al. (1999), acknowledge eutonia sclerotica but measure only positive mood, 
and some ignore all the other types of the classical definition and focus only on positive 
mood (the euphoria sclerotica type; see ,e.g. Kesselring & Klement, 2001).   
Whether they acknowledge the other types or not, the dominant measure of euphoria 
today is the NPI.  But this measure only measures the positive mood aspect (or the aspect 
most similar to the euphoria sclerotica of the classical definition). 
While the classical definitions of each of the types of euphoria was put forward by the 
same team of researchers that created the three types, as highlighted above the NPI only 
addresses positive mood and thus definitions of the remaining types cannot be addressed 
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from the perspective of this measure alone.  There are, however, many differing views among 
contemporary researchers regarding the definitions of euphoria and, despite the fact that this 
section was to be approached from the perspective of the two measures cited, these 
contemporary definitions need to be addressed.  For consistency, I will approach the various 
definitions from the theoretical framework of the original three types. 
Originally known as euphoria sclerotica, positive mood is now termed euphoria and 
definitions range from subtle or more mild mood states such as a “mental… well-being” 
(Ghaffar and Feinstein, 2007, p. 280), a “persistent cheerfulness” (Rodgers and Bland, 1996, 
p. 442), “a type of mood characterised by inappropriate/inadequate serenity (in view of the 
physical disability)” (Kesselring and Klement, 2001, p. 182), an “unusual cheerfulness” 
(Diaz-Olavarrieta et al., 1999, p. 55), and a “fixed state of well-being” (Feinstein, 2007, p. 
75), to more extreme definitions including “a change in trait or character that includes rapid 
vacillations in mood (including anger, dysphoria, and euphoria)” (Benedict et al., 2001, p. 
75), “a syndrome characterized by euphoric mood state, social disinhibition, impulsivity, and 
emotional lability” (Carone et al., 2005, p. 574), and descriptions of these euphoric patients 
being “impatient, inconsiderate, and quarrelsome” (Fishman et al., 2004, p. 354).  The 
popular measure of euphoria, the NPI, also appears to focus more on the extreme end of the 
description and asks, “Does the patient seem too cheerful or too happy for no reason? I don’t 
mean the normal happiness that comes from seeing friends, receiving presents, or spending 
time with family members. I am asking if the patient has a persistent and abnormally good 
mood or finds humour where others do not” (Cummings et al., 1994).   
 Originally known as eutonia sclerotica, this aspect is now defined in terms of a “lack 
of concern about disability” (Diaz-Olavarrieta et al., 1999, p.55), “denial” (Benedict et al., 
2001, p. 75), a “conviction that all is well and that they will walk again” (Feinstein, 2007, p. 
75), a “cheery indifferen[ce] to their circumstances” despite severe cognitive impairment 
(Benedict et al., 2005, p. 32), as well as in terms of patient/informant discrepancies on 
cognitive testing and/or tests of personality change (Carone et al., 2005, p. 574). 
 Finally, originally known as spes sclerotica, contemporary definitions of optimism 
include, “overly optimistic” (Ghaffar and Feinstein, 2007, p.280), an “optimism about the 
future despite awareness of disability” (Rodgers & Bland, 1996, p.442), and “unrealistic 




Further comparisons.  To remind the reader, the aim of this sub-section was to 
address the discrepancies in the definitions of euphoria between classical and contemporary 
reports, both in terms of the number of types of euphoria, and the definitions of those types.   
In addition to the differences that can be seen in the descriptions reported in the 
literature, further differences between classical and contemporary definitions become evident 
when comparing the various popular measures of the constructs of positive mood, 
unawareness of deficit and optimism.  To again remind the reader, although contemporary 
descriptions and definitions relating to the other two classical types (i.e. eutonia sclerotica 
and spes sclerotica) were described above, the popular contemporary measure (the NPI), and 
the definition from which contemporary euphoria was compared with Cottrell and Wilson’s 
classical definition of euphoria, only addresses positive mood.   
Before I can report these results, however, some explanation on the measures included 
in this research is required.  First, the NPI (contemporary measure) was administered to both 
the informants who were asked about their loved-ones’ positive mood (standard 
administration process), and to the participants themselves who self-reported the symptom of 
euphoria.  A yes/no response was required for this measure and, as such, participants were 
classified as either having or not having euphoria.   
Second, the CWQ (classical measure) was administered to the participants who self-
reported feelings of positive mood, physical well-being and optimism as to the future.  While 
Cottrell and Wilson (1926) published their questionnaire, they did not describe how the 
answers to these questions were used to determine the frequencies of their three types or even 
which questions referred to which of the types. Instead of grouping them per type, they 
labelled them according to “emotional content”, “physical determinants”, and “affective 
conduct”. While “affective conduct” appeared to refer to their other area of interest (i.e. 
pathological laughing and crying), and “physical determinants” appeared to refer to eutonia 
sclerotica, no distinction was made between euphoria sclerotica or spes sclerotica within the 
first group of questions.  Sugar and Nadell (1943), who attempted to replicate the original 
study, set out their results section in the same way as Cottrell and Wilson (1926) but also did 
not objectively state how they determined the frequencies reported in their study.  As I also 
wanted to use their measure within a modern day sample of 100 MS participants, I conducted 
a preliminary study whereby 15 independent raters rated the questions according to whether 
they referred to euphoria sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica, spes sclerotica or “other” (which was 
a question deemed to be relating to something other than positive/negative mood, bodily 
feelings, or optimistic/pessimistic outlook). Of the 50 questions, 14 were deemed to relate to 
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euphoria sclerotica, 11 to eutonia sclerotica, four to spes sclerotica, and 22 to “other”, and the 
percentage of agreement between the 15 raters for the category selected by the majority of 
raters for each question, ranged from 46.67% to 93.33% (see Appendix F3 for the categories 
of questions selected by the raters and the percentage of agreement for each question). 
The answers of the 100 MS participants to the 14 identified questions for euphoria 
sclerotica, 11 for eutonia sclerotica and four for spes sclerotica (questions falling into the 
“other” category were excluded) were then rated by three different raters, according to the 
definitions of Cottrell and Wilson (1926) described earlier.  Each rater was required to give 
an answer a rating of “0” if the type of euphoria was absent, and a “1” if the type of euphoria 
was present.  However, the raters voiced some uncertainty with a number of answers and the 
category “1” was changed to represent a possible presence of the symptom (i.e. the 
participant answered some questions in a manner that indicated the definitive presence of the 
symptom, but other questions in a manner that seemed as though the symptom was absent), 
and “2” became representative of a definite presence of the symptom.  Following further 
disagreement, and uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the answers, a specific rating 
criterion was created (see Appendix G for a detailed description of the criteria for definite 
presence and definite absence of euphoria sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica and spes sclerotica).  
and this was used to determine definite and possible cases of euphoria sclerotica, eutonia 
sclerotica and spes sclerotica, of which only the definite cases were used for the analyses 
below. 
Third, additional modern measures, the majority of which had good psychometric 
properties, and are recognised measures of positive mood, optimism and unawareness, were 
included.  Both informant based questions and self-report questionnaires administered to the 
MS participants were used.  These were described in detail in the methods section, but the 
informant measures included Likert-type scales for mood (ranging from very happy/euphoric 
to very sad/depressed) and outlook (ranging from very optimistic to very pessimistic), and 
Likert-types scales for unawareness where the informant was asked to rate how 
aware/unaware they thought their loved-one was regarding any physical, cognitive and/or 
mood/behavioural difficulties (all scales ranged from 1 very aware, to 10 very unaware). 
In terms of self-reported measures of positive mood (euphoria sclerotica), the positive 
sub-scale of the PANAS and the well-being sub-scale of the ISS were included.  For 
optimism (spes sclerotica), the CRJRF and the optimism sub-scales of the OPS and LOT-R 
were used.  Due to the slightly complicated nature of the measures pertaining to unawareness, 
these will be described in more detail.  Although this research used the classical definitions as 
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a framework, it adopted a more modern approach to the measurement of eutonia sclerotica, 
and negative differences, where the participants under-estimated their difficulties as 
compared to their informants’ reports, were considered to represent unawareness, a technique 
that is considered to be the gold standard method in research of awareness (see, e.g. Prigatano 
et al., 1990).  Furthermore, instead of restricting eutonia sclerotica to unawareness of physical 
deficit alone (measured by the PAS), as per the definition of Cottrell and Wilson (1926), 
some of the researchers investigating euphoria in the 21st century (see, e.g. Carone et al., 
2005) have examined unawareness in terms of personality and cognitive impairment, thus 
participant/informant discrepancies on additional measures which addressed unawareness of 
cognitive (i.e. the AI) and mood/behavioural changes (i.e. the NPI) were also included.  
These measures did not only refer to severe disability though, and included questions that 
related to extremely mild impairment, such as an ability to walk but not to run, or the ability 
to orient oneself to place and time but not to remember the word for something, or the 
absence of hallucinations or delusions, but the presence of sadness or depression.  Thus, any 
participant experiencing even mild problems had the potential to be unaware, if they 
underestimated these mild problems in comparison with their informant.  However, the 
greater the disability of the MS participant, the greater the potential for unawareness of these 
deficits. 
Returning to the differences between the classical and contemporary measures: In 
terms of euphoria sclerotica, self-reports of euphoria according to the NPI (modern measure) 
did not correlate well with definite cases of euphoria according to the classical measure, by 
means of a Phi correlation (Φ = -.02, p = .809), or with high-scorers5 on other modern self-
report measures of more subtle positive mood: the positive sub-scale of PANAS (Φ = .12, p = 
.220), and the well-being sub-scale of ISS (Φ = -.08, p = .413) 6.  Whereas, although definite 
euphoria sclerotica (according to the classical measure) did not correlate with self-reported 
NPI euphoria (modern measure), it did demonstrate better correlations with high-scoring 
cases on the other modern measures of more subtle positive mood: positive sub-scale of 
PANAS (Φ = .17, p = .086), and well-being sub-scale of ISS (Φ = .30, p = .003).   
                                                 
5 Described briefly in the section on data analysis, high-scorers refer to those participants who scored within the 
top quartile (75% or more) according to the scale’s minimum and maximum. 
6 It should be noted here that the other modern self-report measures of positive mood correlated well with each 
other (rpb = .73, p=.0001) and that cases representing high-scores on the one correlated well with cases 
representing high-scores on the other (Φ = .38, p = .0001). Therefore, the poor correlations presented in this 
section are not just the result of generally poorly correlated measures. 
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As mentioned, informant-based administration of the NPI was also investigated, as 
the NPI is traditionally an informant-based questionnaire and self-reported euphoria may 
therefore not correlate well with other measures.  Like self-reported NPI euphoria, however, 
the informant-reported NPI euphoria also did not correlate with definite cases of euphoria 
according to the classical measure, in terms of a Phi correlation (Φ = -.02, p = .808), or with 
cases of high-scorers on the modern self-report measures of more subtle positive mood: 
positive sub-scale of PANAS (Φ = .06, p = .523), and well-being sub-scale of ISS (Φ = .06, p 
= .523).  
In addition, the informant-based NPI euphoria ratings did not correlate well with other 
informant ratings of positive mood (where informants were asked to rate their loved-ones on 
a scale of 1 = sad/depressed, to 10 = very happy/euphoric), based on a point-biserial 
correlation (rpb = .02, p = .858).  In contrast, the definite cases of euphoria, in terms of the 
classical measure, did correlate with informant ratings of positive mood (rpb = .26, p = .010).   
Thus, self-reported or informant reported euphoria according to the more extreme 
definition of the NPI did not correlate well with (a) the more subtly defined positive mood of 
the classical CWQ, (b) the more subtly defined positive mood of the other modern measures 
(i.e. the PANAS and ISS), or (c) the more subtly defined positive mood ratings of the 
informants.  In contrast, the measures of less extreme and more subtle mood (i.e. the other 
modern measures, the informant ratings, as well as the CWQ) appeared to correlate well with 
each other, indicating a distinction between the NPI and the other measures of positive mood.   
In terms of eutonia sclerotica, further differences between classical and contemporary 
eutonia sclerotica, are also highlighted by correlations between the various measures 
investigated in this study.  Definite cases of eutonia sclerotica according to the classical 
measure did not correlate well, via point-biserial correlations, with cases where there were 
negative discrepancies indicated unawareness of cognitive deficits7 (rpb = .01, p = .963), or 
cases where unawareness of mood/behavioural changes was indicated (rpb = .15, p = .124). 
However, definite cases of eutonia sclerotica according to the classical measure did not 
correlate well with cases where unawareness of physical deficits were indicated either (Φ = 
.03, p = .800).  Although this research approached the study of euphoria from the classical 
perspective of Cottrell and Wilson (1926), eutonia sclerotica was measured in terms of 
unawareness of physical deficit, which could be different from a sense of physical well-
                                                 
7 Described in greater detail in part two, unawareness was calculated via participant/informant discrepancies on 
particular questionnaires and a negative discrepancy between participant and informant ratings denoted those 
participants who underestimated their deficits, and were, thus, considered to be unaware. 
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being.  This could be why these two measures were poorly correlated, but it also highlights 
the difference between these measures, and the definitions that underpin them.   
Finally, with reference to spes sclerotica, further evidence for changes in definitions 
are again evident when comparing the measures investigated in this study.  Definite cases of 
spes sclerotica in terms the classical CWQ correlated well, via a Phi correlation, with cases 
representative of high-scores on the optimism sub-scale of the OPS (Φ = .26, p = .010), and 
the optimism sub-scale of the LOT-R (Φ = .28, p = .005), which are general measures of 
optimism and of feelings about the future and are, thus, similar in nature to the original 
definition.  In contrast, definite cases of spes sclerotica (classical measure) were not found to 
correlate well, via a point-biserial correlation, with the CRJRF which is a measure of 
unrealistic optimism (rpb = .11, p = .280).  Further, high-scoring cases on the more extreme 
CRJRF (unrealistic optimism) did not correlate particularly well with high-scoring cases on 
the measures of more subtle optimism: the OPS (Φ = .09, p = .367), and the LOT-R (Φ = .17, 
p = .091).   
From the above descriptions it appears evident that a change in not only the number 
of types of euphoria, but also in the definitions of those types appears to have occurred 
between the original definition of Cottrell and Wilson (1926) and the contemporary 
definitions and measurement instruments of these constructs. 
 
Frequencies of euphoria. Possibly the most obvious discrepancy between the 
classical and contemporary literature is that of the incidence of the types of euphoria within 
MS patients.  The aim of this sub-section was therefore to address this inconsistency and I 
hypothesised that the various measurement instruments used by classical and contemporary 
researchers would influence the rates of euphoria found in MS patients.  It was furthermore 
hypothesised that high rates of euphoria would be replicated by using the classical 
description/definition and that low rates of euphoria would be replicated by using the 
contemporary description/definition.  
 
The classical view.  In their 1926 article, Cottrell and Wilson (1926) reported high 
incidence rates of euphoria sclerotica (63%), eutonia sclerotica (84%) and spes sclerotica 
(84%) in their sample of 100 MS participants.  However, as mentioned in the previous sub-
section, they did not specify the rating criteria imposed to determine these frequencies and I 
therefore created my own rating criteria.  Initially a present or absent criterion was used, but 
after concern was raised by the raters regarding a mixed picture in some answers, I had each 
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of the three raters give each answer a “2” if they considered the symptom to be definitely 
present, a “1” if the symptom was possibly present, and a “0” if the symptom was absent. 
This resulted in the following frequencies (see Table 5 below). 
 
Table 5  
Rater Frequencies of CWQ Euphoria Sclerotica, Eutonia Sclerotica and Spes Sclerotica, 
Amongst the MS Participants (n = 100) 
 
Euphoria sclerotica  Eutonia sclerotica  Spes sclerotica 
Def. Pos. Tot.  Def. Pos. Tot.  Def. Pos. Tot. 
#1 23% 38% 61%  10% 39% 49%  38% 33% 71% 
#2 21% 47% 68%  7% 27% 34%  15% 62% 77% 
#3 6% 40% 46%  9% 40% 49%  12% 61% 73% 
Note. Total frequencies are presented in bold font.  Def. = definitely present; Pos. = possibly present; 
Tot. = total. 
 
Inter-rater reliability of the three raters, according to a single measures intraclass correlation 
coefficient, was moderate, although still significant: (a) ICC = .50 for euphoria sclerotica, (b) 
ICC = .33 for eutonia sclerotica, and (c) ICC = .56 for spes sclerotica (all p values < .0001). 
Raters again voiced their difficulties in interpreting the answers and it was discovered 
that each was using slightly different criteria.  Consensus was then reached as to specific 
rating criteria (again, see Appendix G), and the following frequencies of the three euphoric 
types were found (see Table 6 below), with a much improved inter-rater reliability of: (a) ICC 
= .82 for euphoria sclerotica, (b) ICC = .60 for eutonia sclerotica, and (c) ICC = .90 for spes 
sclerotica (all p values < .0001). 
 
Table 6 Rater Frequencies of CWQ Euphoria Sclerotica, Eutonia Sclerotica and Spes 
Sclerotica (with Rating Criteria in Place), Amongst the MS Participants (n = 100) 
 
Euphoria sclerotica  Eutonia sclerotica  Spes sclerotica 
Def. Pos. Tot.  Def. Pos. Tot.  Def. Pos. Tot. 
#1 21% 39% 60%  10% 36% 46%  37% 32% 69% 
#2 27% 38% 65%  7% 33% 40%  41% 34% 75% 
#3 22% 43% 65%  10% 42% 52%  37% 37% 74% 
Note. Total frequencies are presented in bold font.  Def. = definitely present; Pos. = possibly present; 
Tot. = total. 
 
The average of all three raters was then calculated and rounded up or down to the nearest 
whole number, with “0” again indicating an absence of the symptom, “1” again indicating a 
confused or mixed picture which led raters to select a possible presence, and “2” the definite 
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presence of the symptom. The following frequencies of the three types of euphoria, depicted 
below in Table 7, were therefore demonstrated in this sample of 100 MS participants. 
 
Table 7  
Frequencies of CWQ Euphoria Sclerotica, Eutonia Sclerotica and Spes Sclerotica, Amongst 
the MS Participants (n = 100) 
Frequency Euphoria sclerotica  Eutonia sclerotica  Spes sclerotica 
Def. Pos. Tot.  Def. Pos. Tot.  Def. Pos. Tot. 
Average ratings 21% 42% 63%  6% 42% 48%  37% 33% 70% 
Note. Total frequencies are presented in bold font.  Def. = definitely present; Pos. = possibly present; 
Tot. = total. 
 
In addition to disagreement on how to unequivocally determine the frequencies of euphoria, 
another problem with this measure was that Cottrell and Wilson (1926) defined spes 
sclerotica in terms of feelings toward the future and prospects of ultimate recovery, but 
included no questions relating to this.  In order to fully investigate the symptom as per the 
original definition, questions such as, “How do you feel about the future?”, “Do you think 
your MS will get better, stay the same, or get worse in the future?”, and, “Do you believe one 
can ultimately recover from MS?” were included and asked of all MS participants. The three 
raters were then asked to re-rate spes sclerotica by taking both the answers to the old and the 
new questions into account.  The following rates (depicted in Table 8) were demonstrated 




Table 8  
Frequencies of CWQ Euphoria Sclerotica, Eutonia Sclerotica and Spes Sclerotica, Including Additional Questions of Spes Sclerotica, Amongst 
the MS Participants (n = 100) 
Frequency Euphoria sclerotica  Eutonia sclerotica  Spes sclerotica  
(original questions only) 
 Spes sclerotica  
(original and new questions) 
Def. Pos. Tot.  Def. Pos. Tot.  Def. Pos. Tot.  Def. Pos. Tot. 
Average ratings 21% 42% 63%  6% 42% 48%  37% 33% 70%  27% 39% 66% 
Note. Total frequencies are presented in bold font.  Def. = definitely present; Pos. = possibly present; Tot. = total. 
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As one can see from the descriptive statistics above, taking the new questions into account 
reduced the incidence of spes sclerotica from 70% to 66%, or of definite spes sclerotica from 
37% to 27%.  However, in terms of reporting frequencies, since no guidance was given 
regarding the interpretation of this measure, if one presumes that my criteria for a definite 
presence of the symptom were too strict and one includes the unsure or possibly present 
cases, euphoria sclerotica was demonstrated in 63%, eutonia sclerotica in 48%, and spes 
sclerotica (in terms of what the original measure elicited) in 70% of the current sample of MS 
participants, by a measure that defines the euphoric concepts in a subtle way. 
 
The contemporary view. In this sample, 11% were regarded as demonstrating 
euphoria sclerotica according to the standard informant-based administration of the NPI 
which regards euphoria as being a persistent and abnormally good mood.  That is 11% of 
informants believed their loved-one, who had MS, to be euphoric as per the NPI description. 
By contrast, 16% self-reported the symptom of euphoria sclerotica when the same question 
was asked of them (i.e. the MS participants) instead of their informant.  
As described above, the NPI asks only about a “persistent and abnormally good 
mood” (Cummings et al., 1994), and does not address aspects relating to eutonia sclerotica or 
spes sclerotica.  Thus, frequencies of these other types cannot be reported with reference to 
the dominant contemporary measure.   
 Therefore, high rates were replicated by the classical measure (if one includes the 
possibly present cases) that defines euphoria in more subtle ways, and low rates were 
replicated by the modern measure which uses slightly more extreme definitions.  Thus, 
evidence in support of the hypotheses was found.  However, since it appears that incidence 
rates can be influenced by operational definitions, the findings further highlight the need for 
consistency regarding the number of types, and the definition of those types so that these 
symptoms can be better explored and the frequencies better described amongst MS 
participants. 
 
 Additional and different contemporary measures.  Important questions relating to 
the constructs of euphoria, including questions surrounding the number of types of euphoria 
that exist, the definitions of these types, and the frequencies of these types was investigated 
above according to a classical and the popular contemporary measures.  However, each 
measure appears to have its own limitations and were even thought to influence the rates of 
euphoria.  Thus, additional and different popular measures, with good reliability and validity, 
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that are used today to assess positive mood, unawareness and optimism, were included to 
investigate these constructs further. 
I gave a description of these earlier in part one.  But, to remind the reader, these 
included informant based Likert-type scales of positive mood, optimism and unawareness of 
physical, cognitive and mood/behavioural deficits.  In terms of the MS participants 
themselves, self-report measures were used, and the positive, well-being and optimistic sub-
scales of the PANAS, ISS, LOT-R and OPS (respectively), as well as the unrealistic sub-
scale of the CRJRF were included to represent positive mood (euphoria sclerotica) and 
optimism (spes sclerotica).  For unawareness (eutonia sclerotica), both participants and their 
informants completed questionnaires regarding potential physical (PAS), cognitive (AI) 
and/or mood/behavioural difficulties (NPI).  According to the accepted method of awareness 
research (see Prigatano et al., 1990), the MS participants’ self-reports of physical, cognitive 
and mood/behavioural difficulties were compared with their informants’ reports and the 
resulting discrepancy scores formed the scales for awareness, with negative discrepancies 
(where participants under-estimated their deficits) representing unawareness.   
In terms of the aims of this sub-section, these measures were used to determine how 
many types of euphoria really do exist, and at what frequencies.  As I approached this 
question from the classical perspective, I hypothesised that more than one type exists and that 
the frequencies of the types would be closer to that of Cottrell and Wilson (1926) than of the 
frequencies reported today. 
 
Number of types and definitions of the types of euphoria. This section aimed to 
investigate whether three types of euphoria do in fact exist as per the classical definition, or 
whether there is only one type of euphoria, as is believed by some researchers today.  Further, 
it aimed to present a description of these types to aid future research.  As the contemporary 
definitions are characterised by confusion and the contemporary measure investigates only 
one type, the questions of this section were approached from the classical theoretical 
perspective.  Thus, with regard to the number of types I hypothesised that more than one type 
of euphoria exists.   
The first clinicians to describe euphoria in MS patients did so objectively. Thus, 
informant reports (i.e. the Likert-type scales) of their MS loved-one’s mood, unawareness 
and optimism were analysed first to investigate the number of types of euphoria.  Based on 
the theoretical framework of three types of euphoria, a principal components factor analysis, 
using promax rotation and suppression of coefficients of .400 or below, with an extraction 
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method based on 3 fixed factors was run.  This yielded the following results (see Table 9 for 
the pattern matrix).   
 
Table 9  
Factor Analysis of Informant Measures Using a Three Factor Solution 
 Component 
Informant rating 1 2 3 
Euphoria sclerotica    
     Positive mood .84   
Eutonia sclerotica    
     Unawareness of physical deficit   .99 
     Unawareness of cognitive deficit  .79  
     Unawareness of mood/ behavioural  
     difficulties 
 .97  
Spes sclerotica    
     Optimism .96   
Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α) .78 .77  
 
One factor relating to euphoria sclerotica and spes sclerotica was demonstrated, with the 
informant ratings of their loved-ones’ positive/negative mood and optimism/pessimism 
loading onto this factor.  The other two factors related to unawareness of deficit.  
Unawareness of physical deficit (with the informant ratings of their loved-one’s awareness of 
physical symptoms) loaded onto one factor, while unawareness of cognitive and mood or 
behavioural deficits (with the informant ratings of their loved-one’s awareness of cognitive 
and mood/behavioural symptoms) loaded onto the other factor. 
The same variables and analysis were then used, but the extraction method was 
changed to the criterion of eigenvalues of greater than one, in order to determine the number 
of types of euphoria without forcing a particular factor solution (see Table 10 below for the 
pattern matrix results).  
 
Table 10  
Factor Analysis of Informant Measures Based on Eigenvalues of Greater Than One 
 Component 
Informant rating 1 2 
Euphoria sclerotica    
     Positive mood  .85 
Eutonia sclerotica   
     Unawareness of physical deficit .80  
     Unawareness of cognitive deficit .85  
     Unawareness of mood/ behavioural  .79  
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     difficulties 
Spes sclerotica   
     Optimism  .95 
Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α) .78 .75 
 
Two factors emerged.  The first was a combined euphoria and spes sclerotica type (with 
informant ratings of their loved-one’s mood and outlook loading onto this factor). The second 
factor was a eutonia sclerotica type (with informant ratings of their loved-one’s unawareness 
of physical, cognitive, and mood/behavioural deficits loading onto this factor).  
Euphoria sclerotica (in terms of positive mood), is sometimes, particularly by the 
classical literature, described and measured as an outward expression of positive mood.  But 
it has been discovered that when pushed, the patient can acknowledge an inward feeling of 
depression, or of less positive mood than of how they appear to others (see Surridge, 1969, 
for a critique on relying on objective observation alone).  Informant-based measures may, 
therefore, not be an appropriate way of measuring euphoria and its types.  Therefore, the 
additional modern self-report measures discussed above, used in mood, awareness and 
outlook research today, were also investigated in terms of a factor analysis.  Because Cottrell 
and Wilson (1926) believed there to be three types, a principal components factor analysis, 
with an extraction method initially based on 3 fixed factors was again run. A promax rotation 
was used and coefficients below .400 were suppressed. The results of the pattern matrix are 
represented in Table 11 below. 
 
Table 11  
Factor Analysis of Self-Report Measures Using a Three Factor Solution 
 Component 
Measure/Variable 1 2 3 
Euphoria sclerotica    
     Positive sub-scale of PANAS .83   
     Well-being sub-scale of ISS .82   
Eutonia scleroticaa    
     Physical unawareness (PAS)  .60  
     Cognitive unawareness (AI)  .78  
     Mood unawareness (NPI)  .75  
Spes sclerotica    
     Optimism sub-scale of OPS .87   
     Optimism sub-scale of LOT-R .84   
     Unrealistic optimism (CRJRF)    .95 
Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α) .75 .22 - 
Note.  PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; ISS = Internal State Scale; PAS = Physical 
Ability Scale; AI = Awareness Interview; NPI = Neuropsychiatric Inventory; OPS = Optimism and 
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Pessimism Scale; LOT-R = Life Orientation Test-Revised; CRJRF = Comparative Risk Judgement 
Rating Form. 
a = determined via patient/informant discrepancies. 
 
Because a three factor extraction method was used, the analysis indicated three factors.  The 
first revolved around positive mood (euphoria sclerotica) and optimism (spes sclerotica).  The 
positive sub-scale of the PANAS and the well-being sub-scale of the ISS (both included as 
measures of positive mood), and the optimism sub-scale of the OPS and the optimism sub-
scale of the LOT-R (both included as measures of optimism) loaded onto this factor. The 
second factor related to unawareness of deficits. Patient/informant discrepancies on the PAS 
(physical), the AI (cognitive) and the NPI (mood/behavioural) loaded onto this factor.  The 
third factor related to unrealistic optimism, with only the CRJRF loading onto this factor. 
 A second factor analysis was performed, using the same variables. It was again a 
principal components factor analysis, with a promax rotation, and coefficients below .400 
were suppressed.  However, as with the informant based variables, the extraction method was 
again changed to the criterion of eigenvalues of greater than one.  The results of this pattern 
matrix are presented in Table 12 below. 
 
Table 12  
Factor Analysis of Self-Report Measures Based on Eigenvalues of Greater Than One 
 Component 
Measure/Variable 1 2 
Euphoria sclerotica   
     Positive sub-scale of PANAS .84  
     Well-being sub-scale of ISS .84  
Eutonia scleroticaa   
     Physical unawareness (PAS)  .70 
     Cognitive unawareness (AI)  .73 
     Mood unawareness (NPI)  .67 
Spes sclerotica   
     Optimism sub-scale of OPS .86  
     Optimism sub-scale of LOT-R .85  
     Unrealistic optimism (CRJRF)    
Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α) .75 .22 
Note.  PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; ISS = Internal State Scale; PAS = Physical 
Ability Scale; AI = Awareness Interview; NPI = Neuropsychiatric Inventory; OPS = Optimism and 
Pessimism Scale; LOT-R = Life Orientation Test-Revised;  CRJRF = Comparative Risk Judgement 
Rating Form. 




Two factors emerged. One again related to euphoria sclerotica and spes sclerotica.  The same 
measures loaded onto this factor (i.e. the positive sub-scale of the PANAS, the well-being 
sub-scale of the ISS, the optimism sub-scale of the OPS and the optimism sub-scale of the 
LOT-R). The second factor again related to eutonia sclerotica, and again the same measures 
loaded onto this factor (i.e. the patient/informant discrepancies on the PAS [physical], the AI 
[cognitive], and the NPI [mood/behavioural]). The measure of unrealistic optimism (i.e. the 
CRJRF) did not load onto either of these factors. 
Additional measures, that were different from both the classical and contemporary 
measures, were specifically chosen to determine the number of types of euphoria. However, it 
was decided to test the two types of euphoria identified above in terms of the main popular 
measures in euphoria research.  Since the NPI only refers to positive mood (euphoria 
sclerotica), this measure could not be investigated; however, a principal components factor 
analysis, with a promax rotation, a suppression of coefficients below .400 and an extraction 
criterion based on two fixed factors was run using only definite cases of the three types of 
euphoria identified from the data using the CWQ (which was also a self-report measure).  
The results of the pattern matrix are presented in Table 13 below.  
 
Table 13  
Factor Analysis of the CWQ Based on Eigenvalues of Greater Than One 
 Component 
Measure/Variable 1 2 
Euphoria sclerotica .86  
Eutonia sclerotica  .93 
Spes sclerotica .68  
Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α) .35 - 
 
Once again, the same two factors emerged: one relating to euphoria sclerotica and spes 
sclerotica.  The definite cases of euphoria and spes sclerotica, according to the answers of the 
100 MS participants to the CWQ, loaded onto this factor.  The second factor related to 
eutonia sclerotica, and the definite cases of eutonia sclerotica, according to the answers of the 
100 MS participants to the CWQ, loaded onto this factor.   
 The results, therefore, appear to suggest that two types of euphoria exist, even when 
data from the original measure that was designed to elicit three distinct types is used.  In 
terms of defining these two types a little better, I shall name the first type positivity.  It 
encompasses positive mood and optimism and, based on its component measures of more 
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subtle positive mood and optimism, is similar to the original definitions of euphoria sclerotica 
and spes sclerotica combined.  I shall refer to the second type as unawareness.  It is, in part, 
similar to the original definition of eutonia sclerotica in terms of unawareness of physical 
deficit, but it also includes unawareness of other domains. 
 Therefore, support for more than one type of euphoria was established with the 
finding of two latent constructs: positivity and unawareness.  In terms of better defining these 
types, positivity appears to be based on something similar to the original euphoria sclerotica 
and spes sclerotica, while in contrast to the original definition, unawareness appears to relate 
to any one or a combination of the domains of physical, cognitive and/or mood/behavioural 
unawareness.   
 
Frequencies of euphoria.  The second aim of this sub-section was to address the 
issue regarding the frequency of these symptoms.  Since Cottrell and Wilson (1926) 
demonstrated such high frequencies, and since I approached this section from the classical 
perspective, I hypothesised that the frequencies of the new types (i.e. those defined via factor 
analysis in the previous section) would be closer to that of Cottrell and Wilson (1926) than 
the frequencies found today. 
Before the prevalence of these two types could be determined, an attempt needed to 
be made to create composite variables that represented the two new types.  Because (a) self-
reported euphoria may be more reliable than that of informant reports, and (b) the classical 
measure may have limitations, the additional modern self-report measures included in the 
factor analyses reported in Table 12, were used for this endeavour.  These included the 
positive sub-scale of the PANAS, the well-being sub-scale of the ISS, the optimism sub-scale 
of the OPS, and the optimism sub-scale of the LOT-R, which represented positivity; and, 
participant/informant discrepancies on the PAS, the AI, and the NPI, which represented 
unawareness.  Although these measures loaded onto the two factors, while positivity had a 
good internal consistency (α = .746), unawareness did not (α = .224), thus inter-correlations 
between the relevant variables were calculated, as an additional method of checking their 
suitability for creating composite variables before the composites were created. The results of 
these analyses are presented in Tables 14 and 15. 
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Table 14  










PANAS (positive sub-scale) - .73 .51 .60 
ISS (well-being sub-scale) .73 - .56 .65 
OPS (optimism sub-scale) .51 .56 - .60 
LOT-R (optimism sub-scale) .60 .65 .60 - 
Note. PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; ISS = Internal State Scale; OPS = Optimism and Pessimism Scale; LOT-R = Life Orientation Test-
Revised.  
All p values < .001. 
 
Table 15  








Physical (PAS) - .22 (p = .029) .23 (p = .020) 
Cognitive (AI) .22 (p = .029) - .35 (p = .0001) 
Mood/behavioural (NPI) .23 (p = .020) .35 (p = .0001) - 




The component measures of positivity were well correlated, indicating that those who scored 
high on measures of positive mood, also scored high on measures of optimism. In order to 
create a composite variable where descriptive statistics could still be obtained, the variance of 
each scale was calculated and all relevant scales were manipulated so that they fitted onto one 
scale, all with the same range of variance. For positivity, the composite correlated well with 
the original individual measures (all p values < .001; see Appendix H for the full results), and 
the composite was created, defined in terms of its more subtle component measures, similar 
in nature to the original definitions of euphoria sclerotica and spes sclerotica. 
Patient/informant discrepancies on the PAS, the AI and the NPI (as per the factor 
analysis results of Table 12) were less well correlated with each other (explaining the poor 
internal consistency of this factor).  Furthermore, when the actual participants classified as 
unaware were examined, although a certain amount of overlap did occur, of the 61 MS 
participants to demonstrate at least one type of unawareness, only two (3.3%) demonstrated 
unawareness of both cognitive and mood domains, six (9.8%) demonstrated unawareness of 
both physical and cognitive domains, eight (13.1%) presented with unawareness of both 
physical and mood domains, and four (6.6%) of MS participants presented with all three 
types of unawareness.  This meant that having one type of unawareness did not necessarily 
mean that you were unaware in the other domains too. Therefore, although the various types 
of unawareness loaded onto one factor within the factor analysis, and clearly represent a 
second type of euphoria, it seems apparent that the components of this type need to be 
addressed separately.  
Following the computation of the composite variable of positivity, the frequencies of 
this composite were calculated. However, neither the composite scale nor the original modern 
measures used to create the composite explicitly stated how to measure the presence of the 
symptoms.  Therefore a method of analysis was created whereby the positivity composite 
scale was divided into quartiles and those participants who scored within the top quartile (i.e. 
75% or more according to the scale’s minimum and maximum scores) were considered to 
have scored high on that item. A description of these results are presented in Table 16, and 
according to this definition, 13% of the MS sample demonstrated high positivity, the new 
type of euphoria related to euphoria sclerotica and spes sclerotica, encompassing both 




Table 16  






75% cut-off point 




50% - 75% cut-off 
point 
No. of MS participants 
demonstrating moderate 
positivity 
Positivity composite 0 216 162 13 108-162 54 
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However, although the individual variables that made up the composite were well correlated, 
to impose a cut-off at 75% for a composite created from four variables may be a little strict.  
In addition, if one takes into account the subtle nature of the original definitions of Cottrell 
and Wilson (1926), as well as that of others such as Diaz-Olavarrieta et al. (1999) who view 
these patients as being unusually cheerful rather than demonstrating extremely high positive 
mood, this strict criterion may result in the exclusion of a large proportion of MS participants 
that are in fact demonstrating positivity.  The only reason the 75% cut-off method was 
employed was because all other euphoric research used a present versus absent means of 
diagnosis.  But, since this symptom was measured using continuous scales, presenting the 
symptom on a continuum may be more relevant.  However, since scores on a continuum 
cannot be compared with past research, the number of MS participants who fell within the 
range between the halfway point and the top quartile cut-off point was also calculated and 
according to this criterion, 54% of the sample demonstrated moderate positivity.   
The incidence rates of unawareness were also calculated. Table 17 depicts the results 
based on a similar analysis of the MS participants’ answers, but for the variables relating to 
unawareness. The method of measurement and analysis was described in the previous 
section, but it is worth re-iterating that the greater the disability of the MS participant, the 
greater their chances of being unaware, in terms of this method of measurement.  Therefore a 
certain degree of impairment is implied for high or moderate to high rates of unawareness, 
but no participant met the criteria for high unawareness when the cut-off was set at 75% of 
the scale’s maximum score. Even at the 50% cut-off point, no participants were classified as 
demonstrating moderate unawareness.  
When the intensity of unawareness was ignored and unawareness was defined only in 
terms of a negative discrepancy between participant and informant where the participant 
underestimated their deficits compared to the ratings made by their informant, it was found 
that 45% of the MS participants underestimated their physical deficits, 16% underestimated 
their cognitive deficits, and 24% underestimated their mood/behavioural difficulties.  Thus, 
fairly large numbers of the MS group were unaware of their problems, but none demonstrated 
enough disability, or underestimated their problems significantly enough to be regarded as 
having high or even moderate unawareness.  
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Table 17  
The Number of MS Participants Demonstrating Unawareness (n = 100) 






75% cut-off point 




(n = 100) 
Moderate 
unawareness: 
50% cut-off point 




(n = 100) 
No. of unaware 
MS participants 
(n = 100) 
     PAS (physical) 0 -28 -21 0 -14 0 45 
     AI (cognitive) 0 -10 -7 0 -5 0 16 
     NPI (mood/behaviour)  0 -144 -108 0 -72 0 24 
Note. PAS = Physical Ability Scale; AI = Awareness Interview; NPI = Neuropsychiatric Inventory. 
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Thus, it may be appropriate for both positivity and unawareness to lie on a continuum, rather 
than to impose a cut-off point to denote the presence of absence of the symptoms.  However, 
when cut-off points were imposed, low rates of high positivity and unawareness were 
demonstrated, while high rates of lower positivity and unawareness (defined by the moderate 
category for positivity and simply the unaware category for unawareness) were demonstrated.   
Thus mixed findings, which will be discussed further in the discussion section. 
 Furthermore, like the original definition of Cottrell and Wilson (1926), positivity was 
defined in more subtle terms; but unawareness was defined in terms of three domains: 
physical, cognitive and mood/behavioural deficits. 
 
Summary of part one.  The main aim of part one was to investigate the constructs of 
euphoria and to address the discrepancies evident in the literature.  The results presented 
implied several changes in the types of euphoria and the definitions of those types, and the 
potential problems associated with the measurement instruments.  Further, results showed 
that two types of euphoria, not three or one, appear to exist, that the type pertaining to the 
original eutonia sclerotica may include additional aspects, and, further, that the two types of 








Part two.  Describing and predicting positivity and unawareness 
The main aims of part two were to investigate the new types of euphoria (viz. positivity and 
unawareness), within the current MS sample, in order to better understand, and predict these 
symptoms.  This was attempted by first expanding on the new types of euphoria, and by 
describing them further, the results of which are presented below.  No hypotheses were 
presented in this regard.  In order to be able to predict which MS participants might display 
the two types, the disease and cognitive correlates of these types were also investigated.  
Here, I hypothesised that the disease correlates of the different types of euphoria would 
differ, and that, due to the approach of this study from the classical perspective, the euphoric 
types would occur both early and late in the disease, with either little or severe physical 
disability. It was also hypothesised that the cognitive correlates of the euphoric types would 
differ, and that at least one of the euphoric types would correlate with impairment on 
neuropsychological tests of cortical domains of function. 
 
Describing positivity and unawareness.  From the previous section it appears that 
two types of euphoria exist within some MS patients that relate, at least in part, to the original 
types of euphoria described by Cottrell and Wilson (1926).  The first is that of positivity 
which encompasses positive mood (euphoria sclerotica) and optimism (spes sclerotica).  The 
second is unawareness and relates to unawareness of physical, cognitive and 
mood/behavioural deficits (which is, in part, similar to the original eutonia sclerotica).  
Although the types of euphoria identified were defined in terms of their component parts, 
they were not described in detail and, thus, I shall expand on their definitions in this section. 
 
Do positivity and unawareness occur together or are they two separate symptoms? 
One of the aims of part two was to better define the two types of euphoria, and the aim of this 
sub-section was to address that larger aim by determining whether the two types co-occur or 
whether they reflect distinct symptoms.   
Therefore, first, a correlational analysis was run between positivity and unawareness.  
In order to include the full range of variance, the full scales of awareness were used.  This 
means that the scores of all 100 participants were included and not only the negative scores of 
the unaware participants.  Thus, higher scores indicated greater awareness and lower scores 
greater unawareness. 
One might think that addressing the components of unawareness separately may 
impact on an analysis investigating the connectedness of the two types of euphoria.  
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However, this was found not to be the case, and all domains of unawareness, in terms of the 
full range of the awareness scales, were found to be negatively correlated with positivity (see 
Table 18 below).  As the full sample was used, this negative correlation means that as 
positivity increases, so does unawareness. 
 
Table 18  
Pearson Correlations Between Positivity Scores and Awareness Scores (n = 100) 
Variable Physical (PAS) Cognitive (AI) Mood/behavioural (NPI) 
Positivity -.23 (p = .022) -.29 (p = .003) -.32 (p = .001) 
Note. PAS = Physical Ability Scale; AI = Awareness Interview; NPI = Neuropsychiatric Inventory. 
 
Descriptive statistics were then used to determine how many MS participants, from 
the total sample of 100, demonstrated either or both symptoms, in order to determine if 





Table 19  
Number of Participants Demonstrating Either of Both High Positivity and Unawareness 
 Unawareness (n = 61)  High positivity (n = 13)  
Variable 
Without high positivity  Without any 
unawareness 
Plus 1 type of 
unawareness 
Plus 2 types of 
unawareness 
Plus all 3 types of 
unawareness 
Number of participants 52 (85.2%)  4 (30.7%) 5 (38.7%) 2 (15.4%) 2 (15.4%) 
Note.  High positivity was defined in terms of the 75% cut-off point of the composite scale’s minimum and maximum.  Unawareness was defined by negative 
discrepancies between participant and informant where the participant under-estimated their deficits on various domains. 
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From the results above it can be seen that as many as 15.4% of the 13 MS participants 
demonstrating high positivity demonstrated this symptom in combination with unawareness 
of all three domains.  When considering that each area of unawareness was treated separately, 
this is quite a high percentage of co-occurrence.  Further, 69.3%, of the 13 MS participants 
demonstrating high positivity, demonstrated some form of unawareness in conjunction with 
their high positivity, also indicating a high rate of co-occurrence.  However, these types did 
not necessarily co-occur, as 30.7% of the sub-group of MS participants to demonstrate high 
positivity did so without the presence of any unawareness.  Equally, of the 61 MS 
participants to demonstrate at least one type of unawareness, 85.2% demonstrated this alone, 
without also scoring in the high range for positivity. 
 The same descriptive statistics were applied to those demonstrating positivity at the 
moderate level (i.e. between the 50% and 75% cut-off points) as it was thought that 
restricting positivity to only high levels may limit the potential for co-occurrence of these 
symptoms.  These results, depicted in Table 20, also indicated a high rate of co-occurrence 





Table 20  
Number of Participants Demonstrating Either or Both Moderate Positivity and Unawareness 
 Unawareness (n = 61)  Moderate positivity (n = 54)  
Variable 
Without moderate or 
high positivity 
 Without any 
unawareness 
Plus 1 type of 
unawareness 
Plus 2 types of 
unawareness 
Plus all 3 types of 
unawareness 
Number of participants 17 (27.8%)  19 (35.2%) 23 (42.6%) 10 (18.5%) 2 (3.7%) 
Note.  Moderate positivity was defined in terms of scores falling between the 50% and 75% cut-off points of the composite scale’s minimum and maximum.  






In the above analysis, moderate positivity again occurred on its own (without unawareness) in 
35.2% of the MS participants demonstrating moderate positivity, but unawareness occurred 
on its own (without moderate or high positivity) in only 27.8% of those MS participants 
demonstrating unawareness.  This means that an MS patient can present with unawareness 
without positivity at the reduced moderate level.  However, far fewer participants now 
demonstrated unawareness by itself, and when the entire sample is taken into account, of the 
67 participants demonstrating moderate to high positivity, 44/67 (65.7%) did so in 
conjunction with some form of unawareness.  Furthermore, far more participants presented 
with unawareness of all 3 domains in conjunction with high positivity (15.4%), than they did 
with moderate positivity (3.7%).   
The above results therefore appear to suggest an association between positivity and 
unawareness and that, although these two symptoms can occur separately, they appear to 
have high rates of co-occurrence and most likely reflect two types of euphoria.   
 
 Does depression play a role in euphoria?  Due to the idea of depressed patients being 
misdiagnosed as euphoric, based on their appearance (see Surridge, 1969), and the apparent 
lack of literature specifically examining a relationship between depression and unawareness, I 
wanted to investigate the association between depression and the two types of euphoria 
identified in this study with the aim of better describing the euphoric symptoms identified by 
the current research, viz. positivity and unawareness. 
The level of depression in this sample was first determined by comparing the MS 
group with the HC reference group on the BDI-FS, via a Mann-Whitney U test as the data 
was not normally distributed across groups.  It was found that the MS group were, on 
average, significantly more depressed than the HCs (U = 2068.50, p = .0001), and that, on 
average, the MS group was considered to be mildly depressed according to the BDI-FS cut-
off point of four (M 4.75).   
Pearson correlations between depression and positivity, and between depression and 
the various domains of unawareness (using the full scales of awareness from the full sample 





Table 21  
Pearson Correlations Between Depression and Positivity, and Depression and Awareness (n 
= 100) 
  Awareness of 
Variable Positivity Physical domain Cognitive domain 
Mood/behavioural 
domain 
Depression -.65 (p = .0001) .22 (p = .030) .30 (p = .002) .20 (p = .044) 
 
The results of the above correlations indicate that positivity was significantly and negatively 
correlated with depression, which implies that as positivity increases, depression decreases.   
 For unawareness, the full scales were used including both aware and unaware 
participants in order to include the full range of variance (thus higher scores indicated greater 
awareness).  Positive correlations with depression were seen for all domains of awareness and 
these reached statistical significance for the cognitive and approached significance for the 
physical domain.  These results imply that as unawareness increases, depression decreases.  
These results therefore describe the two types of euphoria a little further, in that positivity and 
unawareness appear to have an inverse relationship with depression. 
 
How euphoric is euphoria?  How positive and unaware are MS patients?  Are they 
observably so? Could one notice it with ease?  Or would one consider them to be normal 
were they not experiencing a devastating, chronic and progressive disease?  An attempt was 
made to answer these questions by comparing the MS participants with a sample of matched 
HCs, with the aim of increasing our understanding of and further describing these symptoms. 
In terms of positivity, since such emphasis has been placed on this symptom by a 
whole history of literature, I hypothesised that the sub-group of MS participants who 
demonstrated high positivity would demonstrate it at similar levels to the HCs who 
demonstrated high positivity, and that the sub-group of MS participants who demonstrated 
moderate positivity would demonstrate it at similar levels to the HCs who demonstrated 
moderate positivity.  As not all MS patients demonstrate these symptoms, however, I 
hypothesised that when the full MS sample’s mood was compared with that of the full sample 
of HCs mood, the MS group would display levels of positivity that were lower than the levels 
displayed by the HCs.   
Before these questions were addressed, however, the two samples were compared on 
key sociodemographic variables to ensure that the two groups were well matched and no 
significant pre-existing between-group differences existed that could contribute to differences 
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in positivity between the two groups.  This was tested by using independent samples t-tests 
for the (normally distributed) continuous data and chi-squared tests of independence for the 
categorical data.  The results of these analyses are presented in Table 22 (with the descriptive 





Table 22  
The Key Sociodemographic Characteristics of the MS Participants and Healthy Controls 
     95% CI  
Key variable 
MS participants 
(n = 100) 
Healthy controls 
(n = 100) 
t (df = 198) / 
X2 (df = 1) 
p 
(2-tailed /  
2-sided) LL UL 
Effect size  
d / V 
Gender – Male:Female 14:86 14:86 .0001 1.000   0.00 
Age 44.49 (11.17) 43.75 (11.02) 0.47 .638 -3.83 2.35 0.07 
Race/ethnicity –  
White:Coloured/Indian 
71:29 73:27 .10 .753   0.02 





-0.32 .752 -5152.58 7126.58 -0.04 
Note. Categorical data are presented in ratios. The data on age, education, and income are presented as means with the standard deviations in parentheses. CI = 
confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
a = Highest level of education obtained, presented in years; it excluded pre-school and grade R and presumed a certificate to be a one year course, a diploma 
to be a two year course, and capped “degree” at three years. 
b = Combined monthly household income. 
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The characteristics of the 100 HCs did not differ significantly from the 100 MS participants 
on any of the key demographic variables listed above (all p values > .01).  Thus, the groups 
were deemed to be similar and the sociodemographic variables explored were not thought to 
represent confounding factors. 
The MS participants and HCs were then compared on positivity, at the various cut-off 
points, using either independent samples t-tests or chi-square tests of independence.  Since 
hypotheses were made, directional one-tailed analyses were run (see Table 23).  
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Table 23  
The Performance on Positivity of the MS Participants Compared with the Healthy Controls for Continuous Data 
     95% CI  
Level of positivity 
MS participants 
(n = 100) 
Healthy controls 
(n = 100) t (df =198) 
p 
(1-tailed) LL UL 
Cohen’s 
d 
Composite (all participants) 122.12 (35.02) 151.14 (28.22) 6.45 .0001 20.15 37.89 -0.91 
Moderate positivity scores (50% - 75% 
cut-off) 
133.02 (15.26) 
(n = 54) 
143.01 (13.92) 
(n = 56) 
3.59 (df = 108) .001 4.47 15.51 -0.68 
High positivity scores (75% cut-off) 176.98 (9.24) 
(n = 13) 
179.14 (13.03) 
(n = 35) 
0.55 (df = 46) .293 -5.78 10.11 -0.46 
Note. All data are presented as means with standard deviations in parentheses. Significant results are presented in bold font.  CI = confidence internal; LL = 
lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
 
Table 24  
The Performance on Positivity of the MS Participants Compared with the Healthy Controls for Categorical Data 
Level of positivity 
MS participants 
(n = 100) 
Healthy controls 
(n = 100) χ2(df =1) 
p 
(1-sided) Cramer’s V 
Moderate-scorers (50%-75% cut-off) 54 56 0.08 .338 0.02 
High-scorers (75% cut-off) 13 35 85.64 .0001 0.80 
  Note.  Significant results are presented in bold font. 
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Results from the inferential statistics reported in Table 23 indicated that the total MS group, 
on average, demonstrated significantly less positivity than the HC reference group.  Those 
participants who scored within the moderate range for positivity (i.e. between the 50% and 
75% cut-off points on the scale, according to the scale’s minimum and maximum) and within 
the high range (i.e. equal to or above the 75% cut-off point) were then identified. From Table 
24, it can be seen that similar rates of MS participants and HCs were classified as moderate 
scorers, but significantly more HCs than MS participants were classified as high-scorers.  In 
Table 23 one can see, however, that the average scores of moderately scoring HCs were 
significantly higher than that of the MS group. When just high-scorers were compared there 
were no significant differences between the average scores for high-scoring HCs and high-
scoring MS participants. Since significant differences existed at the moderate level, the 
hypothesis, that the MS participants would demonstrate similar levels of positivity to the HCs 
(as defined by the two cut-off points denoting moderate to high positivity, and high 
positivity), was rejected. 
 While the measures of positivity were applicable to both groups, as they measured 
subtle mood and outlook and did not represent an extreme symptom that might only be 
appropriate for a patient group, the measures of unawareness were not, as HCs (by their 
healthy nature) cannot present with deficits and thus, cannot demonstrate unawareness of 
deficits.  However, I did want to investigate the intensity or severity of the unawareness of 
the MS group.  Thus, instead of comparing discrepancy scores between MS and HC groups, I 
analysed the difference between the MS participant and the MS informant ratings for the 
scales pertaining to physical, cognitive and mood/behavioural related deficits (a method that 
has been used by other researchers such as Benedict et al., 2001).  I did this by using 
independent samples t-tests to determine if any significant differences between these two 
groups existed for the first two normally distributed variables, and a Mann Whitney U-test for 
the mood/behavioural variable as the data was not normally distributed.  Since unawareness 
has also been emphasised throughout the literature, I hypothesised that the ratings of the MS 
participants would be significantly lower than the ratings of their informants, thus 1-tailed p 
values are reported.  On average (i.e. taking the full sample into account), the analyses 
revealed significant differences between the ratings of the participants and their informants 
for the domains of cognition (t(198) = 4.91, p = .0001, d = 0.70, 95% CI [0.74, 1.72]) and 
mood (U = 3855.00, p = .003), but not for physical deficits (t(198) = -0.60, p = .275, d = 0.08, 
95% CI [-2.83, 1.51]).  Thus, the intensity or severity of the former two domains was greater 
in this sample than the intensity of unawareness of physical deficits.  When just the ratings of 
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the unaware MS participants were compared with those of their informants, differences 
nearing significance were demonstrated between the two groups for physical (t(88) = -2.34, p 
= .011, d = 0.49, 95% CI [-6.09, -0.49]), and cognitive domains (t(30) = -2.45, p = .011, d = 
0.87, 95% CI [-2.64, -0.24]), and significant differences were demonstrated for the 
mood/behavioural domain (U = 173.00, p = .009).  Thus, the sub-sample of MS participants 
that were unaware, as defined by under-estimating their deficits in comparison with their 
informant, significantly (or almost significantly) under-estimated their deficits of all three 
domains.  The hypothesis that the ratings of the MS participants would be significantly lower 
than the ratings of their informants was, therefore, largely accepted. 
 
 A qualitative characterisation. While quantitative analysis is very useful in helping to 
define and describe the symptoms of positivity and unawareness, statistics cannot tell us 
about what an unaware or positive MS participant sounds like, or what words they used to 
describe their feelings.  For this reason, a qualitative content analysis was also performed on 
two open-ended questions.   
Unawareness was difficult to analyse qualitatively, for reasons that will be discussed 
further in the next section.  Thus, the questions analysed applied only to positivity and 
included the CWQ question, “Describe in a few words, your usual or general mood”, as well 
as the question I added to their questionnaire to address the missing aspect of optimism as to 
the future, “How do you feel about the future?”.  A content analysis of these questions was 
completed for both the moderate and high scorers for positivity, and the following themes 
surrounding feelings emerged.  The results of the moderately scoring group are presented 
first. 
 
1. Positive.  Some of the MS participants who were classified as demonstrating 
moderate positivity spoke about feeling positive.  These feelings ranged from feeling 
“sometimes positive” (P79), to “quite positive” (P53), to “very positive” (P39, P98), 
to “extremely positive” (P35). 
 
2. Happy.  Feelings of happiness also ranged from mild to more extreme and included 
descriptions such as, “moody, but happy” (P21), “normally cheerful and happy” 




3. Excited/upbeat. This theme referred to feelings of being “excited” (P49), and “mostly 
upbeat” (P69) or “upbeat” (P55, P63).  P47, a female in her fifties who suffers from 
fatigue and is unable to work but is still active in her community, described herself as: 
I’m… most of the time, full of joy and excitement to encourage others um … to, to 
really um … help other people to grab life and to live it to its fullest. It’s such a 
gift we’ve received um … and, and that is really something. 
 
4. Optimistic.  Many of this group of MS participants also described feelings of 
optimism.  Again a range of optimistic feelings were described, from “optimistic, but 
scared” (P34), to “quite optimistic” (P39), to “always an optimist” (P86). 
 
5. Relaxed/at ease.  Some moderate scorers on positivity described feelings of 
contentment, such as feeling “relaxed” (P42, P89), or “more relaxed than before my 
diagnosis” (P100) “content” (P98), “at ease” (P84), and “laidback” (P84). 
 
6. Neutral.  A number of this group, though, described their feelings in terms of more 
neutral terms.  For example, some descriptions of mood included, “normal” (P31, 
P69) or “just normal” (P27), “easy” (P50), “cool and calm” (P77), or “not excessive 
mood” (P95).  
 
7. General negative feelings.  Others, of this same group, described more negative 
feelings, such as, feeling “apathetic” (P18), “generally positive with some downs” 
(P95), or “sometimes despondent” (P79).  P64, a female in her forties who is also still 
able to work, described her feelings as follows: 
I feel defeated easily– it takes longer after each of life’s setbacks to get my bliss 
back. As if I cannot gather the energy to lift my head and go on like I usually 
could do. As if a sort of depression holds me back. 
 
8. Worried/fearful/uncertain.  A specific group of negative emotions was also identified 
within the descriptions of this group of moderate to high scoring MS participants on 
positivity.  This theme referred to feelings such as, “worry about the future” (P22), 
feeling “uncertain for the future” (P36, P64), feeling “unsure of what the next day will 
be” (P67), of trying “to think positively, but worry[ing] at night” (P86), or of 




Linked to this theme was one where the MS participants worried about future symptoms such 
as losing their vision (P31, P70), being unable to care for themselves (P39), the loss of 
independence and the process of death (P6).  P77, a male in his late thirties who has been 
medically boarded due to his disability, states: “I try to remain positive but I’m always 
second guessing anything that could be a sign of a relapse.” 
 
9. Feeling/doing for others.  Some of this group of MS participants also mentioned that 
despite how they felt on the inside, they tried to be, “upbeat around others” (P86), 
“always checking if others are happy” (P63).  
 
10. Preoccupied/busy/don’t think about it.  Finally, the last theme pertaining to feelings 
was that of not having feelings.  That is, the participants who mentioned this theme 
stated that they did not think about their mood, their future, or their MS.  P44, for 
example, a home executive female, mentioned that she was so preoccupied during the 
day with planning of tasks etc., that she did not really notice her general or usual 
mood.  P55 stated that she “do[es]n’t look to the future”.  P1 and P76 echoed these 
sentiments by saying, “I try not to think about [my MS] too much” with P76 adding 
“as it can get me down”. While for others, such as P19 and P69 who both have RRMS 
and have not experienced many relapses, it’s not a conscious decision not to think 
about MS, they just “don’t think of my MS that much” and act “maybe… like an 
ostrich, with my head in the sand. I just carry on and don’t think about it”. 
 
A number of themes relating to feelings were also identified in the answers of MS 
participants who scored highly on positivity. 
 
1. Positive and optimistic.  Some of the MS participants who were classified as 
demonstrating high positivity also spoke about feeling positive and optimistic.  These 
feelings ranged from feeling “positive, yet realistic” (P23) or “positive but uncertain” 
(P92), to “very positive” (P3, P5, P16), and these participants stated that they “look 




2. Happy and upbeat.  High-scoring MS participants on positivity also described feelings 
such as, “happy, content” (P5), “happy-go-lucky” (P61), “generally happy” (P8), 
“mostly upbeat”, and “always happy” (P28).  
 
3. Neutral or negative.  The only high scoring participants to note any neutral or 
negative feelings were P24 who described her mood as “passive, calm”, and P25 who 
voiced her concern of ending up in a wheelchair. 
 
4. Feeling/doing for others.  P8, a recently diagnosed female in her thirties, and a fairly 
new mother of 3 children, mentioned how she viewed taking her injections as being 
for her children rather than herself to prolong the time she has with them: 
Every single time I take that interferon, every time with my injections I feel like 
I'm doing it for my children. I promise you, there’s sometimes, especially in 
winter you look like a pin cushion because you have to take injections like all 
over the place, and, at night, I’ll go to sleep, my arm will feel so sore that I can 
feel where I actually had my injection... It's just like slightly painful. But, I think, 
you know what, I know that I can’t stop what is there, but I can delay it. 
 
5. Preoccupied/busy/don’t think about it.  Finally, like P44 (a moderate scorer), 
P3, also a home executive female, mentioned that she did not really notice her 
general or usual mood.   
 
It is clear from the results presented above that a number of different feelings emerged from 
the content analysis and that differences appeared to be present between those participants 
demonstrating positivity at moderate versus high levels.   
Additional themes were also identified.  Again, I will divide moderate and high scoring 
MS participants.  Within moderately scoring participants, the first category pertained to one’s 
approach to life, and the first theme within this category referred to being grateful for what 
you have and taking something good from MS and was noted by a number of participants.  
P69, for example, a female in her fifties who has had MS since 1989 said that she “realise[s 
she is] blessed when [she] compare [her]self with others with MS”, and P5, a recently 
diagnosed female in her thirties, reported that: 
I think what's come of this is, you know, doing the… different events and getting 
involved with [removed for anonymity]. I actually feel like I'm making a 
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difference, to change something and get the awareness out there. In a way, I 
wouldn't say I'm happy to have MS, but I am quite pleased that I can do 
something about it and I'll try and see where it'll take me. 
 
Linked to this idea of being grateful and seeing the positive side of MS was that of living life 
to the fullest.  A number of pertinent quotes emerged here, so I will reproduce a few below: 
I just…, I just feel I need to live. What I can do right now, I need to do it right 
now. I don’t want to have regrets later on. That is what I feel. (P10, a female in 
her thirties who suffers more from cognitive impairment than physical 
impairment). 
 
I try to get the most out of every day, so that one day when I can’t move anymore 
I can look back and say that I lived my life to the fullest. (P32, a female in her 
forties who received a diploma but is now permanently unable to work). 
 
Until the time comes when I have to use disability tools more prominently or 
move into a care centre, I want to enjoy every day as much as I can. (P69, a 
female in her fifties who has had MS since 1989). 
 
Others had a slightly less energetic or enthusiastic approach to life and rather took it one day 
at a time:  P11 and P94 “take it one day at a time”, P20 and P63 “focus on the now”, P55 
“live[s] for 24 hours”, and P1 recommended to “take it one day at a time, otherwise you will 
end up crying every day”. 
Still others appeared to approach life with a more laissez-faire attitude, with either a 
“just get on with it” attitude or a “what will be, will be” approach (P14).  For example, P63, a 
female in her thirties who was diagnosed with MS in 1995, told me: 
I inject for three days of the week so I often pray for an end to it as I feel it is 
more disturbing for my family than me. Again, I have to do it so let’s just get on 
with it. 
 
Planning one’s life was also a prominent theme.  Some participants mentioned planning their 
day around their MS.  P35, for example, spoke of how she’s learned to cope with her MS by 
planning her day and doing certain things in certain ways, and P86 remarked that “making 
notes has become a lifestyle”.   
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The second aspect regarding planning referred to planning for the future and making 
provisions.  P11 and P27 both planned ahead financially, providing for a future that may 
include an inability to work.  P1 has had to plan for a future where she cannot have children; 
and P6 fostered her dogs with a friend as she would no longer able to take care of them. 
The third aspect, which seems contradictory with all the planning above, is the idea of 
not making plans.  For example, P18, a male in his fifties who has been experiencing RRMS 
since 1971 although it was only diagnosed in 2009, explained how he “basically take[s] each 
day as it comes” and has “long ago learned not to get too excited about plans made” as these 
can change suddenly due to a relapse.  P55, a female in her late forties who was diagnosed 
with MS 13 years ago and who was one of the participants who advocate living day by day, 
stated: 
I’m back to living 24 hours. But, the down side to that is, I actually don’t plan for 
the future.  So, if friends phone and say “Ag, let’s have a braai next month” I say 
to them “That’s great; but, can we talk closer to the day?” I’m very nervous 
about making any plans for the future. Because we’ve already done things like 
OK we’ll go on a holiday in December, and in December I can’t move. 
 
Religion also emerged as a theme.  Many participants appeared to find meaning in their 
religion and stated ideas such as “with my belief system I’ll be fine” (P50). 
Finally, a theme that emerged from the data of MS participants who scored within the 
moderate range on positivity was that of control.  P53, for example, noted her control over 
her own future and said that, “the future is up to me”, while P1 noted her control over her life, 
and her MS, when she said that she “do[es]n’t let MS interfere” with her life (even though 
she requires a wheelchair to get around outside).  Finally, and this is my personal favourite 
quote, P100 indicated the control she has over her life and illness when she said “I have MS, 
but it does not have me”.  
Very few reactions to MS were identified by the highly positive MS participants.  An 
equally unexpected and interesting finding was that most of the themes identified were of a 
more neutral or slightly negative quality.  For example, P16 had a “just get on with it” 
approach to life, P3 had a “just live life” approach, and P23 had a “what will be will be” 
attitude.  P90 was the most positive with a “live in the moment” approach. 
This group also planned for their future and P24 noted how one needs to “readjust 
expectations” with MS and related how she plans her day around fatigue, but does not let this 
stop her from accomplishing what she needs to do. 
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One final theme emerged that was not present in the moderate scorers.  This was the 
idea of a support network, and P61 said that she was “able to combat setbacks with help from 
[her] friends”. 
In conclusion, a number of additional interesting themes emerged that offer a little 
more insight into positivity.  They all appeared to relate to reactions to MS, in one way or 
another, and moderate scorers identified far more themes, and unexpectedly (given that they 
noted negative feelings while the highly positive MS participants did not) appeared to be 
more positive in their reactions than high scorers. 
 
 Predicting euphoria. The next area of interest was that of the disease and cognitive 
correlates of euphoria. The aim was to investigate whether the two types of euphoria 
identified could be predicted in MS participants according to particular demographic, disease 
and/or cognitive variables.  Again, because the investigation of the two types of euphoria was 
approached from the classical perspective, I hypothesised that the demographic, disease 
correlates of the two types would differ, and that positivity and unawareness would occur 
both early and late in the disease, with either little or severe physical disability, and that, due 
to factors highlighted by other studies, gender and current disease state would correlate with 
at least one type of euphoria. Furthermore, I hypothesised that the cognitive correlates of the 
euphoric types would differ, and that at least one of the euphoric types would correlate with 
impairment on neuropsychological tests of cortical domains of function, and that at least one 
of the euphoric types would correlate with impairment on neuropsychological tests of RH 
functioning. 
Before this could be attempted however, the disease characteristics of the 100 MS 
participants, as well as their cognitive functioning, or impairment, needed to be described 
and/or interpreted.  This description or interpretation will be presented in the beginning of 
each relevant section below, followed by an investigation of the correlates. 
 
 The demographic and disease correlates.  The disease and demographic correlates of 
the two types of euphoria were investigated with the aim of predicting which MS participants 
may present with positivity and/or unawareness.  I hypothesised that the demographic, 
disease correlates of the two types may differ and that the two types may occur early or late 
in the disease, with mild or severe disability, and that at least one type may correlate with 
gender and/or current disease state.  First, however, the characteristics of the full MS sample 




 The disease characteristics of the MS sample.  The demographic characteristics of the 
MS sample have been described in the methods section.  However, the MS participants were 
also asked specific questions related to their MS and I will describe these here.  In line with 
previous research investigating disease correlates in MS research, important variables such as 
disease course, duration of disease, current disease state, severity of disease, and use of 
medication were explored.  Diagnosis and disease course were, where possible, confirmed 






Table 25  









(n = 40) 
Total 
(n = 100) 
A diagnosis of MS 60 40 100    
Confirmed diagnosis 57 39 96    
Disease course    
     RRMS 46 29 75 
     PPMS 4 6 10 
     SPMS 10 5 15 
Duration of disease since diagnosis (in years) 8.78 (7.88) 10.75 (6.83) 9.57 (7.50) 
     Mean (SD)    
     Range 0-42 0-28 0-42 
Current disease state    
     Relapse 2 6 8 
     Remission 42 27 69 
     Progression 16 7 23 
Disease severity    
     Mean (SD) 10.98 (8.16) 11.75 (7.29) 11.29 (7.79) 
     Range 0-28 0-28 0-28 
Corticosteroids within the last 4 weeks 11 3 14 
Use of other medication that can affect mood 42 26 68 
Note. The data on duration of disease since diagnosis and disease severity are presented as averages 
with the standard deviations (SD) in parentheses and the minimum to maximum range below. MS = 
multiple sclerosis; RRMS = relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis; PPMS = primary progressive 
multiple sclerosis; SPMS = secondary progressive multiple sclerosis. 
 
All 100 MS participants had received a diagnosis of MS and this was confirmed with their 
neurologist in 96 out of 100 cases (according to the McDonald criteria described in the 
literature review). Although non-probability sampling techniques were used to recruit the MS 
participants, participants were not selected based on any MS disease criteria, and one quarter 
of the 100 MS participants (25%) had a progressive type, and the remaining participants 
(75%) were experiencing RRMS at the time of their participation in this research. This was 
also confirmed with the relevant neurologist in 96% of the cases. 
Disease duration was calculated since diagnosis, as is the accepted method in the 
literature.  The majority of participants (69%) reported that they were in a state of remission 
at the time of their interview; however 8% self-reported that they were experiencing a relapse 
and 23% (all of whom were experiencing a progressive disease course) reported being in a 
state of progression. Two participants with a progressive course reported being in a state of 
relapse at the time of their interview. 
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As was mentioned in the methods section, the EDSS (Kurtzke, 1983) is the gold 
standard measure of physical disability, which is used as a representation of disease severity 
in MS. However, due to a number of factors addressed in the methods section, this measure 
was not used in the current study, and rather a scale of physical ability (i.e. the PAS) was 
included as a representation of disease severity (in terms of physical disability).  As some 
patients with MS can be unaware of their deficits, informant reports of their physical ability 
(or disability) were used.  Scores could range from 0 to 28.  Thus, as is evident in Table 25, 
some MS participants’ informants believed that their MS loved-ones were not impaired at all, 
while others believed their MS loved-ones were maximally disabled.  On average though, the 
severity of disease, in terms of physical disability, was a little under 50% for the total sample 
of MS participants. 
Finally, as was stated in the section pertaining to the exclusion criteria in the methods 
section, MS participants were not excluded based on corticosteroid use, even though it has 
been found to influence mood and, in some cases, cause a temporary state of euphoria 
(Brown et al., 1999; Patten & Neutel, 2000). Rather, use of this and other medication that 
could influence mood was noted and controlled for statistically in the analyses below. With 
this in mind, 14% had received some form of corticosteroid treatment within the last four 
weeks, and 68% were taking medication, such as anti-depressants, which may influence 
mood.  In addition, medical history (reported in the methods section) was also controlled for, 
and 41% had a past medical history of a disease or condition (e.g. past diagnosis of 
depression) that could influence neuropsychological functioning. 
 
The demographic and disease correlates of euphoria.  Multiple regression analyses 
were run in order to determine the demographic and disease correlates of the types of 
euphoria identified in part one of the results section.  Corticosteroids are known to induce a 
euphoric-like state (Brown et al., 1999; Patten & Neutel, 2000), and medications such as anti-
depressants can lift or stabilise mood (Hewitt, Fraser, & Berger, 2000; Turner, Sharp, Folkes, 
& Chew-Graham, 2008).  However, due to limitations regarding the accessibility of patients, 
these variables could not be excluded.  Furthermore, participants could not be excluded on 
the basis of a medical history of diseases or conditions that could influence 
neuropsychological functioning for the same reason.  Thus, I wanted to control for the 
potential effects of these variables in the following analyses and I, therefore, used 
hierarchical regression models.   
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‘Corticosteroids’ included the use of corticosteroids within four weeks prior to the 
participants’ interview.  This was a categorical variable where corticosteroid use was either 
present or absent.  ‘Medication’ included any medication, such as anti-depressants, that 
specified a possible impact on mood as a side-effect.  This was also a categorical variable, 
where medications that could potentially influence mood were either present or absent. 
Finally, the variable ‘medical history’ was created from the medical information provided by 
each participant, and which formed the exclusion criteria of the HC participants.  This was 
also a categorical variable and any history of a disease or condition that could affect 
neuropsychological functioning (e.g. other neurological disease, brain tumour, epilepsy, 
previous psychiatric diagnosis, developmental delay) represented the presence of this 
symptom.  Each of these three variables was entered into the hierarchical model first, in one 
step, using the “enter” method.  This was followed by the selected demographic variables 
(gender, age and income) and disease variables (disease course, duration of disease, current 
disease state, and disease severity), all of which were entered as separate predictors, in a 
second step, also using the “enter” method.  
For both positivity and unawareness, the full scales, within the full sample of 100 MS 
participants, were selected as the dependent variables, as analysing only those participants 
who were classified as highly positive, or unaware (in terms of negative discrepancy scores), 
would have restricted the range of positivity, rendering the multiple regression unusable. 
Thus, in this section, as in the section regarding the correlations between positivity and 
unawareness as well as between depression and unawareness, I will refer to the full scale as 
awareness when discussing the results, where higher scores indicate greater awareness and 
lower scores indicate greater unawareness.  All assumptions were met prior to running the 
multiple regressions and the correlations between the variables investigated are reported in 
Tables J1 through J4, in Appendix J. 
The aim was to investigate whether positivity and unawareness had distinct profiles in 
terms of these correlates.  In line with the ideas of Cottrell and Wilson (1926), I hypothesised 
that the disease correlates of the different types of euphoria may differ, and that the euphoric 
types may occur both early and late in the disease, with either little or severe physical 
disability.  
 






Model Summaries for Positivity and Unawareness 
Model R R2 F p SEE 
Change statistics 
∆ R2 ∆F df1 df2 Sig. ∆F 
Positivity           
     1 .26a .07 2.36 .077 34.32 .07 2.36 3 96 .077 
     2 .39b .15 1.55 .137 34.09 .08 1.18 7 89 .320 
Unawareness of 
physical 
          
     1 .23a .05 1.72 .168 3.07 .05 1.72 3 96 .168 
     2 .48b .23 2.63 .008 2.88 .18 2.91 7 89 .009 
Unawareness of 
cognitive 
          
     1 .18a .03 1.08 .363 1.88 .03 1.08 3 96 .363 
     2 .25b .06 .60 .810 1.92 .03 .42 7 89 .891 
Unawareness of 
mood/behaviour 
          
     1 .15a .02 .71 .547 15.95 .02 .71 3 96 .547 
     2 .29b .08 .82 .612 16.02 .06 .87 7 89 .537 
Note. Significant results are presented in bold font. 
a = Predictors: Corticosteroids, medication, and medical history. 
b = Predictors: Corticosteroids, medication, medical history, gender, age, income, disease course, 
duration of disease, current disease state, and disease severity. 
 
The only model found to significantly predict a type of euphoria was that of all demographic 
and disease variables and unawareness of physical deficits (p = .008).  The results pertaining 
to the coefficients of all models (presented in Tables J5 through J8, in Appendix J), were, 
however, also analysed, and a number of individual predictors were identified. 
 
 The coefficient results.  In terms of positivity, medical history was a significant 
individual predictor of positivity (β = -.28, p = .009) in the (second) total model, above not 
only the demographic and disease variables investigated, but also current corticosteroid and 
medication use which were expected to perhaps play a role.  I had controlled for medical 
history because, due to the limited number of available patients, I was unable to exclude MS 
participants based on criteria such as having a brain tumour or a past psychiatric diagnosis.  
However, since this variable was found to be a significant predictor of positivity, I wanted to 
see how much variance of positivity it accounted for by itself.  Therefore, I ran a linear 
regression with just this variable and positivity.  On its own, previous medical history 
accounted for 7% of the variance in positivity (R2 = .07, F(1, 98) = 7.11, p = .009), with a 





Linear Regression Between Medical History and Positivity 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Constant 129.68 4.42  29.31 .0001 121.00 138.45 
Medical history -18.43 6.91 -.26 -2.67 .009 -32.14 -4.72 
Note. Significant results are presented in bold font.  Medical history = a previous diagnosis of a 
disease or condition, such as other neurological disease, brain tumour, epilepsy, previous psychiatric 
diagnosis or developmental delay, that may influence neuropsychological functioning.  CI = 
confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
 
Returning to the original set of models described, when the standardised Beta coefficients 
were examined in relation to unawareness of physical deficit, it was found that only disease 
severity significantly predicted awareness of physical deficits (β = -.45, p = .0001).  Thus, 
disease severity was entered into a separate model, by itself, to assess how much of the 
variance of unawareness of physical deficits was explained just by the severity of the disease. 
However, it was found that alone it explained only 4.7% of the variance of awareness of 
physical deficits (R2 = .05, F(1, 98) = 4.78), which was not significant at the .01 alpha level 
used throughout this study (β = -.22, p = .031).  The negative correlation between these 
variables is presented below in Table 28. 
 
Table 28 
Linear Regression Between Disease Severity and Unawareness of Physical Deficits 
 Coefficients 
Model 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Constant .25 .54  .47 .643 -0.82 1.32 
Disease severity -.09 .04 -.22 -2.19 .031 -0.16 -0.01 
Note. Disease severity was measured in terms of informant ratings’ of the MS participants’ physical 
abilities.  CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
 
No individual disease or demographic variable was found to be a significant predictor of 
unawareness of cognitive deficits or unawareness of mood/behavioural deficits (all p values > 
.01).   
Thus, in conclusion to this section, while no disease or demographic correlates were 
identified for unawareness of cognitive or mood/behavioural deficits, medical history was 
found to negatively correlate with positivity in this sample of 100 MS participants.  
Furthermore, the full model (including all medical, demographic and disease variables) 
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significantly predicted unawareness of physical deficits, with disease severity being 
negatively correlated with, and a significant individual predictor of, unawareness of physical 
deficits.  I hypothesised that the disease correlates of the two types would differ, and support 
for this hypothesis was, therefore, largely found.  I also hypothesised that positivity and 
unawareness would occur both early and late in the disease, with either little or severe 
physical disability.  Disease duration was not found to correlate with either positivity or 
unawareness, however, disease severity (as measured by degree of physical disability) was 
found to correlate with unawareness of physical deficits.  Thus, this second hypothesis was 
largely rejected.  It was furthermore hypothesised that gender and/or current disease state 
would correlate with at least one type of euphoria, and this hypothesis was also rejected.   
 
 The cognitive correlates. The cognitive correlates of the two types of euphoria were 
then also investigated with the aim of predicting which MS participants may present with 
positivity and/or unawareness.  I hypothesised that the cognitive correlates of the euphoric 
types would differ, that at least one of the euphoric types (most likely that of positivity) 
would correlate with impairment on neuropsychological tests of cortical domains of function, 
and that at least one of the euphoric types (most likely that of unawareness) would correlate 
with RH involvement on cognitive testing.  First, however, the cognitive functioning (or 
impairment) of the sub-sample of MS participants (n = 60) that underwent cognitive testing 
will be described below.  This was achieved by comparing them with the matched sub-
sample of HCs (n = 35) who underwent cognitive testing in terms of the cognitive variables 
examined (as Western norms may not be appropriate for SA participants). 
 
 The cognitive functioning of the MS sample.  The cognitive functioning of the MS 
sub-sample was compared with that of the HCs who underwent cognitive testing, and the 
results are presented in this section.  I hypothesised that the MS group would demonstrate a 
significantly poorer performance on all measures than the HC group.  Given indications in 
the literature reviewed at the beginning of this dissertation, it was further hypothesised that 
they would demonstrate impairment on cognitive functions sub-served by both cortical and 
subcortical domains, and that they would demonstrate impairment on measures of right 
cortical hemispheric functioning, but much less so on measures of left hemispheric 
functioning. 
Although the HCs were matched as closely as possible to the MS participants, the 60 
MS and 35 HC participants who underwent cognitive testing were first compared on the key 
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sociodemographic variables of gender, age, race/ethnicity, level of education and income, 
using independent samples t-tests for the continuous data (which was normally distributed) 
and chi squared tests of independence for the categorical data, in order to ensure that (a) they 
were well matched, (b) no significant group differences existed on these variables, and (c) 
none of these variables were confounding factors that could contribute to differences in 
cognition between the two groups.  These results are presented in Table 29 (with the 




The Key Sociodemographic Characteristics of the MS Participants and Healthy Controls That Completed Cognitive Testing 
Key variable 
MS participants 
(n = 60) 
Healthy controls 
(n = 35) 
t (df = 93) / 





Effect size  
d / V LL UL 
Gender – Male:Female 8:52 6:29 0.26 .613   0.05 
Age 43.35 (11.48) 42.69 (11.35) 0.27 .785 -5.49 4.16 0.06 
Race/ethnicity –  
White:Coloured/Indian 
34:26 22:13 0.35 .554   0.06 





0.05 .962 -7,804.88 7,441.55 0.01 
Note. Categorical data are presented in ratios. The data on age, education, and income are presented as means with the standard deviations in parentheses. CI = 
confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
a = Highest level of education obtained, presented in years; it excluded pre-school and grade R and presumed a certificate to be a one year course, a diploma 
to be a two year course, and capped “degree” at three years. 
b = Combined monthly household income. 
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The characteristics of the 35 HCs did not differ significantly from the 60 MS participants on 
any of the key demographic variables listed above (all p values > .01).  Thus, the groups were 
deemed to be similar and the sociodemographic variables explored were not thought to 
represent confounding factors. 
 The main aim of this section was to investigate the cognitive correlates of the two 
euphoric types; however there were a number of cognitive variables, but only 60 MS 
participants who completed these tests.  Thus, composite cognitive variables were created in 
order to reduce the number of cognitive variables investigated and to increase the power of 
the multiple regression.  The procedure followed to determine these composites will be 
presented below, followed by an interpretation of the MS group’s performance on these 
variables (as compared with that of the HCs). 
First, it should be noted that a number of the cognitive measures required an 
interpretation of the participants’ performance.  These included the ROCF for visuospatial 
construction, the BVMT-R for visual learning and memory, and the ApBat for the repetition 
of prosody in spoken words. Three raters were therefore utilised for these measures and the 
average score (between all three) was used. Good to high inter-rater reliability was found for 
all measures after conducting a single measures intraclass correlation. The inter-rater 
reliability for the MS group was as follows: (a) ICC = .84 for visuospatial construction, (b) 
ICC =.99 for visual learning, (c) ICC = .98 for visual memory, and (d) ICC = .77 for prosodic 
repetition. Inter-rater reliability for the HC group was as follows: (a) ICC = .82 for 
visuospatial construction, (b) ICC = .99 for visual learning, and (c) ICC = .98 for visual 
memory (all p values < .001.). There was slightly less agreement between raters for the HC 
group on prosodic repetition, however the agreement was still statistically significant: ICC = 
.39 (p = .0001). 
The average scores for the above measures, and the scores of the other variables were 
then entered into a factor analysis (with the extraction criterion of eigenvalues of greater than 
one) to determine which variables could be grouped together in order to reduce the number of 
variables included in the multiple regression analyses (see Table K1, in Appendix K, for the 
pattern matrix of this analysis).  The variables speed of information processing, verbal 
fluency, and the two prosodic variables were removed as they were loading onto a number of 
variables, and another similar factor analysis was performed (see Table K2, in Appendix K, 
for these results).  This analysis revealed clear factors for verbal memory, visual memory, 
language, and visuospatial processing and composites were created for these variables using 
the method outlined in the section on data analysis in the methods section.  The remaining 
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executive functioning measures did not load clearly onto one single distinct factor.  Thus, a 
number of composites were attempted for the measures of executive functioning.   
Again, in order to create composite variables where descriptive statistics could still be 
obtained and the composites could be compared between groups, a composite was not 
computed by the creation and averaging of z scores.  Rather, the variance of each scale8 was 
calculated.  The relevant individual scales that were to be combined to form each composite 
were then manipulated so that they all had the same range variance.  Following this, all 
relevant (manipulated) individual scales were added together.  Each composite was then 
tested using an inter-item correlation to test whether or not it correlated with the original 
individual component variables. Inter-item correlations are presented in Tables L1 through 
L12, in Appendix L, but all p values were < .001 for the MS participant data (except for 
WAB comprehension and the language composite, p = .046) and < .003 for the HC data 
(except for WAB comprehension and the language composite, p = .421, and attention and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite, p = .038).   
The MS participants and HCs were then compared on these composites, and the 
individual variables of speed of information processing, verbal fluency and prosodic 
repetition and comprehension, which were removed from the factor analysis.  This was 
achieved via independent samples t-tests.  The significance level was again set at α = .01.  As 
the MS participants were hypothesised to perform more poorly than the HCs; directional one-
tailed p values are reported with the results (see Table 30). 
                                                 




The Cognitive Performance of the MS Participants Compared with the Healthy Controls 
Measure 
MS participants 
(n = 60) 
Healthy controls 
(n = 35) T (df = 93) 
p 
(1-tailed) 
95% CI Effect 
size  
d / r LL UL 
Subcortical (executive functioning)        
     Speed of information processingb 630.74 (232.36) 543.23 (199.66) -1.86 .033 -180.84 5.82 0.40 
     Verbal fluency 35.27 (12.44) 40.60 (10.62) 2.12 .018 0.35 10.32 0.22 
Cortical        
     Executive functioning        
          Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning  
          compositec 
59.36 (7.11) 
(n = 45) 
64.44 (6.32) 
(n = 30) 
3.17  
(df = 73) 
.001 1.88 8.28 -0.74 
          Orbitobasal compositea 34.45 (9.27) 35.97 (5.72) 0.88 .192 -1.92 4.96 -0.19 
     Memory        
         Verbal memory composite (left) 169.75 (24.06) 189.51 (18.52) 4.19 .0001 10.39 29.14 0.40 
         Visual memory composite (right) 85.14 (16.86) 93.74 (11.52) 2.67 .005 2.21 14.99 -0.57 
     Language composite (left) 272.14 (18.34) 278.11 (15.17) 1.63 .054 -1.32 13.25 0.17 
     Visuospatial composite (right)a 93.16 (9.86) 97.45 (6.12) 2.62  
(df = 92.58) 
.005 1.04 7.55 -0.49 
     Prosody (right)        
          Prosodic repetitiona c 127.10 (13.06)  
(n = 56) 
133.88 (6.03) 
 (n = 32) 
3.31  
(df = 83.17) 
.001 2.70 10.84 -0.62 
          Prosodic comprehension 56.05 (8.21) 58.51 (10.32) 1.28 .102 -1.35 6.28 -0.27 
Note. All data are presented as means with standard deviations in parentheses. Significant results are presented in bold font. CI = confidence interval; LL = 
lower limit, UL = upper limit. Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite = attention, WM and abstract reasoning.  Orbitobasal composite = disinhibition 
and set shifting. Verbal memory composite = verbal learning, memory and recognition.  Visual memory composite = visual learning, memory and 
recognition. Language composite = naming, repetition and comprehension.  Visuospatial composite = visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial perception 3D 
and visuospatial construction.   
a = Levene’s test for homogeneity was significant, therefore the results for “equal variances not assumed” were reported along with the degrees of freedom 
next to the statistic.  
b = a lower value indicates a better performance.  
c = incomplete data set, relevant sample numbers are presented in parentheses.
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In terms of descriptive statistics, the MS group performed more poorly than the HC reference 
group on every measure (composite or individual) of cognitive functioning.  However, from 
the inferential statistics, one can see that they performed significantly more poorly than the 
HC group on measures of verbal memory composite (verbal learning, memory and 
recognition), visual memory composite (visual learning, memory and recognition), 
dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite (attention, WM and abstract reasoning), 
visuospatial composite (visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial perception 3D and 
visuospatial construction), and repetition of prosodic information (all p values < .01).  
Variables that almost reached statistical significance at the .01 level included verbal fluency 
(p = .018).  Thus, the only variables that did not reach, or very nearly reach, statistical 
significance were speed of information processing, orbitobasal composite (disinhibition and 
set shifting), language composite (naming, repetition and comprehension), and the 
comprehension of prosodic information. 
Since I hypothesised that when compared to the HCs, the MS participants would 
perform significantly more poorly, the evidence largely supports this hypothesis.  The 
variables investigated were also delineated in terms of the neuroanatomical area by which the 
domain was sub-served and a subcortical versus cortical hypothesis and a right versus left 
hypothesis was tested.  Firstly, the results presented above largely appeared to provide 
support for the cortical/subcortical hypothesis, as the MS group performed near to 
significantly more poorly than the HCs on the subcortical variable of verbal fluency, and 
importantly performed significantly more poorly than the HCs on the cortical variables of 
dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite (attention, WM and abstract reasoning), verbal 
memory composite (verbal learning, memory and recognition), visual memory composite 
(visual learning, memory and recognition), visuospatial composite (visuospatial perception 
2D, visuospatial perception 3D and visuospatial construction), and the repetition of prosody.  
Secondly, using these same measures, but now separating them in terms of which were sub-
served by left versus right areas, the MS group performed significantly (or very nearly 
significantly) more poorly than the HCs on the majority of measures of RH functioning, but 
did not perform significantly more poorly than the HCs on measures of left cortical 
hemispheric functioning.  
 
The cognitive correlates of euphoria.  The cognitive correlates of positivity and 
unawareness were then examined and multiple regression analyses were run in order to 
determine if each symptom has a separate, distinct cognitive profile and if one could predict 
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which MS participants would present with which symptom based on their type and severity 
of cognitive impairment.  As only a sub-sample of the MS participants took part in cognitive 
testing, the multiple regression analyses run were conducted using the sub-sample of 60 MS 
participants, and individual cases that did not complete the prosodic repetition or the 
measures making up the dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite (attention, WM and 
abstract reasoning) were excluded pair-wise.   
As predictions were made regarding particular variables, two hierarchical regression 
models were used.  In the first, the cortical variables pertaining to (a) executive functioning 
(i.e. the dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite (attention, WM and abstract reasoning), 
and orbitobasal composite (disinhibition and set shifting)); (b) memory (i.e. the verbal 
memory composite (verbal learning, memory and recognition), and visual memory composite 
(visual learning, memory and recognition)); (c) the language composite (naming, repetition 
and comprehension); (d) the visuospatial composite (visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial 
perception 3D and visuospatial construction); and (e) the repetition and comprehension of 
prosody were entered first.  This was followed by the subcortical variables of verbal fluency 
and speed of information processing.   
In the second hierarchical model, measures of RH functioning were entered first.  
These included (a) the visual memory composite (visual learning, memory and recognition), 
(b) the visuospatial composite (visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial perception 3D and 
visuospatial construction), and (c) the two measures of prosody.  These were followed by the 
remaining measures of left hemispheric functioning or executive functioning, as described 
above in relation to the first model. 
The full scales of positivity and unawareness, within the sub-sample of MS 
participants who underwent cognitive testing (n = 60), were selected as the dependent 
variables, as including only those participants demonstrating high positivity, or those 
participants demonstrating unawareness would again limit the range of these variables, 
thereby precluding covariance analysis.  Again, I will refer to awareness to denote the full 
scale of this variable, as I have done previously.  All assumptions were met prior to running 
the multiple regressions and the correlations between the variables investigated are reported 
in Tables M1 through M4, in Appendix M. 
The aim was to investigate whether positivity and unawareness had distinct profiles in 
terms of these correlates.  In line with the ideas of Cottrell and Wilson (1926), I hypothesised 
that the cognitive correlates of the euphoric types may differ.  Furthermore, based on the 
literature presented at the beginning of this dissertation, I hypothesised that at least one of the 
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euphoric types (most likely that of positivity) would correlate with impairment on 
neuropsychological tests of cortical domains of function, and that at least one of the euphoric 
types (most likely that of unawareness) would correlate with RH involvement on cognitive 
testing.   
 
The model results.  The results pertaining to all models testes are presented in Tables 





Model Summaries for Positivity and Unawareness (Cortical and Subcortical Cognitive Correlates) 
Model R R2 F p SEE 
Change statistics 
∆ R2 ∆F df1 df2 Sig. ∆F 
Positivity           
     1 .37a .14 .65 .734 36.33 .14 .65 8 32 .734 
     2 .39b .15 .54 .847 37.22 .01 .25 2 30 .783 
Unawareness of physical           
     1 .55a .31 1.76 .123 2.89 .31 1.76 8 32 .123 
     2 .58b .33 1.52 .182 2.92 .03 .69 2 30 .509 
Unawareness of cognitive           
     1 .46a .21 1.07 .407 1.87 .21 1.07 8 32 .407 
     2 .49b .24 .93 .524 1.90 .02 .48 2 30 .623 
Unawareness of mood/behaviour           
     1 .37a .14 .64 .740 16.48 .14 .64 8 32 .740 
     2 .41b .17 .62 .788 16.70 .03 .59 2 30 .559 
Note. a = Predictors: Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite (attention, WM and abstract reasoning), orbitobasal composite (disinhibition and set 
shifting), verbal memory composite (verbal learning, memory and recognition), visual memory composite (visual learning, memory and recognition), 
language composite (naming, repetition and comprehension), visuospatial composite (visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial perception 3D and visuospatial 
construction), prosodic repetition, and prosodic comprehension. 
b = Predictors: Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite (attention, WM and abstract reasoning), orbitobasal composite (disinhibition and set shifting), 
verbal memory composite (verbal learning, memory and recognition), visual memory composite (visual learning, memory and recognition), language 
composite (naming, repetition and comprehension), visuospatial composite (visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial perception 3D and visuospatial 









Model Summaries for Positivity and Unawareness (Right and Left/Executive Cognitive Correlates) 
Model R R2 F p SEE 
Change statistics 
∆ R2 ∆F df1 df2 Sig. ∆F 
Positivity           
     1 .24a .06 .57 .687 35.80 .06 .57 4 36 .687 
     2 .39b .15 .54 .847 37.22 .09 .55 6 30 .766 
Unawareness of physical           
     1 .46a .21 2.45 .063 2.90 .21 2.45 4 36 .063 
     2 .58b .34 1.52 .182 2.92 .12 .91 6 30 .499 
Unawareness of cognitive           
     1 .40 .16 1.70 .171 1.82 .16 1.70 4 36 .171 
     2 .49 .14 .93 .524 1.90 .08 .50 6 30 .802 
Unawareness of mood/behaviour           
     1 .33 .11 1.10 .373 15.80 .11 1.10 4 36 .373 
     2 .41 .17 .62 .788 16.70 .06 .37 6 30 .891 
Note. a = Predictors: Visual memory composite (visual learning, memory and recognition), visuospatial construction (visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial 
perception 3D and visuospatial construction), prosodic repetition and prosodic comprehension. 
b = Predictors: Visual memory composite (visual learning, memory and recognition), visuospatial construction (visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial 
perception 3D and visuospatial construction), prosodic repetition, prosodic comprehension, dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite (attention, WM and 
abstract reasoning), orbitobasal composite (disinhibition and set shifting), verbal memory composite (verbal learning, memory and recognition), language 
composite (naming, repetition and comprehension), speed of information processing and verbal fluency. 
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None of the models tested were found to significantly predict either type of euphoria.  The 
results pertaining to the coefficients (presented in Tables M5 through M12, in Appendix M), 
were, however, also analysed.  
 
 The coefficient results.  No individual cognitive variable was found to significantly 
predict any of the types of euphoria (i.e. positivity or unawareness of physical, cognitive or 
mood/behavioural deficits) in either the cortical versus subcortical model or the right versus 
left/executive model (all p values >.01).   
Although not significant, two variables that were close to significant were tested 
further via a linear regression to investigate their ability to predict euphoria.  These were the 
orbitobasal composite (disinhibition and set shifting) for unawareness of physical deficits, 
when all (i.e. right and left) cortical (but no subcortical) measures were included (β = .45, p = 
.056), and the visuospatial composite (visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial perception 3D 
and visuospatial construction) for unawareness of cognitive deficits, in all models (cortical 
variables only: β = .47, p = .032; RH variables only: β = .38, p = .056; all cognitive variables: 
β = .48, p = .032).   
The orbitobasal composite was found to significantly predict awareness of physical 
deficits, explaining 23% of the variance on its own (R2 = .23,F(1, 58) = 17.72, p = .0001).  
The coefficient results are presented below, in Table 33.  
 
Table 33 
Linear Regression Between the Orbitobasal Composite and Unawareness of Physical Deficits 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Constant -6.30 1.37  -4.59 .0001 -9.05 -3.55 
Orbitobasal composite .16 .04 .48 4.21 .0001 0.09 0.24 
Note. Significant results are presented in bold font.  Orbitobasal composite = disinhibition, set 
shifting.  CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
 
The results pertaining to the analysis of the visuospatial composite demonstrated that, on its 
own, visuospatial ability significantly predicted 12% of the variance of awareness of 
cognitive deficits (R2 = .12, F(1, 58) = 7.66, p = .008).  The coefficient results are presented 










 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Constant -4.85 2.21  -2.20 .032 -9.28 -0.43 
Visuospatial composite .07 .02 .34 2.77 .008 0.02 0.11 
Note. Significant results are presented in bold font.  Visuospatial composite = visuospatial perception 
2D, visuospatial perception 3D, visuospatial construction.  CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, 
UL = upper limit. 
 
Thus, in conclusion to this section, while no cognitive correlates were identified for 
positivity, or for unawareness of mood/behavioural deficits, disinhibition and problems with 
set shifting were significant predictors of unawareness of physical deficits, and poor 
visuospatial abilities significantly predicted unawareness of cognitive deficits.  In terms of 
the first hypothesis of this section, namely that the cognitive correlates of the euphoric types 
would differ, support was largely found for this hypothesis.  It was, furthermore, 
hypothesised that at least one of the euphoric types (i.e. positivity) would correlate with 
cortical impairment on cognitive testing, and that at least one (i.e. unawareness) would 
correlate with measures of RH functioning on neuropsychological testing.  As a cortical 
variable was found to be significant in two cases of unawareness, and a measure of RH 
functioning was found to be significant in one case of unawareness, support for these 
hypotheses also appeared to be found. 
 
Summary of part two.  The main aims of part two were to further describe and be 
better able to predict the newly identified types of euphoria (viz. positivity and unawareness).  
The results appeared to indicate an association between positivity and unawareness implying 
that they are two types of euphoria that often co-occur.  Both were demonstrated to have an 
inverse relationship with depression.  The positivity of the MS participants was found to be 
comparable to that of the HCs only at the high level; and MS participants were found to 
significantly (or near to significantly) under-estimate their deficits, compared with their 
informants, across all domains.  Few demographic, disease or cognitive correlates were 
identified; however, positivity was predicted by the lack of a prior medical history of 
conditions that could influence neuropsychological functioning.  Unawareness of physical 
deficits was predicted by all demographic and disease variables included as well as by a 
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greater disease severity and problems with disinhibition and set shifting, individually.  
Unawareness of cognitive deficits was predicted only by visuospatial impairment.  No 





Part three.  The cause of euphoria 
The main aim of part three was to explore some intriguing ideas about potential causes of 
euphoria.  Due to limited sample sizes and unequal sizes between the patient control groups 
and the MS group, the findings of this section are very preliminary.  However, because these 
are interesting and exciting hypotheses, and because they may perhaps shed some light on 
which lines of investigation show promise for future investigation with full research 
protocols, they are presented despite these limitations.  But, great caution is required with 
regard to any interpretations of this data. 
As was described in detail in the literature review, two main hypotheses have existed 
in the literature: that euphoria in MS is (a) a psychological reaction to a disabling disease, or 
(b) the result of executive dyscontrol.  In terms of the first hypothesis, the literature largely 
regards euphoria as being caused by cerebral involvement (see, e.g. Rabins et al., 1986), but 
this has not been unequivocally proven, and the psychological reaction hypothesis is still a 
possibility.  Thus, a group of MG patients were used to examine this idea, as MG is similarly 
a chronic disease, but does not affect the CNS (Cantor, 2010; Dönmez et al., 2004; Wolfe et 
al., 2012).   
Regarding the second hypothesis, the contemporary literature, and even some of the 
classical literature, regards euphoria in MS to be the result of executive dysfunction (largely 
due to the white damage so prevalent in MS, or to focal grey matter damage of the frontal 
lobes; Benedict et al., 2001; Diaz-Olavarrieta et al., 1999; Fishman et al., 2004).  However, 
this has not yet been proven.  Thus, a group of patients who had experienced a TBI as a result 
of an MVA were included to examine this hypothesis, as MVA TBI results in damage to 
neuroanatomical areas and causes a dysexecutive cognitive picture that is similar to that of 
MS. 
There may, however, be other factors at play regarding the cause of euphoria in MS.  
For example, possible contributions made by the immunological nature of the disease or RH 
dysfunction have not (to my knowledge) been addressed before.  Thus, two further patient 
control groups (i.e. NP-SLE patients and patients with damage to only their RH) were also 
included to test these third and fourth hypotheses. 
The diagnoses of all of the participants in the above patient control groups were 
confirmed prior to analysis.  All groups were then analysed in the same way. First, an attempt 
was made to assess the suitability of each patient control group to address their relevant 
research question. This was done by comparing each patient control group with the MS group 
on key demographic variables, via chi-squared tests of independence for the categorical 
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variables and independent samples t-tests for the normally distributed continuous variables, to 
determine the influence of variables such as gender, age, race, education and income on the 
other variables in question (i.e. the cognitive and euphoric variables).  In addition, the sub-
samples of each patient control group that underwent cognitive testing9 were compared with 
the 60 MS participants who underwent cognitive testing, via ANCOVAs, which controlled 
for any significant pre-existing between-group differences on the abovementioned key 
demographic variables, while investigating the cognitive performance of the group.  This was 
done in an attempt to test the hypotheses that the MGs would demonstrate a better cognitive 
performance in relation to the MS group, and that the MVA TBIs and NP-SLEs would 
demonstrate similar executive dysfunction to the MS group.  All assumptions were checked 
prior to performing this test and although unequal sample sizes were present, the ANCOVA 
was never-the-less performed as the remaining assumptions were met and it is considered to 
be fairly robust test (Levy, 1980; Lund Research Ltd, 2013).   
The hypotheses to be tested included that, when significant pre-existing group 
differences were controlled for, the MGs would demonstrate better cognitive functioning than 
the MS group, and that the MVA TBI and NP-SLE groups would demonstrate similar 
cognitive functioning to the MS group.  As group differences were expected, 1-tailed p values 
are reported.   
First, however, two of the cognitive measures (i.e. BVMT-R, part of the visual 
memory composite, and the ROCF for visuospatial construction) required an interpretation.  
Therefore three raters scored these particular tests and the average between all three was 
used.  A single measures intraclass correlation was calculated for each of the measures, for 
each group of participants.  Inter-rater reliability for the MS group has already been reported 
in part two of the results section, and fairly high inter-rater reliability was found for all 
measures in the patient control groups: (a) visual learning - MG: .96, MVA TBI: .99, NP-
SLE: .96; (b) visual memory - MG: .99, MVA TBI: .99, NP-SLE: .85; and (c) visuospatial 
construction - MG: .76, MVA TBI: .82, NP-SLE: .98 (all p values < .001). 
Composite variables were then created for these and the remaining cognitive variables 
included in this study.  The method of creation of these cognitive composites has been 
described in part two of the results section, and the correlations between the individual 
component measures and their composites reported for the MS group.  The individual 
                                                 
9 Note: The RH control participants did not undergo cognitive testing in this study due to research fatigue of this 
patient group.  However, their cognitive functioning was described in detail from their participation in a similar 
study conducted in the same year. 
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component measures and their composites for the patient control groups were, on the whole, 
well correlated, with the majority of p values < .01 (please see Tables N1 through N12, in 
Appendix N, for the results of these analyses).  
All patient control groups were then compared with the full MS group (n = 100) on 
the measures pertaining to positivity and unawareness, via ANCOVAs, to determine whether 
group differences occurred between the MS and patient control groups for these variables, 
while taking any significant pre-existing group differences on the key demographic variables 
into account.  For positivity, the participants were compared using the scores of the full 
sample, those participants presenting with moderate positivity, and those participants 
presenting with high positivity.  For unawareness, the scores of only unaware participants 
(i.e. those with negative discrepancy scores where participants under-estimated their deficits 
when compared to their informants) were compared.   
The above comparison (i.e. between the groups for positivity and unawareness) was 
made in order to test the main hypotheses of this section: that the euphoric types would not be 
prominent amongst participants with MG (or would not be as prominent as in the other 
groups), and that at least one euphoric type would be present in participants with MVA TBI, 
NP-SLE, and participants with RH damage. As group differences were again expected, 1-
tailed values are reported. 
The results of the four hypotheses will be presented below.  To remind the reader, 
these hypotheses regarded euphoria in MS as being the result of: (a) a psychological reaction 
to the disease, (b) executive dysfunction, (c) immunological processes, and (d) RH damage. 
To further remind the reader, the results presented below are from preliminary analyses, 
using very small patient control groups, and must be interpreted with caution. 
 
A psychological reaction. An attempt was made to test the first potential cause for 
euphoria (i.e. a psychological reaction to the disease) using the participants with MG.  Ten 
MG participants underwent a cognitive assessment and completed the questionnaires 
pertaining to euphoria, while a further 10 only completed the euphoria questionnaires.   
 
Assessing the suitability of the group to address the research question.  MS and MG 
participants were compared on the key demographic variables first (see Table 35) to 
determine if any pre-existing group differences existed that may influence their performance 
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MS participants 
(n = 100) 
MG controls 
(n = 20) 
t (df = 118) / 




95% CI Effect 
size d / 
V Key variable LL UL 
Gender – Male:Female 14:86 4:16 0.47 .493   0.06 
Age 44.49 (11.17) 39.95 (13.39) 1.60 .111 -1.07 10.15 0.04 
Race/ethnicity – White:Coloured/Indian 71:29 8:12 7.12 .008   0.24 
Educationa b 13.18 (1.65) 11.65 (2.58) 2.545 
(df = 22.22) 





0.61 .546 -8,640.72 16,252.68 0.15 
Duration of illness 9.57 (7.50) 7.45 (7.19) 1.16 .248   0.28 
Number of participants with a medical 
history that can affect neuropsychological 
functioning 
41 (41%) 10 (50%) 0.55 .457   0.07 
Use of medication that can affect mood 68 (68%) 15 (75%) 0.38 .536   0.06 
Note. Categorical data are presented in ratios or percentages. The data on age, education, income, and duration of illness are presented as means with standard 
deviations in parentheses. Significant results are presented in bold font. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit.  
a = Highest level of education obtained, presented in years; it excluded pre-school and grade R and presumed a certificate to be a one year course, a diploma 
to be a two year course, and capped “degree” at three years. 
b = Levene’s test for homogeneity was significant, therefore the results for “equal variances not assumed” were reported along with the degrees of freedom 
next to the statistic.  
c = Combined monthly household income. 
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The only significant pre-existing group difference between the MS and MG groups occurred 
for the variable of race or ethnicity.  Highest level of education was almost, but not quite, 
significant (p = .018).  Education, however, had a large effect size (d = 0.84) and while well-
matched on the other variables, these differences in race and education could impact 
negatively on performance on neuropsychological tests and, therefore, were controlled for in 
the following analyses. 
The MG group who underwent cognitive testing (n = 10) was then compared with the 
MS group who underwent cognitive testing (n = 60), to assess their cognitive functioning 
while controlling for the significant pre-existing between-group differences for race/ethnicity 
and close to significant differences for education.  This was done in order to attempt to assess 
the MG’s suitability as a control group and to assist in indicating whether their cognitive 
functioning was better than that of the MS group.  Descriptive results are presented first in 
Table 36, followed by results of the inferential statistics in Table 37. 
 
Table 36 
The Cognitive Performance of the MS Participants and MG Controls  
Measure 
MS participants 
(n = 60) 
MG controls 
(n = 10) 
Subcortical (executive functioning)   
     Speed of information processing 630.74 (232.36) 634.15 (179.26) 
     Verbal fluency 35.27 (12.44) 27.60 (9.69) 
Cortical   
     Executive functioning   
          Dorsolateral prefrontala 
          functioning composite 
59.36 (7.11) 
(n = 45) 
55.35 (8.29) 
(n = 6) 
          Orbitobasal composite 34.45 (9.27) 33.10 (11.51) 
     Memory   
          Verbal memory composite (left) 169.75 (24.06) 151.35 (30.24) 
          Visual memory composite (right) 85.14 (16.86) 73.10 (16.62) 
     Visuospatial (right)   
          Visuospatial construction 30.56 (3.09) 29.10 (3.26) 
Note. All data are presented as means with standard deviations in parentheses.  





ANCOVA Between-Subjects Effects (Between MS Participants and MG Controls) for the Cognitive Variables, Controlling for Race and 
Education 
 Adjusted means       
Source MS MG 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p η2 
Subcortical (executive functioning)         
     Speed of information processing 640.46 610.10       
          Corrected model   173,288.19 4 43,322.05 0.85 .497 0.05 
          Intercept   802,048.52 1 802,048.52 15.79 .0001 0.23 
          Type of participant   4,989.59 1 4,989.59 0.10 .755 0.00 
          Error   3,301,569.96 65 50,793.38    
          Total   31,365,933.68 70     
          Corrected total   3,474,858.15 69     
     Verbal fluency 34.25 31.43       
          Corrected model   2,304.74 4 576.19 4.59 .003 0.22 
          Intercept   57.94 1 57.94 0.46 .500 0.01 
          Type of participant   43.08 1 43.08 0.34 .560 0.00 
          Error   8,169.20 65 125.68    
          Total   92,212.00 70     
          Corrected total   10,473.94 69     
Cortical         
     Executive functioning         
          Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning  
          composite 
58.91 56.21       
               Corrected model   459.53 4 114.88 2.41 .063 0.17 
               Intercept   440.40 1 440.40 9.24 .004 0.17 
               Type of participant   33.06 1 33.06 0.69 .409 0.12 
               Error   2,192.33 46 47.66    
               Total   179,509.21 51     
               Corrected total   2,651.86 50     
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 Adjusted means       
Source MS MG 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p η2 
Cortical         
          Orbitobasal composite 33.28 39.53       
               Corrected model   2,537.22 4 634.30 11.02 .0001 0.40 
               Intercept   1.55 1 1.55 0.03 .870 0.00 
               Type of participant   211.49 1 211.49 3.68 .060 0.03 
               Error   3,740.16 65 57.54    
               Total   88,426.00 70     
               Corrected total   6,277.37 69     
     Memory         
          Verbal memory composite (left) 167.76 155.52       
               Corrected model   12,495.20 4 3,123.80 6.19 .0001 0.28 
               Intercept   7,017.62 1 7,017.62 13.91 .0001 0.15 
               Type of participant   810.00 1 810.00 1.61 .210 0.02 
               Error   32,786.02 65 504.40    
               Total   2,000,351.25 70     
               Corrected total   45,281.22 69     
          Visual memory composite (right) 83.33 78.91       
               Corrected model   8,085.42 4 2,021.36 10.58 .0001 0.02 
               Intercept   128.09 1 128.09 0.67 .416 0.00 
               Type of participant   105.74 1 105.74 0.55 .220 0.00 
               Error   12,417.89 65 191.05    
               Total   507,670.56 70     
               Corrected total         
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 Adjusted means       
Source MS MG 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p η2 
Cortical         
     Visuospatial (right)         
          Visuospatial construction 30.36 30.03       
               Corrected model   93.73 4 23.43 2.61 .044 0.00 
               Intercept   637.38 1 637.38 70.92 .0001 0.03 
               Type of participant   0.59 1 0.59 0.07 .798 0.00 
               Error   584.20 65 8.99    
               Total   65,146.39 70     
               Corrected total   20,503.32 69     
Note. Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite = attention, WM and abstract reasoning; Orbitobasal composite = disinhibition and set shifting; Verbal 
memory composite = verbal learning, memory and recognition; Visual memory composite = visual learning, memory and recognition.
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Descriptive statistics appear to imply that the MG participants performed a little more poorly 
than the MS participants on all measures of cognition.  However, the ANCOVA results above 
(see Table 37), suggest that when race and education were controlled for, no significant 
differences existed between the MS and MG groups, with very small eta-squared values 
indicating a very small effect size within these analyses. 
 These are limited results and are based on a small sample of only 10 MG controls.  
However, they appeared to suggest that the cognitive performance of the MG group was not 
better than that of the MS group.  However, they did not appear to perform significantly more 
poorly on any of the measures.  Thus, the MG group were tentatively accepted to be a 
possibly appropriate reflection of a similar chronic disease to MS that does not affect the 
brain, or cognitive functioning.  Thus, I proceeded with an analysis of the euphoric variables. 
 
Addressing the research question.  The 20 MG controls were then compared with the 
100 MS participants on the two types of euphoria identified by this study: positivity and 
unawareness, while controlling for the significant group differences described above.  This 
was done in order to provisionally investigate whether the MGs would demonstrate these two 
types of euphoria at lower levels than the MS participants.  Descriptive results are presented 
first in Table 38, followed by results of the preliminary inferential statistics, based on limited 






The Performance on Measures of Positivity and Unawareness of the MS Participants and 




(n = 100) 
MG controls 
(n = 20) 
Positivity   
     Composite (all participants) 122.12 (35.02) 138.94 (28.49) 
     Moderate positivity scores (50%-75% cut-off) 133.02 (15.26)  
(n = 54) 
139.33 (15.01)  
(n = 13) 
     High positivity scores (75% cut-off)  176.98 (9.24)  
(n = 13) 
174.21 (5.33)  
(n = 4) 
Unawareness (negative discrepancies only)   
     Physical domain (PAS)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 3.42 (2.30)  
(n = 45) 
4.00 (2.41) 
(n = 10) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50%-75% cut-off) - - 
          High unawareness scores (75% cut-off) - - 
     Cognitive domain (AI)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 1.44 (.81) 
(n = 16) 
1.00 
(n = 1) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50% - 75% cut-
off) 
- - 
          High unawareness scores (75%  cut-off) - - 
     Mood/behavioural domain (NPI)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 9.21 (8.94) 
(n = 24) 
12.00 (9.43) 
(n = 7) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50% - 75% cut-
off) 
- - 
          High unawareness scores (75% cut-off) - - 
Note. All data are presented as means with standard deviations in parentheses. Positivity = Positive 
sub-scale of PANAS, well-being sub-scale of ISS, optimism sub-scale of OPS, optimism sub-scale of 
LOT-R.  Unawareness = negative discrepancies between participant and informant ratings.  PAS = 





ANCOVA Between-Subjects Effects (Between MS and MG Participants) for Positivity and Unawareness (Controlling for Race and Education) 
 Adjusted means       
Source MS MG 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p η2 
Positivity         
     Composite (all participants) 125.72 138.97       
          Corrected model   12,067.62 4 3,016.91 2.68 .035 0.09 
          Intercept   26,233.82 1 26,233.82 23.30 .0001 0.19 
          Type of participant   2,616.75 1 2,616.75 2.33 .130 0.02 
          Error   129,457.93 115 1,125.72    
          Total   2,014,201.28 120     
          Corrected total   141,525.55 119     
     Moderate positivity scores (50%-75% cut-off) 134.20 142.05       
          Corrected model   1,304.52 4 326.13 1.427 .235 0.08 
          Intercept   17,424.15 1 17,424.15 76.27 .0001 1.13 
          Type of participant   548.37 1 548.37 2.40 .126 0.04 
          Error   14,165.11 62 228.47    
          Total   1,222,867.15 67     
          Corrected total   15,469.63 66     
     High positivity scores (75% cut-off) 174.39 183.00       
          Corrected model   327.82 4 81.96 1.22 .353 0.29 
          Intercept   4,630.26 1 4,630.26 68.97 .0001 4.09 
          Type of participant   87.42 1 87.42 1.30 .276 0.08 
          Error   805.61 12 67.13    
          Total   529,680.84 17     
          Corrected total   1,133.43 16     
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 Adjusted means       
Source MS MG 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p η2 
Unawareness (unaware participants only)         
     Physical domain (PAS) 3.45 3.88       
          Corrected model   16.68 4 4.17 0.77 .552 0.06 
          Intercept   48.78 1 48.78 8.97 .004 0.17 
          Type of participant   1.05 1 1.05 0.19 .662 0.94 
          Error   277.25 51 5.44 0.001 .975  
          Total   994.00 56     
          Corrected total   293.93 55     
     Cognitive domain (AI) 1.46 0.06       
          Corrected model   3.19 3 1.06 1.99 .165 0.32 
          Intercept   4.95 1 4.95 9.29 .009 0.49 
          Type of participant   1.24 1 1.24 2.32 .152 0.12 
          Error   6.93 13 0.53    
          Total   44.00 17     
          Corrected total   10.12 16     
     Mood/behavioural domain (NPI) 9.25 12.31       
          Corrected model   284.41 4 71.10 0.87 .496 0.12 
          Intercept   313.80 1 313.80 3.83 .061 0.13 
          Type of participant   48.43 1 48.43 0.59 .449 0.02 
          Error   2,129.79 26 81.92    
          Total   5,415.00 31     
          Corrected total   2,414.19 30     
Note. Positivity = Positive sub-scale of PANAS, well-being sub-scale of ISS, optimism sub-scale of OPS, optimism sub-scale of LOT-R.  Unawareness = 







Descriptive statistics suggested that, on average, the MG control participants appeared to 
demonstrate higher rates of positivity, than the MS participants.  When the sample was 
divided and moderate and high scorers were examined, MGs appeared to demonstrate greater 
positivity at the moderate level, but not at the high level.  In terms of the unaware 
participants, the MGs appeared to be slightly more unaware of physical and 
mood/behavioural deficits, but slightly more aware of cognitive deficits. 
Inferential statistics controlling for the pre-existing group difference in race and 
education, however, appeared to suggest that no significant differences existed between these 
two groups for any analysis of positivity or unawareness.  Not only were all p values > .01, 
but the eta-squared values were all low (the majority being η2 < 0.13), indicating small effect 
sizes and a lack of statistical significance. 
  The above results therefore appeared to imply that the MG and MS participants, in 
this sample, performed similarly on all variables relating to the two types of euphoria: that is, 
the MGs could be described as being as positive/optimistic and as unaware of potential 
deficits as the MS participants.  This was unexpected as the hypothesis was that MGs would 
not demonstrate positivity and unawareness at the same levels as the MS participants.  Since 
they did, this hypothesis was rejected. 
 
Executive dysfunction. Executive dysfunction is often considered to be the cause of 
euphoria, particularly by contemporary researchers (see, e.g. Benedict et al., 2001; Diaz-
Olavarrieta et al., 1999; Fishman et al., 2004).  Thus, this was the second potential cause to 
be investigated, and an attempt was made to examine this using the participants with MVA 
TBI.  Ten MVA TBI participants underwent a cognitive assessment and completed the 
questionnaires on euphoria, while a further nine completed only the euphoric questionnaires.   
 
Assessing the suitability of the group to address the research question.  The MS and 
MVA TBI participants were compared on the key demographic variables first (see Table 41) 
to determine if any pre-existing group differences existed that may influence their 





The Key Sociodemographic Characteristics of the MS Participants and MVA TBI Controls 
   t (df = 117) / 








d /  V Key variable 
MS participants 
(n = 100) 
MVA TBI controls 
(n = 19) LL UL 
Gender – Male:Female 14:86 12:7 22.60 .0001   0.44 
Age 44.49 (11.17) 32.58 (10.57) 4.30 .0001 6.42 17.40 1.07 
Race/ethnicity – White:Coloured/Indian 71:29 7:12 8.25 .004   0.26 





2.16 .033 987.52 22,477.12 0.54 
Number of participants with a medical 
history that can affect neuropsychological 
functioning 
41 (41%) 10 (52.6%) 0.88 .348   0.09 
Use of medication that can affect mood 68 (68%) 4 (21.1%) 14.73 .0001   0.35 
Note. Categorical data are presented in ratios or percentages. The data on age, education, and income are presented as means with the standard deviations in 
parentheses. Significant results are presented in bold font.  CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit.  
a = Highest level of education obtained, presented in years; it excluded pre-school and grade R and presumed a certificate to be a one year course, a diploma 
to be a two year course, and capped “degree” at three years. 
b = Combined monthly household income. 
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The inferential statistics appeared to suggest that these groups were not particularly well 
matched.  Significant pre-existing group differences existed for gender, age, race, highest 
level of education and current use of medication, in this limited sample.  Since group 
differences were implied, these variables were controlled for in future analyses, but additional 
caution should be taken with the interpretations made. 
The MVA TBI group that underwent cognitive testing (n = 10) was then compared 
with the MS group that underwent cognitive testing (n = 60), to assess their cognitive 
functioning while controlling for the significant pre-existing between-group differences for 
gender, age, race, education and use of medication.  This was done in order to attempt to 
assess the MVA TBIs suitability as a control group and to assist in signifying whether their 
cognitive functioning was similar to that of the MS group.  Descriptive results are presented 
first in Table 41, followed by results of the inferential statistics in Table 42. 
 
Table 41 
The Performance on Cognitive Measures of the MS Participants and MVA TBI Controls 
Measure 
MS participants 
(n = 60) 
MVA TBI controls 
(n = 10) 
Subcortical (executive functioning)   
     Speed of information processinga 630.74 (232.36) 
(n = 60) 
547.64 (137.31) 
(n = 9) 
     Verbal fluency 35.27 (12.44) 27.20 (9.99) 
Cortical   
     Executive functioning   
          Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning  
          compositea 
59.36 (7.11) 
(n = 45) 
50.09 (11.32) 
(n = 8) 
          Orbitobasal composite 34.45 (9.27) 35.50 (4.67) 
     Memory   
          Verbal memory composite (left) 169.75 (24.06) 132.80 (31.24) 
          Visual memory composite (right) 85.14 (16.86) 69.67 (20.96) 
     Visuospatial (right)   
          Visuospatial construction 30.56 (3.09) 31.28 (2.45) 
Note. All data are presented as means with standard deviations in parentheses.  






ANCOVA Between-Subjects Effects (Between MS Participants and MVA TBI Controls) for the Cognitive Variables (Controlling for Gender, 
Age, Race, Education and Current Medication Use) 
 Adjusted means       
Source MS MVA TBI 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p η2 
Subcortical (executive functioning)         
     Speed of information processing 657.31 603.15       
          Corrected model   994,552.43 13 76,504.03 1.76 .075 0.29 
          Intercept   38,685.50 1 38,685.50 0.89 .350 0.01 
          Type of participant   20,377.17 1 20,377.17 0.47 .497 0.01 
          Error   2,395,876.47 55 43,561.39    
          Total   29,905,179.02 69     
          Corrected total   3,390,428.89 68     
     Verbal fluency 31.93 30.19       
          Corrected model   3,243.89 13 249.53 1.90 .049 0.31 
          Intercept   75.06 1 75.06 0.57 .452 0.01 
          Type of participant   3.40 1 3.397 0.03 .873 0.00 
          Error   7,337.20 56 131.02    
          Total   92,046.00 70     
          Corrected total   10,581.09 69     
Cortical         
     Executive functioning         
          Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning  
          Composite 
59.45 52.04       
               Corrected model   1,827.32 12 152.28 3.25 .002 0.49 
               Intercept   144.48 1 144.48 3.08 .087 0.04 
               Type of participant   393.21 1 393.21 8.39 .006 0.11 
               Error   1,874.63 40 46.87    
               Total   181,762.03 53     
               Corrected total   3,701.96 52     
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 Adjusted means       
Source MS MVA TBI 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p η2 
Cortical         
          Orbitobasal composite 32.34 39.03       
               Corrected model   2,380.89 13 183.15 3.54 .0001 0.45 
               Intercept   2.77 1 2.77 0.05 .818 0.00 
               Type of participant   97.44 1 97.44 1.886 .175 0.02 
               Error   2,893.91 56 51.68    
               Total   89,076.00 70     
               Corrected total   5,274.80 69     
     Memory         
          Verbal memory composite (left) 159.28 124.05       
               Corrected model   29,576.30 13 2,275.10 5.08 .0001 0.54 
               Intercept   2,595.48 1 2,595.48 5.80 .019 0.05 
               Type of participant   3,618.80 1 3,618.80 8.09 .006 0.07 
               Error   25,061.65 56 447.53    
               Total   1,948,197.50 70     
               Corrected total   54,637.94 69     
          Visual memory composite  
          (right) 
82.17 64.40       
               Corrected model   12,775.36 13 982.72 5.50 .0001 0.56 
               Intercept   64.93 1 64.93 0.36 .549 0.00 
               Type of participant   1,791.87 1 1,791.87 10.03 .002 0.08 
               Error   10,007.63 56 178.71    
               Total   504,239.19 70     
               Corrected total   22,783.00 69     
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 Adjusted means       
Source MS MVA TBI 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p η2 
Cortical         
     Visuospatial (right)         
          Visuospatial construction 30.55 31.37       
               Corrected model   220.34 13 16.95 2.36 .014 0.35 
               Intercept   327.52 1 327.52 45.57 .0001 0.53 
               Type of participant   2.01 1 2.01 0.28 .599 0.00 
               Error   402.46 56 7.19    
               Total   66,423.25 70     
               Corrected total   622.80 69     
Note. Significant results are presented in bold font. Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite = attention, WM and abstract reasoning; Orbitobasal 
composite = disinhibition and set shifting; Verbal memory composite = verbal learning, memory and recognition; Visual memory composite = visual 
learning, memory and recognition. 
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The descriptive statistics above (see Table 41) suggest that the MVA TBI group performed 
more poorly than the MS group on the majority of variables. 
However, the ANCOVA results above (see Table 42) indicated that when gender, age, 
race, education and current medication use were controlled for, the MVA TBIs appeared to 
perform significant more poorly than the MS participants only on the dorsolateral prefrontal 
functioning composite (attention, WM, abstract reasoning), the verbal memory composite 
(verbal learning, memory, recognition), and the visual memory composite (visual learning, 
memory, recognition). 
 The results above, although not without notable associated limitations, therefore 
appeared to demonstrate that the MVA TBI group performed similarly to the MS group on 
the majority of variables, but significantly more poorly on one variable of executive 
functioning and the two variables of memory (where they performed more poorly on recall 
than recognition memory).  This was largely expected and since impairment in recall 
memory, comparative to recognition memory, is considered to be representative of a 
dysexecutive, rather than an axial-type memory impairment, the performance on the memory 
tasks, along with the remaining performance on executive tasks, implied possible support for 
the tentative hypothesis regarding their similar dysexecutive picture of cognitive impairment.  
This group was, therefore, tentatively accepted as a possible reflection of a group with similar 
executive dysfunction, and I proceeded with an analysis of the euphoric variables. 
 
Addressing the research question.  The 19 MVA TBI control participants were then 
compared with the 100 MS participants on the two types of euphoria identified by this study: 
positivity and unawareness, while controlling for the significant group differences described 
above.  This was done in order to attempt a preliminary investigation of the hypothesis that 
MVA TBI participants would demonstrate at least one of these two types of euphoria at the 
same levels as the MS participants.  Descriptive results are presented first in Table 43, 






The Performance on Self-Report Measures of Mood and Outlook of the MS Participants 
Compared with the MVA TBI Control Group for Continuous Data. 
Self-report measure 
MS participants 
(n = 100) 
MVA TBI 
controls 
(n = 19) 
Positivity   
     Composite (all participants) 122.12 (35.02) 122.65 (30.53) 
     Moderate positivity scores (50%-75% cut-off) 133.02 (15.26) 
(n = 54) 
128.10 (14.41) 
(n = 13) 
     High positivity scores (75% cut-off)  176.98 (9.24) 
(n = 13) 
172.80 (13.79) 
(n = 2) 
Unawareness (negative discrepancies only)   
     Physical domain (PAS)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 3.42 (2.30) 
(n = 45) 
3.50 (1.05) 
(n = 6) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50%-75% cut-off) - - 
          High unawareness scores (75% cut-off) - - 
     Cognitive domain (AI)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 1.44 (.81) 
(n = 16) 
2.10 (1.60) 
(n = 10) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50% - 75% cut-off) - - 
          High unawareness scores (75%  cut-off) - - 
     Mood/behavioural domain (NPI)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 9.21 (8.94) 
(n = 24) 
20.70 (13.88) 
(n = 10) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50% - 75% cut-off) - - 
          High unawareness scores (75% cut-off) - - 
Note. All data are presented as means with standard deviations in parentheses.  Positivity = Positive 
sub-scale of PANAS, well-being sub-scale of ISS, optimism sub-scale of OPS, optimism sub-scale of 
LOT-R.  Unawareness = negative discrepancies between participant and informant ratings.  PAS = 





ANCOVA Between-Subjects Effects (Between MS Participants and MVA TBI Controls) for Positivity and Unawareness, Controlling for Gender, 
Age, Race, Education and Current Medication Use 




Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p η2 
Positivity         
     Moderate positivity scores (50%-75% cut-off) 129.87 121.86       
          Corrected model   2,701.72 14 192.98 0.81 .655 0.18 
          Intercept   9,480.45 1 9,480.45 39.79 .0001 0.63 
          Type of participant   259.47 1 259.47 1.09 .302 0.02 
          Error   12,390.32 52 238.28    
          Total   1,183,595.90 67     
          Corrected total   15,092.04 66     
     High positivity scores (75% cut-off) 176.02 180.42       
          Corrected model   596.52 8 74.57 0.69 .695 0.48 
          Intercept   649.72 1 649.72 6.01 .050 0.53 
          Type of participant   0.92 1 0.92 0.01 .930 0.00 
          Error   648.73 6 108.12    
          Total   468,105.50 15     
          Corrected total   1,245.25 14     
Unawareness (unaware participants only)         
     Physical domain (PAS) 3.03 2.83       
               Corrected model   32.87 12 2.74 0.51 .898 0.14 
               Intercept   9.04 1 9.04 1.69 .204 0.04 
               Type of participant   0.05 1 0.05 0.01 .922 0.00 
               Error   205.64 38 5.41    
               Total   839.00 51     
               Corrected total   238.51 50     
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Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p η2 
Unawareness (unaware participants only)         
     Cognitive domain (AI) 1.42 1.83       
               Corrected model   27.09 12 2.26 3.47 .017 0.76 
               Intercept   2.20 1 2.20 3.38 .089 0.62 
               Type of participant   0.12 1 0.12 0.19 .671 0.00 
               Error   8.45 13 0.65    
               Total   110.00 26     
               Corrected total   35.54 25     
Note. Positivity = Positive sub-scale of PANAS, well-being sub-scale of ISS, optimism sub-scale of OPS, optimism sub-scale of LOT-R.  Unawareness = 
negative discrepancies between participant and informant ratings.  PAS = Physical Ability Scale.  AI = Awareness Interview.  
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Descriptively, on average, the MS and MVA TBI groups appeared to demonstrate similar 
levels of positivity.  When moderate and high scorers for positivity were examined, the MVA 
TBIs demonstrated slightly lower levels of positivity at the two different cut-off points, than 
the MS group.  When the participants classified as unaware were examined, the MVA TBIs 
seemingly demonstrated greater unawareness of all three domains. 
ANCOVAs (see Table 46) suggested that no group differences were present for any 
of the variables relating to positivity or unawareness represented above.  Effect sizes (via eta-
squared results) were again small (all η2 < 0.03); thus, the lack of statistical significance may 
not just be due to the small sample sizes.  Positivity (for all participants) and unawareness of 
mood/behavioural deficits both violated an assumption of ANVOCA.  Thus, hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses were run, including the controlled for variables first, and then 
using the “type of participant” grouping variable as a predictor variable.  The grouping 
variable did not appear to be a significant predictor of either positivity (β = -.02, p = .846, 
95% CI [-23.45, 19.35]) or unawareness of mood (β = -.21, p = .087, 95% CI [-21.10, 1.46]).  
Thus, significant group differences were tentatively considered not to be present for these 
variables either. 
The above results therefore appear to indicate that the MVA TBI and MS participants 
performed similarly on all variables relating to the two types of euphoria: that is, the MVA 
TBIs were as positive/optimistic and as unaware of potential deficits as the MS participants.  
This was expected as the hypothesis was that MVA TBIs would demonstrate at least one of 
the euphoric types at the same level as the MS participants.  Thus, tentative, provisional 
support for this hypothesis may have been demonstrated. 
 
Immunological processes affecting the brain. An attempt was made to investigate 
the third potential cause for euphoria (i.e. the result of immunological processes) using the 
participants with NP-SLE.  Ten NP-SLE participants underwent the cognitive assessment and 
completed the mood questionnaires.   
 
Assessing the suitability of the group to address the research question.  The MS and 
NP-SLE participants were compared on the key demographic variables first (see Table 45) to 
determine if any pre-existing group differences existed that may influence their performance 




The Key Sociodemographic Characteristics of the MS Participants and NP-SLE Controls 
   
t (df = 108) / 




95% CI Effect 
size 
d / V Key variable 
MS participants 
(n = 100) 
NP-SLE controls 
(n = 10) LL UL 
Gender – Male:Female 14:86 1:9 0.12 .725   0.03 
Age 44.49 (11.17) 45.60 (9.54) -0.30 .762 -8.37 6.15 -0.10 
Race/ethnicity – White:Coloured/Indian 71:29 0:10 20.03 .0001   0.43 
Educationa b 13.18 (1.65) 9.40 (4.33) 2.74  
(df = 9.27) 





2.07 .041 614.24 29,317.77 0.69 
Duration of illnessb 9.57 (7.50) 10.90 (13.21) -0.31  
(df = 9.59) 
.761 -10.84 8.18 -0.16 
Number of participants with a medical 
history that can affect neuropsychological 
functioning 
41 (41%) 7 (70%) 3.11 .078   0.17 
Use of medication that can affect mood 68 (68%) 7 (70%) 0.02 .897   0.01 
Note. Categorical data are presented in ratios or percentages. The data on age, education, income, and duration of illness are presented as means with the 
standard deviations in parentheses. Significant results are presented in bold font. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit.  
a = Highest level of education obtained, presented in years; it excluded pre-school and grade R and presumed a certificate to be a one year course, a diploma 
to be a two year course, and capped “degree” at three years. 
b = Levene’s test for homogeneity was significant, therefore the results for “equal variances not assumed” were reported along with the degrees of freedom 
next to the statistic.  





The only significant pre-existing between-group difference that appeared to exist was for race 
or ethnicity, which was controlled for in the following analyses. 
The NP-SLE group was then compared with the MS group who underwent cognitive 
testing (n = 60), while controlling for the significant pre-existing between-group differences 
for race. This was done in order to attempt to assess the suitability of the NP-SLE group to 
investigate their research question, and to assist in indicating whether their cognitive 
functioning was similar to that of the MS group.  Descriptive results are presented first in 
Table 46, followed by results of the inferential statistics in Table 47. 
 
Table 46 
The Cognitive Performance of the MS Participants and NP-SLE Controls 
Measure 
MS participants 
(n = 60) 
NP-SLE controls 
(n = 10) 
Subcortical (executive functioning)   
     Speed of information processing 630.74 (232.36) 777.98 (428.92) 
     Verbal fluency 35.27 (12.44) 30.10 (14.26) 
Cortical   
     Executive functioning   
          Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning  
          compositea 
59.36 (7.11) 
(n = 45) 
53.15 (8.25) 
(n = 8) 
          Orbitobasal composite 34.45 (9.27) 33.20 (9.99) 
     Memory   
          Verbal memory composite (left) 169.75 (24.06) 151.75 (29.77) 
          Visual memory composite (right) 85.14 (16.86) 69.33 (17.86) 
     Visuospatial (right)   
          Visuospatial construction 30.56 (3.09) 27.58 (9.64) 
Note. All data are presented as means with standard deviations in parentheses.  





ANCOVA Between-Subjects Effects (Between MS Participants and NP-SLE Controls) for the Cognitive Variables, Controlling for Race 
 Adjusted means       
Source MS NP-SLE 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F p η2 
Subcortical (executive functioning)         
     Speed of information processing 637.03 777.98       
          Corrected model   317,154.23 2 158,577.12 2.26 .113 0.63 
          Intercept   21,030,604.29 1 2,103,0604.29 299.16 .0001 4.18 
          Type of participant   63,466.13 1 63,466.13 0.90 .345 0.01 
          Error   4,709,970.27 67 70,298.06    
          Total   34,763,441.76 70     
          Corrected total   5,027,124.51 69     
     Verbal fluency 34.72 30.10       
          Corrected model   1,205.10 2 602.55 4.05 .022 0.11 
          Intercept   51,020.13 1 51,020.13 342.58 .0001 4.56 
          Type of participant   2.22 1 2.22 0.02 .903 0.00 
          Error   9,978.34 67 148.93    
          Total   94,639.00 70     
          Corrected total   11,183.44 69     
Cortical         
     Executive functioning         
          Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning  
          composite 
59.00 53.15       
               Corrected model   376.10 2 188.05 3.64 .034 0.13 
               Intercept   115,613.87 1 115,613.87 2236.03 .0001 39.04 
               Type of participant   94.29 1 94.29 1.82 .183 0.03 
               Error   2,585.24 50 51.71    
               Total   183,864.55 53     
               Corrected total   2,961.34 52     
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 Adjusted means       
Source MS NP-SLE 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F p η2 
Cortical         
     Memory         
          Verbal memory composite (left) 169.33 151.75       
               Corrected model   3,364.18 2 1,682.09 2.71 .074 0.07 
               Intercept   1,193,371.77 1 1,193,371.77 1924.78 .0001 26.58 
               Type of participant   1,502.40 1 1,502.40 2.42 .124 0.03 
               Error   41,540.34 67 620.01    
               Total   2,001,311.75 70     
               Corrected total   44,904.52 69     
          Visual memory composite (right) 84.63 69.33       
               Corrected model   3,021.09 2 1,510.54 5.39 .007 0.14 
               Intercept   282,581.27 1 282,581.27 1008.79 .0001 12.97 
               Type of participant   944.52 1 944.52 3.37 .071 0.04 
               Error   18,768.00 67 280.12    
               Total   502,692.00 70     
               Corrected total   21,789.09 69     
Note. Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite = attention, WM and abstract reasoning; Verbal memory composite = verbal learning, memory and 
recognition; Visual memory composite = visual learning, memory and recognition. 
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According to the descriptive statistics above (see Table 46), the NP-SLE group appeared to 
perform more poorly than the MS group on all variables of cognition.  However, neither the 
ANCOVA results (presented in Table 47), nor the hierarchical multiple regression analyses 
that were conducted for the orbitobasal composite (disinhibition and set shifting) and 
visuospatial construction (which violated an assumption of the ANCOVA) implied 
significant group differences (orbitobasal composite {β = .07, p = .455, 95% CI [-1.00, 
2.21]}; visuospatial construction {β = .16, p = .099, 95% CI [-0.14, 1.61]}).   
These preliminary results, therefore, appeared to imply that the NP-SLE group 
performed similarly to the MS group on all variables of cognition.  These findings were 
largely expected and the NP-SLE group, as a whole, was tentatively accepted to be possibly 
representative of a similar auto-immune disease to MS that does affect the brain and 
cognitive functioning.  Thus, I proceeded with an analysis of the euphoric variables. 
 
Addressing the research question.  The 10 NP-SLE control participants were then 
compared with the 100 MS participants on the two types of euphoria identified by this study: 
positivity and unawareness, while controlling for the significant pre-existing between-group 
differences for race.  This was done in an attempt to provisionally investigate whether NP-
SLEs would demonstrate at least one of the two types of euphoria at the same levels as the 
MS participants.  Descriptive results are presented first in Table 48, followed by results of the 






The Performance on Self-Report Measures of Mood and Outlook of the MS Participants 
Compared with the NP-SLE Control Group for Continuous Data 
Self-report measure 
MS participants 
(n = 100) 
NP-SLE 
controls 
(n = 10) 
Positivity   
     Composite (all participants) 122.12 (35.02) 145.98 (15.01) 
     Moderate positivity scores (50%-75% cut-off) 133.02 (15.26) 
(n = 54) 
141.11 (12.34) 
(n = 8; 80%) 
     High positivity scores (75% cut-off)  176.98 (9.24) 
(n = 13) 
165.45 (3.61) 
(n = 2) 
Unawareness (negative discrepancies only)   
     Physical domain (PAS)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 3.42 (2.30) 
(n = 45) 
2.25 (1.50) 
(n = 4) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50%-75% cut-off) - - 
          High unawareness scores (75% cut-off) - - 
     Cognitive domain (AI)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 1.44 (.81) 
(n = 16) 
- 
(n = 0) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50% - 75% cut-off) - - 
          High unawareness scores (75%  cut-off) - - 
     Mood/behavioural domain (NPI)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 9.21 (8.94) 
(n = 24) 
3.00 (0.00) 
(n = 1) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50% - 75% cut-off) - - 
          High unawareness scores (75% cut-off) - - 
Note.  All data are presented as means with standard deviations in parentheses. Positivity = Positive 
sub-scale of PANAS, well-being sub-scale of ISS, optimism sub-scale of OPS, optimism sub-scale of 
LOT-R.  Unawareness = negative discrepancies between participant and informant ratings.  PAS = 




ANCOVA Between-Subjects Effects (Between MS Participants and NP-SLE Controls) for Positivity and Unawareness, Controlling for Race 
 Adjusted means       
Source MS NP-SLE 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p η2 
Positivity         
     Composite (all participants) 125.67 145.98       
          Corrected model   11,059.03 2 5,529.52 5.03 .008 0.09 
          Intercept   888,859.54 1 888,859.54 809.28 .0001 6.91 
          Type of participant   1,044.32 1 1,044.32 0.95 .332 0.01 
          Error   117,522.10 107 1,098.34    
          Total   1,827,824.30 110     
          Corrected total   128,581.13 109     
     Moderate positivity scores (50%-75% cut-off) 134.14 141.11       
          Corrected model   800.78 2 400.39 1.81 .173 0.06 
          Intercept   696,284.06 1 696,284.06 3,143.41 .0001 50.20 
          Type of participant   93.94 1 93.94 0.42 .517 0.01 
          Error   13,068.84 59 221.51    
          Total   1,128,133.44 62     
          Corrected total   13,869.62 61     
     High positivity scores (75% cut-off) 177.12 165.45       
               Corrected model   275.91 2 137.96 1.67 .229 0.22 
               Intercept   270,357.13 1 270,357.13 3,269.52 .0001 213.18 
               Type of participant   275.40 1 275.40 3.33 .093 0.22 
               Error   992.28 12 82.69    
               Total   462,956.10 15     
               Corrected total   1,268.20 14     
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 Adjusted means       
Source MS NP-SLE 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p η2 
         
Unawareness (unaware participants only)         
     Physical domain (PAS) 3.38 2.25       
               Corrected model   8.35 2 4.18 0.81 .450 0.03 
               Intercept   184.34 1 184.34 35.87 .0001 0.75 
               Type of participant   2.42 1 2.42 0.47 .496 0.97 
               Error   236.42 46 5.14    
               Total   787.00 49     
               Corrected total   244.78 48     
     Mood/behavioural domain (NPI) 9.25 3.00       
               Corrected model   37.34 2 18.67 0.22 .802 0.02 
               Intercept   258.43 1 258.43 3.09 .092 0.14 
               Type of participant   36.13 1 36.13 0.43 .518 0.02 
               Error   1,837.63 22 83.53    
               Total   3,882.00 25     
               Corrected total   1,874.96 24     
Note. Positivity = Positive sub-scale of PANAS, well-being sub-scale of ISS, optimism sub-scale of OPS, optimism sub-scale of LOT-R.  Unawareness = 
negative discrepancies between participant and informant ratings.  PAS = Physical Ability Scale; NPI = Neuropsychiatric Inventory.
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Descriptive statistics appeared to suggest that, on average, the NP-SLEs were more 
positive/optimistic than the MS group.  When the scores of the moderately and highly scoring 
participants were compared, the NP-SLE group seemingly demonstrated greater levels of 
moderate positivity, but lower levels of high positivity than the MS participants.  In terms of 
the unaware participants, the MS group appeared to demonstrate greater unawareness than 
the NP-SLEs, for all three domains.   
Results from the ANCOVAs (presented in Table 49 above), however, implied that, 
when race was controlled for, no significant differences existed between these two groups for 
any analysis of positivity or unawareness.  In addition, unawareness of cognitive deficits, 
tested via a hierarchical multiple regression by inserting the controlled for demographic 
variable first, and then including type of participant as a predict variable (because it violated 
as assumption of ANCOVA), was also non-significant (β = -.05, p = 6185, 95% CI [-1.66, 
0.99]), implying no between-group differences for this variable. 
In support of this, the majority of eta-squared values, for the ANCOVAs were found 
to be less than 0.23 (except for unawareness of physical deficits which was high; η2 = 0.97).  
Thus, small effect sizes were largely indicated for these analyses and the non-significant 
differences may, exist despite the small sample sizes.  
The above results therefore suggested that the NP-SLE and MS participants 
performed similarly on all variables relating to the two types of euphoria.  This was expected 
and appears to provide possible support for the hypothesis that the NP-SLEs would 
demonstrate at least one of the euphoric types at the same level as the MS participants. 
 
Right hemispheric dysfunction. The fourth and last potential cause for euphoria (i.e. 
RH involvement) was provisionally investigated using the participants with RH damage.  As 
this was also a pilot investigation, 10 participants with RH damage as a result of a previous 
stroke were recruited.  As they had recently taken part in another neuropsychological study 
(see Mosdell, 2013), to minimise research fatigue and to maximise their willingness to take 
part in the current research, the RH control participants only completed the questionnaires 
pertaining to euphoria.   
 
Assessing the suitability of the group to address the research question.  MS and RH 
participants were compared on the key demographic variables first (see Table 53) to 
determine if any pre-existing group differences existed that may influence their performance 




The Key Sociodemographic Characteristics of the MS Participants and RH Controls 
    p 
(2-tailed / 
2-sided) 
95% CI Effect 
size 
d / V Key variable 
MS participants 
(n = 100) 
RH controls 
(n = 10) 
t (df = 108)/ 
X2 (df = 1) LL UL 
Gender – Male:Female 14:86 5:5 8.25 .004   0.27 
Age 44.49 (11.17) 46.90 (8.82) -0.66 .510 -9.64 4.82 -0.22 
Race/ethnicity – White:Coloured/Indian 71:29 1:9 14.96 .0001   0.37 
Educationa b 13.18 (1.65) 11.00 (2.83) 2.40 (df = 9.63) .038 0.14 4.22 1.23 




2.30 .023 2,291.03 31,000.99 0.76 
Number of participants with a medical 
history that can affect 
neuropsychological functioning 
41 (41%) 5 (50%) 0.30 .582   0.05 
Use of medication that can affect mood 68 (68%) 3 (30%) 5.74 .017   0.23 
Note. Categorical data are presented in ratios or percentages. The data on age, education, income, and duration of illness are presented as means with the 
standard deviations in parentheses. Significant results are presented in bold font. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit.  
a = Highest level of education obtained, presented in years; it excluded pre-school and grade R and presumed a certificate to be a one year course, a diploma 
to be a two year course, and capped “degree” at three years. 
b = Levene’s test for homogeneity was significant, therefore the results for “equal variances not assumed” were reported along with the degrees of freedom 
next to the statistic.  





Significant pre-existing between-group differences appeared to be present for gender and 
race.  Use of medication that can affect mood was close to significant (p = .017) with far 
more MS participants using such medications than RH participants (68% versus 30%).  While 
well-matched on the other key variables, these differences could impact negatively on 
neuropsychological functioning and, thus, were controlled for in the comparisons between 
these groups to follow. 
As discussed previously, due to research fatigue, the RH participants did not undergo 
cognitive testing as they had just taken part in an extensive neuropsychological study.  In 
private correspondence with the principal investigator, however, Ms Jill Mosdell described 
the cognitive performance of her RH group, of which the participants in the current study 
formed 50%.  The RH patients of the Mosdell et al. (2013) study performed similarly to well-
matched HCs on all measures of executive functioning (all p values > .01).  These measures 
included the digit span forwards and backwards test from the Wechsler Memory Scale, 3rd 
edition (for attention and WM; Wechsler, 1997), and the same CWIT (for disinhibition and 
set shifting) and DST (for abstract reasoning) used in the current study.  Although 
intelligence quotients (IQ) were not assessed in the current study, the RH group also 
performed similarly to the HCs on these measures.  However, they performed significantly 
more poorly than the HCs on RH measures of perspective taking and theory of mind tasks, as 
well as on measures of spatial cognition, including the construction and rotation subsets of 
the Stick Test (Benson & Barton, 1970; Lezak et al., 2004), and the ROCF (which was also 
used in the current study to assess visuospatial constructional ability; all p values < .01).  
This description largely appears to be in line with what was expected for this group, 
and the RH group, as a whole, was therefore tentatively accepted to be a possible appropriate 
reflection of a control group with damage to the RH only.  I thus proceeded with an analysis 
of the euphoric variables. 
 
Addressing the research question.  The 10 RH control participants were then 
compared with the 100 MS participants on the two types of euphoria identified by this study: 
positivity and unawareness, while controlling for the significant group differences described 
above.  This was done in order to provisionally investigate whether the RHs would 
demonstrate at least one of these two types of euphoria at the same levels as the MS 
participants.  Descriptive results are presented first in Table 51, followed by results of the 




The Performance on Self-Report Measures of Mood and Outlook of the MS Participants 
Compared with the NP-SLE Control Group for Continuous Data 
Self-report measure 
MS participants 
(n = 100) 
RH controls 
(n = 10) 
Positivity   
     Composite (all participants) 122.12 (35.02) 107.36 (29.80) 
     Moderate positivity scores (50%-75% cut-off) 133.02 (15.26) 
(n = 54) 
125.71 (11.52) 
(n = 6) 
     High positivity scores (75% cut-off)  176.98 (9.24) 
(n = 13) 
- 
(n = 0) 
Unawareness (negative discrepancies only)   
     Physical domain (PAS)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 3.42 (2.30) 
(n = 45) 
7.43 (5.38) 
(n = 7) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50%-75% cut-off) - 
(n = 0) 
17.00 (0.00) 
(n = 1) 
          High unawareness scores (75% cut-off) - - 
     Cognitive domain (AI)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 1.44 (.81) 
(n = 16) 
1.00 (0.00) 
(n = 2) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50% - 75% cut-off) - - 
          High unawareness scores (75%  cut-off) - - 
     Mood/behavioural domain (NPI)   
          Unawareness scores (all unaware participants) 9.21 (8.94) 
(n = 24) 
3.00 (2.83) 
(n = 2) 
          Moderate unawareness scores (50% - 75% cut-off) - - 
          High unawareness scores (75% cut-off) - - 
Note.  All data are presented as means with standard deviations in parentheses. Positivity = Positive 
sub-scale of PANAS, well-being sub-scale of ISS, optimism sub-scale of OPS, optimism sub-scale of 
LOT-R.  Unawareness = negative discrepancies between participant and informant ratings.  PAS = 




ANCOVA Between-Subjects Effects (Between MS Participants and RH Controls) for Positivity and Unawareness, Controlling for Gender, Race 
and Current Medication Use 
 Adjusted means       




F p η2 
Positivity         
     Composite (all participants) 125.33 100.62       
          Corrected model   17,220.00 12 1,435.00 1.22 .281 0.13 
          Intercept   270,663.40 1 270,663.40 230.03 .0001 2.06 
          Type of participant   5,951.62 1 5,951.62 5.06 .027 0.05 
          Error   114,135.97 97 1,176.66    
          Total   1,735,958.53 110     
          Corrected total   131,355.98 109     
     Moderate positivity scores (50%-75% cut-off) 129.59 121.81       
          Corrected model   2,071.44 11 188.31 0.81 .635 0.16 
          Intercept   320,463.75 1 320,463.75 1.40 .243 24.09 
          Type of participant   326.83 1 326.83 0.10 .754 0.02 
          Error   11,228.83 48 233.93    
          Total   1,063,255.13 60     
          Corrected total   13,300.27 59     
Note. Positivity = Positive sub-scale of PANAS, well-being sub-scale of ISS, optimism sub-scale of OPS, optimism sub-scale of LOT-R.
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Descriptively, on average, the RHs appeared to demonstrate less positivity than the MS 
participants.  When just moderate and high scorers were examined, no RHs scored within the 
high range and RH moderate scorers demonstrated slightly less positivity than the MS 
moderate scorers.  The RHs appeared to be more aware of their deficits, except for physical 
deficits.   
No RHs scored within the high range for positivity, thus no inferential statistics were 
run on this variable.  However, ANCOVAs were run on the scores of the majority of other 
variables.  An assumption was violated for unawareness of physical and unawareness of 
mood/behavioural deficits.  Thus, hierarchical multiple regression analyses were run, 
including the controlled for variables first, and then using the ‘type of participant’ grouping 
variable as a predictor variable.  The grouping variable was found to be a significant predictor 
of unawareness of physical deficits (β = -.27, p = .010, 95% CI [2.60, 8.88]), which implied 
that the RHs were significantly more unaware of their physical deficits than were the MS 
group.  However, unawareness of cognitive deficits (β = .07, p = .622, 95% CI [-0.95, 1.82) 
and unawareness of mood/behavioural deficits (β = .02, p = .844, 95% CI [-10.30, 12.58]) 
were non-significant.  All ANCOVA results for all of the remaining variables associated with 
positivity and unawareness (presented above in Table 52), also appeared to be non-significant 
(with small effect sizes of η2 < 0.05). 
 The above results therefore suggest that the RH and MS participants did not perform 
similarly on the majority of variables relating to the two types of euphoria, as there were 
significant differences in their performance on unawareness of physical deficits (where the 
RHs appeared to be significantly more unaware of their physical deficits than the MS 
participants), and positivity at the high level (where no RHs scored within this range).  Since 
group differences were demonstrated for both positivity and unawareness (i.e. both of the 
euphoric types), the hypothesis that RHs would demonstrate at least one of the euphoric types 
at the same level as the MS participants was tentatively rejected. 
 
 Summary of part three.  The aim of part three was to explore four hypotheses 
regarding the cause of euphoria in MS, via preliminary analyses.  The MG, MVA TBI and 
NP-SLE groups all demonstrated as much positivity and unawareness as the MS group.  The 
RH group, in comparison, did not demonstrate positivity at the high cut-off point, and 
demonstrated significantly more unawareness of physical deficits than did the MS group.  









This study was the first of its kind to approach euphoria in MS comprehensively.  Not only 
did it include both classical and contemporary understandings, which allowed for a more 
broad and comprehensive investigation; it also investigated both the symptoms of euphoria, 
and the constructs that define them, in order to gain a greater understanding of these 
phenomena.  It additionally included a preliminary investigation of new hypotheses regarding 
the possible cause of euphoria in MS.  The results of these investigations will be discussed in 
the following sub-sections.   
This section will follow the same format as the results section.  In part one I discuss 
the results presented on the constructs of euphoria.  In part two I discuss the findings 
pertaining to a better description of the types of euphoria; and, in part three, I discuss the 
provisional results presented on the various hypotheses concerning the etiology of euphoria.  
These will be followed by a general discussion where I will summarise the study and further 
discuss some important issues raised by this research. 
 
Part one.  Addressing discrepancies and defining euphoria 
The main aim of part one was to critically examine the constructs of euphoria in order to 
better understand what euphoria involves before investigating it within the sample.  The 
discrepancies between classical and contemporary literature in terms of the number of types, 
the definitions of each type and the frequencies of the various types were investigated via an 
analysis of the literature and the use of the original (classical) CWQ, and the popular modern 
measure, the NPI; and I proposed that a change in the number of types, and in the definition 
of those types has occurred since the description presented by Cottrell and Wilson (1926), 
resulting in the euphoria measured today having a different quality to that of the classical 
measure/description. I also hypothesised that the different measurement instruments, which 
are based on the different definitions, could influence the incidence rates of euphoria found 
and that high rates of euphoria could be replicated by using the classical measure (and 
definition) and that low rates of euphoria could be replicated by using the modern measure 
(and definition). 
 These ideas (that of the number of types, definitions of the types and frequencies of 
the types) were then addressed using additional, different measures (i.e. not the CWQ or NPI) 
with good psychometric properties, that are popular measures in the study of positive mood, 
awareness and optimism today, to investigate the symptoms of euphoria from a modern 
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perspective.  As I approached this largely from a framework using the classical definitions, I 
hypothesised that more than one type of euphoria exists and that the frequencies of these 
types would be higher than those found today and more comparable to that of Cottrell and 
Wilson (1926). 
 
 Classical versus contemporary measures.  First, the euphoric constructs were 
investigated using the classical CWQ and the modern measure of the NPI.  Discrepancies 
between authors using these measures regarding the number of types of euphoria, the 
definitions of those types, and the frequencies or incidence rates of those types were 
investigated and results pertaining to the analysis of these discrepancies were presented. 
 
Number of types and definitions of the types of euphoria.  As has been noted, a 
number of discrepancies between the classical and contemporary literature regarding 
euphoria exist.  One of the most obvious is a difference in the number of types and in the 
definitions of those types.  Results from an investigation of these differences were presented 
first and I proposed that a change in the number of types has occurred since the original 
definition of Cottrell and Wilson (1926), and that the euphoria described and measured today 
does not reflect the same euphoria of the original classical definition.  
 
The classical and contemporary views.  First, the classical descriptions and definitions 
of Cottrell and Wilson (1926) were presented.  These reflected three types of euphoria: 
euphoria sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica, and spes sclerotica.  The contemporary descriptions 
and definitions were then presented.  As the NPI only addresses something similar to 
euphoria sclerotica, reporting findings of the NPI alone implies that only one type of euphoria 
exists.  Thus, it appears clear that a change in the number of types of euphoria recognised has 
occurred.  While Cottrell and Wilson (1926) included three types, authors today often fail to 
differentiate between these types, and even when they do, the majority report euphoria only 
in terms of the NPI which measures only one type (something similar to euphoria sclerotica).   
It is also clear, from reading the descriptions of the types, that a change in the 
definition of these types appears to have occurred.  In terms of the definitions of the various 
types, euphoria sclerotica appears to have changed from cheerfulness, happiness and serenity 
to unusual or persistent cheerfulness, inappropriate serenity, rapid mood changes, and social 
disinhibition.  In terms of the two main measures investigated in this study (i.e. the CWQ and 
NPI), fairly general questions referring to what could be called normal mood or a subtle or 
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mild positive mood (in the classical CWQ) seem to have been replaced by a single question 
referring to persistent and abnormally good mood (in the modern NPI).   
Even greater changes in definition are evident when it comes to eutonia sclerotica.  
Original definitions included a sense of physical well-being, with or without disability, and a 
lack of awareness of physical disability. These seem to have been replaced by an 
unawareness of physical deficit in the presence of severe physical impairment, as well as by 
definitions that include cognitive impairment and unawareness of cognitive or personality 
changes.  With the classically described lack of awareness may have indeed occurred 
alongside physical impairment, Cottrell and Wilson (1926) did not maintain that physical 
disability needed to be present for these patients to experience a sense of physical well-being.  
Furthermore, although they defined eutonia sclerotica in terms of an unawareness of physical 
disability, as well as in terms of physical well-being, the questions of their original 
questionnaire related far more to the latter than they did to the former.  Thus a change appears 
to have occurred here as contemporary researchers place a far larger emphasis on 
unawareness of disability rather than on a feeling of physical well-being; and 
patient/informant discrepancies are the dominant means of measuring this symptom.  With 
regard to the object of unawareness, the classical definition referred only to that of the 
physical domain, but contemporary researchers broaden this to include cognitive and 
personality changes. 
Spes sclerotica, in contrast, does not appear to have undergone as much of a change; 
although general optimism regarding the future and recovery that is elevated or out of place 
when considering the MS patient’s situation appears to have been intensified to reflect an 
optimism that is considered to be unrealistic.  Therefore, euphoria sclerotica and spes 
sclerotica appear to have become more extreme or abnormal, while eutonia sclerotica has 
morphed from a feeling of physical well-being or lack of awareness of physical deficit, to an 
unawareness of physical, cognitive and/or personality changes or deficits. 
  
Further comparisons.  Results from a variety of correlational analyses between the 
various measures investigated were also presented.  In terms of euphoria sclerotica and spes 
sclerotica, the classical CWQ did not correlate well with the current popular measures of 
extreme mood and outlook such as the NPI (p = .809), which measures a persistent and 
abnormally good mood, and the CRJRF (p = .280), which measures unrealistic optimism.  
However, it did correlate well with other modern measures of more subtle mood and outlook,  
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including the positive sub-scale of the PANAS, the well-being sub-scale of the ISS, and the 
optimism sub-scales of the OPS and LOT-R (all p values < .01, except for PANAS, p = .086).   
In contrast, in addition to poorly correlating with the classical measure (CWQ), the 
more extreme modern measures – the NPI and CRJRF (which are often used to measure the 
constructs of euphoric mood and unrealistic optimism today) - did not correlate well with the 
other modern measures of more subtle mood and outlook – the PANAS, ISS, OPS and LOT-
R (all p values > .05). This provides compelling evidence that the NPI and the CRJRF seem 
to be measuring something other than positive mood and optimism; perhaps as the questions 
suggest: something more, something abnormal, something unrealistic.  But, it also appears to 
imply that the more general, subtle measures of positive mood and optimism (i.e. the 
PANAS, ISS, OPS and LOT-R), which perhaps have greater reliability and validity than the 
original CWQ, appear to better reflect (than the NPI and CRJRF) what was originally 
described by Cottrell and Wilson (1926) to represent euphoria sclerotica and spes sclerotica. 
The fact that the quality of euphoria elicited by these measures appears to be different 
from that which is elicited by the NPI (and CRJRF) suggests that a change in definition 
appears to have taken occurred.  The subtle symptoms described by the classical literature 
appear to now be defined in a slightly more extreme manner and no longer measure the same 
symptoms. 
In terms of the correlational analysis concerning eutonia sclerotica, the CWQ did not 
correlate well with the modern measures of awareness used to represent this type of euphoria.  
Not only did it correlate poorly with unawareness of cognitive and mood/behavioural deficits 
(p values > .100), but the original measure of eutonia sclerotica also correlated fairly poorly 
with the modern measure of unawareness of physical deficits (p = .800).  This, again, 
provides evidence that the current measures of unawareness of deficit are measuring 
something other than the physical well-being originally described by Cottrell and Wilson 
(1926), and that a change in definition has taken place. 
But then are euphoria sclerotica and spes sclerotica meant to be abnormal positive 
mood and unrealistic optimism?  Or just subtle positive mood and optimism that appear 
abnormal when one considers the plight of the MS patient?  And, is eutonia sclerotica meant 
to be a state of physical well-being or rather an unawareness of physical deficit?  In terms of 
the definition of Cottrell and Wilson (1926), it would appear that euphoria sclerotica and spes 
sclerotica reflect a more subtle quality, and that modern measures that are similar to the 
original constructs are better reflectors of these symptoms than more popular, extreme, 
measures such as the NPI (and CRJRF).  In reference to eutonia sclerotica, however, Cottrell 
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and Wilson (1926) were not clear on which aspect (i.e. physical well-being or unawareness of 
physical deficit) deserved more attention, and included both in their definition, but measured 
only well-being.  However, although they may not reflect the same construct, unawareness of 
deficit may be more important than a feeling of physical well-being in terms of treatment and 
rehabilitation. Therefore, a greater emphasis on unawareness than on physical well-being 
may be more appropriate.   
These are, however, difficult questions to answer.  What can be addressed here, 
though, is that a change in the conceptual definition of euphoria, since the definition provided 
by Cottrell and Wilson (1926), appears to have taken place.  While reviews of the literature 
on euphoria, such as that of Finger (1998), exist that note some of these discrepancies, to my 
knowledge no one has addressed them specifically, or closely investigated whether a change 
in definition has actually taken place, or investigated why this has occurred.  However, 
clarifying the differences that exist and the confusions that have crept into the literature is of 
great importance as the operational definitions, and the measurement of a symptom depends 
on the construct and conceptual definition underpinning that symptom.  If the questions or 
measures used today are based on definitions that are different from that of the original 
descriptions, we may be missing out something important or excluding a number of patients 
that could benefit from treatment or intervention.  As I proposed that a change in definition 
(in terms of the number of types and the definitions of those types) has occurred, support for 
this proposition has been demonstrated. 
 
Frequencies of euphoria.  Cottrell and Wilson (1926) found high rates of euphoria 
amongst their sample of 100 MS participants: 63% euphoria sclerotica, 84% eutonia 
sclerotica and 84% spes sclerotica.  Today, however, researchers such as Diaz-Olavarrieta et 
al. (1999), Figved et al. (2005), and Fishman et al. (2004), using the popular NPI, report 
much lower rates of around 4.7% to14.6 % of euphoria (of the euphoria sclerotica type).  
Thus, the aim of this section was to investigate these discrepancies in incidence rates of 
euphoria.  I hypothesised that the measurement instruments used may influence the rates of 
euphoria found, and that high rates of euphoria would be replicated using the classical 
measure (and definition) and that low rates of euphoria would be replicated using the modern 
measure (and definition). 
In accordance with the aims and hypotheses above, I used these same measures as 
those used with reference to the rates reported above (i.e. the CWQ for the classical measure 
and the NPI for the contemporary measure) as I wanted to investigate, among other things, 
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the incidence of euphoria within a sample of 100 MS participants.  In terms of the classical 
measure (i.e. the CWQ), Cottrell and Wilson (1926) did not specify how to determine rates of 
euphoria from the answers to their questionnaire.  Nor did they explicitly state which of their 
questions referred to which types of euphoria.  Thus, 15 raters assigned each of the questions 
to a category (i.e. euphoria sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica, spes sclerotica, other), some with 
fairly low agreement.  I then asked three different raters to rate each answer to the relevant 
questions identified by the provisional study according to whether they thought the symptom 
(i.e. only euphoria sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica or spes sclerotica; “other” questions were not 
rated) was definitely present, or definitely absent.  Raters, however, stated that a number of 
answers appeared to be mixed, some of the answers pertaining to the euphoric type indicating 
a definite presence, and some an apparent absence of the symptom.  They thus requested that 
a possibly present category be included.  Following this, the three raters again rated the 
answers and determined whether the type of euphoria was definitely present, possibly present 
or absent.  After additional concerns were raised regarding the interpretation of the answers 
and after uniform rating criteria were created, using a lenient criterion (i.e. including both 
definite and possible cases) I demonstrated similar rates to that of others using this 
questionnaire.  I found euphoria sclerotica in 63% of participants, eutonia sclerotica in 48%, 
and spes sclerotica in 70%.  This was comparable to the 63% euphoria sclerotica, 84% 
eutonia sclerotica, and 84% spes sclerotica found by Cottrell and Wilson (1926) and the 
53.6% euphoria sclerotica, 50% eutonia sclerotica, and 50% spes sclerotica found by Sugar 
and Nadell (1943) who later attempted to replicate the original study.   
This appears to demonstrate that high frequencies of the euphoric types were found by 
this study when these symptoms were defined more subtly, which provides support for the 
hypothesis that high rates of euphoria could be replicated by using the classical 
description/definition and measure. However, the fact that a possibly present category was 
needed by the raters, and the fact that a lack of consensus existed between the 15 raters who 
initially assigned each question a category of euphoria illuminates the highly interpretable 
nature of the CWQ, and this demonstrated a major limitation of the CWQ.  
In contrast, similar low rates of euphoria (in terms of abnormal positive mood, a 
symptom that is most similar to the euphoria sclerotica of the classical types of euphoria) to 
those found by other modern authors were demonstrated by this study when using the NPI: 
11% according to the standard informant-based administration of the measure, and 16% when 
the euphoria question of the NPI was asked of the participants themselves, which is similar to 
the 13% found by Diaz-Olavarrieta et al. (1999) and the 14.6% found by Fishman et al. 
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(2004).  Support for the hypothesis that low rates of euphoria could be replicated by using the 
contemporary description/definition and measure was, therefore, also found, and the results 
indicated that low rates of euphoria (sclerotica) were demonstrated when the symptom was 
defined in a more extreme, abnormal manner.   
However, only rates relating to euphoria sclerotica could be reported as the NPI does 
not address the other types, which revealed a major limitation of this popular measure. 
As a number of limitations of each of these measures was uncovered, a discussion of 
these is required.  In terms of the modern measure, the NPI addressed only a symptom that 
related to euphoria sclerotica and no results could be provided regarding eutonia sclerotica or 
spes sclerotica.  Thus, in terms of the classical framework, this measure could be described as 
being too specific, restrictive and/or lacking in content validity.  Furthermore, although a 
limitation associated more with the researchers using the NPI rather than with the NPI itself, 
reviewers of the contemporary literature may regard modern investigators as being biased 
against detecting this aspect of euphoria in MS patients (see, e.g. Fishman et al., 2004; 
Kesselring & Klement, 2001).  This could also influence the definitions they use to describe 
it and, consequently the rates at which they find euphoria. 
The classical CWQ, on the other hand, could be described as being too inclusive and 
lacking specificity, if one presumes that the rating criteria used were lenient and included the 
definite and unsure cases that were identified by the current study.  In addition, as they did 
not objectively state their rating criteria, as they were fixed on the idea of there being three 
types, and as they believed euphoria to be the predominant mood state of MS patients, 
experimenter bias may have played a role in the high frequencies they found.   
Furthermore, the fact that unsure or possibly present cases were identified at all is a 
limitation, and indicates that their measure was highly subjective and potentially arbitrary.  
This was evident not only when rating the answers for the presence of euphoria (where inter-
rater agreement was between .327 and .555), but also in determining which questions referred 
to which type of euphoria (where the percentage of inter-rater agreement per question was 
between 46.67% and 93.33%).   
Finally, Cottrell and Wilson (1926) operationalised spes sclerotica to include 
prospects of recovery, but no questions were included in their measure that related to this 
issue.  When questions relating to their description were included (along with the original 
questions), the rates of definite spes sclerotica dropped from 37% to 27%, and the rates of 
definite as well as possibly present spes sclerotica from 70% to 66%.  The fact that important 
questions pertaining to their definition were not included in their questionnaire is noteworthy 
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enough; but the fact that the inclusion of these questions negatively influenced rates of 
optimism again indicates that the original questions were not specific enough.   
The results concerning these two measures, however, also revealed interesting 
findings pertaining to the incidence rates of euphoria within this sample. As low rates were 
demonstrated when the NPI was administered, and as relatively high rates were found when 
the CWQ was used, albeit with some interpretation of the findings, support for the hypotheses 
concerning the replication of either high or low frequencies was largely demonstrated.  As the 
same MS participants were tested on both measures at the same time, this implies that high 
frequencies of euphoria were demonstrated when the associated symptoms were defined 
more subtly. 
However, these findings also provide support for the hypothesis that different 
measuring instruments (along with their different operational definitions of euphoria), can 
influence the rates of euphoria found within MS patients.  Again, reviews of euphoria, such 
as that of Finger (1998), have highlighted vast differences in rates.  Furthermore, reasons for 
these differences have been postulated, including differences in disease duration across 
samples (Minden, 2000; Minden & Schiffer, 1990), inadequate screening to rule out other 
diseases such as neurosyphillis (Ombredane, 1929, as cited in Finger, 1998; Rabins, 1990), as 
well as differences in definitions and measurement instruments (Baretz and Stephenson, 
1981; Finger, 1998; Minden, 2000; Minden & Schiffer, 1990; Pratt, 1951; Rabins, 1990) and 
the lack of standardised measurement instruments (Minden & Schiffer, 1990; Reischies et al., 
1988). However, to my knowledge, no-one has addressed the issue of differing incidence 
rates specifically, or investigated factors which may directly impact on this problem.  Prior to 
this study, it could be argued that the rates of these symptoms had somehow changed and that 
MS patients are no longer predominantly euphoric.  However, if this change could be due to 
the instruments and definitions used to measure these symptoms, rather than a change in the 
MS patient, an interrogation of these factors is important in illuminating the real facts 
concerning the constructs of euphoria as well as the frequencies with which these symptoms 
can be found in MS patients.  Since the operational definition of these symptoms and the 
ways in which they are measured is entirely dependent on how these symptoms are 
conceptualised, it seems clear that both the conceptual and operational definitions of euphoria 
have changed.  As a result, the main measures of this study (i.e. the NPI and the CWQ), and 
their associated definitions of euphoria, appear to have impacted on the incidence rates and 
typing of euphoria within MS patients via artefact of these measures (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2001; DeSteno, Bartlett, Braverman, & Salovey, 2002), which refers to a 
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specific error that occurs due to the influence of the measurement instrument and is a serious 
threat to validity.  Therefore, the findings of this section both provide support for the 
associated hypothesis (i.e. that the measurement instruments used will influence the rates of 
euphoria found, and, by association, that high rates of euphoria will be replicated using the 
classical measure and low rates using the modern measure), as well as highlight the need for 
a better definition regarding the number of types of euphoria, the definition of those types and 
better measurement instruments that reliably measure these constructs. 
 
 Additional and different contemporary measures.  Since I hypothesised that the 
main measures investigated in this study would impact on the definitions and incidence rates 
of euphoria, the true number of types and frequencies of these types were also investigated 
using different modern measures, with well-established psychometric properties.  These 
consisted of either informant reports of their MS loved-one’s mood, or of well-known 
modern self-report measures of positive mood, unawareness of deficit and optimism.  Given 
the weaknesses demonstrated for both the most-used classical and contemporary 
measurement instruments, this was a very important line of investigation.  
 
 Number of types and definitions of the types of euphoria.  The first aim was to 
investigate the true number of types of euphoria, and to describe these types. As 
contemporary definitions are characterised by confusion, I approached this research question 
from the classical theoretical perspective of there being three types of euphoria.  Thus, I 
hypothesised that more than one type of euphoria exists. 
The results from the informant based factor analyses were reported first, based on the 
classic objective descriptions of euphoric patients put forward in the literature review. A 
principal components factor analysis, using promax rotation and the suppression of 
coefficients of .400 or below was run using the informants’ ratings of their loved-ones’ mood, 
outlook and awareness.  As the classical framework suggests three types, a solution with 
three forced factors was run.  This revealed one factor consisting of euphoria sclerotica and 
spes sclerotica (with the informants’ ratings of their loved-ones’ mood and outlook loading 
onto this factor).  The second factor related to unawareness of cognitive deficits and 
unawareness of mood deficits (with the informants’ ratings of their loved-ones’ awareness of 
any deficits present in these domains loading onto this factor).  The third factor only included 
unawareness of physical deficits (with the informants’ ratings of the MS loved-ones’ 
awareness of their physical difficulties loading onto this factor).  However, when these 
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variables were not forced into three factors, two clear factors emerged: one relating to 
euphoria sclerotica and spes sclerotica (i.e. positive mood and optimism), and one on which 
all forms of unawareness loaded (i.e. eutonia sclerotica).   
The factors relating to unawareness in these two analyses deserve a special mention.  
The original definition of eutonia sclerotica is circumscribed to unawareness of physical 
deficit alone, and based on our neuropsychological understanding of unawareness, and 
particularly the difference between unawareness of physical and cognitive disability which 
may have unique underlying mechanisms, it was not unexpected to find them separated (as in 
the first analysis). However, given that these additional elements were included based on 
contemporary descriptions of unawareness in MS, it is of particular interest to find that they 
did, in fact, all load onto one factor (along with unawareness of physical deficit) when the 
variables were not forced into particular factors (as in the second analysis).  In the latter 
analysis each domain or type of unawareness could have loaded onto its own distinct factor, 
but did not.  This, therefore, suggests some underlying commonality between them which is 
an important finding.  Unawareness in MS may, therefore, include a wider spectrum than just 
that of physical deficits. 
 Due to the issues raised by researchers such as Surridge (1969) addressed in the 
literature review, we know that objective reports of euphoria (in terms of physicians 
determining the mood state of the patient without asking for their subjective opinion) may be 
unreliable.  Thus, the modern self-report measures were also analysed via principal 
components factor analyses, using promax rotation and suppression of coefficients of .400 or 
below.  When the variables were not forced onto three factors, the factor analysis again 
revealed two types of euphoria: one relating to positive mood and optimism (a combined 
euphoria and spes sclerotica, with self-report measures of positive mood [PANAS and ISS] 
and of optimism [OPS and LOT-R] loading onto this factor), and one relating to unawareness 
of deficit (or eutonia sclerotica, with self-report measures of unawareness in terms of 
participant/informant discrepancies on the PAS, AI and NPI loading onto this factor).  
Importantly, the latent factor structure revealed was the same for informant based and self-
reported measures, and again revealed an underlying commonality between the types of 
unawareness. 
I then tested this two factor structure using the classical measure of euphoria (it was 
not possible to test the NPI as it measures only one type of euphoria).  A two fixed factor 
analysis was run as (a) I already knew that the CWQ and classical definition included three 
types, and (b) I was rather interested in determining whether even this measure (which was 
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designed to elicit three types of euphoria) might actually only elicit two types.  The same 
principal components analysis was run, using the CWQ, and the forced two factor solution 
demonstrated the same two factors as the previous analyses using the additional measures 
described above: one encompassing euphoria sclerotica and spes sclerotica, and one onto 
which eutonia sclerotica loaded.   
Therefore, it would almost certainly appear that two types of euphoria exist: (a) a type 
that I referred to as positivity, that is defined in terms of both positive mood (euphoria 
sclerotica) and optimism (spes sclerotica); and (b) a type characterised by unawareness and 
defined in terms of physical, cognitive and mood/behavioural domains (eutonia sclerotica).  
This interesting finding has mixed implications.  It contradicts of both Cottrell and Wilson 
(1926) and contemporary researchers, such as Carone et al. (2005), Kesselring and Klement 
(2001), and Minden (2000), in that it suggests that two and not three or one type exists.   
However, it also supports the findings of Cottrell and Wilson (1926) in terms of a type 
being present that relates to unawareness, which is sometimes ignored by contemporary 
researchers. But, again in contrast to Cottrell and Wilson (1926), the unawareness is not 
circumscribed to the physical domain, but supports more modern ideas of, for example, 
Benedict et al. (2005) and Carone et al. (2005), who include cognitive and affective domains 
in their descriptions of unawareness in MS.   
Because this finding, in terms of unawareness is in support of previous literature, it 
not only provides support for the measures of unawareness included in the current study 
(some of which, e.g. the PAS and NPI, had either not been used before or had not been used 
in this context), in that they appear to be measuring something similar to that of other studies.  
It further provides support for the idea that MS patients in general may be unaware of 
domains other than purely the physical. 
In conclusion, evidence in support of the hypothesis that more than one type of 
euphoria exists was demonstrated, and the characteristics of two types of euphoria were 
defined.   
 
 Frequencies of euphoria.  The second aim of this section was to determine how 
prevalent these symptoms really are in MS patients.  Since high rates of euphoria were 
described by Cottrell and Wilson (1926) and since I approached this section from the 
classical perspective, I hypothesised that the frequencies of the new types (i.e. positivity and 
unawareness) would also be high. 
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 Results from correlational analyses indicated that although the different types of 
unawareness clearly shared some underlying commonality and were appropriately considered 
to represent one type of euphoria, they were poorly correlated and a composite measure could 
not be created.  Thus, each type of unawareness was addressed individually. 
The component measures of positivity, on the other hand, appeared to be well 
correlated and instead of using a z-score approach to create a composite, the variance of each 
component scale (relating to positivity) was calculated, and each scale was manipulated to lie 
on the same range (i.e. all were manipulated to range from 0 to the maximum score of the 
scale with the largest variance).  This was done so that the composite could be treated as a 
variable with descriptive statistics that would allow for it to be compared across groups. 
Thus, results were presented that defined positivity in terms of its component subtle 
measures of positive mood and optimism.  Unawareness was similarly defined in terms of its 
related parts of physical, cognitive and mood/behavioural domains. 
Following the above procedure, rates of positivity and unawareness within the sample 
of 100 MS participants were reported.  While high positivity (defined in terms of scoring 
within the top quartile of the scale’s minimum and maximum) was determined to be present 
in 13% of the sample, moderate rates (defined by scoring between the top half and the top 
quartile of the scale’s minimum and maximum) were present in 54% of the sample.   
Although this type of euphoria was defined in terms of its components, how to 
interpret the incidence and intensity of this symptom is not straightforward.  Unlike the 
CWQ, however, where differing interpretations could lead to different rates of the symptoms, 
positivity (as measured in this research) was measured on a continuous scale and MS 
participants could present with different degrees of positivity without there having been a 
misinterpretation of the answers.  While previous research has used a dichotomous 
present/absent means of diagnosis, perhaps rating euphoria on a continuum is more 
appropriate.  With this view, a large number of MS participants (67%) demonstrated 
moderate to high positivity, but only a handful of those (19.4% of moderate to highly positive 
participants, or 13% of the total sample) demonstrated high positivity.   
This poses slight problems when relating these results to previous research as, due to 
their present/absent approach, levels or grades of euphoria are not addressed in the literature: 
Euphoria is simply reported as either being present or absent.   
Rates of unawareness within the sample were also presented.  These were determined 
via participant/informant discrepancies on measures of physical, cognitive and 
mood/behavioural symptoms or disabilities, and a negative difference (where participants 
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underestimated their deficits as compared with the ratings of their informant) denoted 
unawareness.  The MS participants did not need to present with severe disability to have 
unawareness, as the scales ranged from mild impairment to severe disability.  What was 
important was that they had a potential for impairment, due to the nature of their disease, and 
that they considered themselves to be less impaired than their informant did.  Although each 
domain was examined separately (due to their poor inter-correlation, which most likely 
explains the poor internal consistency found for the unawareness factor), the level or degree 
of unawareness was calculated in the same way as the rates of positivity.   
The levels were not as high for unawareness as they were for positivity.  In fact, no 
participant scored within the top quartile of the scale’s minimum and maximum (denoting 
high unawareness) or even between the top half and top quarter of the scale’s minimum and 
maximum (denoting moderate unawareness).  However, as with the research on euphoria, 
those studies who have examined unawareness in MS do not distinguish between mild and 
high rates of unawareness, they simply note its presence or absence (see, e.g. Benedict et al., 
2001; Carone et al., 2005; Sherman et al., 2008).  This might imply that results simply 
pertaining to the number of participants showing any unawareness may be sufficient.  In this 
regard, almost half (45%) of the MS participants were considered to be unaware of physical 
deficits, a little under one fifth (16%) were unaware of cognitive deficits, and just under one 
quarter (24%) were unaware of mood/behavioural difficulties (in terms of an under-
estimation of deficits by the MS participant compared to the rating of their loved-one).  Thus, 
in terms of the most popular method of determining rates of unawareness used in research 
today, fairly high rates were demonstrated in this sample. 
Lower rates of physical unawareness were found in the current study than were 
presented in Cottrell and Wilson’s (1926) paper; thus, the present results could be said to 
differ from or contradict the classical findings.  However, in this study, unawareness (which 
relates to the original eutonia sclerotica) was measured in terms of patient/informant 
discrepancies and did not address the issue of physical well-being, while in their paper, 
although they defined eutonia sclerotica in terms of an unawareness of physical deficit, 
Cottrell and Wilson (1926) predominantly measured it in terms of a feeling of physical well-
being.  Thus, comparing my results with theirs is problematic and likely reflects the 
difference in definition, rather than a contradiction of results in terms of the incidence rates 
demonstrated. 
A number of contemporary researchers, however, have looked at unawareness in MS. 
Benedict et al. (2001), for example, found that on average, their MS group was significantly 
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more likely to over-estimate their capacity for empathy and conscientiousness than their HC 
sample.  However, they did not report the actual frequencies of unaware participants.  In 
contrast, in Carone et al.’s (2005) study unawareness was measured in terms of 
overestimating one’s cognitive ability and frequencies of unaware MS participants were 
reported.  Just over 18% (18/98) of the MS participants were reportedly unaware; thus the 
results of the current study are in support of these. Likewise, Sherman et al. (2008) found 
31.1% of their MS sample to be unaware of cognitive deficits (slightly higher than the 
frequencies demonstrated in the current study, that is 16%), and 35.1% to be unaware of 
physical deficits (slightly lower than the frequencies demonstrated in the current study, that is 
45%).  Interestingly though, Sherman et al. (2008) found that 16% of their sample were 
unaware of both cognitive and physical domains, whereas the overlap between these two 
domains in the current study was present in only 6%. 
However, although (a) simply reporting the rates of unaware participants may be 
sufficient, and (b) no high or even moderate rates of unawareness were reported within this 
sample (according to the criteria imposed), a range of unawareness still existed.  Thus, 
unawareness, like positivity, might also be better represented on a continuum (albeit with less 
variance), and ideas relating to the appropriateness of using a continuum to measure the 
euphoric symptoms as well as of what denotes the pathological presence of these symptoms 
will be discussed in greater detail in the general discussion to follow towards the end of this 
dissertation. 
Since such low intensities of unawareness were demonstrated, factors that may 
influence this (as well as the rates of unawareness as a whole) should be addressed.  The first 
issue is the influence of the informant, as unawareness could only be present if the informant 
rated the participant as being more impaired than the participants rated themselves. As much 
as the participants might be unaware of their deficits as a symptom of their disease, their 
informants may be equally unaware due to their own denial, avoidance, or to the participants 
hiding their disease and putting on a brave face.   
The CWQ includes the question, “Is your outward expression a reliable gauge of your 
inward feeling?”.  This refers to pathological laughing and crying and the incongruence that 
can occur between hysterical laughter, for example, on the outside without the accompanying 
internal affect of amusement.  But when this question was asked of the MS participants of 
this sample, the majority answered “no” and explained that they put on a brave face, created a 
happy mask, and generally preferred hide their feelings and symptoms from their loved-ones 
so as not to add to their burden.  Additionally, many participants noted that they preferred not 
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to talk to their spouses or partners about their MS and rather asked a family member or best 
friend (who they spoke to more often about their problems) to complete their informant form.  
This occurred in 41% of the sample, and 21% of informants did not live with their MS loved-
one.  Thus, while these informants knew their MS loved-ones very well, it is possible that 
they only knew the symptoms which the MS participants wanted them to know, and not being 
around them in the same way as a spouse might be, might have lead them to under-report 
impairment as they may not have been aware of some symptoms that they did not see 
themselves.  Thus, rates of unawareness, and particularly the level or intensity of 
unawareness could be higher than reported here and although participant/informant 
discrepancies is the recognised method of determining awareness, this method is not without 
limitations, and the resulting finding, should therefore be approached and interpreted with 
care. 
Another factor that may have influenced the level or degree of unawareness, (again, 
as well as the rates of unawareness as a whole) is the idea of disability.  Given that greater 
discrepancies denote greater unawareness, a certain degree of disability is required for greater 
discrepancies to occur.  For example, the mood/behavioural scale on which unawareness of 
this domain is based, ranges from 0 to 144, but only 12% of informants noted an impairment 
of more than 20/144 in their loved-ones, thus very few MS participants demonstrated extreme 
levels of disability in this area, according to their informants, which would be required for 
extreme unawareness.  This lack of severe impairment within the current sample could 
explain why no moderate or high unawareness was found. 
 Therefore, this study evidenced low rates of high positivity, but high rates of lower 
positivity (defined by the moderate cut-off point).  Further, it demonstrated no moderate or 
high unawareness amongst MS participants (in terms of the criteria used in the current 
research), but demonstrated fairly high rates of unawareness when the most often used 
method of determining the frequency of unawareness (i.e. using only negative discrepancy 
scores) were employed. 
 
Summary of part one. In terms of the main aim of part one, that of investigating the 
constructs of euphoria, a clearer understanding has been gained by this research. The results 
appear to suggest that due to demonstrated changes in conceptual and operational definitions 
the types of euphoria and definitions of those types have changed.  Furthermore, 
discrepancies in incidence rates may be indicative of artefact of measure.   
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Following extensive analysis with additional measures of the euphoric symptoms, 
(measures with strong psychometric properties that are often used today in research in these 
fields), it was also demonstrated that the original three constructs described appear to rather 
represent two constructs (viz. positivity and unawareness).  Unawareness was developed even 
further to show that different aspects of unawareness could exist within the same patient 
group.  Ideas regarding a continuum as opposed to a cut-off point for positivity and 
unawareness were also addressed and varying degrees of these symptoms were demonstrated 
depending on where one imposed the cut-off.  
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Part two.  Describing and predicting positivity and unawareness 
The main aims of part two were to further describe and define the two types of euphoria, viz. 
positivity and unawareness, within this sample of 100 MS participants in order to better 
understand these symptoms.  No hypotheses for this former part of the section were made. 
Following this, the disease and cognitive correlates of positivity and unawareness 
were investigated in the hopes of being able to predict which MS participants might develop 
these types of euphoria, and the results of the multiple regression analyses were presented.  
Here, I hypothesised that the disease correlates of positivity and unawareness may differ, and, 
because I approached this study from the classical perspective, that these symptoms may 
occur both early and late in the disease, with either little or severe physical disability. I also 
hypothesised that the cognitive correlates of positivity and unawareness may differ, and that 
at least one of these euphoric types would correlate with impairment on neuropsychological 
tests of cortical domains of function, and that at least one type would correlate with RH 
impairment on cognitive testing. 
 
 Describing positivity and unawareness.  It was established in the previous section 
that there appear to be two types of euphoria: positivity (which involves positive mood, or 
euphoria sclerotica, and optimism, or spes sclerotica) and unawareness (which includes 
unawareness of physical, cognitive and mood/behavioural domains and refers in part to the 
original eutonia sclerotica).  The aim of this section was to further expand on these two types 
by describing them and defining them in more detail. 
 
 Do positivity and unawareness occur together or are they two separate symptoms?  
The first question relating to a better description of the identified types of euphoria was that 
of whether they represent interdependent symptoms that invariably co-occur, or whether they 
reflect two distinct symptoms that can be seen in (different) patients with MS.  
 Results pertaining to a correlational analysis between positivity and each domain of 
awareness (using the full scale) indicated a negative correlation for every domain, which 
means that as positivity increases, awareness decreases.  Put another way, as positivity 
increases, unawareness increases.  This indicates that each domain of unawareness, although 
treated separately, forms part of a similar symptom as the direction of the correlations were 
the same no matter which domain was tested.  It also indicates an association between 
positivity and unawareness and a tendency to co-occur.  
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 Although we know that inconsistencies exist regarding the definitions of euphoria, 
this finding does appear to support a large amount of the literature that positions euphoric 
mood and unawareness (of at least physical deficit), as being symptoms that appear to occur 
together (Finger, 1998). 
Results were also presented in terms of the number of participants demonstrating both 
an area of unawareness and positivity at the high level.  These appeared to demonstrate a co-
occurrence between the two, as 9% of the total MS sample, and 69.3% of the 13 participants 
demonstrating high positivity, did so in conjunction with least one type of unawareness.  
However, 30.7% of this same sub-group (demonstrating high positivity) did so without any 
unawareness, and 85.2% of the sub-group demonstrating unawareness did so without high 
positivity.   
In this comparison, though, positivity and unawareness were measured at two 
different levels.  High positivity reflected scores that were within the top quartile of the 
composite scale’s minimum and maximum values.  While, because unawareness did not have 
the same extensive range, the intensity of unawareness was not measured and unawareness 
was represented by merely the presence of any negative discrepancy scores between the 
participants and their informants.  This may, therefore, have affected the number of 
participants displaying both, as positivity was defined in a more stringent way (i.e. by 
including only the high level), thus preventing a number of participants from displaying this 
symptom, which, in turn, restricted the potential to display both.   
Thus, results of the same type of correlational analysis were presented, but between 
unawareness and positivity at the moderate cut-off point.  These results demonstrated that 
35% of the total sample, and 64.8% of the MS participants scoring in the moderate range for 
positivity demonstrated at least one type of unawareness along with moderate positivity.  
Furthermore, only 27.8% of the sub-group to demonstrate unawareness, did so without also 
demonstrating at least moderate positivity.  This implied that there was a greater co-
occurrence between these two symptoms when both were measured in a more inclusive way.   
However, as there were greater numbers of MS participants presenting with all three 
types of unawareness and high positivity than there were with all three types of unawareness 
and moderate positivity, and as positivity was shown to be negatively correlated with 
awareness, an association between these two symptoms was also implied, where an increase 
in positivity appears to be associated with an increase in unawareness.  It was therefore 
concluded that positivity and unawareness likely represent two types of euphoria that are 
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appear to be positively associated with one another.  But, it was noted that these two types 
could also occur independently of one another. 
 These results appear to contradict some of the somewhat confusing contemporary 
approaches to euphoria.  For example, Carone et al. (2005) acknowledge that both euphoric 
mood and eutonic unawareness exist.  They define euphoric mood as “euphoric behavioural 
disinhibition” and measure it in terms of the NPI, and they measure unawareness via 
patient/informant discrepancies on cognitive testing and tests of personality change.  But, 
they suggest that these aforementioned patient/informant discrepancies on cognitive or 
personality measures can predict the “euphoric behavioural disinhibition”, which is their 
conceptualisation of euphoria sclerotica.  This implies that patients displaying unawareness 
will also display euphoria.  Even though a co-occurrence was demonstrated in the current 
study, 17 MS participants in this study still demonstrated some form of unawareness without 
the presence of even moderate positivity (which was measured at the more inclusive, lower 
cut-off level).  Thus, these two types, although related, do not represent the same symptom, 
and determining the presence of the one does not mean that the other automatically exists.  
 The complete opposite was stated by Cottrell and Wilson (1926).  They believed their 
triad of euphoric symptoms (i.e. euphoria sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica and spes sclerotica) to 
be independent of each other, and that each of the three symptoms could occur on its own. 
But, since they found that 63% of their sample had euphoria sclerotica, 84% eutonia 
sclerotica and 84% spes sclerotica, there must have been considerable overlap between these 
symptoms.  Thus, the results of this research support both the suppositions of Cottrell and 
Wilson (1926), and their findings, as it has been demonstrated that positivity and 
unawareness can occur independently of one another, but that they are associated and, more 
often than not, co-occur, with a considerable overlap between the two symptoms being 
evident in their study. 
 Although this section did not have an associated hypothesis, the aim of expanding on 
the definition and description of the two types was addressed, broadening our knowledge on 
these symptoms a little further. 
 
 Does depression play a role in euphoria?  We know that, although euphoric mood 
was considered to be the prevailing mood state of MS patients for many years, depression is 
considered to be the most common symptom of mood in MS patients today, with a lifetime 
prevalence rate of up to 50% (Joffe et al., 1987; Sadovnick, Dyment, Ebers, & Risch, 1996).  
We also know, however, that some researchers have noted an inconsistency relating to 
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euphoria, where an outward display of emotion is not necessarily a reflection of inward 
subjective feeling, and Surridge (1969) even went so far as to create four different degrees of 
euphoria from mixed state (objective euphoria but subjective depression), to severe euphoria 
(objective and subjective euphoria).  Furthermore, we know that outsiders can, at times, be 
misled to believe that anosognosic (for hemiplegia) patients are happy, even though they can 
experience intense sadness, because the reality that they create is almost always more positive 
than their actual reality at the time (Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Turnbull et al., 2002).  However, 
these inconsistencies noted by Surridge, as well as Turnbull and colleagues, are often found 
when objective and subjective descriptions are compared, so when only subjective or self-
reported data is used, do euphoric MS patients still demonstrate some degree of depression?   
Furthermore, while unawareness in MS has historically been associated with euphoric 
mood (Cottrell and Wilson, 1926; Finger, 1998), less has been investigated in terms of 
awareness or unawareness and depression.  Questions regarding the association of depression 
with the two euphoric types were, therefore, asked in the hopes of addressing the main aim of 
part two: to better describe and define the symptoms of positivity and unawareness. 
Results indicated a significant negative correlation between depression and positivity, 
a significant positive correlation between depression and awareness of cognitive deficits (in 
terms of the full scale), and a trend towards a positive association between depression and 
awareness of physical and mood/behavioural deficits.    
In terms of positivity, this implies that as self-reported positivity increases, depression 
decreases.  Thus, although some negative mood may be present, it appears to be unlikely that 
an MS patient would demonstrate profoundly depressed mood alongside positivity, and even 
less so at the higher ends of the positivity scale. While previous research has investigated 
both self-reported euphoric mood and depression in the same sample, to my knowledge, no 
studies have specifically investigated the relationship between these two variables, thus I 
cannot comment on these findings in terms of previous research.   
However, the significant inverse relationship identified between positivity and 
depression does further imply that, at least in this sample, positivity does not appear to mask 
an underlying depression and that self-reported positivity appears to be an accurate way of 
measuring euphoric mood.  This goes some way to address the concerns of Surridge (1969) 
as well as Turnbull and colleagues (Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Turnbull et al., 2002) who have 
noted a discrepancy between outward and inward feelings, or the feelings portrayed and the 
feelings truly felt, by patients with euphoria and/or anosognosia (for hemiplegia). 
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For unawareness, the results demonstrated a largely significant positive relationship 
between depression and awareness (indicating that as unawareness increases, depression 
decreases).  This finding is consistent with previous research.  Sherman et al. (2008), for 
example, found that depressed MS patients were more aware of their physical impairments, 
but those who were unaware of physical impairments appeared to be less concerned about 
them.  Furthermore, Carone et al. (2005) found that over-estimators of cognitive ability (i.e. 
MS participants unaware of cognitive deficits) were more likely to be characterised by less 
depression.  In conclusion, depression does not appear to play a role in euphoria and appears, 
in contrast, to be negatively correlated with both positivity and unawareness.  These findings 
address the associated aim, by better defining and describing the euphoric symptoms. 
 
How euphoric is euphoria?  As we know, some MS patients demonstrate positivity 
and unawareness, albeit, perhaps, in differing degrees.  Contemporary literature (and the 
popular measure used) would have us believe that the symptoms demonstrated are abnormal 
and unrealistic.  But, although defined in less extreme terms, even the classical literature 
regarded these symptoms as being unusual or striking enough to warrant comment, 
description and study.  Thus, an aspect of positivity and unawareness that required further 
interpretation was that of how positive the MS participants that scored in the moderate or 
high ranges for this variable were, and how unaware the unaware MS participants were.  The 
intensity or severity of unawareness will be discussed in the latter half of this section; 
however, an attempt to answer the first part of this question was made by comparing the MS 
participants with the HC group as a reference point denoting “normal” levels of positivity.   
Since the literature has noted positive mood and optimism in MS patients for years 
and the intensity of the symptom has been implied by the emphasis placed on it within the 
literature, I felt that it must be relatively prominent to warrant this notice.  Thus, I 
hypothesised that those MS participants who demonstrated high positivity would demonstrate 
similar levels of this mood/outlook variable to the HCs demonstrating high positivity.  That 
is, no significant differences between these two groups would be demonstrated for high 
positivity.  Furthermore, I hypothesised that those MS participants who demonstrated 
positivity at the moderate cut-off point (i.e. between 50% and 75% of the scale’s minimum 
and maximum) would demonstrate similar levels of this mood/outlook variable to the HCs at 
the same cut-off point.  Further, as not all MS participants demonstrate positivity and as 
depression is quite a prominent mood symptom within MS, I hypothesised that on average 
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(i.e. when all scores were taken into account) the MS group would demonstrate levels of 
positivity that would be lower than those demonstrated by the HC group. 
As expected, the results indicated that, on average, the total MS group was 
significantly less positive than the HCs, with a large effect size of 0.91.  Furthermore, at the 
high level of positivity the MS group presented with similar levels of positivity to the HC 
group.  Although expected, this is an incredibly interesting finding.  Individuals with MS can 
experience a wide variety of debilitating symptoms (Jones, 2011; Rich et al., 2008; Schapira 
et al., 2007), and suffer from a highly unpredictable disease (Lublin & Reingold, 1996) that, 
as I was told from the participants themselves, limits their ability to plan for the future and 
severely impacts on their day.  Yet, some experience a high level of positive mood and 
optimism that is as high as HCs demonstrating high levels.  This appears to be completely out 
of keeping with their diagnosis and current disease state and clearly demonstrates the 
euphoria demonstrated by some MS patients. 
In contrast, and unexpectedly, at the moderate cut-off point the MS group 
demonstrated significantly less positivity than the HC group, again with a fairly large effect 
size of 0.68.  This finding is important for two reasons.  First, it implies that moderate 
positivity, although positive by nature, is not at the same level as the moderate positivity of 
HCs.  While I cannot comment on the construction of this affect/outlook according to the 
statistics presented, evidence of a more mild positive mood with the inclusion of some 
negative feelings was provided in the section referring to the quality of positivity.  This 
further appears to imply that positivity is only truly reflective of euphoria at higher levels, 
and that moderate positivity may be representative of more normal mood and outlook 
including both positive/optimistic and negative/pessimistic feelings and attitudes.   
Secondly, this finding is important since an increase in positivity was associated with 
an increase in unawareness (thereby implying a development of these symptoms), although 
positivity was not found to correlate with disease duration in this sample, and although this 
was beyond the scope of this cross-sectional study, this finding is important as moderate 
positivity may develop into high positivity later in the disease course.  Thus, identifying 
patients with moderate positivity may help to predict and better serve patients who might 
benefit from treatment or management protocols later in their disease course.   
In terms of this section however, I hypothesised that the MS group would demonstrate 
positivity at the same levels of the HC group at both the moderate and high cut-off points, 
and as such, this hypothesis was rejected.  
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With regard to unawareness, I hypothesised (again because these symptoms have 
received so much attention in the literature), that the MS participants would significantly 
under-estimate their deficits when their ratings were compared with those of their informants.  
The results revealed that when the scores of all aware and unaware participants were 
analysed, significant differences between participant and informant ratings were 
demonstrated for cognitive (p = .0001) and mood/behavioural deficits (p = .003), but not for 
physical deficits (p = .275).  Thus, on average (in the whole sample), the intensity or severity 
of unawareness for cognitive and mood/behavioural difficulties was greater than for physical 
difficulties.  The former two findings were expected, but this latter finding was unexpected, 
particularly considering that the physical domain had the greatest number of unaware 
participants (i.e. 45 as opposed to 16 for cognitive and 24 for mood/behavioural).   
However, these scores were based on the full sample which included both aware and 
unaware participants, and while there were large numbers of unaware MS participants for this 
domain, the participants who over-estimated their physical deficits may have done so at such 
an extreme level that it cancelled out the unawareness displayed by the unaware participants.   
Furthermore, over-estimators of deficits may have been more likely to severely over-
estimate their physical deficits as opposed to their cognitive or mood/behavioural deficits as 
physical symptoms and difficulties appeared to be uppermost in the minds of the majority of 
participants and were mentioned far more often than cognitive or mood/behavioural 
symptoms.  A few MS participants did not even appear to know that cognitive and 
mood/behavioural symptoms could form part of the symptoms experienced by MS patients.   
Further evidence for this explanation was obtained when the scores of only the 
unaware participants were compared: Significant differences between participant and 
informant ratings were demonstrated for mood/behavioural deficits (p = .009), and close to 
significant differences were demonstrated for physical (p = .011) and cognitive deficits (p = 
.011).  This means that, amongst those participants who were unaware the intensity of 
unawareness was relatively high or strong, and roughly the same across all domains for 
unaware MS participants.  Thus, evidence was demonstrated for the hypothesis that MS 
participants would significantly underestimate their deficits when compared with their 
informants. 
 
A qualitative characterisation.  In order to further address the main aim of this 
section (that is to better describe and define the symptoms of positivity and unawareness), the 
results of a content analysis were presented. 
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Qualitative description of unawareness was unfortunately not possible as MS 
participants were not specifically asked questions about their physical, cognitive or 
mood/behavioural symptoms, other than the ones included in the questionnaires on these 
domains.  Had they been asked such questions though, it would still have been difficult to 
describe the quality of their unawareness as I did not know them particularly well, and did 
not meet some of them in person.  Thus, descriptions such as those given in terms of 
anosognosia for hemiplegia would have been very difficult for physical deficits and virtually 
impossible for cognitive and mood/behavioural deficits as I could not know or objectively 
rate what deficits to question or point out in the hopes of eliciting unawareness, and would 
not necessarily know when their answers were reflective of unawareness.   
However, results from a content analysis of data pertaining to the mood and outlook 
of only those participants scoring in the moderate and high ranges for positivity revealed 
some interesting findings regarding the quality of moderate versus high positivity.  A number 
of themes were identified.  These were centred around two main topics: feelings and 
reactions to MS.   
With regard to feelings, although relaxed feelings, as well as positive, happy, 
optimistic, and excited feelings might be expected from participants who scored within the 
moderate to high range on positivity, it is of interest to note that asides from P25 who noted 
concern about possibly having to use a wheelchair in the future, only moderately scoring MS 
participants demonstrated negative feelings such as apathy, despondence, defeat, fear, worry 
and uncertainty. 
This might appear to be in contradiction to the bulk of the literature on euphoria, as 
the majority of articles written on this topic would have us believe that euphoric MS patients 
demonstrate highly positive or abnormally positive mood with an implication that they do not 
also experience negative mood symptoms.  However, this finding may not imply that 
euphoric MS patients experience negative mood, but rather that positivity measured at the 
moderate level reflects normal mood, and that mood and outlook at the higher level (where 
only one participant identified a negative feeling) is more indicative of true euphoria. 
In addition to themes surrounding feelings, the content analysis revealed themes 
regarding reactions to MS.  These encompassed aspects such as approach to life, planning, 
religion and control.  When considering that these themes emerged from questions relating to 
one’s general mood and outlook (and not about how one feels about MS or views one’s MS 
in the future), it is clear that, for many of the MS participants, the disease has greatly 
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impacted on their life and even their general mood and outlook is viewed through the lens of 
MS.   
It is also interesting to note that although a number of negative feelings were identified, 
very few negative reactions to MS were present in the descriptions given.  The closest 
representation of a negative reaction was that of needing to live in the now or take things one 
day at a time, perhaps the need to make provisions for one’s future, and the inability to plan 
too far ahead in case a relapse prevents the participant from completing the plan.  However, 
many of these were viewed in a more realistic than negative light and many of the 
participants gave the sense that you just adjust and life goes on.  Even for the theme of 
control, no MS participant related relinquishing their control to MS, or ideas of life being out 
of their control (except perhaps for the “what will be will be” approach to life of P14 and 
P23), and the participants who mentioned this theme framed it in a positive light. 
Following from this, a number of participants related taking something positive from 
MS, or gaining something good from it.  Although they may truly feel such positive feelings, 
an interpretation of this could be something similar to that of Turnbull and colleagues, who 
noticed that anosognosic (for hemiplegia) patients often create a new reality that is very often 
more positive than their actual reality at the time (Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Turnbull et al., 
2002).  While I’m not suggesting that, like anosognosic-hemiplegic patients, this is masking 
an underlying depression, there may be some psychodynamic aspect to the way in which they 
frame their experience of their disease.   
Further to this, another interpretation may be that the unconscious of a euphoric MS 
patient is faced with positive feelings that are incongruent to its reality, and reframing the 
illness in a positive light is a way of defending against the harsh reality.  These interpretations 
are beyond the scope of the current study, but are never-the-less interesting inferences to 
consider. 
Finally, it was of interest to note that very few themes relating to reactions to MS were 
identified by the group who scored high on positivity, and that the moderate scorers appeared 
to report more positive experiences.  Since unawareness increases with an increase in 
positivity, one might speculate that the moderate scorers were more able to make sense of 
their experience and to report a variety of reactions to MS, while the high scorers for 
positivity were less able to do so, being less aware of their experience of MS or the ways in 
which they have dealt with it. 
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Although no hypotheses were presented for this section, these findings help to 
illuminate the quality of the types of euphoria in question and the aim of better describing and 
defining these symptoms was addressed. 
 
Predicting euphoria.  The final section of part two included the results pertaining to 
the disease and cognitive correlates of the two types of euphoria.  The aim was to determine 
if these types could be predicted, within a sample of 100 MS participants, according to 
particular disease and/or cognitive variables, and this formed part of the larger aim of part 
two, which was to better describe these symptoms.  I hypothesised that at least one type of 
euphoria may correlate with gender and/or with current disease state.  Furthermore, because I 
approached the investigation of the two types of euphoria identified from the classical 
perspective, I hypothesised that the disease correlates of the two different types may differ, 
and that positivity and unawareness may occur both early and late in the disease, with either 
little or severe physical disability.  Additionally, I hypothesised that the cognitive correlates 
of the euphoric types may differ, and that at least one of the euphoric types would correlate 
with impairment on neuropsychological tests of cortical domains, and that at least one type of 
euphoria would correlate with impairment on neuropsychological tests of RH functioning. 
 
 The demographic and disease correlates. Results were first presented describing the 
various disease variables in question. In line with previous literature, disease variables 
investigated included: disease course (i.e. RRMS or a progressive type), duration of disease 
(from diagnosis), current disease state (i.e. relapse/progression or remission), and severity of 
disease (in terms of physical disability).  As numbers were limited, MS participants were not 
excluded based on current medication use or past history of a disease or condition that could 
potentially influence neuropsychological functioning, even though these variables could 
influence their performance on the measures pertaining to positivity and/or unawareness.  
Thus, these factors were noted and controlled for in the multiple regression analyses that 
followed. 
 
 Predicting positivity and unawareness: results from the models tested.  Hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses were run in order to control for the abovementioned variables of 
corticosteroid use, use of other medications that could affect mood, and a previous history of 
a disease or condition that may affect neuropsychological functioning.  These three covariates 
were entered into the model first, followed by the demographic predictor variables of gender, 
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age and income, and the disease predictor variables of disease course, duration of disease, 
current disease state, and disease severity.   
For both positivity and unawareness, the full scales, using the full sample of 100 MS 
participants, were selected as the dependent variables to avoid restricting the range of these 
variables, thereby rendering the analysis impossible.  Thus, when referring to awareness I am 
referring to all 100 MS participants, and not only unaware participants. 
 Only one model was found to be significant.  When all demographic and disease 
variables were included, they significantly predicted awareness of physical deficits, and 
accounted for 23% of the variance, 18% more variance than the variance explained by factors 
relating to medical history or medication use alone.  Gender, current disease state and disease 
severity were all negatively correlated, while age, income, disease course and duration of 
disease were positively correlated with awareness of physical deficits.  Because the full scale 
of awareness was used, this means that greater unawareness of physical deficits was more 
likely to be present in females, of a younger age, and lower income, with RRMS course, but 
in a relapse, exacerbation or a progressive state, with a shorter disease duration, but with 
greater disease severity.  This describes a female patient with fairly early onset MS that is 
still in the early stages, but who has experienced a number of relapses or exacerbation of the 
disease that has resulted in physical disability early on.   
Few researchers have specifically investigated unawareness of physical deficit, but 
these findings do appear to be in contradiction to what was believed by classical researchers 
such as Cottrell and Wilson (1926) and Sugar and Nadell (1943): that eutonia sclerotica 
(unawareness of physical deficit) could occur early or late in the disease with mild or severe 
physical disability.  The findings are also in contradiction with those of Langworthy et al 
(1941) and Surridge (1969) who noted that euphoria tends to occur later in the disease course 
with greater physical disability.  Furthermore, the findings appear to contradict what is 
believed regarding euphoria, in general, today: that is tends to occur later in the disease, along 
with a progressive course (Diaz-Olavarrieta et al., 1999; Fishman et al., 2004), and advanced 
physical disability (Rabins et al., 1986).   
This finding further means that the demographic and disease variables included in this 
study together did not significantly account for the variance seen in positivity, or the majority 
of domains of unawareness.  This may imply that something other than those variables 
investigated could be responsible for these symptoms, but the findings may have also been 
influenced by the number of variables included, particularly if they were not adding to the 
variance.  Thus, the coefficient results were also analysed and a number of individual 
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predictors were identified, which will be discussed individually according to each type of 
euphoria. 
 
Predicting positivity: coefficient results of individual predictors.  Only one individual 
variable was found to predict positivity: medical history was negatively correlated with, and 
significantly predicted, positivity (p = .009).  This means that the fewer previous diseases or 
conditions that could influence neuropsychological functioning a participant had, the greater 
the positivity they would demonstrate, although it should be noted here, that this finding 
denotes an association and not necessarily a causal relationship.  This was an interesting 
finding as, not only did medical history predict positivity over the MS disease variables that 
were investigated, but it also predicted positivity over and above the use of corticosteroids or 
other medications such as anti-depressants which are known to affect mood (Brown et al., 
1999; Hewitt et al., 2000; Patten & Neutel, 2000; Turner et al., 2008).   
In this sample of 100 MS participants, previous diseases or conditions classified as 
having a potential influence on neuropsychological functioning included (a) other auto-
immune diseases, present in 8% of the sample; (b) previous meningitis/encephalitis, present 
in 3%; (c) previous TB or malaria, present in 4% and 2% respectively; (d) previous head 
injury, present in 9%; (e) brain tumour, present in 1%; (f) previous stroke, in 1%; (g) 
epilepsy, present in 2%; (h) some form of loss of consciousness, in 4%; (i) a diagnosis of 
depression or bipolar mood disorder, present in 22% and 2% respectively; (j) complications 
at birth, present in 9%; (k) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in childhood, in 2%; (l) 
learning disability, in 2%; (m) delay in walking/talking, in 5%; and (n) use of marijuana, 
present in 7%.  While the use of marijuana might be expected to have a positive influence on 
mood (Clark, Ware, Yazer, Murray, & Lynch, 2004), some of the other conditions, such as 
depression, may negatively affect mood (Arnett et al., 2008).  Thus, the fewer of these 
negatively impacting conditions a patient has, the greater their potential for experiencing 
positive mood and outlook. 
Furthermore, the mere experience of one of these diseases or conditions, or even 
worse – a combination of them – may indirectly result in a more negative outlook as the 
individual may be presented with additional stressors and problems with which they are 
required to cope.  However, this interpretation refers more to general mood than to something 
that is caused by an organic process, and euphoria is, in fact, thought to increase with disease 
progression. To my knowledge, though, no researchers have investigated co-morbidity 
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between euphoria and other illness, and the extent to which euphoria in MS endures in the 
face of, or can override, other stressors remains to be seen. 
 
Predicting unawareness: coefficient results of individual predictors.  Even though the 
relationship did not maintain its significance when the association between disease severity 
and awareness of physical deficits was investigated (p = .031), disease severity (measured by 
means of physical disability) was found to be a significant individual predictor of awareness 
of physical deficits when included in the full model (β = -.45, p = .0001).  Since it was 
negatively correlated, an association was demonstrated between greater disease severity (or 
physical disability) and greater unawareness of physical deficits.   
Unawareness of physical deficits refers, at least in part, to what was originally 
described as eutonia sclerotica, and Cottrell and Wilson (1926) believed that eutonia 
sclerotica could occur independently of the disease type or course of MS and with or without 
physical impairment.  Thus, the finding that unawareness of physical deficit is associated 
with greater physical disability is in contradiction to their findings.  However, they defined 
eutonia sclerotica in terms of physical well-being (as well as unawareness of physical 
deficits), but measured only the former, which could very well be experienced by MS patients 
who either are, or are not, experiencing physical disability.  But, the measure referring to 
eutonia sclerotica in the current study referred to unawareness of physical deficits and not to 
feelings of physical well-being, and unawareness of physical deficits in this study (i.e. 
discrepancies between the scores of the participants and the scores of their informants), 
required a certain degree of physical disability to be present in order for the participant to 
under-estimate their deficits in comparison with the ratings of their informant and be 
classified as unaware of physical deficits.  Thus, these variables may be associated due to 
artefact of measure. 
Of course, degree of physical disability, in this research, represented degree of disease 
severity, in place of the EDSS which also largely relies on physical dysfunction to represent 
the progression and severity of the disease.  Thus, unawareness of physical deficit may 
actually have had an association with the severity of the disease, in terms of degree of 
cerebral involvement, represented by greater physical disability in the participant.  This is in 
support of previous research such as that of Sherman et al. (2008) who found that disease 
severity (in terms of EDSS score) was significantly and positively correlated with 
unawareness of physical deficits. 
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No individual variables were found to be significant predictors of unawareness of 
cognitive or of mood/behavioural deficits. 
 
A discussion of the hypotheses.  A number of hypotheses were considered in this sub-
section that were not specifically addressed by the findings discussed above and require 
further discussion. In terms of the first hypothesis, that the disease correlates of the two types 
of euphoria (i.e. positivity and unawareness) may differ, as different disease correlates 
appeared to be demonstrated for the various types of unawareness, this hypothesis was 
largely confirmed.   
However, very few disease correlates were actually identified in total, and some 
euphoric types (i.e. unawareness of cognitive and mood/behavioural difficulties) did not have 
any significant disease, or demographic, correlates.  This could indicate that these variables 
simply are not associated with positivity and/or unawareness; which may, further, mean that 
positivity and unawareness can, as Cottrell and Wilson (1926) suggested, occur 
independently of disease variables.  This further implies that different mechanisms may 
underpin positivity and unawareness, and that the different domains of unawareness may be 
accounted for by different underlying mechanisms.  However, this finding may also mean 
that the disease variables investigated may have been associated with positivity and 
unawareness, but this association was not revealed due to the sample size being too small, or 
the sample size to variable number ratio being too poor, or due to the measures not being 
sensitive enough.  The issue of sample size to variable number ratio was somewhat addressed 
by exploring the significant individual variables in a model by themselves, as then the sample 
size remained at 100, but the number of variables investigated was reduced from 10 to only 
one.  However, the issue regarding sensitivity of the measures may still be relevant. 
 The second hypothesis stated that positivity and unawareness may occur both early 
and late in the disease, with either little or severe physical disability.  Disease duration was 
not found to correlate with either positivity or unawareness, however, disease severity was 
found to correlate with unawareness of physical deficits, with greater disease severity (in 
terms of physical disability), being associated with greater unawareness of physical deficits.  
Thus, this hypothesis was largely rejected. 
However, the fact that disease severity correlated with only one type of unawareness, 
and that disease duration did not correlate with either type of euphoria may reflect support for 
Cottrell and Wilson’s (1926) suppositions that these symptoms can occur independently of 
the disease variables of MS.  It also, however, supports an interesting finding put forward by 
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Peyser et al. (1980), who noted the difference between euphoric MS patients, and those MS 
patients who have only had the disease for a short period of time, and who, therefore, have 
minimal cognitive and physical disability, but who yet demonstrate positive mood and a 
sense of physical well-being.  Peyser et al. (1980) describe the emotional and physical well-
being in these patients as being in proportion to their physical state as they are not disabled, 
and explain this in terms of denial and “coping mechanism[s] rather than the pathologic state 
implied by Sugar and Nadell” (p. 440).   Of the 13 MS participants to demonstrate high 
positivity, although 4/13 (30.8%) were rated by their informants as falling within the top 
quartile of physical disability (i.e. were severely physically disabled), with one even rating 
their loved-one as being 100% impaired according to the items included in the PAS, 6/13 
(46.1%) were rated as being 50% or less impaired physically. Thus well-being was 
demonstrated amongst MS participants in this study who had both minimal and severe 
physical disability, which raises an interesting question regarding the pathological nature of 
euphoria and whether (a) all MS patients should be expected to present with negative feelings 
and thus any positive feelings are abnormal; (b) positive mood and outlook in early patients, 
or patients not severely affected, is still abnormal given the unpredictability of the disease, or 
(c) true euphoria is only possible once the disease has progressed.   
Finally, the third hypothesis related to the influence of gender and current disease 
state.  These variables were included due to the apparent higher rates of euphoric mood 
amongst male MS participants (Figved et al., 2005; Fishman et al., 2004), and greater 
emotional disturbances occurring around periods of disease exacerbation (Dalos, et al., 1983; 
Rabins et al., 1986).  Although, neither variable emerged as a significant predictor of either 
positivity or unawareness, a female gender and a state of exacerbation or progression were 
included in the model that was found to significantly predict unawareness of physical deficit.  
This was unexpected, however, as the rationale for their inclusion centred more around the 
euphoric symptom relating to mood, than unawareness, and, as a result, this finding cannot be 
compared with that of previous research.  However, since disease activity in the brain is more 
active during relapse or a progressive state, it seems plausible that this may be related to 
greater unawareness. 
 
 The cognitive correlates. As with the disease and demographic correlates, results 
were first presented describing the cognitive performance of the sub-sample of MS 
participants who underwent cognitive testing (n = 60), and the cognitive variables in 
question.  In line with previous research, subcortical and executive variables were included, 
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but due to the aims of this particular study I also included additional cortical variables, as 
well as measures of right versus left hemispheric functioning.  As expected, it was found that 
the MS group performed more poorly than the HCs (and significantly more poorly in the 
majority of cases) on both variables of subcortical and cortical functioning, and, furthermore, 
significantly more poorly on recognised measures of RH functioning (i.e. the visuospatial 
composite [visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial perception 3D and visuospatial 
construction], and at least one measure of prosody) than on recognised measures of left 
hemispheric functioning (i.e. the language composite [naming, repetition and 
comprehension]).   
Thus, the picture of cognitive impairment demonstrated was typical of MS patients, as 
executive dysfunction, and visuospatial processing deficits amongst other deficits of RH 
functioning, with a lack of left hemispheric deficits, are commonly demonstrated amongst 
patients with MS (Amato et al., 2001; Comi et al., 1995; Foong et al., 1997; Ruggieri et al., 
2003), and support for the hypothesis was largely found as impairment was demonstrated in 
the predicted domains, and the domains central to the investigation of the cognitive correlates 
to follow. 
 
 Predicting positivity and unawareness: results from the models tested.  As questions 
regarding cortical versus subcortical and right versus left/executive functioning were 
important, results pertaining to two hierarchical multiple regression models per type of 
euphoria were presented.  In the cortical versus subcortical regression model, the cortical 
predictor variables (i.e. the dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite [attention, WM and 
abstract reasoning], orbitobasal composite [disinhibition and set shifting], the verbal memory 
composite [verbal learning, memory and recognition], visual memory composite [visual 
learning, memory and recognition], the language composite [naming, repetition and 
comprehension], the visuospatial composite [visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial 
perception 3D and visuospatial construction], and the repetition and comprehension of 
prosody) were entered into the model first. This was followed by the subcortical variables of 
verbal fluency and speed of information processing.  In the right versus left/executive 
regression, measures of RH functioning (i.e. the visual memory composite [visual learning, 
memory and recognition], the visuospatial composite [visuospatial perception 2D, 
visuospatial perception 3D and visuospatial construction], and the two measures of prosody) 
were entered into the model first, followed by the remaining measures.  The full scales for 
positivity and unawareness, using the full sample of 100 MS participants, were again selected 
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as the dependent variables.  Thus, when referring to awareness, I am referring to all 100 MS 
participants, and not only aware or unaware participants. 
 Not one of the models was found to be significant.  This means that the cognitive 
variables included in this research together did not significantly account for the variance seen 
in positivity or any of the domains of unawareness.  The coefficient results were also 
analysed to determine if any individual predictors existed.   
 
 Predicting positivity and unawareness: coefficient results of individual predictors.  
No individual cognitive variable was found to significantly predict any of the types of 
euphoria (i.e. positivity or unawareness of physical, cognitive or mood/behavioural deficits) 
in either the cortical versus subcortical model or the right versus left/executive model (all p 
values >.01).  This may imply that something other than the variables included in this study 
could be responsible for the variance of these symptoms; or that the symptoms can occur 
independently of cognitive impairment; or it may imply that they number of variables to 
participant ratio may have impacted on the results. 
Two variables were found to be close to significant predictors and these were 
investigated further via a linear regression.  First, the orbitobasal composite (disinhibition and 
set shifting) was a close to significant predictor of unawareness of physical deficits, when all 
(i.e. right and left) cortical (but no subcortical) measures were included (β = .45, p = .056).  
On its own, the orbitobasal composite (disinhibition and set shifting) significantly accounted 
for 23.4% of the variance, and was positively correlated with awareness of physical deficit in 
the full sample of MS participants.  This means that as performances improve for inhibition 
and set shifting, awareness increases, and conversely, the more disinhibited a participant is, 
and the more they struggle to shift between cognitive sets, the more unaware they will be of 
physical deficits.  That is not to say that disinhibition or problems with set shifting cause 
unawareness of physical deficits, but they appear to be associated in some way, and this 
deserves some discussion.   
Despite descriptions of eutonia sclerotica throughout the literature, little research has 
been conducted on unawareness of physical deficits in particular, amongst MS patients and 
Sherman et al. (2008), who did research this domain, found that no cognitive variable 
predicted this type of unawareness.  Considering the similarities to anosognosia for 
hemiplegia, it was thought that unawareness of physical deficit might correlate with a cortical 
measure of RH functioning, and not a cortical measure of executive functioning, thus, this 
association was particularly interesting.  However, if one assumes that disinhibition, 
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measured by the CWIT, can represent behavioural disinhibition as well as an inability to 
inhibit a natural response, perhaps the association makes sense, as caring less about what one 
says or does, or the way one behaves may be related to caring less about, and therefore 
underestimating, physical difficulties that one may be experiencing. 
 Second, the visuospatial composite (visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial 
perception 3D and visuospatial construction) was found to be a close to significant predictor 
of unawareness of cognitive deficits, in all models (cortical variables only: β = .47, p = .032; 
RH variables only: β = .38, p = .056; all cognitive variables: β = .48, p = .032).  This means 
that an association was found between decreasing or worsening visuospatial ability and 
increasing unawareness of cognitive deficits.  Again, this was particularly interesting, as 
although unawareness (in terms of the hypothesis) of cognitive deficits was predicted to 
possibly correlate with a measure of cortical functioning, it was thought that it might 
correlate with a cortical measure of executive functioning, and not a cortical measure of RH 
functioning, as a lack of insight into cognitive performance has been related to executive 
dysfunction (Benedict et al., 2001; Flashman, 2002).  
Although this result was unexpected, it has been demonstrated before.  Sherman et al. 
(2008), for example, found that visuospatial functioning, in terms of the JLO, was moderately 
and inversely related to unawareness of cognitive deficits (r = -.42).  This means that, like the 
current finding, as performance on the JLO worsened, unawareness increased.  However, 
they did demonstrate that the cognitive variable with the best association was their executive 
functioning composite, which, similar to this study, was comprised of verbal fluency 
(COWAT), disinhibition (CWIT), a measure of abstract reasoning, and a measure of set 
shifting.   
Although there may be a true association between visuospatial difficulties and 
unawareness of cognitive deficits, a possible explanation for this finding, could be that 
neuropsychological tests can often tap into additional (and often executive) functions, even 
though they are meant to assess a different domain such as that of visuospatial functioning.  
To this end, the CA task, for example, is sometimes used as a test of reasoning (executive 
functioning) rather than a test of 3-D visuospatial ability (Lezak et al., 2004). 
 
A discussion of the hypotheses.  A number of hypotheses were again connected to this 
sub-section that were not specifically addressed by the findings discussed above and require 
further discussion.  Since different correlates were identified for the different types of 
euphoria, support for the first hypothesis (that the cognitive correlates of the euphoric types 
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may differ) was largely demonstrated.  Although, as with the disease correlates, very few 
cognitive correlates were again actually identified.  I created this hypothesis with the 
assumption that the euphoric types would correlate with cognitive impairment, as based on 
the extensive findings of researchers such as Surridge (1969), Rabins et al. (1986), Diaz-
Olavarrieta et al. (1999), DeSousa et al. (2002), and Fishman et al. (2004). Although the MS 
group demonstrated significant cognitive impairment in comparison with the HC group on a 
number of variables, none of the cognitive models were significant predictors of positivity or 
unawareness in their totality, and significant individual predictors were few and far between.  
This was an interesting finding and implies that the cognitive variables assessed may simply 
not be associated with positivity and unawareness in this study.  However, it may also mean 
that the association between these variables was not revealed in this research due to factors 
such as inadequate sample size, too many cognitive variables being assessed in the current 
sample, or to a lack of sensitivity of the measures.  The variable to sample ratio was, once 
again, addressed by investigating those individual variables which were significant or very 
nearly significant predictors of the two types of euphoria.  However, the other limitations 
could not be addressed and may still have played an influential role.  
It was, furthermore, hypothesised that at least one of the euphoric types (most likely 
that of positivity) would correlate with cortical impairment on cognitive testing, and that at 
least one (most likely that of unawareness) would correlate with measures of RH functioning 
on cognitive testing, and support for this hypothesis was also largely demonstrated.  Although 
only two cognitive correlates were identified in relation to two types of unawareness (with 
one correlate being identified per type), and thus the results should perhaps be interpreted 
with care, the findings did reveal that cortical cognitive variables, as well as a variable of RH 
functioning, are important in euphoria, and particularly in relation to unawareness.   
Previous research has not specifically compared cortical and subcortical or right and 
left/executive measures of cognitive functioning, and although some have found euphoric 
mood to correlate with grey matter atrophy (see Benedict, Weinstock-Guttman et al., 2004; 
Sanfilipo et al., 2006), I cannot relate this finding, in terms of unawareness, to that of others.  
However, I believe it is an important result which further describes and defines the types of 
euphoria investigated in this study. In terms of cortical involvement, it may implicate the 
influence of grey matter damage in euphoria to greater extents than it is currently considered; 
and, in terms of RH involvement, it may implicate the influence of RH damage in euphoria.  
However, since only one aspect of euphoria correlated with this variable and since limitations 
associated with this neuropsychological measure as a sole measure of RH dysfunction were 
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addressed above, this finding is slightly less clear and I recognise that unawareness in MS 
may be a different type of unawareness to that of anosognosia for hemiplegia. 
 
Summary of part two.  The main aims of part two were to further describe and 
define the two types of euphoria identified by part one (viz. positivity and unawareness), as 
well as to investigate their correlates with the aim of better predicting these symptoms.  An 
association between positivity and unawareness was established, and these symptoms were 
considered to represent two types of euphoria with high rates of co-occurrence.  Depression 
was found to be negatively correlated with both positivity and unawareness; thus euphoric 
mood was found to represent an inward feeling experienced by the MS patient and not an 
outward façade.   
Although no high or moderate levels of unawareness were demonstrated in this 
sample, the MS participants significantly (or near to significantly) under-estimated their 
deficits in comparison with their informants which described the intensity of unawareness 
amongst unaware participants.  Further, those MS participants demonstrating high levels of 
positivity did so at levels that were comparative to high scoring HCs, indicating the intensity 
of positivity amongst highly positive MS participants. 
While few demographic, disease or cognitive correlates were identified, positivity and 
each domain of unawareness appeared to have different correlates and these types appeared 
to be independent of the majority of the variables investigated.  However, limitations 







Part three.  The cause of euphoria 
The main aim of part three was to explore some heuristic ideas about potential causes of 
euphoria via a preliminarily investigation of a number of hypotheses.  Although these 
investigations were tentative due to a number of limitations, they had the additional aim of 
perhaps identifying which hypotheses show promise for larger research, with full research 
protocols, in the future.  The hypotheses investigated included euphoria in MS being the 
result of: (a) a psychological reaction to the disease (investigated via MG controls who have a 
similar disease that does not affect the CNS), (b) the result of executive dyscontrol 
(investigated via MVA TBI controls who demonstrate similar executive dysfunction to MS 
participants), (c) immunological disease processes (investigated via NP-SLE controls who 
have an auto-immune disease affecting the CNS), and (d) involvement of the RH 
(investigated via stroke patients with damage to the RH).   
The related hypotheses were, therefore, that the MG group would demonstrate better 
cognitive functioning than the MS group, given that their disease does not affect the CNS, 
and that, therefore, the euphoric types identified by this research would not be as prominent 
amongst MG controls as it was in MS participants.  For the MVA TBI and NP-SLE groups, I 
hypothesised that they would demonstrate similar executive dysfunction to the MS group, 
given that their diseases affect the CNS and brain, and that at least one euphoric type would 
be demonstrated, at similar levels, within the MVA TBI and NP-SLE control groups, as 
within the MS participants.  Finally, in terms of the RH group, I hypothesised that they would 
demonstrate good performance on tests of executive functioning, but would perform similarly 
poorly to the MS group on tests of functions sub-served by the RH, given their particular 
cerebral pathology, and that at least one euphoric type would be demonstrated, at similar 
levels, within the RH control group, as within the MS participants.  
I would again like to remind the reader of the small sample sizes included in this 
section, and the risks associated with inferring any definite conclusions, and caution the 
reader when interpreting the findings.  However, I would like to rationalise the preliminary 
nature of these hypotheses in light of the unavoidable limitations associated with control 
patient recruitment, within this research, and emphasis the value of pilot studies in planning 
future research.  
 
 A psychological reaction.  Results pertaining to the first potential cause of euphoria 




Assessing the suitability of the group to address the research question.  The 
cognitive functioning of the sub-group of MG participants (n = 10) who underwent cognitive 
testing was presented and compared with that of the sub-group of MS participants (n = 60) 
who underwent cognitive testing.  This was done in order to assist in indicating whether their 
cognitive functioning was better than that of the MS group and to attempt to assess their 
suitability as a control group to address their particular research question. 
When the significant pre-existing between-group differences for race and education 
were controlled for, the MG participants were found to perform similarly to the MS group on 
all domains of cognitive functioning.  This result was somewhat unexpected given that the 
MS group was compared with the HCs in part two of the results section and were found to 
perform significantly more poorly than the HCs on the majority of cognitive variables.   
However, the analyses were based on a small sample of MG participants, and this 
could possibly have negatively influenced the potential for statistically significant results. 
Even though the effect sizes showed very small effects, implying that even with larger 
sample sizes a lack of statistically significant differences between these two groups may have 
been found, the power analyses revealed a very small statistical power of between 0.01 and 
0.09 for these analyses.  Thus, there may not have been enough statistical power within these 
analyses to determine whether MG controls really do perform at the same level as MS 
participants. 
Furthermore, even though the significant between-group differences for race and 
education were controlled for, since the group on which cognitive performance was based 
was small, these key differences may have played an influential role.  With this in mind, the 
MG group had almost double the number of Coloured and Indian participants (60%) that 
were included in the MS group (29%).  While ethnic background does not influence one’s 
cognitive capacity per se, in SA due to the Apartheid regime, people of Coloured and Indian 
backgrounds were marginalised and did not receive the same quality of education or access to 
resources as white SA citizens (Case & Yogo, 1999).  The average age of the MG sample 
was just under 40 years and 60% were over the age of 33.  Thus, only 40% of this sample 
would have received their high-school education post-Apartheid (which occurred 20 years 
ago, pre-1994) when new educational policies were adopted.  Their background may, 
therefore, have negatively impacted their education and thus their cognitive functioning.   
Level of education has also been found to correlate with performance on cognitive 
testing, particularly IQ tests (Heaton & Pendleton, 1981), and the difference between these 
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two groups on these variables may therefore have played an influential role in the cognitive 
performance demonstrated.  
Mild cognitive impairment, and particularly that of executive dysfunction, has, 
however, been noted in patient groups whose chronic illness does not affect the CNS, due to 
secondary factors such as fatigue, increased anxiety and stress (Grosshans, Meyers, Allen, 
Davenport, & Komaki, 2008; Kurella, Chertow, Luan, & Yaffe, 2004).  Thus, even though 
the MG group appeared to perform at a similar level to the MS participants, their 
performance does not necessarily reflect CNS involvement.   
Furthermore, the MGs did not perform significantly more poorly than the MS 
participants on any variable.  Thus, although the MGs appeared to demonstrate some 
compromise of cognitive functioning, as this may not have been a direct result of CNS 
involvement, they were very tentatively thought to be an appropriate reflection of a similar 
disease to MS that does not affect the brain.  An attempt was, therefore, made to address the 
question concerning a psychological reaction to a disease with reference to euphoria. 
 
Addressing the research question.  The full MG (n = 20) and MS groups (n = 100) 
were then compared on variables relating to positivity and unawareness, while controlling for 
significant pre-existing between-group differences for race and education.  This comparison 
was made in an attempt to investigate whether or not the MGs would demonstrate positivity 
and unawareness at a lower level to the MS participants.  Unexpected results were, however, 
found, and the MG group appeared to perform similarly to the MS group on all variables 
relating to the two types of euphoria.  This meant that the MGs were just as positive and 
unaware as the MS participants, and implied that euphoria (in terms of both positivity and 
unawareness) may be caused by something both MG and MS patients have in common.   
On relating these findings to previous research, it was found that these results are in 
contradiction to previous literature as little has been documented regarding positive mood in 
MG, and negative mood such as depression is regarded as being common (Cantor, 2010; 
Kulaksizoglu, 2007).   
Since the MGs unexpectedly appeared to demonstrate as much positivity and 
unawareness as the MS group, and since the hypothesis was, therefore, tentatively rejected, 
possible reasons for this finding require discussion.  First, again, the analyses were based on a 
small sample of MG participants, and this could possibly have negatively influenced the 
potential for statistically significant results. Even though the effect sizes showed very small 
effects, the power analyses revealed a very small statistical power of between 0.01 and 0.20 
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for these analyses.  Thus, there may not have been enough statistical power within these 
analyses to determine whether MG controls really do perform at the same level as MS 
participants. 
One may also conclude that the null hypothesis was correct and that euphoria (in 
terms of positivity and unawareness) may be caused by a psychological reaction to a chronic 
disease (and not necessarily by brain involvement), which these groups have in common.  But 
this seems unlikely since euphoric mood has not been demonstrated in other non-neurological 
patient groups, such as muscular dystrophy, and impaired awareness of physical deficits has 
also been found to be significantly less common amongst patients with muscular dystrophy 
than that of MS (30.5% for MS versus 5.1% for muscular dystrophy, p < .001; Surridge, 
1969).  Further, euphoria in MS has been found to be more likely following cerebral rather 
than spinal cord involvement (Rabins et al., 1986).  Thus, cerebral involvement, rather than a 
psychological reaction, appears to be a more likely cause of euphoria. 
Further, the measures used to determine positivity in this research were in line with 
the classical description of euphoria sclerotica and spes sclerotica and defined these 
symptoms in a more subtle way.  If studies concerning positive mood have taken place, 
perhaps investigations defined in more subtle terms have not, and this may account for these 
seemingly contradictory findings. 
Disease severity may have, however, played a role.  The PAS used in this study was 
related more to physical abilities rather than specific symptoms such as diplopia (from which 
both groups can suffer; Cantor, 2010; Rich et al., 2008; Schapira et al., 2007), and, thus, I did 
not compare the two groups on this variable.  But, a number of the MGs mentioned that they 
didn’t even think they had MG anymore as, provided they take their medication, they had not 
experienced a relapse or any symptoms for a few years, and this may have positively 
influenced their outlook and possibly resulted in them under-estimating their symptoms. 
The nature of the disease of these control participants may too have played an 
influential role.  While MG might appear to be an appropriate control disease, as it is a 
disease similar in nature to MS, with an unpredictable pattern and chronic disability, but 
without an effect on the CNS, it is, however, similar to MS as it is also an auto-immune 
disease. Since effects of immunological processes on mood (particularly that of depression 
and bipolar) have been found (Horrobin & Bennett, 1999), it is possible that the auto-immune 
nature of MG could be influencing the mood of the patients affected by it, and that euphoria 
may be caused by some form of immunological disease process related to auto-immune 
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diseases in general.  To my knowledge, however, this has not been researched before in MS, 
thus hypotheses as to this relationship at this stage remain just that.   
Finally, even though it was argued that executive dysfunction may have been 
demonstrated in this group without there having been CNS involvement, the MG group 
never-the-less demonstrated similar cognitive functioning to that of the MS group, and, thus, 
similar executive dysfunction.  As will be addressed in the sub-section to follow, executive 
impairment has been hypothesised to play a causative role in euphoria, in MS (Benedict et al., 
2001; Diaz-Olavarrieta et al., 1999; Fishman et al., 2004), and further investigation regarding 
executive dysfunction due to cerebral involvement versus executive dysfunction relating to 
secondary factors in non-neurological patients may be of significant relevance.  However, as 
was noted earlier in this sub-section, patients with muscular dystrophy (another disease that 
does not affect the CNS) who are just as likely as MGs to present with executive impairment 
due to similar secondary disease processes, such as fatigue (Grosshans et al., 2008; Kurella et 
al., 2004), have been found to not demonstrate positive mood or unawareness of physical 
deficit (Surridge, 1969).  Thus, a further investigation of immunological disease markers may 
also be relevant. 
 
Executive dysfunction.  Results pertaining to the second pilot study, and potential 
cause of euphoria (i.e. executive dysfunction), were presented.   
 
Assessing the suitability of the group to address the research question. The 
cognitive functioning of the sub-group of MVA TBI participants (n = 10) who underwent 
cognitive testing were presented and compared with that of the sub-group of MS participants 
(n = 60) who underwent cognitive testing.  This was done in order to attempt to assist in 
identifying whether their cognitive functioning was similar to that of the MS group, and to 
assess the suitability of this control group to answer its relevant hypothesis. 
This control group was particularly ill-matched on a number of key demographic 
variables, but when the significant pre-existing between-group differences for gender, age, 
race, education and current medication use were controlled for, the MVA TBI participants 
appeared to perform similarly to the MS group on the majority of variables but significantly 
more poorly than the MS group on three variables that can be considered tests of executive 
functioning  (i.e. the dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite [attention, WM, abstract 
reasoning], the verbal memory composite [verbal learning, memory, recognition], and the 
visual memory composite [visual learning, memory, recognition]).  This apparent 
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performance of the MVA TBI group was consistent with previous literature which has 
demonstrated a picture of predominantly executive dysfunction, and memory retrieval 
difficulties (Hartman et al., 1992; Rao & Lyketsos, 2000). 
Although they were expected to demonstrate some impairment, it was thought that 
they would perform within a similar range on variables of executive functioning to the MS 
group.  They, however, performed significantly more poorly on three variables, and although 
significant between-group differences on key demographic variables such as age, race and 
education were controlled for, these variables may have played an influential role in their 
cognitive performance due to the aforementioned legacy of Apartheid and its effects on 
marginalised minority groups (Case & Yogo, 1999; Heaton & Pendleton, 1981). 
Since the MVA TBIs, however, did not demonstrate a significantly better 
performance than the MS group on any cognitive measure, and did appear to demonstrate 
executive impairment, they were tentatively accepted to be an appropriate representation of a 
condition with similar executive dysfunction (and white matter involvement).  Thus, the 
hypothesis surrounding the association between executive impairment and euphoria was 
addressed. 
 
Addressing the research question.  The full MVA TBI (n = 19) and MS groups (n = 
100) were then compared on the variables pertaining to positivity and unawareness, while 
controlling for the significant pre-existing between-group differences for gender, age, race, 
education and current medication use.  This comparison was made in an attempt to 
investigate whether or not the MVA TBIs would demonstrate at least one of these two types 
of euphoria at the same levels as the MS participants.   
Results appeared to imply that no significant differences existed between these two 
groups for either positivity or unawareness, meaning that the MVA TBIs were just as positive 
and unaware as the MS participants.  Even taking the small sample sizes into account, the 
effect sizes of η2 < .02 imply that had greater sample sizes been used, these non-significant 
results may have remained.  Thus, these findings appear to suggest that euphoria (in terms of 
both positivity and unawareness) may be caused by something both MVA TBI and MS 
patients have in common. 
In terms of unawareness, these results largely support what has been found in the 
literature as poor insight into cognitive and behavioural changes post TBI is a common 
symptom of these patients (Flashman, 2002; Toglia & Kirk, 2000).  However, euphoric mood 
is not a common symptom, and this finding was in contradiction to previous research.  Fann 
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et al. (1995), for example, describe the mood of TBI patients as predominantly including 
depression and anxiety, while Rao and Lyketsos (2000) describe a picture of depression, 
mania at times, anxiety, psychosis, apathy and behavioural dyscontrol.  However, the 
measures used to determine positivity in this research were, again, in line with the classical 
description of euphoria sclerotica and spes sclerotica and defined these symptoms in a more 
subtle way.  Thus, more subtle descriptions of positive mood/outlook may not have been 
investigated in reference to TBI and this may account for these seemingly contradictory 
findings. 
Significant between-group differences, furthermore, existed between the MVA TBIs 
and the MS participants.  Although these were controlled for, more MVA TBIs were 
Coloured or Indian and the group had a lower level of education than the MS group.  While 
these two variables don’t have an obvious effect on mood, due to the aforementioned legacy 
of Apartheid, economic deprivation (as an indirect result of a lower level of education), might 
be thought to impact on mood.  However, this would likely have a negative and not a positive 
effect (Bassuk, E., Buckner, Perloff, & Bassuk, S., 1998).  Thus, the differences between 
these groups on these variables are unlikely to have accounted for the MVA TBIs unexpected 
positivity.   
 Furthermore, use of particular medications such as corticosteroids or anti-depressants 
were controlled for as these can also influence mood (Brown et al., 1999; Hewitt, Fraser, & 
Berger, 2000; Patten & Neutel, 2000; Turner, Sharp, Folkes, & Chew-Graham, 2008).  
However, although significant group differences existed for this variable, significantly fewer 
MVA TBIs were taking these medications and, thus, group differences on this variable were 
also unlikely to account for their unexpected mood and outlook. 
Therefore, tentative support for this hypothesis may have been demonstrated, and the 
results may provisionally suggest that the null hypothesis was incorrect and the MVA TBI 
group appeared to demonstrate similar levels of euphoria due to the executive dysfunction 
that these two groups have in common.  Since euphoria in MS has been hypothesised to be 
the result of executive dysfunction (see, e.g. Benedict et al., 2001; Benedict, Carone et al., 
2004; Diaz-Olavarrieta et al., 1999; Fishman et al., 2004), even though euphoric mood is not 
readily reported in MVA TBI patients (Fann et al., 1995; Rao & Lyketsos, 2000), this 
dysfunction may be, in some way, associated with the symptoms of euphoria demonstrated in 
this study.  This was, however, a provisional investigation, and small sample sizes were used.  




Immunological processes affecting the brain. Preliminary results pertaining to the 
third potential cause of euphoria to be investigated (i.e. effects of immunological disease 
processes in auto-immune disease affecting the CNS and brain) were presented.   
 
Assessing the suitability of the group to address the research question. Results 
pertaining to the cognitive functioning of the NP-SLE participants (n = 10) were presented 
and compared with that of the sub-group of MS participants (n = 60) who underwent 
cognitive testing.  This was done in order to assess their suitability as a control group to 
investigate their associated research question and to assist in indicating whether the cognitive 
functioning of the NP-SLE group was similar to that of the MS group.   
When the significant pre-existing between-group differences for race were controlled 
for, no significant differences were apparent between the NP-SLE and MS groups.  These 
findings, therefore, appeared to be in support of previous research that indicates a cognitive 
picture of NP-SLE patients similar to that of MS patients, predominantly characterised by 
executive dysfunction and including impairment in the domains of attention, WM, 
information processing speed, learning and memory (Benedict et al., 2008; Covey et al., 
2012; Skeel et al., 2000).   
Additionally, the findings appeared to provide cautious support for the hypothesis that 
NP-SLEs would demonstrate similar cognitive functioning when compared with the MS 
participants.  This patient control group was, thus, tentatively considered to be an appropriate 
reflection of a similar auto-immune disease to MS that does affect the brain and cognitive 
functioning.  The question pertaining to the effect of immunological disease processes on the 
cause of euphoria was, therefore, addressed.  
 
Addressing the research question.  The 10 NP-SLEs and 100 MS participants were 
then compared on the two types of euphoria (i.e. positivity and unawareness), while 
controlling for the significant pre-existing between-group differences for race.  This was done 
in an attempt to preliminarily investigate whether or not the NP-SLEs would demonstrate at 
least one of these two types of euphoria at similar levels to the MS participants.  Results of 
these pilot investigations appeared to demonstrate no significant differences between the NP-
SLE and MS participants for any variables pertaining to positivity or unawareness.  This 
meant that the NP-SLEs were just as positive and unaware as the MS participants, and 
possibly implied that euphoria (in terms of both positivity and unawareness) may be caused 
by something both NP-SLE and MS patients have in common. 
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Again, these results are based on analyses conducted within groups of unequal sample 
sizes, and small sample sizes on the part of the control group.  However, effect sizes were 
also small (all except for high positivity were η2 < .03), and this may indicate that even with 
larger sample sizes results may remain non-significant. 
Although little appears to have been described regarding unawareness in NP-SLE, this 
result was largely in support of previous literature which has noted euphoria as a 
neuropsychiatric symptom of NP-SLE (Alao et al., 2009; Benedict et al., 2008; Covey et al., 
2012; Hanrahan, 1954). 
Since support for the hypothesis was suggested and the NP-SLEs appeared to 
demonstrate at least one type of euphoria at a similar level to the MS group, the results could, 
tentatively and provisionally, therefore suggest that euphoria may, in some way, be 
associated with an immunological disease process, which both groups have in common.   
However, the NP-SLE group seemingly demonstrated similar executive dysfunction 
to the MS group, which (as has been discussed in the previous sections above) has been 
hypothesised to be involved in the cause of euphoria in MS patients (Benedict et al., 2001; 
Fishman et al., 2004).  Thus, one could argue that it was the executive dysfunction and not 
the immunological nature of the disease that resulted in positivity and unawareness being 
demonstrated within this group.   
However, even though the MGs also appeared to demonstrate executive impairment, 
euphoria in MS has been linked not only to executive dysfunction, but to cerebral 
involvement (Rabins et al., 1986), and the MGs, by way of their disease, do not suffer from 
cerebral damage but never-the-less demonstrated just as much positivity and unawareness as 
the MS group.  Thus, immunological disease processes, such as fatty acid regulation and 
levels of cytokines (addressed in the rationale of part three, following the literature review) 
may still be worth further investigation. 
 
Right hemispheric dysfunction.  Preliminary results pertaining to the fourth and last 
potential cause of euphoria to be investigated (i.e. the effects of RH involvement) were 
presented.   
 
Assessing the suitability of the group to address the research question.  The 
cognitive functioning of the RH participants (n = 10) was described, according to a personal 
communication with Ms Mosdell who personally interviewed each of these participants as 
part of her neuropsychological study (see Mosdell et al., 2013).  The description of the RH 
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participants was in line with what was expected as the RHs appeared to demonstrate similar 
impairments of RH functioning to the MS participants, but no executive dysfunction.  This 
description was also in line with previous literature on deficits due to RH stroke, who found 
that RH damage was associated with difficulties in spatial cognition and construction 
(Benowitz et al., 1990) as well as less executive dysfunction than damage to the left 
hemisphere (Nys et al., 2007).   
While significant differences existed between the MS and RH groups for gender, 
race/ethnicity and combined household monthly income, these were not thought to account 
for the cognitive functioning of the RH group as they demonstrated only RH deficits and no 
differences on IQ or tests of executive functioning when compared with matched HCs (see 
Mosdell et al., 2013), which would be more common if their cognitive deficits were the result 
of impoverished or under-privileged conditions (Heaton & Pendleton, 1981). 
Thus, the RH group was tentatively considered to be an appropriate reflection of a 
control group with damage only to the RH.  The question pertaining to the effect of RH 
involvement on the cause of euphoria was, therefore, addressed. 
 
Addressing the research question.  The 10 RHs and 100 MS participants were then 
compared on the two types of euphoria (i.e. positivity and unawareness), while controlling for 
significant pre-existing between-group differences for gender, race and current medication 
use.  This was done in an attempt to investigate whether or not the RHs would demonstrate at 
least one of the euphoric types at the same level as the MS participants.   
Although significant differences were not apparent for the majority of variables, two 
findings of interest emerged.  The first was that no RHs demonstrated positivity at the high 
level.  The second was that the RH group appeared to be significantly more unaware of their 
physical (but not their cognitive or mood/behavioural) deficits than the MS participants.   
The findings in terms of unawareness of physical deficit appears to be in support of 
previous research in this field (see, e.g., Hartman-Maeir et al., 2001; Jenkinson et al., 2011; 
Vocat & Vuilleumier, 2010).  Equally, the findings in terms of low positive mood also appear 
to be in support of more recent theories concerning the neuroanatomical location of positive 
mood in the brain (see, e.g., Davidson et al., 1990; Hartman-Maeir et al., 2001; Jenkinson et 
al., 2011; Vocat & Vuilleumier, 2010).   
However, these findings appeared to suggest that the RHs did not demonstrate 
positivity and unawareness at the same levels as the MS participants.  In fact, they were not 
positive at the high level, and were significantly more unaware of physical deficits than the 
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MS group, which may imply that euphoria (in terms of both positive and unawareness) may 
not be caused by RH involvement.   
Thus, although many similarities appeared to exist between the original descriptions 
of eutonia sclerotica and anosognosia for hemiplegia, and although the original theories such 
as the RH hypothesis held that positive mood could result from damage to the RH (Borod, 
1992; Borod et al., 2002; Tondowski et al., 2007), RH impairment does not appear to be 
related, in this limited preliminary analysis, to euphoria in MS. 
 
Summary of part three.  The aim of part three was to explore four hypotheses 
regarding the cause of euphoria in MS, via preliminary analyses.  While the MVA TBIs and 
NP-SLEs expectedly demonstrated similar levels of positivity and unawareness to the MS 
participants, significant between-group differences were also absent between the MG and MS 
groups.  These findings implied a potential role played by executive dysfunction, due to the 
cognitive performance of the groups, as well as possibly immunological disease processes in 







Being unaware of one’s difficulties, displaying positive mood that seems out of place, and 
having an optimism regarding recovery in the future that is unlikely to occur, are all 
symptoms experienced by sub-groups of MS patients.  Since notable disagreement 
concerning these symptoms, collectively known as euphoria, has appeared throughout the 
literature, improving our understanding of (a) the euphoric symptoms; (b) their underlying 
causes and mechanisms; (c) the definitions which underpin them; (d) the ways in which they 
should be measured; and (e) at what level they should be considered pathological 
symptomatology, rather than representations of normal beliefs and feelings, are all areas of 
significant value.   
 
The risk of false discovery  
Before I begin to summarise and discuss the abovementioned points which form the crux of 
this dissertation, special attention must be given to the number of inferential statistics 
included in this study.  Firstly I would like to acknowledge that including so many analyses is 
problematic and that I am aware of the risk of false discovery.  I, thus, urge caution in the 
interpretation of the findings and do not claim these results to be unequivocal fact.  However, 
I would also like to justify the use of the analyses used, as the complex nature of euphoria 
necessitated the use of a comprehensive, exploratory approach.  With such vastly differing 
opinions and findings on what constitutes euphoria, in which patients it presents, and what 
causes this interesting phenomenon, a small concise study would not have adequately 
addressed the important questions which this research attempted to answer. Moreover, I 
attempted to compensate for this problem to some extent by adopting a more conservative 
alpha cut-off level of .01, rather than the conventional .05. 
 
A change in the constructs 
As we now know, an abundance of literature on the topic of euphoria in MS exists, dating all 
the way back to the early 1800’s.  However, great differences in opinion appear to exist 
between authors researching and reporting on these phenomena.  Contemporary investigators 
appear to disagree with classical authors, and even classical researchers disagreed with each 
other regarding the definitions, types, and incidence rates of euphoria.  Although a number of 
excellent review articles exist that note, or imply, such discrepancies in the literature, or even 
go so far as to hypothesise a possible reason for the change, this study is the first empirical 
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investigation of the actual changes that appear to have crept into the literature. Although a 
renewed interest in euphoria in MS has taken place in recent times, resulting in a number of 
contemporary studies of these symptoms, well-grounded research cannot take place without a 
substantial understanding of the constructs that underpin those symptoms. Thus, in addition 
to investigating the inconsistencies as well as the root of the inconsistencies present in the 
literature, a further strength of this research was that it re-investigated the euphoric constructs 
themselves in order to better define, and therefore better study euphoria. 
 Prior to this study, it seemed as though the rates of euphoria had just changed, and 
that MS patients are no longer predominantly euphoric as they once were.  However, this 
study demonstrated that instead of three types, only one type is typically measured today, and 
that instead of more subtle definitions of cheerfulness, happiness, ease, and optimism 
(euphoria and spes sclerotica), today researchers report the presence of more abnormal, 
unrealistic and extreme mood and optimism.  Furthermore, eutonia sclerotica appears to have 
morphed from a sense of physical well-being (and unawareness of physical deficit) to largely 
only an unawareness, but not just of the physical domain.  Using the CWQ to represent the 
classical definition and measure, I demonstrated that replication of relatively high rates of 
euphoria according to the more subtle definition (along with an interpretation of the results) 
was possible.  Using the NPI as the popular modern definition and measure, I demonstrated 
that lower rates of euphoria (in the same sample) according to the more extreme definition 
were possible.  This highlighted that the high rates of Cottrell and Wilson’s (1926) three 
types, and the low rates of the modern researchers’ predominantly one type, reflect an artefact 
of measure and the different operational definitions used; which implies that the nature of the 
MS patient has not undergone the shift apparent in the literature.  It further seems possible 
that a bias amongst researchers exists where the majority of classical investigators (i.e. not 
just Cottrell and Wilson) appeared to be biased towards finding euphoria and described it as 
the predominant mood state of MS patients (Charcot, 1877; Finger, 1998; Surridge, 1969), 
while the modern investigators appear to be biased against finding euphoria and consider it to 
be rare (Figved et al., 2005; Kesselring & Klement, 2001).  This bias may further have 
influenced the ways in which euphoria was or is defined, measured, and the rates at which it 
is found.  These discoveries regarding the altering definitions, are a significant finding and 
may influence our understanding of these constructs moving forward. 
Towards the beginning of this dissertation, I stated that the change in definition that 
appears to have occurred does not appear to have resulted from a demonstrated 
inappropriateness of the definition provided by Cottrell and Wilson (1926).  Since euphoria 
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sclerotica, eutonia sclerotica and spes sclerotica were all demonstrated within this sample 
(even if one only accepts the definite presence of these symptoms), and since using the more 
inclusive, subtle definition identified a number of euphoric MS participants that were not 
identified by the more extreme NPI, it appears that this supposition is correct.   
Furthermore, it highlights that by using modern definitions that are different from the 
classical definitions described as “cogent” (Minden & Schiffer, 1990), we are likely losing 
important characteristics that were present in the original definitions that may assist us in the 
diagnosis and treatment of MS patients (and perhaps translate into better treatment for other 
patients too).   
Thus, this re-investigation of euphoria from a classical perspective has broadened our 
knowledge of the constructs underlying the symptoms of euphoria.  However, now that we 
know a change appears to have taken place, it is important to understand the real nature of 
these symptoms. 
 
The quality of euphoria 
Despite the above noted disagreement regarding the characteristics and definitions of 
euphoria, many studies exist that have investigated the symptoms of positive mood, optimism 
and unawareness of deficit, within MS.  However, contemporary researchers predominantly 
use different measures from those used in classical research and appear to approach the topic 
from a slightly different perspective.  A strength of this study was, therefore, that it combined 
both classical and contemporary views, thereby addressing potential missing components 
from both perspectives.  It also included additional demographic and disease variables that 
have previously not specifically been assessed in relation to euphoria.  Furthermore, this 
research attempted to investigate the cortical contributions to euphoria, as well as to 
investigate euphoria from the perspective of RH dysfunction, which has not been done 
before, and some of these avenues yielded useful and interesting results that enabled me to 
better describe and define the symptoms associated with euphoria. 
 From the results of this study, it appears that two types of euphoria exist within this 
sample.  Relating to Cottrell and Wilson’s (1926) original euphoria sclerotica and spes 
sclerotica, the first type, which I termed positivity, includes feelings of positive mood and an 
optimistic outlook.  It is not defined in terms of abnormal positive mood or unrealistic 
optimism, but rather involves a more subtle definition that exists on a continuum of milder to 
more intense presentations of this symptom.   
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The second type, in part referring to the original eutonia sclerotica as defined by 
Cottrell and Wilson (1926), I called unawareness.  Rather than focussing on the aspect of 
physical well-being from the original definition, I focussed on the idea of unawareness of 
physical deficit (which also formed part of the original definition); but results revealed that 
unawareness, in MS, may extend to more domains than just the physical, and MS patients 
appear to demonstrate unawareness of, at least, cognitive and mood or behavioural deficits 
too.  Results did, however, reveal that an MS patient does not necessarily present with 
unawareness of all domains concurrently, and while overlap did occur, of the 61 MS 
participants to demonstrate unawareness, 41/61 (67.2%) did so in only one domain. 
 An association between positivity and unawareness was demonstrated, where an 
increase in the one is associated with an increase in the other, and fairly high rates of co-
occurrence between these two symptoms appeared to exist.  This appeared to demonstrate 
that positivity and unawareness are not mutually exclusive.  However, some participants 
demonstrated one without the other, and, as such, I concluded that, although associated, 
positivity and unawareness are also not one and the same symptom, and that measuring one 
does not mean that the other automatically exists. 
 In relation to discrepancies between definitions of inward and outward euphoria, 
positivity was found to be negatively correlated with depression.  This finding not only 
implied that the two symptoms are unlikely to co-occur, but that self-reported positivity (i.e. 
positive mood and optimism) is a symptom experienced by the patient themselves, and not 
just a façade or persona that they project, as MS participants reporting moderate to high rates 
of positivity did not also report depression. This further implies that the self-report measures 
included in this study are accurate ways of eliciting or measuring this type of euphoria 
identified.   
Awareness was positively correlated with depression, which meant that as 
unawareness increased, depression decreased.  As this finding supported that of previous 
research, I concluded that the measures and method used (i.e. participant/informant 
discrepancy scores) for this type of euphoria, were also appropriate and accurate ways of 
determining unawareness.   
 While no cognitive correlates, of the domains of cognitive functioning that were 
assessed in the current study, were found to significantly predict positivity, a previous 
medical history of diseases or conditions that could impact on one’s neuropsychological 
functioning was found to negatively correlate with and significantly predict positivity.  This 
appeared to imply that positivity can (at least in this sample) occur independently of cognitive 
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impairment, gender, age, income, disease course, disease duration, current disease state, and 
severity of disease (in terms of physical disability).  Furthermore, it appears to be 
independent of medication.  However, the fewer medical conditions a patient has had in the 
past, the more positive s/he will be, in terms of the findings of this research.   
For unawareness, no correlates were identified for the domain of mood and/or 
behavioural difficulties.  No demographic or disease correlates were identified for 
unawareness of cognitive deficits either; however, poor visuospatial ability (a cognitive 
predictor) was found to be associated with greater unawareness of cognitive deficits.  
Unawareness of physical deficits had the greatest number of correlates and the full model of 
demographic and disease variables significantly predicted unawareness of physical deficits. 
Two individual variables were also significant predictors: Greater disease severity (in terms 
of physical disability; a disease predictor) and increased disinhibition and difficulties in set 
shifting (a cognitive predictor) were found to be associated with greater unawareness of 
physical deficit.  Few demographic, disease and/or cognitive correlates were thus identified in 
general and, apart from the correlates addressed above, unawareness too, appears to be 
largely independent of the variables assessed in this research.   
Although overall, relatively few correlates were identified, there did appear to be 
different correlates not only for positivity and unawareness, but for the different domains of 
unawareness too.  While this may imply that different mechanisms may underpin positivity 
and unawareness, and that the different domains of unawareness may be accounted for by 
different underlying mechanisms, limitations such as sample to variable ratio or sensitivity of 
the measures were also discussed in relation to those findings, and definitive conclusions 
cannot yet be drawn. 
 In the process of investigating the origin of a change in definition, as well as of better 
describing and defining what euphoria really appears to involve, I uncovered an exceptionally 
important aspect: What is the most appropriate way to measure positivity and unawareness, 
and at what point are they no longer characteristic of normal beliefs and feelings, but rather 
something that one can consider to be pathological? 
 
How best to measure euphoria and what is pathological? 
As stated, this research has produced important findings in terms of the influence of artefact 
of measure and differing conceptual and operational definitions on the frequencies of 
euphoria demonstrated throughout the literature.  In addition, it has contributed to a better 
understanding of euphoria.  However, it has also raised two additional important issues, that 
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of: (a) how best to measure euphoria, and (b) at what point the feelings and beliefs of MS 
patients should be considered outside the normal range, or strong enough to be considered 
pathological or indicative of a symptom.   
A major strength of this research, and one that assisted in answering these difficult 
questions, was that it included different types of measurement instruments (both classical and 
modern, as well as other well-known subtle [e.g. PANAS, OPS] and more extreme [e.g. 
CRJRF] modern measures), and that it approached euphoria from both the classical and 
contemporary views. 
 I will discuss the idea of how best to measure euphoria first.  Researchers 
investigating euphoric mood predominantly use a yes/no diagnosis, and those investigating 
unawareness largely just distinguish between aware and unaware patients based on whether 
they over or under-estimate their deficits.  Although, continuous scales are often used in 
unawareness research, the researchers generally do not acknowledge the different degrees of 
unawareness; and although a wide range of unawareness was not demonstrated in this 
research, a range was never-the-less found.   
Determining whether or not a patient has euphoric mood, or is unaware, is important, 
but since a range does exist, it may be beneficial and appropriate to represent both positivity 
and unawareness on a continuum, instead of imposing cut-off points or a yes/no diagnosis.  
One benefit may be that patients with differing degrees of positivity and unawareness require, 
and may benefit from, different types of intervention or treatment options.  As such, 
identifying at what level a patient is experiencing these symptoms may assist practitioners to 
develop tailor-made treatment programs, specific to their patient, rather than treating all 
euphoric patients in the same way. 
Another benefit is associated with the finding that an increase in positivity was 
associated with an increase in unawareness, and an increase in unawareness (of physical 
impairment) was associated with, and significantly predicted by, an increase in disease 
severity.  If unawareness, and thus positivity, increase as the disease worsens, identifying 
those participants who fall within a more moderate category, but who may progress to present 
with more severe euphoria at a later stage, may assist clinicians and caregivers to provide 
such patients with timeous and appropriate care.   
Representing an individual’s mood and/or outlook on a scale of euphoria may also 
lessen any sense of stigma that may be attached to an abnormal symptom.  When asking a 
number of participants in this study whether they experience a “persistent and abnormally 
good mood” (Cummings et al., 1994), many replied that they may be happy but they are not 
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crazy, and are not abnormal, and one related that she had been called euphoric by her 
neurologist and spoke of this label in a very negative light.  If these patients feel that their 
support networks (i.e. their families and doctors) think they are not normal, they may be less 
likely to share their concerns or ask for help when they need it. 
 Although a range of unawareness may exist and although it may be beneficial to 
identify patients with differing degrees of unawareness, determining which patients are 
pathologically unaware is relatively easy if one assumes that those who underestimate their 
deficits are unaware. 
In contrast, although the same benefits (as related to unawareness) of conceptualising 
positivity on a continuum exist, positivity is more difficult to diagnose and the majority of 
patients demonstrating positivity may not necessarily have euphoria. Thus, the idea of what 
denotes a pathological presence of positivity is of equal, or even greater, importance. 
This idea, though, is an even more difficult one to address, particularly given the 
inconsistencies present in the literature, as well as the limitations identified regarding the 
measures most often used to determine whether or not euphoric mood exists.  It is further 
complicated by ideas such as those raised by Peyser et al. (1980) who noted a difference 
between early MS patients who have minimal impairment, but who (in their opinion) 
realistically demonstrate well-being (due to their lack of disability), and MS patients who 
have had the disease for longer, are more disabled, and who (in their opinion) unrealistically 
demonstrate well-being (due to their severe impairment).  Similar findings were noted in this 
sample, where 46.1% of the participants scoring within the high range for positivity were 
rated, by their informants, as being 50% or less impaired physically.  Thus, like the early MS 
patients in Peyser et al.’s (1980) study, almost half of the participants classified as displaying 
high positivity in the current study were not severely physically impaired and may have (due 
to their lack of disability) been entitled to demonstrate positive mood and optimism without it 
being considered abnormal.  However, even early MS patients have an unpredictable, 
chronic, degenerative, disabling disease, and displaying euphoric mood in the face of this 
reality, even with minimal symptoms initially, may be considered pathological.   
The above complexity aside, participants in the present study displaying moderate 
positivity still noted some negative mood, as per the themes identified in the qualitative 
analysis.  This means that it was only towards the higher level of positivity that the symptom 
resembled pathological euphoria.  Furthermore, when the MS participants were compared 
with the control groups of this research, they generally demonstrated slightly, but not 
significantly, lower levels, than the other patient control groups, of positivity on average (i.e. 
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when the full sample was included) and demonstrated significantly lower levels than the 
well-matched HCs (p = .0001).  They also largely demonstrated slightly, but not significantly, 
lower levels of positivity than the other patient control groups at the moderate cut-off point 
(i.e. when all scores between the 50% and 75% cut-off points were included) and again 
demonstrated significantly lower levels than the HCs (p = .001).  But, they demonstrated 
similar levels of positivity to the HCs (p = .293) and slightly, but not significantly, higher 
levels of positivity than all patient control groups at the high cut-off point (i.e. when all 
scores within the top quartile were included).  This appears to demonstrate not only that high 
positivity is likely to represent the level at which this symptom may be deemed pathological, 
but also that there appears to be a fairly steep increase in the curve of positivity at this end of 
the continuum, and that, in general, MS patients are not obviously euphoric, but those that do 
present with euphoria demonstrate it at very high levels. 
However, positivity was measured on a continuum, and the moderate and high cut-off 
points imposed were perhaps as arbitrary as believing a yes/no answer can address the 
complexities of this symptom.  Thus, these interpretations should be received with caution, 
and a 65% cut-off point may have differentiated euphoric patients from non-euphoric patients 
just as well as the 75% cut-off point. My recommendation is, therefore, that one 
acknowledges that a large percentage of MS patients experience some form of positive mood 
and optimistic outlook, as 67% of the participants of this study fell within the moderate to 
high range; but that this mood and outlook only becomes pathological at a higher level, and, 
thus (in this sample at least) is relatively uncommon. 
 
What is the cause of euphoria? 
Many researchers have hypothesised as to what may be causing euphoria in MS, and a 
number of (particularly contemporary) investigations have brought us a little closer to an 
answer to this question.  However, the absolute etiology of euphoria in MS remains unclear.  
A strength of this study, therefore, was that it tested a number of existing hypotheses, and that 
it introduced a pilot investigation of two new hypotheses that, despite a strong rationale for 
their inclusion/consideration, had not been investigated before.  However, I will remind the 
reader again of the unequal sample sizes between groups and the small sample sizes of the 
patient control groups, and emphasise that only tentative speculations regarding the causes of 
euphoria could be made and that absolute conclusions could not be drawn from the 
preliminary findings provided by these analyses.   
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 Although the euphoric symptoms may be better represented on a continuum, in terms 
of the above understanding, the level at which positive mood and optimistic outlook becomes 
pathological and may be considered to represent euphoria appears to be around the higher 
cut-off point, rather than the more modest cut-off point of moderate positivity.  Thus, an 
examination of the underlying cause of euphoric mood should perhaps be made by comparing 
the MS group with the patient control groups at this high level, as it is likely here that we may 
see some trends with regard to the various groups (whereas scores in the lower quartiles may 
present more ‘normal’ mood states).   
However, except for the RHs where statistics could not be calculated due to a lack of 
any RHs scoring highly on positivity, inferential statistics appeared to reveal no significant 
differences between the MS group and any of the patient control groups for high positivity.  
Sample sizes were small though, and this limitation could likely have influenced these 
results.  However, an examination of the effect sizes appeared to reveal very small effects for 
the majority of these analyses (all η2 < .21).  Thus, what these provisional results may imply 
is that as executive dysfunction, in terms of, in this research, at least, the dorsolateral 
prefrontal functioning composite (attention, WM and abstract reasoning) as well as 
dysexecutive-type memory deficits appeared to be demonstrated  in all patient control groups 
(except for the RHs), this form of cognitive impairment may, as has been theorised, be 
imperative in the etiology of euphoria.   
However, since intriguing findings were unveiled with regard to the MG group, who, 
even though they appeared to present with executive impairment, did not have a disease that 
affects the CNS, executive dysfunction, in terms of cerebral involvement, might not be the 
only causative factor in euphoric mood/outlook and immunological disease processes could 
play a potentially influential role.  Furthermore, the results may suggest that RH involvement 
may not be a causative factor in positivity. 
 In terms of unawareness, a distinction was not made regarding the level or degree of 
unawareness, and participants were merely classed as being aware or unaware.  Thus, an 
investigation of the underlying cause of unawareness could possibly be made by comparing 
the scores of unaware MS participants with those of unaware patient controls for the different 
domains.  For unawareness of physical deficits, no significant differences appeared to be 
demonstrated between the unaware MS participants and the unaware control participants of 
any group, except for that of the RHs.  But since the RHs were significantly more unaware of 
their physical deficits than the MS participants and did not present their unawareness at the 
same level as the MS participants, this may imply that RH unawareness of physical deficit is 
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something different from MS unawareness of physical deficit.  Further, since the effect sizes 
regarding the analyses between the MS and the MG, NP-SLE and MVA TBI groups were all 
small (all η2 < .01) these findings may again implicate both executive dysfunction as well as, 
potentially, immunological factors in the etiology of euphoria. 
Regarding unawareness of the remaining two domains (that of cognitive and 
mood/behavioural deficits), no significant differences were found in the limited analyses 
conducted for any of the groups for these variables.  Furthermore, even though sample sizes 
were small, since all effect sizes were less than .15, this lack of significant differences may be 
somewhat representative of larger groups.  While these findings do not implicate a particular 
group, and, thus, underlying cause, for unawareness of these domains, the lack of significant 
differences also does not rule out any of the hypotheses as a potential cause, which is also an 
important finding. 
However, although the findings of this study, in terms of the demographic, disease 
and cognitive correlates of positivity and the different domains of unawareness, implied that 
differing correlates between these aspects of euphoria may exist, associated limitations (such 
as sensitivity of measures and sample size to variable ratio) with this interpretation have been 
discussed.  Furthermore, an association was demonstrated between positivity and 
unawareness in this research, and indeed much of the literature before this (see, e.g. Finger, 
1998).  In addition, a number of participants were found to demonstrate unawareness of more 
than one domain concurrently, and many in conjunction with moderate to high positivity.  
Furthermore, all domains of unawareness loaded onto one factor, in the factor analysis 
conducted to determine the number of types of euphoria, indicating some underlying 
commonality between them.  Moreover, even Sherman et al. (2008), who stated that different 
mechanisms may underlie different aspects of unawareness, found an overlap of 16% of 
participants experiencing both physical and cognitive unawareness.  Therefore, it seems 
likely that one mechanism underlies not only both types of euphoria identified in this 
research, but all domains of unawareness.  In terms of the provisional studies conducted, 
executive dysfunction appears to be the most likely avenue to explore.  However, 
immunological disease processes should not be discounted as other non-neurological 
diseases, such as muscular dystrophy, which also presumably have the potential for executive 
impairment according to studies such as that of Grosshans et al. (2008) and Kurella et al. 
(2004), have not been found to present with euphoric mood or unawareness of physical 
deficits (Surridge, 1969).  Thus, auto-immunity, along with executive impairment, both 




Limitations of the study 
Although every attempt was made to address these, I recognise that a number of limitations 
were present in this study.  I will address each limitation below in separate sections pertaining 
to the participants, their medical records, and the measures included in this research.  
 
 Inaccessibility of patients.  Not one of the patient groups included in this study was 
easily accessed.  Firstly, there were not many of these patients in the WC (or SA), and 
secondly a lack of motivation and resources, as well as time constraints, existed for 
neurologists in private practise, support groups, speech therapists, neuropsychologists and/or 
rehabilitation centres, which impacted on the identification and recruitment of patients.  In 
addition, research fatigue of patients in public hospitals led to my being unable to interview a 
number of MG patients that were identified, as well as to my being unable to cognitively test 
the RH patients that were included in this study.   
As addressed in the methods section, every attempt was made to address these 
problems and I explored every avenue of patient recruitment available to me, including 
adapting the research to include only the euphoric questionnaires and broadening the research 
population to the whole of SA in order to be able to post or e-mail the questionnaires to 
participants that were too far away to see in person.  However, despite this, patient numbers 
remained low and this led to a number of limitations in this research.  The first is that it 
resulted in small sample sizes, particularly of the patient control groups (i.e. the groups of 
MG, MVA TBI, NP-SLE and RH patients), which may have influenced the generalisability 
of the results as well as the reliability of the data.   
The second is that inaccessibility of patients resulted in my not being able to exclude 
any MS or patient control participant according to the exclusion criteria imposed upon the 
HC group.  This resulted in the potential for confounding variables that could influence 
neuropsychological functioning being present in groups that should otherwise have had clean 
pathology (i.e. only the disease or condition in question being present), which may, in turn, 
have influenced the results.  Severe cerebral pathology within the samples (for instance, 
stroke or current epilepsy) was, however, rare and the kinds of conditions reported were a 
loss of consciousness in childhood with no lasting effects, or malaria, but not of the cerebral 
kind).  Furthermore, a medical history of factors that could influence neuropsychological 
functioning was controlled for statistically.   
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Thirdly, inaccessibility of patients resulted in my inability to match groups according 
to one on one, or even aggregate matching.  Thus, some of the groups were mis-matched on 
certain key demographic variables, although this was controlled for statistically.   
Finally, the issue of research fatigue led the RH patient control group to be excluded 
from cognitive testing.  Here, I used the thorough description of the cognitive performance of 
these patients that was available to me and they were still regarded as being appropriate 
controls for the hypothesis in question. 
  
 Access to medical information.  Accessing MS patients via neurologists and private 
practise and at public hospitals accounted for approximately one quarter of the total 
participants included in this research.  The majority were recruited via MSSA or MS support 
groups, and, due to time constraints and limited numbers of patients being available, these 
participants were often interviewed before their neurologist could be reached.  Thus, a 
confirmed diagnosis of MS and current disease course could not be obtained in four cases, 
despite my sending numerous e-mails and making numerous phone-calls to the relevant 
neurologists.  Although this was a small percentage, it may, never-the-less, have influenced 
the results.   
 
 The measures.  A number of limitations associated with the measures included in this 
research were also present.  Firstly, the majority of measures were only available in English.  
Thus, although provisions were made for certain cognitive tests (addressed in the methods 
section), all participants had to be fluent in English in order to be able to answer the 
remaining measures.  This did not, however, result in the exclusion of any participants as all 
participants were fluent in English, and were able to answer all the questions. 
 The majority of the measures were also created in developed countries and, thus, 
cross-cultural applicability issues may have played an influential role in the interpretation of 
the performance of the patient groups.  I addressed this issue by including matched HCs as a 
reference group for the MS patients and rather than comparing their performance with 
standardised international norms, they were compared with HCs from similar 
sociodemographic (where possible) and geographic areas. 
 Self-reported measures were included for a particular reason: to address the 
discrepancies between objective and subjective displays of emotion noted by Surridge (1969).  
But since (at least some) MS and TBI participants are known to present with issues of 
unawareness, self-report measures may present their own limitations in accurately measuring 
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the euphoric symptoms in question.  I addressed this by including informant ratings which 
supplemented the self-reported findings (for example when determining how many types of 
euphoria exist).   
Furthermore, as was addressed in part one of the discussion, although informants were 
used to determine the degree of unawareness amongst the MS participants, factors relating to 
the informants themselves, such as not knowing the extent of the participants’ deficits, may 
also have affected the results obtained.  However, as was further addressed in part two of the 
discussion, forming true objective opinions regarding the physical, cognitive and 
mood/behavioural deficits of the participants would have been near to impossible as I did not 
know them well enough, and I followed the procedure that is considered to be standard 
practice in unawareness research (see Prigatano et al., 1990). 
 Another limitation associated with the measures of the study was that of including the 
PAS as a measure of disease severity rather than the EDSS.  While it was not possible to 
include this measure (the reasons for which were addressed in the methods section), the fact 
that these measures are not directly comparable does influence the extent to which the current 
results relating to disease severity could be compared with that of previous research results 
relating to disease severity. 
 Another factor that has also been addressed previously but should never-the-less be 
mentioned here, is that many neuropsychological measures are not as domain specific as we 
would like them to be.  For example, it was noted in part two of the discussion that the CA, 
for example, may tap into executive functioning in addition to RH visuospatial abilities.  
Thus, basing a study that aims to differentiate between cortical and subcortical, as well as 
right versus left neuroanatomical areas solely on neuropsychological testing may not be the 
most scrupulous form of methodology.  Differentiating between these areas was, however, an 
exploratory investigation, and it was not deemed essential to include these additional 
techniques (such as MRI) in this initial study.  
 Finally, the number of measures included may also have impacted on the results.  
While all were considered to be necessary, the number of measures included resulted in a full 
testing session (for the MS and HC participants who took part in both the cognitive 
assessment and the interview including the euphoric questionnaires) of between 2.5 and 3 
hours; and patient control interviews, which included the euphoric questionnaires and the 
tests of executive functioning, of up to 2 hours.  This may have resulted in fatigue or loss of 
concentration.  A number of attempts were made to address these concerns.  Participants were 
given breaks and refreshments, and the interview schedule was structured in such a way that 
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difficult, complicating or tiring tasks were interspersed with easier, less taxing tasks.  
However, fatigue is a common symptom of at least MS and MG (Cantor, 2010; Jones, 2011; 
Rich et al., 2008), thus may have influenced the performance of these patients. 
 
Directions for future research 
There are a number of factors that could be addressed by future researchers to minimise the 
limitations described above.  For example, future research should consider larger sample 
sizes for each of the patient control groups addressing the hypotheses concerning the cause of 
euphoria.  If availability and/or accessibility of patients still poses a problem with the groups 
included in this study, perhaps future investigators might consider other patient groups that 
are appropriate to answer the various questions.  Someone else may, for example, have better 
access to muscular dystrophy patients and will, thus, be better equipped to investigate the 
psychological reaction/cerebral involvement hypothesis.  Obtaining greater sample sizes will 
also allow for more stringent/rigorous exclusion criteria.  
 Future researchers should also ensure that all diagnoses of participants obtained via 
support groups are confirmed with the patients’ neurologists prior to their inclusion in the 
study.  Or, if patients are readily available, they should include only patients referred by a 
neurologist, neurosurgeon, neuropsychologist, or medical practitioner who has access to the 
medical records of the patient.  This will ensure that 100% of the sample has clean and 
confirmed pathology. 
 In addition, one of the aims of this research was to determine if one could predict 
either of the euphoric types identified, based on cortical versus subcortical and/or right versus 
left hemispheric involvement.  But, this involvement was measured by means of 
neuropsychological tests which can tap into more than the specific domain one is wanting to 
investigate (Lezak et al., 2004).  Because of this limitation, and because this study revealed 
some interesting results regarding the cortical correlates of unawareness, future research may 
want to consider measuring this more objectively by including MRI scans to examine, in 
more depth, the contributions made by these neuroanatomical areas to the euphoric types. 
A number of interesting and important findings, however, also emerged from this 
study that could be further investigated and addressed by research studies to come.  For 
example, researchers investigating euphoria might consider approaching this topic from the 
perspective of a longitudinal study.  Past research, like the current study, appears to have 
consistently investigated euphoria from a cross-sectional methodological approach; however 
given that positivity and unawareness could be appropriately measured by a continuum, it 
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would be interesting to see if these symptoms change or develop over time.  A longitudinal 
study would also help to address the association found between positivity and unawareness, 
by seeing if this relationship (i.e. an increase in positivity is associated with an increase in 
unawareness) endures, or increases over time.   
I would like to add, in addition, that future researchers investigating euphoria should 
be cognisant of the varying degrees of positivity and unawareness, and should be cautious 
and pay particular attention to the question surrounding what is considered to be a 
pathological presentation of these symptoms.   
In addition, although three domains of unawareness were included in the present 
research, based on prior literature and the aims and objectives of the current study, and also 
limited by time constraints and the length of the interview, that is not to say that they are the 
only objects of unawareness in MS.  Additional domains, or additional aspects of the current 
domains, could be included to better describe and define unawareness in MS. 
Future research may also consider incorporating premorbid characteristics, for 
example concerning coping strategies, of the MS patients, and investigate how these are 
associated with positivity (and unawareness) post MS.  Although not addressed in-depth in 
the findings of this study, I, like Cottrell and Wilson (1926), found that many participants 
noted a change since their MS to a more positive and optimistic state.  Some who were 
positive and optimistic before their disease reported becoming more so, while others who 
were slightly negative and/or pessimistic reported a change to being more positive and 
optimistic.  A study investigating whether premorbid personality can affect which 
participants develop positivity (and unawareness) and which develop these symptoms in 
higher rates of intensity may reveal interesting findings regarding these concepts. 
 Following on from this, the investigation of positivity and unawareness from a 
psychodynamic or psychoanalytic approach would also be of great interest.  Concepts such as 
denial and avoidance would be interesting to pursue within this subject matter.  Further, some 
MS participants related ways in which they have gained something or taken something 
positive from their MS.  However, did this positive outcome and the accompanying mood and 
outlook result from an acceptance of the disease, or did the organic euphoria experienced by 
the participant create an incongruence between mood/outlook and the reality of their situation 
that their unconscious addressed by reframing the participants’ experience of the disease into 
something more positive?  These are interesting questions that deserve further attention. 
 Finally, further research is required to investigate the etiology of euphoria.  Since (a) 
the results concerning these analyses were preliminary, (b) an association between positivity 
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and unawareness and a high co-occurrence of these two symptoms was demonstrated, but (c) 
no one clear cause of euphoria was identified by this research, researchers may want to 
explore this question further. In addition, due to the interesting (but very provisional) findings 
that were revealed in relation to the contributions made by the immunological nature of the 
disease, future researchers should additionally explore this area further, with both bigger 
sample sizes and perhaps the inclusion of immune disease markers such as cytokine levels. 
 
Conclusion 
This exploratory study demonstrated that a change in the definition of euphoria appears to 
have occurred since the first comprehensive definition was provided, in 1926, by Cottrell and 
Wilson.  It further put forward a new definition and described two associated types of 
euphoria (viz. positivity and unawareness), of which positivity was defined in more subtle 
terms, and unawareness was defined in terms of a variety of domains (including unawareness 
of physical, cognitive and mood or behavioural deficits), and both of which were elicited by 
self-report measures (which were compared with the answers of informants, in the case of 
unawareness). Although a range was present and both symptoms appeared to be represented 
on a continuum, any under-estimation of deficits was deemed representative of pathological 
unawareness, while positivity was considered pathological around the high cut-off point.  
Although associated, each symptom appeared to have different disease and cognitive 
correlates, and, although both executive dysfunction and immunological disease processes 
may possibly be implicated in euphoria, no single indisputable underlying cause for both 
symptoms was identified in terms of the very preliminary analyses conducted.   
This study has thus added substantially to our understanding of both the constructs 
that underpin euphoria in MS as well as the symptoms of euphoria themselves.  These results 
may, therefore, shape research in this area going forward.  In addition, they might assist 
clinicians in the diagnosis of patients that may benefit from, either currently, or in the future, 
both direct treatment and management of these symptoms as well as from taking these 
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Appendix B: Consent and Assent Forms 
 
Appendix B1: Multiple Sclerosis Participants, Healthy Controls, Myasthenia Gravis, 
Neuropsychiatric Systemic Lupus Erythematosus, Stroke, Traumatic Brain Injured Controls 
Able to Provide Informed Consent and Guardians of Traumatic Brain Injured Controls Un-
able to Provide Informed Consent: Full Interview (Consent Form) 
 
The cognitive and affective symptoms of Multiple Sclerosis 
 
Mrs Amy Duncan                      Prof Mark Solms 
Researcher           Supervisor 
Department of Psychology                Department of Psychology  
University of Cape Town                  University of Cape Town 
083 653 3048                 021 650 3437 
E-mail: amynortham@gmail.com                   E-mail: Mark.Solms@uct.ac.za 
 
Invitation to take part in this research study 
We would like to invite you to participate in a neuropsychological study conducted by 
researchers of the University of Cape Town (see above). 
 
Purpose and description 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the cognitive and mood, or affective, symptoms 
associated with multiple sclerosis (MS). Cognitive, or cognition, refers to one’s mental 
processes of, for example, perception, attention, and memory. Mood, or affect, refers to one’s 
state of mind, or quality of feeling or emotion. Examples might include depression or 
cheerfulness. 
 
[For MS participants] You are invited to participate because 1) you have been diagnosed with 
MS, and 2) you either contacted me, or gave consent for the researcher to contact you.  
 
[For HCs] You are invited to participate because 1) your demographic details match those of 
an MS participant, 2) you are a healthy person, and 3) the study requires control participants 
who have no neurological disease.  
 
[For MG controls] You are invited to participate because 1) have received a diagnosis of 
myasthenia gravis, and 2) you either contacted us, or gave consent for the researcher to 
contact you.  
 
[For MVA TBI controls] You are invited to participate because 1) you have experienced a 
head injury, and 2) you either contacted us, or gave consent for the researcher to contact you.  
 
[For NP-SLE controls] You are invited to participate because 1) you have received a 
diagnosis of systemic lupus erythematosus, and 2) you either contacted us, or gave consent 
for the researcher to contact you.  
 
[For RH controls] You are invited to participate because 1) you have experienced a stroke, 




Participants will be recruited for this study from Groote Schuur and Tygerberg Hospitals, 
private neurologists/neurosurgeons/neuropsychologist in the Western Cape, organisations 
such as Multiple Sclerosis South Africa, and by word of mouth. 
 
Procedures 
I [and/or your neurologist] will have already briefly explained the study to you via telephone, 
letter or e-mail. [For HC controls] I asked you a number of questions relating to the exclusion 
criteria of the study (e.g. prior brain injury). [For all participants] You agreed to give a loved-
one a questionnaire for this research. If you decide to participate in this study, you will be 
asked to take part in a one-on-one interview with the researcher and will be encouraged to 
answer all the questions and give as much detail as possible, where required.  You will be 
asked to answer a number of questionnaires regarding your mood and to complete a number 
of tasks assessing your cognition, for example your attention, memory, spatial and language 
abilities. As mentioned, your loved-one will also be asked to answer some questions. Your 
answers will be marked down [For MS participants] as well as tape-recorded. These 
recordings will be kept until the research study has been submitted. They will then be 
destroyed. There will only be one interview. It may take up to 3 hours to complete, but you 
may request a break at any point during the interview. Your interview will take place in an 
office at either Groote Schuur or Tygerberg Hospital, or in your own home. 
 
Access to medical records 
[For MS participants] This study requires information such as when your MS was diagnosed 
and the type of MS you are experiencing. As some participants might not be sure of this 
information, we may need to check the above information with their neurologist.  
 
[For MG controls] This study requires information such as when your MG was diagnosed. As 
some participants might not be sure of this information, we may need to check the above 
information with their neurologist.  
 
[For MVA TBI controls] This study requires information such as the date of your head injury. 
As some participants might not be sure of this information, we may need to check the above 
information with their neurosurgeon, or in the medical folder. 
 
[For NP-SLE controls] This study requires information such as when your lupus was 
diagnosed. As some participants might not be sure of this information, we may need to check 
the above information with their neurologist. 
 
[For RH controls] This study requires information such as the location of your stroke.  As 
some participants might not be sure of this information, we may need to check the above 
information with their neurologist, or in the medical folder. 
 
Risks and benefits 
There are no foreseeable risks for you as a participant of this study. However, the interview 
may take up to [For MS participants and HC controls] 3 hours to complete [For MG, MVA 
TBI, NP-SLE and RH controls] 2 hours to complete, and should you experience increased 
mental and/or physical fatigue, or any form of psychological distress, please inform the 
researcher immediately. Breaks can be taken at any point during the interview. Besides your 





Participation in this study will benefit you in the following ways: 
1) You will receive an information pamphlet on the common cognitive and affective 
symptoms of MS/MG/MVA TBI/NP-SLE/RH. This will include information about 
each of the symptoms as well as ways of coping with them. 
2) You will receive a full [for MS participants] / brief [for MG, MVA TBI, NP-SLE and 
RH controls] feedback form following participation in this study. This will outline 
any potential cognitive or mood symptoms you may be experiencing and help you to 
understand them better. It can also be used in conjunction with the information 
pamphlet to learn more about possible impairments in cognition and mood. 
3) Should you travel to the interview, you will be compensated for travel costs and will 
receive refreshments during a break, during the interview. 
4) In addition, we hope to gain information about the cognitive and affective symptoms 
of MS, the publication of which will broaden the scientific knowledge on the topic, 
and your answers will be invaluable in this respect. 
 
Voluntary participation and withdrawal 
Participation in this research study is voluntary. It is your choice to decide whether or not to 
take part.  If you agree to take part you will be given this form to keep and will be asked to 
sign the declaration of consent at the bottom.  You will still be free to withdraw from the 
study at any time. 
 
Debriefing following participation and end of study 
You will be debriefed following your interview. Any additional questions you may have 
following participation in this study may then be asked and will be answered to the best of 
the researcher’s ability. Should you wish to receive the results of the study and/or any journal 
articles, please indicate this to the researcher. 
 
Confidentiality 
The confidentiality of your answers and identity will be protected.  All interviews will be 
coded in such a way that your name and all identifying features will be removed and your 
answers will be given a participant number rather than a name, known only to the researcher. 
Only this will appear when the results of this study are published, and your name, contact 
details and other identifying data will not be included. All your answers will be confidential. 
They will be combined with the answers from the other participants and it will be 
impossible to identify you from the responses you give. All paper-based answers will be kept 
in a locked cupboard at the researcher’s home, will only be accessible to the researcher, and 
will be destroyed following completion of the study. [For MS participants] Tape-recorded 
information will be transcribed, will be kept in the same locked cupboard as the written 
answers, and the tape-recordings and transcribed notes will be destroyed following the 
completion of the study. Computer-based information will be available only to the researcher 
and will be password protected.  
 
Research ethics approval 
The Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of Cape Town (Faculty of Health 
Sciences) has reviewed this project for the protection of human participants in research. If 
you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights and welfare as a research 




E52, Room 24,  Old Main Building, Groote Schuur Hospital, Observatory, 7925  
Tel: 021 406 6338; Fax: 021 406 6411 
 
Declaration of consent 
I recognise that I was contacted by my neurologist, an organisation, by word of mouth, or 
contacted the researcher directly and I was invited to take part in this study.  I gave my 
consent for a loved-one to answer a questionnaire about me. I have read the information 
above. I have had the chance to ask questions and have received satisfactory answers to my 
questions. I understand that my involvement in this study is voluntary and that I may 
withdraw from the study at any time. [For all but HC controls] I understand that my 
neurologist may be contacted for medical information and give my permission for this to take 
place. I understand that my answers will be written down and tape recorded, but that neither 
my name, nor any identifying information will be included; and I consent to the confidential 
use of these recordings for scientific purposes. I understand that I will be given a copy of this 
form to keep, and that by signing this form I am agreeing to take part in a once-off interview 
for this research study.  
 
Signed: ___________________________________      Date: _________________________ 
 
 
(Name in block letters) ________________________________________________________ 
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding the study, or would like to be informed of 




Mrs Amy Duncan                      Prof Mark Solms 
Researcher           Supervisor 
Department of Psychology                Department of Psychology  
University of Cape Town                  University of Cape Town 
083 653 3048                 021 650 3437 





Appendix B2: Multiple Sclerosis Participants, Healthy Controls, Myasthenia Gravis, 
Neuropsychiatric Systemic Lupus Erythematosus, Stroke, Traumatic Brain Injured Controls 
Able to Provide Informed Consent and Guardians of Traumatic Brain Injured Controls Un-
able to Provide Informed Consent Euphoria Questionnaires Interview via E-mail or Post 
(Consent Form) 
 
The cognitive and affective symptoms of Multiple Sclerosis 
 
Mrs Amy Duncan                      Prof Mark Solms 
Researcher           Supervisor 
Department of Psychology                Department of Psychology  
University of Cape Town                  University of Cape Town 
083 653 3048                 021 650 3437 
E-mail: amynortham@gmail.com                   E-mail: Mark.Solms@uct.ac.za 
 
Invitation to take part in this research study 
We would like to invite you to participate in a neuropsychological study conducted by 
researchers of the University of Cape Town (see above). 
 
Purpose and description 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the cognitive and mood, or affective, symptoms 
associated with multiple sclerosis (MS). Cognitive, or cognition, refers to one’s mental 
processes of, for example, perception, attention, and memory. Mood, or affect, refers to one’s 
state of mind, or quality of feeling or emotion. Examples might include depression or 
cheerfulness. 
 
[For MS participants] You are invited to participate because 1) you have been diagnosed with 
MS, and 2) you either contacted me, or gave consent for the researcher to contact you.  
 
[For HCs] You are invited to participate because 1) your demographic details match those of 
an MS participant, 2) you are a healthy person, 3) the study requires control participants who 
have no neurological disease, and 4) you gave consent for the researcher to contact you.  
 
[For MG controls] You are invited to participate because 1) have received a diagnosis of 
myasthenia gravis, and 2) you either contacted us, or gave consent for the researcher to 
contact you.  
 
[For MVA TBI controls] You are invited to participate because 1) you have experienced a 
head injury, and 2) you either contacted us, or gave consent for the researcher to contact you.  
 
[For NP-SLE controls] You are invited to participate because 1) you have received a 
diagnosis of systemic lupus erythematosus, and 2) you either contacted us, or gave consent 
for the researcher to contact you.  
 
[For RH controls] You are invited to participate because 1) you have experienced a stroke, 




Participants will be recruited for this study from Groote Schuur and Tygerberg Hospitals, 
private neurologists/neurosurgeons/neuropsychologist in the Western Cape, organisations 
such as Multiple Sclerosis South Africa, and by word of mouth. 
 
Procedures 
I [and/or your neurologist] will have already briefly explained the study to you via telephone, 
letter or e-mail. [For HC controls] I asked you a number of questions relating to the exclusion 
criteria of the study (e.g. prior brain injury).  [For all participants] You will now be asked to 
take part in an e-mail interview with the researcher, or to complete a number of forms posted 
to you, where you will be asked to answer a number of questionnaires regarding your mood 
and outlook. You are encouraged to answer all the questions and give as much detail as 
possible, where required. Your loved-one will also be asked to answer some questions about 
you. Your answers will be kept until the research study has been submitted. They will then be 
destroyed. There will only be one interview.  
 
Access to medical records 
[For MS participants] This study requires information such as when your MS was diagnosed 
and the type of MS you are experiencing. As some participants might not be sure of this 
information, we may need to check the above information with their neurologist.  
 
[For MG controls] This study requires information such as when your MG was diagnosed. As 
some participants might not be sure of this information, we may need to check the above 
information with their neurologist.  
 
[For MVA TBI controls] This study requires information such as the date of your head injury. 
As some participants might not be sure of this information, we may need to check the above 
information with their neurosurgeon, or in the medical folder. 
 
[For NP-SLE controls] This study requires information such as when your lupus was 
diagnosed. As some participants might not be sure of this information, we may need to check 
the above information with their neurologist. 
 
[For RH controls] This study requires information such as the location of your stroke.  As 
some participants might not be sure of this information, we may need to check the above 
information with their neurologist, or in the medical folder. 
 
Risks and benefits 
There are no foreseeable risks for you as a participant of this study. Besides your time, there 
are no costs for taking part in this study. Participation in this study will benefit you in the 
following ways: 
1) You will receive an information pamphlet on the common cognitive and affective 
symptoms of MS/MG/MVA TBI/NP-SLE/RH. This will include information about 
each of the symptoms as well as ways of coping with them. 
2) You will receive a brief feedback form following participation in this study. 
Unfortunately as this aspect does not include cognitive testing I cannot comment on 
your cognition, but I can comment on your mood/behaviour and may make 
recommendations regarding these. 
3) In addition, we hope to gain information about the cognitive and affective symptoms 
of MS, the publication of which will broaden the scientific knowledge on the topic, 




Voluntary participation and withdrawal 
Participation in this research study is voluntary. It is your choice to decide whether or not to 
take part.  If you agree to take part you will be given this form to keep and will be asked to 
sign the declaration of consent at the bottom.  You will still be free to withdraw from the 
study at any time. 
 
Debriefing following participation and end of study 
You will be debriefed following your interview via e-mail. Any additional questions you may 
have following participation in this study may then be asked and will be answered to the best 
of the researcher’s ability. Should you wish to receive the results of the study and/or any 
journal articles, please indicate this to the researcher. 
 
Confidentiality 
The confidentiality of your answers and identity will be protected.  All interviews will be 
coded in such a way that your name and all identifying features will be removed and your 
answers will be given a participant number rather than a name, known only to the researcher. 
Only this will appear when the results of this study are published, and your name, contact 
details and other identifying data will not be included.  
All your answers will be confidential. They will be combined with the answers from the other 
participants and it will be impossible to identify you from the responses you give. Computer-
based information will be available only to the researcher and will be password protected.  
 
Research ethics approval 
The Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of Cape Town (Faculty of Health 
Sciences) has reviewed this project for the protection of human participants in research. If 
you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights and welfare as a research 
participant, please contact Lamees Emjedi at one of the following details: 
Contact details: 
E52, Room 24,  Old Main Building, Groote Schuur Hospital, Observatory, 7925  
Tel: 021 406 6338; Fax: 021 406 6411 
 
Declaration of consent 
I recognise that I was contacted by my neurologist, an organisation, by word of mouth, or 
contacted the researcher directly and I was invited to take part in this study.  I also gave my 
consent for a loved-one to fill in a questionnaire about me. I have read the information above. 
I have had the chance to ask questions and have received satisfactory answers to my 
questions. I understand that my involvement in this study is voluntary and that I may 
withdraw from the study at any time. I understand that my neurologist may be contacted for 
medical information such as my date of diagnosis and give my permission for this to take 
place. I understand that my answers will be recorded, but that neither my name, nor any 
identifying information will be included in these; and I consent to the confidential use of 
these recordings for scientific purposes. I understand that I will be given a copy of this form 
to keep, and that by signing this form I am agreeing to take part in a once-off interview for 
this research study.  
 
Signed: ___________________________________      Date: _________________________ 
 
 




If you have any questions or concerns regarding the study, or would like to be informed of 




Mrs Amy Duncan                       Prof Mark Solms 
Researcher            Supervisor 
Department of Psychology                Department of Psychology  
University of Cape Town                  University of Cape Town 
083 653 3048                 021 650 3437 
E-mail: amynortham@gmail.com                   E-mail: Mark.Solms@uct.ac.za  
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Appendix B3: Traumatic Brain Injured Controls Un-able to Provide Informed Consent Full 
Interview (Assent Form) 
 
The cognitive and affective symptoms of Multiple Sclerosis 
 
Mrs Amy Duncan                      Prof Mark Solms 
Researcher           Supervisor 
Department of Psychology                Department of Psychology  
University of Cape Town                  University of Cape Town 
083 653 3048                 021 650 3437 
E-mail: amynortham@gmail.com                   E-mail: Mark.Solms@uct.ac.za 
 
Invitation  
We would like to invite you to participate in a research study looking at cognition (things to 




You will be asked to take part in an interview with the researcher. This will include 
answering some questionnaires about your mood and playing some games that look at your 
memory and attention. Your loved-one will also be asked to answer some questions about 
your mood. The interview might take 2 hours. Please let me know if you get tired and we will 
take a break. 
After the interview you and your loved-one will receive a pamphlet that will tell you 
about some of the symptoms you might experience and ways of coping with them.  You will 
also get some feedback on your interview. 
If at any time you don’t want to take part anymore, please let me know and we will 
stop. If you would like to ask any questions at any time, I will do my best to answer them. 
 
Confidentiality 
Your answers will be kept confidential. That means that only a number will appear next to 
your answers and your name will not be next to your answers. Written information will be 
kept in a locked cupboard. Computer information will be available only to the researcher and 
will be password protected.  
 
Declaration of consent 
I agree to take part in this study. 
Signed: ___________________________________      Date: _________________________ 
(Name in block letters) ________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you.  
  
Mrs Amy Duncan                      Prof Mark Solms 
Researcher           Supervisor 
Department of Psychology                Department of Psychology  
University of Cape Town                  University of Cape Town 
083 653 3048                 021 650 3437 




Appendix C: Materials for Participants 
 






MS is a chronic, inflammatory degenerative disease of the central nervous system. Its main 
disease processes involve: 
• Demyelination - an inflammatory response whereby the body’s own immune system 
attacks the myelin sheath surrounding the axons in the central nervous system 
• Reactive gliosis -  the formation of plaques, or lesions 
• Atrophy - the loss of neurons and the connections between them 
 
These disease processes can occur anywhere in the central nervous system. Therefore, MS 
can produce a wide variety of neurological, cognitive and affective (or mood) symptoms. 
You (or your loved-one) may not experience any of the following cognitive and/or mood 
symptoms, or you may experience just one, or a few in varying combinations. Symptoms 
may also change and new ones may develop throughout the course of the disease, so it is 
important to be aware of the possible (cognitive and affective) symptoms of MS. 
 
Common cognitive symptoms of MS 
 
Domain Symptom 
Attention Difficulty following a conversation, tv program or book; 
forgetting what one has just read or been told 
Speed of information 
processing 
A longer time is needed to think about what one wants to say 
or to process what one has just heard or read 
Working memory Difficulty holding information in mind to use it 
Visuo-spatial and verbal 
learning and memory 
Difficulty remembering information one has seen or been 
told 
Verbal fluency/generativity A longer time is needed to think of and produce words  
Visuo-spatial 
processing/perception 
Difficulty in understanding visual patterns, navigating 
unfamiliar environments, or accurately perceiving lengths 
and angles 
Abstract reasoning Difficulty in perceiving abstract categories and connections 
between concepts 
Problem solving Difficulty in working one’s way around a problem 
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Planning Difficulty in formulating a strategy to reach a goal 
 
Strategies to help cope with the cognitive symptoms of MS 
 
Attention (and working memory) 
 
1. Take breaks – if you are required to concentrate on something for an extended period 
of time, allow yourself to move around and take a break in between periods of paying 
attention. 
2. Change things up and reduce concentration time – try changing your working 
environment every 30min to give you renewed focus. Or alter what you’re paying 
attention to (e.g. reading a book, then watching tv). 
3. Use signals – get your family members or care-giver to use a signal when you have 
“tuned out”. For example, they could tap you on the shoulder to bring you back or 
prompt you when you need to pay attention by saying, “I’m going to tell you 
something important now”. 
4. Minimise other distractions – when you need to pay attention, try to minimise noise 
and distractions. For example, turn off the radio or tv, or close the door. 
5. Get organised – the use of notebooks, lists, check-lists, diaries and calendars may help 
you to plan and structure your day. You might also find colour-coding helpful (e.g. 
red = ‘things I still need to do’, blue = ‘completed tasks’).  
6. Get instructions in different forms – ask your family members or care-giver to give 
you information in a number of different ways.  For example, they could tell you 
about a lunch invitation and then also add it to your diary to remind you. 
 
Speed of information processing 
 
1. Understand the problem – realise yourself, and educate your family members/care-
giver, that this is not a behavioural or emotional problem, but is a cognitive symptom 
of MS and not something you are doing on purpose. 
2. Establish a routine – understand the sequence of activities that makes up your day. 
Try not to alter the routine too much as you might have trouble processing and 
adjusting. 
3. Slow down instructions – if you’re having trouble keeping up, ask the person you’re 
speaking to, to simply slow down or repeat the instruction. Family members – be 
patient, speak slowly, and repeat where needed. 
4. .   Use non-verbal supports – verbal material may be presented too quickly to process. 
Request additional instructions in the form of writing, pictures, symbols, and 
checklists that you can go through in your own time. 
5. More time – allow yourself additional time to complete a task or work through a piece 
of information. Don’t pressurise yourself. Reduce the amount of activities in your 
day. 
6. Speak to your doctor – slowed information processing can be a result of medication. 




1. Use rhymes/acronyms – try to simplify something you need to remember with a 
catchy phrase. For example, when leaving the house you need to remember to 1) Take 
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your wallet/bag/car keys, 2) Reason for going out? (do you need a shopping list? 
notes for a meeting?), 3) turn off dangerous Appliances (stove/iron), 4) check the 
Weather (take a warm jacket?), 5) Lock the door behind you. This could become: 
TRAWL . 
2. Use cues/structure – always keep your keys in the same place. Get rid of confusing 
clutter. Make use of alarms and reminders to remind you to do something. Keep your 
lists in a visible place (such as on the fridge) and don’t move them. 
3. Stay healthy - get enough exercise, relaxation, sleep, and eat a balanced diet. 
4. Reduce anxiety – relax and be patient with yourself. Don’t be critical or fearful of 
forgetting. Educating one’s family members about your areas of difficulty and ways 
they can help will also reduce your anxiety. 
5. Determine the important items - get help in determining which tasks or pieces of 
information are most important so you don’t end up paying attention to and 




1. Patience - take your time. Think about what you want to say and speak slowly. Family 
members – have patience while your loved-one tells you what they want to say. Try 
not to interrupt or finish their sentence for them. 
2. Encouragement and support – family members - encourage conversation by speaking 




1. Minimise change - keep items in regular places. Moving them may cause confusion. 
2. Accident proof your home – keep breakable items away from the edges of surfaces 
where they could be knocked off accidentally. Separate items such as sharp knives 
from other cutlery. 
3. Ask for help - family members or care-givers can assist in locating items or guiding 
you around unfamiliar locations. You could also ask people to visit you rather than 




1. Fatigue – avoid carrying out tasks when you are tired, stressed or in pain. These 
internal distractions will limit your ability to pay attention, plan and carry out the task. 
2. Time to plan – schedule a time in your diary for planning ahead. This will allow you 
enough time to process, think about and prepare for upcoming tasks. 
3. Keep it simple – ask your family members/care-giver to give you easy, straight-
forward instructions.  Family members – do not assume your loved-one knows what 
you are thinking or feeling, state things explicitly. 
4. Alarms and reminders – alarms and reminders may again be useful to remind you or 
help you to initiate a task. 
5. Check-lists/diaries etc – the use of lists, check-lists, diaries etc can also help you plan 
for upcoming activities. 
6. Use notes – notes and signs dotted around the house may help you through your day 







The disorders of mood and affect associated with MS 
 
Disorder of mood or affect 
Depression 
Bipolar affective disorder 
Euphoria 




Definitions of the disorders of mood and affect associated with MS 
 
Depression: a mood disorder characterised by intense feelings of sadness, feelings of 
helplessness or worthlessness, social withdrawal, a loss of interest, changes in appetite and 
weight, disturbance of sleep and loss of sex drive. 
 
Bipolar affective disorder: a mood disorder in which depression is accompanied by mania 
(elevated or irritable mood, accompanied by intrusive thoughts, a lack of attention, 
uninhibited behaviour such as impulsive sexual activity, increased energy and a reduced need 
for sleep). Characteristically, individuals cycle between the two. 
 
Euphoria: a mood disorder characterised by cheerfulness, happiness and ease. Some also 
consider it to include a denial of physical disability and an optimism regarding the future that 
is disproportionate to the individual’s situation. 
 
Disorders associated with affective dysregulation: a group of mood disorders characterised 
by rapid mood changes, exaggerated expression of emotion, and an inability to control one’s 
expression of emotion. These are also known as emotional lability, pseudobulbar affect, 
pathological laughing and crying, or involuntary emotional expression disorder. 
 
Psychosis: a disorder characterised by impairment in thinking and perception.  This may be 
accompanied by confused speech, incorrect beliefs or delusions (e.g. false ideas about what is 
taking place or who one is), hallucinations, (e.g. seeing or hearing things that aren’t there) 
298 
 
and emotions or feelings that are inappropriate. In MS, psychosis can include syndromes 
resembling schizophrenia, delusional disorders, affective psychoses, and delirium. 
In addition to mood disorders, one can experience avariety of other difficulties, including 
apathy, fatigue, irritability and sleep disturbances (to name a few). 
 
Strategies to help cope with the mood symptoms of MS 
 
General tips for most symptoms 
 
1. Education and understanding – educate your family and loved-ones/care-giver about 
your mood and behavioural symptoms to avoid unrealistic expectations. It is not your 
fault, it’s part of the disease. Ask a family member to join you at doctor’s 
appointments – this will help them to learn more and give them the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
2. Take care of yourself – aim for 8 hours of sleep per night; spend a bit of time in the 
sun each day; try relaxation techniques to keep stress levels down; eat a healthy 
balanced diet. Exercise can also help to lift your spirits, and exercising with a friend 
can also double up as a social activity. Avoid alcohol and drugs as these can trigger 
your symptoms. Be careful when taking over-the-counter medications – these can 
interfere with your mood and/or your mood medications. 
3. Ask for help – take advantage of any resources available to you. Initially you may 
require medication, but sharing your experiences can also be beneficial. There are also 
therapists that could give you skills to cope with your symptoms and change the way 
you think. If your symptoms are persisting or getting worse, seek professional help. If 
you have seen a doctor but you’re experiencing side-effects of medication, report 
these as you may need to change the dosage or type of medication. 
4. Exercise – regular exercise can have a positive effect on mood. Try to include at least 
30min of exercise 5 times per week. You also tend to think about your worries less 
when you are out exercising.  
5. Relax – Try relaxation techniques such as deep breathing, tai chi or yoga.  Don’t rely 
on the television, drugs or alcohol to relax you – these can often have the opposite 
effect. Do things you enjoy and try to keep stress to a minimum.  
6. Connect/socialise - isolation and loneliness can cause depression. Make use of the 
energy you have by going for a short walk, going to the movies, or calling or e-
mailing a loved-one. Try to do these, even if you don’t feel like it, this will help you 
to feel supported and secure. Try to socialise with positive people that will enhance 
your life. Share what you’re going through with loved-ones or join a support group. 
7. Keep busy – if you can, spend time with positive people. If you would rather be alone, 
fill your time with things you enjoy doing and things that will take your mind off your 




1. Start small and take things one day at a time – decide on a few small goals and build 
from there, each small step adds up. 
2. Help someone else – volunteer and help others. This can give you a purpose and a 
sense of accomplishment. 
3. Reward yourself – Celebrate the baby steps! 
4. Get a pet – animals and pets can bring joy and companionship and help you feel less 
isolated. It may also help you to feel needed. 
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5. Challenge negative thinking – ask yourself if you’d say what you’re thinking about 




1. Get involved in your treatment – keep in contact with your health professional. Talk 
to them if your symptoms change and be honest about your experiences. 
2. Take your medication as instructed – don’t skip or change your dosage without 
talking to your doctor, even if you’re feeling better. This can have detrimental effects 
on your symptoms. 
3. Monitor your moods and symptoms – know your triggers and the early warning signs 
and watch for them. 
4. Develop a daily routine – structure can help stabilise mood swings. Include set times 
for sleeping, eating, socialising, exercising, working and relaxing. Try to keep to this 
pattern, even through ups and downs. 
5. The right amount of sleep – too little sleep can trigger mania and too much sleep can 
lower your mood. Try to go to bed and wake up around the same time each day. 
6. Develop a crisis plan – create a plan with a loved-one in case you become manic or 
suicidal. For example, your family might want to take away your credit card when 
you’re in a manic state to avoid unnecessary spending. 
7. Have hope – in most cases bipolar can be treated and stabilised. Have hope that a 




Most professionals don’t offer advice on how to deal with euphoria because it usually doesn’t 
bother the patient or their family, but it can be frustrating for a caregiver when their loved-
one is indifferent to their symptoms. Try to remember that it’s a symptom of their disease; 
this may help to lessen your frustration. 
 
Disorders associated with affective dysregulation 
 
1. Recognising there’s a problem – crying can be misinterpreted as depression and 
laughter as happiness. Both can also be embarrassing. It is important to know when 
these outward displays of emotion are real and when they are manageable 
pathological symptoms (that don’t reflect one’s inner feelings). 
2. Medication – out of all the mood disorders, medication can help to control this one the 
most effectively, so speak to your health professional. 
3. Know your triggers – sometimes an episode of laughing or crying can be set off by a 
trigger such as stress or a particular topic. Try to avoid these. 
4. Watch out for isolation – because it can sometimes be embarrassing, people tend to 
isolate themselves which can lead to depression and other symptoms of mood. If 
you’d like to avoid large groups or public places, then rather invite a few close friends 




1. Family members take control – try to keep your loved-one calm. Take them to the 
nearest hospital if you think they might be a danger to themselves or others. If your 
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loved-one is experiencing hallucinations due to sleep deprivation try to get them to 
sleep. 
2. Avoid violent movies – watching violent or visually busy television can be 
detrimental. 
3. Use soft lighting – this may aid sleep. 
4. Avoid being alone – family members: talk to your loved-one in a calming voice and 
stay with them. Find a quiet room to talk to them without distractions. 
5. Don’t take offence/care for your loved-one – family members - try not to take things 
your loved-one says personally. Talk to them about things other than their mistaken 
beliefs. Don’t go along with their delusions or hallucinations, but try not deny or 
dismiss them either. When recovering, they may need your help in making decisions. 
Try to be caring and non-judgemental. Give your loved-one extra time to process 




1. Try doing things you think you would enjoy – even if you don’t enjoy them at first, 
give it a bit of time before you give up.  
2. Have people around you, you might find you have less apathy when you are around 
others than when you are alone. 
3. Create some healthy competition. Whether it’s video games or a work related goal.  
And it doesn’t have to be against another person, you could just aim to better your last 
attempt. 
4. Identify the areas on which apathy is impacting most and make active plans to deal 
with it. For example, if apathy is keeping you from taking care of your household, 
create a specific schedule for doing the necessary chores. 
5. Break tasks down into manageable chunks and reward yourself when you achieve 
them. 
6. Use self-talk. When you don’t feel like doing anything, ask yourself, “Do I really 
want to let this rule my life?”, or “What can I do to motivate myself?”. 





1. Know the difference between fatigue and depression. 
2. Avoid stress wherever possible. 
3. Do things that boost your energy – talking with friends, a stroll around the garden etc. 
4. Eat often (and healthily) – this will help to keep your energy levels up throughout the 
day. 
5. Exercise if you can. 
6. Get enough sleep.  Try relaxation techniques in the evening, or a hot bath. Keep to 
regular sleeping patterns. 




1. Find your triggers  - the things that make you irritable and try to avoid them or diffuse 
them before they set you off. 
2. Count to five. Try to relax before responding. 
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3. Think about what you want to say before responding. 
4. Try relaxation techniques and spending a little time each day doing something just for 
you – something that you enjoy. 
5. Don’t wait until you are annoyed with someone before breathing and trying to relax – 





1. Seek medical assistance and fine the right treatment. 
2. Keep a regular sleep schedule – go to bed at the same time, get the same number of 
hours of sleep per night. 
3. Create a happy sleep environment – make sure your room is dark, cool and quiet. 
4. Try not to combine working areas with sleeping areas.  Keep your bedroom for 
sleeping only. 
5. Turn off all TV’s, radio’s, iPod’s and computers etc. 
6. Wind down close to bed. Don’t do anything too stimulating. 
7. Consciously relax. Try a warm bath or warm drink before bed. 
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Appendix C2: Example of Feedback Form 
 
FEEDBACK FROM RESEARCH STUDY 
Name: Ms X  
DOB: 01/01/1981 (age 31) 
Assessment date: 26 June 2012 
Assessed by: Mrs Amy Duncan (researcher) 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. Below is some feedback from your 
interview/assessment on 26 June 2012. If you have any questions, please contact me at the 
details provided below. 
 
MS Background:  
You were diagnosed with MS in 2009, around the time that your symptoms first started. Your 
MS currently follows a relapsing-remitting pattern and you have experienced about 7 
relapses. You describe yourself as having minimal (as opposed to significant or no) motor 
impairment and you rated yourself 6/34 (17.6%) impaired on the physical ability scale. You 
noted some difficulties with thinking or concentration, memory, language or speech and 




This refers to your ability to remember information. Audio-verbal memory mainly refers to 
memory for spoken words and visuo-spatial memory refers to memory for pictures or visual 
information in relation to space.  
Your audio-verbal memory was assessed with the Rey Auditory-Verbal Learning Test 
(the word list I read five times). You demonstrated learning across trials, and you were able 
to retain 10 of the 15 words on delayed recall. You correctly identified 28 out of 30 words on 
the recognition trial, which implies that your recognition memory is better than your 
unprompted recall memory. 
Your visuo-spatial memory was assessed with the Brief Visuospatial Memory Test-
Revised (BVMT-R; the one where you had to remember the six designs). You again 
demonstrated some learning across trials, and were able to retain the majority of details on 
delayed recall (scoring 11/12). You correctly identified 12 out of 12 pictures on the 
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recognition trial. Although your visual memory was slightly better than your verbal, this 
performance did not indicate any obvious impairments in memory. 
 
Attention, working memory and speed of information processing 
Attention refers to your ability to attend to information (or concentrate). For this we did the 
0-back task (where you had to identify all the “X’s” on the computer screen). You achieved 
an accuracy rating of 100% on the n-back task, implying no obvious problems with attention. 
 Working memory is required when you need to hold some information in mind in 
order to use it in some way.  For this, we used the 2-back, where you had to remember the 
letter that was presented two letters ago and then decide whether or not it was a match.  For 
this task you achieved a score of 96.3% which is above average and indicates no problems 
with working memory. 
Speed of information processing refers to how long it takes you to process new 
incoming information and answer the question, perform a task, push a button etc. You 
performed well on most timed tests (such as the Colour Word Interference Test and Sorting 




This refers to higher cognitive functions such as planning, the ability to think abstractly (i.e. 
to see relationships between items and not just the items themselves), to inhibit an automatic 
response (inhibition), to switch between ideas or rules (set shifting) and to voluntarily 
generate words or ideas without prompts or clues (generativity). 
Planning was assessed with the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure (where you had to 
copy the geometric design using coloured pens) and you did not demonstrate any obvious 
difficulties. 
Inhibition and set shifting was assessed with the Colour Word Interference Test 
(where you had to name the ink colour or read the word). You completed the task quickly and 
made only a few errors, which you corrected yourself. You therefore do not appear to have 
any difficulties in inhibiting an automatic response and switching between different rules or 
ideas.  
Abstraction was assessed using the Sorting Test (where you had to sort the cards into 
two sets of three) and you identified 7/16 possible ways to sort the cards. Taking your age 
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into account, you performed within the normal range and demonstrated an ability to see 
abstract relationships between objects. 
Your generativity was assessed using the Controlled Oral Word Associated Test 
(where you had to say lots of words starting with a particular letter). You produced 40 words 
across the three letters and have no difficulties in generating words spontaneously (also 
sometimes known as verbal fluency). 
 
Language 
This refers to both output (i.e. your ability to produce sounds, words and sentences) as well as 
understanding incoming information. The ability to name various items and repeat spoken 
words also falls under the category of language. 
 Your ability to name objects was assessed with the short form of the Boston Naming 
Test (where you had to give names to the pictures I showed you). You were able to name all 
except one of the drawings. Therefore you did not demonstrate any difficulties in naming. 
 Repetition was assessed using the repetition task of the Western Aphasia Battery 
(where you had to repeat the phrases I read) and you were able to repeat all phrases correctly, 
implying no deficits in repetition. 
 Finally, comprehension was also assessed with the Western Aphasia Battery (where 
you had to answer questions and point to a variety of objects and pictures) and you achieved 
a perfect score, implying no difficulties in understanding or comprehension. 
 Therefore, at present, you do not appear to have any impairments in language. 
 
Emotion in language 
While language is considered a “left hemisphere” function, the ability to produce, repeat or 
understand emotion in language is considered a “right hemisphere” function. 
 Your ability to identify emotion in spoken language was assessed with the Aprosodia 
Battery (where you listened to the speaker on the CD and then identified the emotion he was 
using). You achieved slightly below the average American norms on this test (SA norms are 
not yet available), but never-the-less do not appear to have any gross deficits in this domain. 
 
Visuospatial processing 
This refers to your ability to perceive spatial relationships and construct images correctly in 
space. This was assessed using the copy trials of the BVMT-R and the ROCF and there were 
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elements of the ROCF that were not constructed perfectly, although you didn’t demonstrate 
major difficulties in visuo-spatial construction. 
 Your visuo-spatial perception was also assessed using the Judgement of Line 
Orientation (JLO) test (where you had to choose the corresponding number in the array of 
lines below), and the Cube Analysis test (where you had to count the number of blocks in 
each design). You performed well on both of these tasks (scoring 29/30 for the JLO and 
14/14 for the Cube Analysis). You therefore have no difficulties with visuo-spatial 
perception. 
 
Mood and behaviour 
Fairly self-explanatory, this refers to happy, sad and other possible mood states, as well as a 
variety of behaviours, such as apathy or aggression. In terms of mood, you noted some 
symptoms of low mood, and scored in the moderate range on the Beck Depression Inventory-
Fast Screen. You also demonstrated slightly more negative than positive mood and slightly 
more pessimism than optimism on other scales.  
 On the Neuropsychiatric Inventory, which is a questionnaire regarding mood and 
behavioural disturbances, in addition to the low mood, you noted some anxiety, euphoria or 
positive mood at times, apathy or loss of interest, disinhibition or impulsivity, irritability, 
aberrant motor behaviour or repetitive movements, some difficulty sleeping and some 
changes in eating habits. These were all extremely frequent and appear to cause you quite a 
bit of distress at present.  
 
Impression and Conclusion 
Your primary functions were intact. You were able to attend, your working memory was 
intact, and you didn’t appear to have any difficulties in speed of information processing. You 
did not demonstrate any obvious impairments in memory, language or identifying emotion in 
language. In addition, you could inhibit a natural response, switch between rules, generate 
words spontaneously and think abstractly. Your visual processing was also intact. 
In terms of your mood and behavior, you are experiencing some low mood as well as 
a number of other mood and behavioural symptoms. As these behaviours are worrying you, I 
would recommend your seeking help with these, particularly if they worsen, as your doctor 
will be able to help limit their impact on you. 
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Therefore at present, asides from the behavioural symptoms addressed above, you do 
not appear to demonstrate any neuropsychological difficulties. I am happy to do a follow up 
with you in 1 year (or more) to track any changes, on your request. 
 
Thank you once again for participating in this study. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Mrs Amy Duncan                      Prof Mark Solms 
Researcher                      Supervisor 
Department of Psychology                Department of Psychology  
University of Cape Town                  University of Cape Town 
083 653 3048                 021 650 3437 


















Appendix D: The Sociodemographic Characteristics of the Multiple Sclerosis Participants 
 
Sociodemographic characteristic 
Cognitive and euphoria 
questionnaires 
(n = 60) 
Euphoria questionnaires only 
(n = 40) 
Total 
(n = 100) 
Gender – Male:Female 8:52 6:34 14:86 
Age 43.35(11.48) 46.20 (10.61) 44.49 (11.17) 
     Range 19-72 26-64 19-72 
Race/ethnicity – White:Coloured/Indian 34:26 37:3 71:29 
Marital status    
     Never married 12 4 16 
     Widowed/divorced/separated 12 8 20 
     Married/living with partner 36 28 64 
Number of children 1.48 (1.45) 1.38 (1.56) 1.42 (1.51) 
     Range 0-5 0-6 0-6 
Educationa    
     High school (up to 12 years) 21 12 33 
     Certificate / diploma (up to 14 years) 26 15 41 
     Degree (15 years) 13 13 26 
     Average mean (SD) 13 (1.69) 13.45 (1.58) 13.18 (1.65) 
     Average range 8-15 8-15 8- 15 
Employment status    
     Full time/part time/self employed 31 25 56 
     Homemaker 7 4 11 
     Student 1 - 1 
     Retired/unemployed/disabled 21 11 32 




Cognitive and euphoria 
questionnaires 
(n = 60) 
Euphoria questionnaires only 
(n = 40) 
Total 
(n = 100) 
Incomeb    
     R801 – R6400 (ave R3600.50) 4 2 6 
     R6401 – R51 200 (ave R28 800.50) 52 34 86 
     R51 201 – R204 800 (ave R128 000.50) 4 4 8 
     Mean (SD) R23,002.17 (R18,427.84) R30,513.02 (R27,218.12) R26,006.51 (R22,536.54) 
     Range R1,200.50 – R76,800.50 R4,800.50 – R153,601.00 R1,200.50 – R153,601.00 
Number of people in household 2.87 (1.6) 2.70 (1.35) 2.80 (1.51) 
     Range 1-8 1-7 1-8 
Informant – Spouse/partner:Family 
member:Good friend 
28:21:11 31:5:4 59:26:15 
     Living with participant – Yes:No 44:16 35:5 79:21 
Note. Categorical data are presented in ratios. The data on age, education, and income are presented as means with the standard deviations (SD) in 
parentheses, then minimum to maximum ranges below.  
a = Highest level of education obtained, presented in years; it excluded pre-school and grade R and presumed a certificate to be a one year course, a diploma 
to be a two year course, and capped “degree” at three years. 
b = Combined monthly household income. 
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Appendix E: Sociodemographic, Medical and Disease/Condition Specific 
Questionnaires 
 
Appendix E1: Sociodemographic Information (For All Participants and Controls) 
 
Gender (mark with an “X”) 
     Male  
     Female  
Date of birth  
Age  
Race/ethnicity (mark with an “X”) 
     Caucasian/white  
     Coloured  
     Indian  
     Black  
     Other  
Preferred language (mark with an “X”) 
     English  
     Afrikaans  
     Other  
Marital status (mark with an “X”) 
     Never married  
     Widowed  
     Divorced  
     Separated but not divorced  
     Married  
     Living with partner  
Children (mark with an “X”) 
     No  
     Yes  
     Number of children  
Level of education (mark with an “X”) 
     Grade 8/Std. 6  
     Grade 9/Std. 7  
     Grade 10/Std. 8  
     Grade 11/Std. 9  
     Grade 12/Matric  
     Trade/Apprenticeship  
     Certificate from college  
     Diploma  
     Degree  
     Other  
Employment status (mark with an “X”) 
     Full time employed  
     Part time employed  
     Self-employed  
     Homemaker  
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     Full time student  
     Part time student  
     Retired  
     Unemployed  
     Permanently unable to work  
     Disabled  
     Other  
Current occupation (if retired, past occupation)  
Do you have medical aid? (mark with an “X”) 
     Yes  
     No  
Socioeconomic status (household income per month) (mark with an “X”) 
     No income  
     Disability grant (plus value)  
     R1 – R400   
     R401 – R800   
     R801 – R1600   
     R1601 – R3200   
     R3201 – R6400   
     R6401 – R12 800   
     R12 801 – R25 600   
     R25 601 – R51 200   
     R51 201 – R102 400   
     R102 401 – R204 800   
     More than R204 801   





Appendix E2: Medical Information (For All Participants and Controls) /Exclusion Criteria 
(For Healthy Controls) 
         Mark with an “X” 
Have you ever had/do you currently have any of the following? Yes No 
A diagnosis of multiple sclerosis   
A diagnosis of myasthenia gravis   
A head injury   
A diagnosis of systemic lupus erythematosus   
A stroke   
If you have not received a diagnosis of any of the above, has your 
doctor ever been concerned that you might have one of the above? 
  
     Which one? (type/write out)  
Any other infectious, immunological or neurological disease? For 
example: 
(mark with an “X”) 
     HIV/AIDS   
     Meningitis/encephalitis   
     TB   
     Malaria   
     Addisons disease   
     Huntington’s disease   
     Parkinson’s disease   
Any other brain injury? For example: (mark with an “X”) 
     Brain tumour   
     Epilepsy   
     Near drowning/heart attack/loss of consciousness (other than head  
     injury) 
  
A diagnosis of psychiatric disorder? For example: (mark with an “X”) 
     Depression   
     Bipolar mood disorder   
     Psychosis/hallucinations/delusions   
     Schizophrenia   
     Obsessive/compulsive disorder   
A developmental disorder or delay? For example: (mark with an “X”) 
     Complications at birth   
     Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder   
     Learning disability   
     A delay in walking or talking   
     A generalized developmental delay   
     A delay in school readiness   
     Did you reach high school by age 16 in a mainstream school?   
Do you drink alcohol?   
     What do you drink? (type/write out)  
     How much to do you drink? (type/write out)  
Do you take any other substances (i.e. recreational drugs, not 
medication)? 
  
     What do you take? (type/write out)  
     How much do you take? (type/write out)  
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Do you have any other medical conditions (other than the ones listed 
above)? 
  





Appendix E3: Multiple Sclerosis Specific Information 
 
Disease course (type of multiple sclerosis)  
Date (year) of symptom onset  
Date (year) of diagnosis  
Number of relapses  
Date of last relapse  
Current disease state (remission or 
relapse/exacerbation) 
 
Do you take any medication specifically for MS?  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
Have you ever had corticosteroid treatment? (mark with an “X”) 
     Yes  
     No  
When last did you have corticosteroid treatment? 
(was it within the last 4 weeks?) 
(mark with an “X”) 
     Yes  
     No  
Other than all medications listed above (i.e. for 
MS and/or other reasons), are you taking any 
other medication? 
 
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  





Appendix E4: Myasthenia Gravis Specific Information 
 
Date (year) of symptom onset  
Date (year) of diagnosis  
Number of relapses  
Date of last relapse  
Current disease state (remission or 
relapse/exacerbation) 
 
Do you take any medication specifically for your 
myasthenia gravis? 
 
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
Have you ever had corticosteroid treatment? (mark with an “X”) 
     Yes  
     No  
When last did you have corticosteroid treatment? 
(was it within the last 4 weeks?) 
(mark with an “X”) 
     Yes  
     No  
Other than all medications listed above (i.e. for 
the myasthenia gravis and/or other reasons), are 
you taking any other medication? 
 
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  





Appendix E5: Neuropsychiatric Systemic Lupus Erythematosus Specific Information 
 
Date (year) of symptom onset  
Date (year) of diagnosis  
Number of relapses  
Date of last relapse  
Current disease state (remission or 
relapse/exacerbation) 
 
Do you take any medication specifically for your 
lupus? 
 
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
Have you ever had corticosteroid treatment? (mark with an “X”) 
     Yes  
     No  
When last did you have corticosteroid treatment? 
(was it within the last 4 weeks?) 
(mark with an “X”) 
     Yes  
     No  
Other than all medications listed above (i.e. for 
the lupus and/or other reasons), are you taking 
any other medication? 
 
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  





Appendix E6: Traumatic Brain Injury Information 
 
What happened? (brief description)  
Date of head injury (month and year)  
Did you lose consciousness?  
How long were you unconscious? 
(approximately) 
 
Do you take any medication specifically as a 
result of your head injury? 
 
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
Have you ever had corticosteroid treatment? (mark with an “X”) 
     Yes  
     No  
     If yes, briefly explain why  
Other than all medications listed above (i.e. for 
your head injury and/or other reasons), are you 
taking any other medication? 
 
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  










Appendix E7: Stroke information 
 
Date of stroke (month and year)  
Which side of your body was affected?  
Do you take any medication specifically as a 
result of your head injury? 
 
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
Have you ever had corticosteroid treatment? (mark with an “X”) 
     Yes  
     No  
     If yes, briefly explain why  
Other than all medications listed above (i.e. for 
your head injury and/or other reasons), are you 
taking any other medication? 
 
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  
     Name and dosage  


















Appendix F: The Less Well-known Questionnaires 
 
Appendix F1: The Informant Questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire given to each informant, reproduced below, included four parts.  The first 
part included Likert-type scales, created by myself, to measure euphoria sclerotica, eutonia 
sclerotica and spes sclerotica.  The second part included the PAS (which was loosely based 
on the PCRS, by Prigatano and Fordyce [1986] and the SF-36, by Ware & Sherbourne 
[1992]).  The third part included the items of the AI10 included in this research, and the 
fourth, the NPI (which is readily available). 
 
The cognitive and affective symptoms of Multiple Sclerosis 
 
Mrs Amy Duncan                      Prof Mark Solms 
Researcher                     Supervisor 
Department of Psychology                Department of Psychology  
University of Cape Town                  University of Cape Town 
083 653 3048                 021 650 3437 
E-mail: amynortham@gmail.com                   E-mail: Mark.Solms@uct.ac.za 
 
Description of study 
 
Your loved-one is participating in a neuropsychological research study investigating the 
cognitive and mood symptoms of multiple sclerosis. In terms of the study we need to know 
some things about your loved-one and ask you to answer the questions below. You will only 
need to fill in one questionnaire and it shouldn’t take you more than about 15 minutes to 
complete. There are no risks to you and your information will be kept confidential and your 
identity protected.  
 
Declaration of consent 
 
I recognise that I was contacted by my loved-one and asked to complete this questionnaire. I 
understand that my involvement in this study is voluntary. I understand that my answers will 
be recorded, but that neither my name, nor any identifying information will be included in 
these; and I consent to the confidential use of these recordings for scientific purposes. I 
understand that by signing this form I am agreeing to take part in this research study.  
 
 
Signed: ___________________________________      Date: _________________________ 
 
 
(Name in block letters) ________________________________________________________ 
                                                 
10 The AI has not been reproduced as I didn’t receive a reply from S. Anderson regarding permission to 





Below are a number of questions relating to your loved-one.  Please be as honest as possible 
in answering these questions and don’t let anyone else influence your answers (i.e. it might 
be better to answer the questions below on your own, without your loved-one being present). 
There are four parts to this questionnaire.  Instructions will be given at the beginning of each 




Please rate your answers to the following questions from 1 – 10 and place an “X” next to the 
correct option.  
 
1. On average (i.e. most of the time), how optimistic/pessimistic is your loved-one? 
For example, if on average, they tend toward being optimistic, you would rate them 
between 1 and 4, with 1 being very optimistic and 4 being slightly optimistic; but if 
they tend toward being pessimistic most of the time, you would rate them between 6 
and 10, with 10 being very pessimistic and 6 being slightly pessimistic. 
Very optimistic      Neither/both   Very pessimistic 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
2. On average (i.e. most of the time), how happy/depressed is your loved-one?  
For example, if on average, they are usually happy, you would rate them between 1 
and 4, with 1 being very happy/euphoric and 4 being slightly or mildly happy; but if 
they tend to be unhappy or depressed most of the time, you would rate them between 
6 and 10, with 10 being very unhappy/depressed and 6 being slightly or mildly 
unhappy. 
Very happy/euphoric      Neither/both   Very unhappy/depressed 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
3. How aware do you think your loved-one is of any physical problems they might have? 
For example, if they deny any deficits and continue as if nothing were wrong, they 
would be “unaware”. If they acknowledge their limitations, have to adjust, or mention 
their disabilities, they would be “aware”. 
 
Very aware         Average         Very unaware 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
4. How aware do you think your loved-one is of any problems with cognition they might 
have (e.g. memory, ability to concentrate, slowed thinking etc)? 
For example, if they deny any deficits and do not realise they have any problems with 
memory or thinking, would be “unaware”. If they acknowledge their limitations, have 




Very aware          Average        Very unaware 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
5. How aware do you think your loved-one is of any problems with mood/behaviour 
they might have (e.g. depression, unrealistic happiness, apathy, aggression etc)? 
For example, if they deny any deficits and do not realise they have any problems with 
mood, would be “unaware”. If they acknowledge changes or problems with mood 
and/or behaviour, have to adjust, or mention their symptoms, they would be “aware”. 
Very aware         Average         Very unaware 
 




The following items are about activities your loved-one might do during a typical day. Please 
read each item carefully, and then rate how capable your loved-one is of performing these 
activities currently. Use the following scale to record your answers: 
 
“No problem” = He/she has no problems performing these activities 
“A little problem” = He/she has a little problem performing these activities  
“Cannot do it” = He/she cannot perform these activities on his/her own 
 
Please indicate the appropriate response by placing an “X” in the correct block (either “no 
problem”, “a little problem” or “cannot do it”) next to each item.  Choose only one per item 
(the one that fits the best). For example, if they currently have no problems performing 
vigorous activities such as running, lifting heavy objects or participating in strenuous sports, 









1 Running or participating in sport    
2 Doing the dishes    
3 Doing the laundry    
4 Moving a table, pushing a vacuum cleaner    
5 Lifting or carrying shopping bags    
6 Making lunch/dinner    
7 Climbing several flights of stairs    
8 Climbing one flight of stairs    
9 Dressing yourself    
10 Bathing/showering    
11 Bending, kneeling, getting onto the ground    
12 Walking more than a kilometre    
13 Walking several blocks     









The following items are about your loved-one’s cognition (their way of thinking, memory 
etc.). Please read each item carefully, and then rate your loved-one on each item. There will 
be three options per item. Please indicate your response by placing an “X” next to the 
appropriate option. Choose only one per item (the one that fits the best).  
 




This last section concerns your loved-one’s mood and behaviour. Please read each item 
carefully, and then rate your loved-one on each item. For each item, you will need to answer 
“yes” or “ no”.  If “yes” (i.e. your loved-one does demonstrate this mood/emotion or 
behaviour), you also need to rate the frequency of this emotion/behaviour (i.e. how often it 
occurs) and the severity of this emotion/behaviour (i.e. how disturbing or disabling this 
emotion/behaviour is for your loved-one). 
 
1. Delusions 
Does your loved-one have beliefs that you know are not true? For example, does 
he/she insist that people are trying to harm him/her or to steal from him/her? Has 
he/she said that family members are not who they say they are or that the house is not 
their home? I’m not asking about mere suspiciousness: I am interested if the patient is 
convinced that these things are happening to him/her. 
 




How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 
4 – Very frequently (daily or essentially continuously present) 
 
How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 
2 – Moderate (more disturbing to my loved-one but can be redirected by their 
family/friends) 
3 – Severe (very disturbing for my loved-one) 
 
2. Hallucinations 
Does your loved-one have hallucinations such as false visions or voices? Does he/she 
seem to see, hear or experience things that are not present? By this question I do not 
mean just mistaken beliefs such as stating that someone who had died is still alive; 









How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 
4 – Very frequently (daily or essentially continuously present) 
 
How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 
2 – Moderate (more disturbing to my loved-one but can be redirected by their 
family/friends) 
3 – Severe (very disturbing for my loved-one) 
 
3. Agitation/Aggression 
Does your loved-one have periods when he/she refuses to co-operate or won’t let 
people help him/her? Is he/she hard to handle? 
 




How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 
4 – Very frequently (daily or essentially continuously present) 
 
How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 
2 – Moderate (more disturbing to my loved-one but can be redirected by their 
family/friends) 
3 – Severe (very disturbing for my loved-one) 
 
4. Depression/Dysphoria 
Does your loved-one seem sad or depressed? Does he/she feel sad or depressed? 
 




How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
325 
 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 
4 – Very frequently (daily or essentially continuously present) 
 
How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 
2 – Moderate (more disturbing to my loved-one but can be redirected by their 
family/friends) 
3 – Severe (very disturbing for my loved-one)  
 
5. Anxiety 
Is your loved-one very nervous, worried, or frightened for no apparent reason?  Does 
he/she seem very tense or fidgety?  Is he/she afraid to be apart from you? 
 




How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 
4 – Very frequently (daily or essentially continuously present) 
 
How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 
2 – Moderate (more disturbing to my loved-one but can be redirected by their 
family/friends) 
3 – Severe (very disturbing for my loved-one) 
 
6. Elation/Euphoria 
Does your loved-one seem too cheerful or too happy for no reason? I don’t mean the 
normal happiness that comes from seeing friends, receiving presents, or spending time 
with family members. I am asking if he/she has a persistent and abnormally good 
mood or finds humour where others do not. 
 




How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 




How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 
2 – Moderate (more disturbing to my loved-one but can be redirected by their 
family/friends) 
3 – Severe (very disturbing for my loved-one) 
 
7. Apathy/Indifference 
Has your loved-one lost interest in the world around him/her? Has he/she lost interest 
in doing things or does he/she lack motivation for starting new activities? Is he/she 
more difficult to engage in conversation or in doing chores? Is he/she apathetic or 
indifferent? 
 




How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 
4 – Very frequently (daily or essentially continuously present) 
 
How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 
2 – Moderate (more disturbing to my loved-one but can be redirected by their 
family/friends) 
3 – Severe (very disturbing for my loved-one) 
  
8. Disinhibition 
Does your loved-one seem to act impulsively without thinking? Does he/she do or say 
things that are not usually done or said in public? Does he/she do things that are 
embarrassing to you or others? 
 




How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 
4 – Very frequently (daily or essentially continuously present) 
 
How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 




3 – Severe (very disturbing for my loved-one) 
 
10. Irritability/Lability 
Does your loved-one get irritated and easily disturbed? Are his/her moods very 
changeable? Is he/she abnormally impatient? I do not mean frustration over memory 
loss or inability to perform usual tasks; I am interested to know if the patient has 
abnormal irritability, impatience, or rapid emotional changes different from his/her 
usual self. 




How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 
4 – Very frequently (daily or essentially continuously present) 
 
How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 
2 – Moderate (more disturbing to my loved-one but can be redirected by their 
family/friends) 
3 – Severe (very disturbing for my loved-one) 
 
10. Aberrant motor behaviour 
Does your loved-one pace, do things over and over such as opening closets or 
drawers, or repeatedly pick at things or wind string or threads? 




How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 
4 – Very frequently (daily or essentially continuously present) 
 
How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 
2 – Moderate (more disturbing to my loved-one but can be redirected by their 
family/friends) 






11. Night-time behaviours 
 
Does your loved-one have problems sleeping at night? By this I do not mean getting 
up to go to the bathroom. What I mean is difficulty in achieving and maintaining 
sleep. 
 




How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 
4 – Very frequently (daily or essentially continuously present) 
 
How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 
2 – Moderate (more disturbing to my loved-one but can be redirected by their 
family/friends) 
3 – Severe (very disturbing for my loved-one) 
  
12. Eating disorders  
Have your loved-one’s eating habits changed? By this I mean eating less or 
overeating different from his/her usual self. 
 




How often do these things occur? (mark an “X” next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Occasionally (less than once a week) 
2 – Often (about once a week) 
3 – Frequently (several times a week but less than every day) 
4 – Very frequently (daily or essentially continuously present) 
 
How disturbing or disabling are these behaviours for your loved-one? (mark an “X” 
next to the appropriate response) 
1 – Mild (produce little distress in loved-one) 
2 – Moderate (more disturbing to my loved-one but can be redirected by their 
family/friends) 
3 – Severe (very disturbing for my loved-one) 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to fill out the above questions.  If you have any 




Amy Duncan  
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Appendix F2: Comparative Risk Judgement Rating Form 
 
This questionnaire was loosely based on the Forms of Fournier et al. (2003), Covey and 
Davies (2004), Warner et al. (2012), and Weinstein (1983). 
 
Compared to an average person of the same sex, age and form of illness as you, what are the 
















1 Your purchase of an expensive TV will 
turn out to be a mistake 
     
2 You’ll get a fractured limb      
3 You’ll make and keep good friends on 
whom you can trust 
     
4 You’ll experience financial problems      
5 You’ll be offered an interesting position 
with flexible working hours (You’ll be 
offered an interesting position which 
allows for a career move) 
     
6 You’ll contract HIV      
7 You’ll need to stay in hospital at least 
once sometime next year 
     
8 You’ll be unable to go on holiday      
9 You’ll experience a drinking problem      
10 You’ll fall ill and will have to stay in bed 
for at least one week next year 
     
11 You’ll find affordable and handicap 
compliant housing (You’ll find 
affordable housing) 
     
12 You’ll develop cancer      
13 You’ll be considered a show-off by 
people close to you 
     
14 You’ll win R100 000 in the lottery      
15 You’ll need to ask for help as you can’t 
cope on your own anymore 
     
16 You’ll have a heart attack      
17 You’ll be deceived by a good friend      
18 You’ll not have to stay in hospital next 
year 
     
19 You’ll be able to spend your holidays 
abroad every year 
     




Appendix F3: Cottrell and Wilson (1926) Questionnaire 
 
Category selected by 
majority of raters 
Question Percentage of agreement for 
category rated by majority 
Euphoria sclerotica Describe in a few words your general or usual mood 73.33% 
Euphoria sclerotica Do you feel consistently cheerful or happy? 93.33% 
Euphoria sclerotica Do you feel consistently sad or unhappy? 93.33% 
Spes sclerotica Are you naturally optimistic? 86.67% 
Spes sclerotica Are you naturally pessimistic? 93.33% 
Euphoria sclerotica  
and spes sclerotica 
Are you aware of any alteration in either respect since the onset of the illness? 53.33% 
Spes sclerotica Are you optimistic or pessimistic in reference to your disease? 73.33% 
Euphoria sclerotica Do you change readily from a feeling or cheerfulness to one of sadness, and vice 
versa? 
60% 
Euphoria sclerotica Are you easily amused by what you see? 93.33% 
Euphoria sclerotica Are you easily amused by what you hear? 93.33% 
Euphoria sclerotica Are you easily amused by what you read? 93.33% 
Euphoria sclerotica Are you easily depressed by what you see? 80% 
Euphoria sclerotica Are you easily depressed by what you hear? 80% 
Euphoria sclerotica Are you easily depressed by what you read? 80% 
Other Are you moods fleeting or apt to last for some time? 73.33% 
Other Any change in this respect from formerly? 86.67% 
Other Are you naturally phlegmatic or indifferent? 80% 
Other Are you anxious or worried? 86.67% 
Other Are you irritable? 86.67% 
Other Do you easily lose your temper? 86.67% 
Other Are you different in mood in any of these respects from what you were one, two, five, 
ten, twenty years ago, or before the commencement of the illness? 
60% 
Euphoria sclerotica Are your thoughts consistently pleasant? 73.33% 
Other Are your thoughts amusing? 80% 
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Other Are you inclined to daydream, to live in the future, to live in an ideal world, or to live 
in the past? 
46.67% 
Euphoria sclerotica Are your thoughts consistently unpleasant, serious, sombre? 60% 
Euphoria sclerotica Are you inclined to ruminate on unpleasant subjects? 60% 
Euphoria sclerotica Are your thoughts depressing? 73.33% 
Other Are you inclined to worry about yourself? 80% 
Other Do you dream? 93.33% 
Other Are the dreams pleasant or unpleasant? 80% 
Eutonia sclerotica Describe your bodily feeling as a whole. 60% 
Eutonia sclerotica Are you conscious of any pleasant or unpleasant sensation in your body as a whole or a 
part? 
60% 
Eutonia sclerotica Do you feel tired or fatigued? 60% 
Eutonia sclerotica Do you feel relaxed? 46.67% 
Other Do you feel sleepy? 66.67% 
Eutonia sclerotica Is the feeling one of bodily ease? Is the feeling one of contentment? 80% 
Eutonia sclerotica Is the feeling one of pleasure? 53.33% 
Eutonia sclerotica Is your general feeling one of malaise? 60% 
Eutonia sclerotica Do you feel tense? 60% 
Other Do you feel nervous or jumpy? 66.67% 
Eutonia sclerotica Have you any feeling or pain, aching, soreness? 60% 
Eutonia sclerotica Are you restless? 53.33% 
Eutonia sclerotica Does the performance of normal bodily functions produce pleasant or unpleasant 
sensations? 
60% 
Other Do you laugh easily? 86.67% 
Other Do you laugh without adequate cause? 73.33% 
Other Do you cry easily? 80% 
Other Do you cry without adequate cause? 86.67% 
Other Is your outward expression a reliable gauge of your inward feeling? 80% 
Other Can you control the expression of your feeling? 80% 
Other Are you different in any of these respects from what you were one, two, five, ten, 





Appendix F4: Internal State Scale (Bauer et al., 1991) 
 
This questionnaire is readily available.  The original questionnaire requires participants to 
rate how they feel with an ‘x’ on a 100mm line from 0 to 100. I adapted this rating criteria to 









a bit Extremely 
1 My mood is changeable      
2 I feel irritable      
3 I feel like a capable person      
4 I feel like people are out to get me      
5 I actually feel great inside      
6 I feel impulsive      
7 I feel depressed      
8 My thoughts are going fast      
9 It seems like nothing will ever work 
out for me 
     
10 I feel overactive      
11 I feel as if the world is against me      
12 I feel “sped up” inside      
13 I feel restless      
14 I feel argumentative      






Appendix F5: Optimism and Pessimism Scale (Dember et al., 1989) 
 
This questionnaire is reproduced with the permission of S. Howe, on behalf of the late B. 
Dember. 
 
The following 56 statements represent individual differences in viewpoint. Please read each 
item carefully, and then, using the scale shown below, please respond with your own point of 
view to all of the statements. Do not spend a lot of time thinking about each one; just indicate 
your first impression. Remember, respond to these statements according to how you feel 




agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
1 I like people I get to know     
2 It is best not to set your hopes too high since you 
will probably be disappointed 
    
3 There is so much to be done and so little time to 
do it in 
    
4 I have a tendency to make mountains out of 
molehills 
    
5 Rarely do I expect good things to happen     
6 Everything changes so quickly these days that I 
often have trouble deciding which are the right 
rules to follow 
    
7 All in the world is a good place     
8 When it comes to my future plans and ambitions 
in life, I expect more to go wrong than right 
    
9 My hardest battles are with myself     
10 I believe there’s not much hope for the human 
race 
    
11 It does not take me long to shake off a bad mood     
12 If you hope and wish for something long and 
hard enough, you will eventually get it 
    
13 People get ahead by using ‘pull’ and not because 
of what they know 
    
14 Even when things in my life are going okay, I 
expect them to get worse soon 
    
15 With enough faith, you can do almost anything     
16 I enjoy myself most when I am alone, away from 
other people 
    
17 When I undertake something new, I expect to 
succeed 
    
18 Honesty is the best policy in all cases     
19 I generally look at the brighter side of life     
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20 If I make a decision on my own, I can pretty 
much count on the fact that it will turn out to be 
a poor one 
    
21 I generally make light of my problems     
22 It is always good to be frank     
23 Where there’s a will, there’s a way     
24 I have a tendency to blow up problems so they 
seem worse than they really are 
    
25 All in all, it is better to be humble and honest 
than important and dishonest 
    
26 As time goes on, things will most likely get 
worse 
    
27 It is the slow, steady worker who usually 
accomplishes the most in the end 
    
28 When I go to a party I expect to have fun     
29 Times are getting better     
30 Everyone should have an equal chance and an 
equal say 
    
31 Better to expect defeat; then it doesn’t hit so hard 
when it comes 
    
32 It is wise to flatter important people     
33 I expect to achieve most of the things I want to 
in life 
    
34 It seems the cards of life are stacked against me     
35 What is lacking in the world today is the old 
kind of friendship that lasted for a lifetime 
    
36 When the weatherman predicts 50% chance of 
rain, you might just as well count on seeing rain 
    
37 Before an interview, I am usually confident that 
things will go well 
    
38 Sometimes I feel down, but I bounce right back 
again 
    
39 The future seems too uncertain for people to 
make serious plans 
    
40 When I have undertaken a task, I find it difficult 
to set it aside even for a short time 
    
41 Tenderness is more important than love     
42 When gambling, I expect to lose     
43 Anybody who is willing to work hard has a good 
chance for success 
    
44 The future looks very dismal     
45 If I had to choose between happiness and 
greatness, I’d choose greatness 
    
46 Minor setbacks are something I usually ignore     
47 In general, things turn out all right in the end     
48 It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward     
49 Give me 50/50 odds and I will choose the wrong 
answer every time 
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50 It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners 
here and there 
    
51 If I were in competition and contestants were 
narrowed down to myself and one other person, I 
would expect to be runner-up 
    
52 April showers bring May flowers     
53 I can be comfortable with nearly all kinds of 
people 
    
54 The worst defeats come after the best victories     
55 In the history of the human race there have 
probably been just a handful of really great 
thinkers 
    






Appendix F6: Physical Ability Scale 
 
This questionnaire was loosely based on the PCRS of Prigatano and Fordyce (1986) and the 
SF-36 of Ware and Sherbourne (1992). 
 










1 Running or participating in sport    
2 Doing the dishes    
3 Doing the laundry    
4 Moving a table, pushing a vacuum cleaner    
5 Lifting or carrying shopping bags    
6 Making lunch/dinner    
7 Climbing several flights of stairs    
8 Climbing one flight of stairs    
9 Dressing yourself    
10 Bathing/showering    
11 Bending, kneeling, getting onto the ground    
12 Walking more than a kilometre    
13 Walking several blocks     






Appendix G: Rating Criteria for Definite Presence and Definite Absence of Euphoria 
Sclerotica, Eutonia Sclerotica and Spes Sclerotica (in terms of the CWQ) 
 
Euphoria sclerotica 
2 = mood described as generally positive, yes to consistently happy, no to consistently 
unhappy, yes to easily amused, no to easily depressed, yes to thoughts are pleasant, no to 
thoughts are unpleasant 
1 = confused/mixed answer 
0 = indifferent or depressed (no to consistently happy, yes to consistently unhappy) 
 
Eutonia sclerotica 
2 = body feels good/great, not aware of any unpleasant feelings, yes to bodily ease, yes to 
feeling of pleasure, no to malaise 
1 = confused/mixed answer 
0 = aware of negative feelings (no to bodily ease, yes to malaise) 
 
Spes sclerotica 
2 = yes to naturally optimistic, no to naturally pessimistic, yes to optimistic about MS 
1 = confused/mixed answer 







Appendix H:  Pearson Correlations Between the Positivity Composite and its Component Measures 
 










Positivity  .66 (p = .001) .46 (p = .029) .44 (p = .041) .66 (p = .001) 




Appendix I:  The Sociodemographic Characteristics of the MS Participants and Healthy Controls 
 









(n = 40) 
Total 
(n = 100) 
 Cognitive and 
euphoria 
questionnaires 




(n = 65) 
Total 
(n = 100) 
Gender – Male:Female 8:52 6:34 14:86  6:29 8:57 14:86 
Age 43.35 (11.48) 46.20 (10.61) 44.49 (11.17)  42.69 (11.35) 44.32 (10.88) 43.75 (11.02) 
     Range 19-72 26-64 19-72  19-69 21-67 19-69 
Race/ethnicity – 
White:Coloured/Indian 
34:26 37:3 71:29  23:12 53:12 76:24 
Educationa 13 (1.69) 13.45 (1.58) 13.18(1.65)  13.49 (1.38) 13.35 (1.58) 13.40 (1.50) 
     Range 8-15 8-15 8-15  11-15 8-15 8-15 
Marital status        
     Never married 12 4 16  8 6 14 
     Widowed/divorced/separated 12 8 20  6 10 16 

























Informants – Spouse/partner:Family 
member:Good friend 
28:21:11 31:5:4 59:26:15  24:6:5 50:7:8 74:13:13 
     Living with participant – Yes:No 44:16 35:5 79:21  25:10 52:13 77:23 
Note. Categorical data are presented in ratios. The data on age, education, and income are presented as means with the standard deviations in parentheses, 
then minimum to maximum ranges below.  
a = Highest level of education obtained, presented in years; it excluded pre-school and grade R and presumed a certificate to be a one year course, a diploma 
to be a two year course, and capped “degree” at three years. 
b = Combined monthly household income. 
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Appendix J: Tables Relating to the Demographic and Disease Correlates of Euphoria 
 
Table J1 
Pearson Correlations Between Positivity and the Medical, Demographic and Disease Variables 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Positivity 1.00 -.26* .04 -.05 .03 -.08 .04 .10 -.09 -.18 -.16 
2. Medical history  1.00 -.10 .09 -.07 .24* -.10 .13 .07 .09 -.09 
3. Corticosteroids   1.00 .28* -.00 -.01 -.10 -.26* .09 .15 .06 
4. Medication    1.00 .22 .09 .08 -.13 .08 .11 -.14 
5. Gender     1.00 .05 -.05 .00 -.06 -.08 -.15 
6. Age      1.00 -.12 .44** .23 .38** .33** 
7. Income       1.00 -.07 .00 -.03 -.09 
8. Duration of disease        1.00 .08 .09 .15 
9. Disease course         1.00 .86** .45** 
10. Current disease state          1.00 .56** 
11. Disease severity           1.00 





Pearson Correlations Between Unawareness of Physical Deficit and the Medical, Demographic and Disease Variables 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Unawareness of 
physical deficits 
1.00 .16 .13 .01 -.09 .08 .01 .06 .20 .12 -.22 
2. Medical history  1.00 -.10 .09 -.07 .24* -.10 .13 .07 .09 -.09 
3. Corticosteroids   1.00 .28* -.00 -.01 -.10 -.26* .09 .15 .06 
4. Medication    1.00 .22 .09 .08 -.13 .08 .11 -.14 
5. Gender     1.00 .05 -.05 .00 -.06 -.08 -.15 
6. Age      1.00 -.12 .44** .23 .38** .33** 
7. Income       1.00 -.07 .00 -.03 -.09 
8. Duration of disease        1.00 .08 .09 .15 
9. Disease course         1.00 .86** .45** 
10. Current disease state          1.00 .56** 
11. Disease severity           1.00 






Pearson Correlations Between Unawareness of Cognitive Deficit and the Medical, Demographic and Disease Variables 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Unawareness of 
cognitive deficits 
1.00 .17 -.08 -.01 -.01 .01 -.04 -.03 -.02 .05 -.02 
2. Medical history  1.00 -.10 .09 -.07 .24* -.10 .13 .07 .09 -.09 
3. Corticosteroids   1.00 .28* -.00 -.01 -.10 -.26* .09 .15 .06 
4. Medication    1.00 .22 .09 .08 -.13 .08 .11 -.14 
5. Gender     1.00 .05 -.05 .00 -.06 -.08 -.15 
6. Age      1.00 -.12 .44** .23 .38** .33** 
7. Income       1.00 -.07 .00 -.03 -.09 
8. Duration of disease        1.00 .08 .09 .15 
9. Disease course         1.00 .86** .45** 
10. Current disease state          1.00 .56** 
11. Disease severity           1.00 






Pearson Correlations Between Unawareness of Mood/Behavioural Deficit and the Medical, Demographic and Disease Variables 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Unawareness of 
mood/behavioural 
deficits 
1.00 .10 .09 .01 -.13 .02 -.11 -.02 -.13 -.07 -.11 
2. Medical history  1.00 -.10 .09 -.07 .24* -.10 .13 .07 .09 -.09 
3. Corticosteroids   1.00 .28* -.00 -.01 -.10 -.26* .09 .15 .06 
4. Medication    1.00 .22 .09 .08 -.13 .08 .11 -.14 
5. Gender     1.00 .05 -.05 .00 -.06 -.08 -.15 
6. Age      1.00 -.12 .44** .23 .38** .33** 
7. Income       1.00 -.07 .00 -.03 -.09 
8. Duration of disease        1.00 .08 .09 .15 
9. Disease course         1.00 .86** .45** 
10. Current disease state          1.00 .56** 
11. Disease severity           1.00 







The Demographic and Disease Correlates of Positivity 
Model 
Coefficients 
     95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant 130.79 6.54  20.01 .0001 117.82 143.76 
     Corticosteroids 1.92 10.39 .02 0.19 .854 -18.70 22.53 
     Medication -2.23 7.72 -.03 -0.29 .773 -17.55 13.09 
     Medical history -18.09 7.07 -.26 -2.56 .012 -32.13 -4.06 
Step 2        
     Constant 131.93 18.50  7.13 .0001 95.17 168.69 
     Corticosteroids 9.62 10.90 .10 0.88 .380 -12.04 31.27 
     Medication -2.516 8.21 -.03 -0.31 .760 -18.83 13.80 
     Medical history -19.87 7.48 -.28 -2.66 .009 -34.74 -5.01 
     Gender -2.57 10.37 -.03 -0.25 .805 -23.17 18.04 
     Age 0.07 0.40 .02 0.18 .860 -0.73 0.87 
     Income 1.37 0.00 .01 0.09 .931 0.00 0.00 
     Disease course 9.97 9.56 .21 1.04 .300 -9.03 28.97 
     Duration of disease 0.83 0.54 .18 1.54 .127 -0.24 1.90 
     Current disease state -11.36 9.45 -.27 -1.20 .233 -30.14 7.42 
     Disease severity -0.75 0.57 -.17 -1.30 .196 -1.88 0.39 





The Demographic and Disease Correlates of Unawareness of Physical Deficits 
 Coefficients 
Model 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant -1.15 0.59  -1.96 .053 -2.31 0.02 
     Corticosteroids 1.47 0.93 .17 1.59 .116 -0.37 3.32 
     Medication -0.37 0.69 -.06 -0.54 .592 -1.74 1.10 
     Medical history 1.15 0.63 .18 1.82 .072 -0.10 2.41 
Step 2        
     Constant -0.16 1.56  -0.10 .918 -3.26 2.94 
     Corticosteroids 1.67 0.92 .19 1.82 .072 -0.15 3.50 
     Medication -0.80 0.69 -.12 -1.15 .254 -2.17 0.58 
     Medical history 0.54 0.63 .09 0.85 .397 -0.72 1.79 
     Gender -1.05 0.88 -.12 -1.20 .234 -2.79 0.69 
     Age 0.04 0.03 .13 1.05 .298 -0.03 0.10 
     Income 2.63 0.00 .02 0.20 .843 0.00 0.00 
     Disease course 1.61 0.81 .38 2.00 .049 0.01 3.22 
     Duration of disease 0.03 0.05 .06 0.55 .582 -0.07 0.12 
     Current disease state -0.18 0.80 -.05 -0.23 .819 -1.77 1.40 
     Disease severity -0.18 0.05 -.45 -3.67 .0001 -0.27 -0.08 




The Demographic and Disease Correlates of Unawareness of Cognitive Deficits 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant 1.04 0.36  2.89 .005 0.33 1.75 
     Corticosteroids -0.34 0.57 -.06 -0.59 .557 -1.47 0.80 
     Medication -0.02 0.42 -.01 -0.05 .961 -0.86 0.82 
     Medical history 0.62 0.39 .16 1.60 .112 -0.15 1.39 
Step 2        
     Constant 1.74 1.04  1.67 .099 -0.34 3.82 
     Corticosteroids -0.54 0.62 -.10 -0.87 .386 -1.76 0.69 
     Medication -0.08 0.46 -.02 -0.16 .872 -1.10 0.85 
     Medical history 0.62 0.42 .16 1.47 .146 -0.22 1.46 
     Gender 0.06 0.59 .01 0.11 .915 -1.10 1.23 
     Age -0.01 0.02 -.07 -0.49 .623 -0.06 0.03 
     Income -2.52 0.00 -.03 -0.28 .777 0.00 0.00 
     Disease course -0.75 0.54 -.29 -1.39 .167 -1.82 0.32 
     Duration of disease -0.01 0.03 -.05 -0.40 .694 -0.07 0.05 
     Current disease state 0.81 0.53 .37 1.53 .131 -0.25 1.87 
     Disease severity -0.01 0.03 -.06 -0.43 .672 -0.08 0.05 





The Demographic and Disease Correlates of Unawareness of Mood/Behavioural Deficits 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant 4.65 3.04  1.53 .129 -1.37 10.68 
     Corticosteroids 5.26 4.83 .12 1.09 .278 -4.32 14.84 
     Medication -1.24 3.59 -.04 -.35 .730 -8.36 5.88 
     Medical history 3.64 3.29 .11 1.11 .270 -2.88 10.17 
Step 2        
     Constant 13.73 8.70  1.58 .118 -3.55 31.01 
     Corticosteroids 4.48 5.12 .10 .88 .384 -5.70 14.66 
     Medication -.28 3.86 -.01 -.07 .942 -7.95 7.39 
     Medical history 2.16 3.52 .07 .61 .542 -4.83 9.14 
     Gender -7.04 4.87 -.16 -1.45 .152 -16.73 2.64 
     Age .06 .19 .04 .30 .764 -0.32 0.43 
     Income -6.98 .0001 -.10 -.95 .347 0.00 0.00 
     Disease course -5.29 4.49 -.25 -1.18 .242 -14.22 3.64 
     Duration of disease 0.00 .25 .00 .01 .994 -0.50 0.50 
     Current disease state 3.23 4.44 .17 .73 .469 -5.60 12.06 
     Disease severity -.29 .27 -.14 -1.09 .278 -0.83 0.24 
Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
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Appendix K: Factor Analyses of the Cognitive Variables 
 
Table K1 
Factor Analysis of the Cognitive Variables 
 Component 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Attention       .80 
WM .78       
Speed of information processing   -.41     
Verbal learning    .71    
Verbal memory    .76    
Verbal recognition    .84    
Visual learning   .93     
Visual memory   .90     
Visual recognition   .65     
Naming .42       
Repetition     .43 .50  
Comprehension .78       
Visuospatial perception 2D  .86      
Visuospatial perception 3D  .83      
Visuospatial construction .55 .44      
Verbal fluency  .41    -.45  
Abstract reasoning  .46      
Disinhibition (time)       -.66 
Disinhibition (errors) .82       
Set shifting (time)      .82  
Set shifting (errors) .61       
Prosodic repetition     .82   
Prosodic comprehension  .40   .62   




Factor Analysis of the Cognitive Variables, Without Speed of Information Processing, Verbal Fluency, Prosodic Repetition and Prosodic 
Comprehension 
 Component 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Attention      .61 
WM .79      
Verbal learning    .70   
Verbal memory    .81   
Verbal recognition    .84   
Visual learning  .95     
Visual memory  .93     
Visual recognition  .71     
Naming .54      
Repetition .41      
Comprehension .74      
Visuospatial perception 2D   .84    
Visuospatial perception 3D   .91    
Visuospatial construction   .51    
Abstract reasoning       
Disinhibition (time)      -.82 
Disinhibition (errors) .76      
Set shifting (time)     .86  
Set shifting (errors) .50      





Appendix L: Inter-Item Correlations for MS and HC Groups 
 
Table L1 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Language Composite and its Component Variables for 
MS Participant Data 
Composite Naming Repetition Comprehension 
Language composite .83** .84** .26 
Note.  Language composite = naming, repetition and comprehension. 
** p < .001. 
 
Table L2 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Verbal Memory Composite and its Component Variables 
for MS Participant Data 
Composite Verbal learning Verbal memory Verbal recognition 
Verbal memory composite .91** .96** .67** 
Note. Verbal memory composite = verbal learning, memory and recognition. 
** p < .001. 
 
Table L3 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Visual Memory Composite and its Component Variables 
for MS Participant Data 
Composite Visual learning Visual memory Visual recognition 
Visual memory composite .97** .97** .70** 
Note. Visual memory composite = visual learning, memory and recognition. 
** p < .001. 
 
Table L4 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Visuospatial Composite and its Component Variables 








Visuospatial composite .83** .86** .74** 
Note. Visuospatial composite = visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial perception 3D and 
visuospatial construction.   





Inter-Item Correlations Between the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Functioning Composite and its 
Component Variables for MS Participant Data 
Composite Attention WM Abstract reasoning 
Dorsolateral prefrontal 
functioning composite 
.47** .85** .60** 
Note. Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite = attention, WM and abstract reasoning. 
** p < .001. 
 
Table L6 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Orbitobasal Composite and its Component Variables for 











.61** .84** .73** .79** 
Note. Orbitobasal composite = disinhibition and set shifting. 
** p < .001. 
 
Table L7 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Language Composite and its Component Variables for 
HC Participant Data 
Composite Naming Repetition Comprehension 
Language composite .68** .81** .14 
Note. Language composite = naming, repetition and comprehension. 
** p < .001. 
 
Table L8 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Verbal Memory Composite and its Component Variables 
for HC Participant Data 
Composite Verbal learning Verbal memory Verbal recognition 
Verbal memory composite .86** .93** .65** 
Note. Verbal memory composite = verbal learning, memory and recognition. 







Inter-Item Correlations Between the Visual Memory Composite and its Component Variables 
for HC Participant Data 
Composite Visual learning Visual memory Visual recognition 
Visual memory composite .97** .96** .48* 
Note. Visual memory composite = visual learning, memory and recognition. 
* p < .01.  ** p < .001. 
 
Table L10 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Visuospatial Composite and its Component Variables 









.67** .76** .70** 
Note. Visuospatial processing composite = visuospatial perception 2D, visuospatial perception 3D and 
visuospatial construction.   
** p < .001. 
 
Table L11 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Functioning Composite and its 
Component Variables for HC Participant Data 




.35 .74** .62** 
Note. Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite = attention, WM and abstract reasoning. 
** p < .001. 
 
Table L12 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Orbitobasal Composite and its Component Variables for 











.63** .81** .59** .57** 
Note. Orbitobasal composite = disinhibition and set shifting. 
** p < .001. 
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Appendix M: Tables Relating to the Cognitive Correlates of Euphoria 
 
Table M1 
Pearson Correlations Between Positivity and the Cognitive Variables 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Positivity 1.00 -.05 .02 .23 .15 -.08 -.03 -.15 .04 -.12 -.02 
2. Language comp.  1.00 .42** .35* .33* .40* .58** .24 .50** -.09 .45** 
3. Visuospatial comp.   1.00 .48** .44** .30 .50** .20 .59** -.18 .41* 
4. Verbal memory comp.    1.00 .61** .32 .40* .22 .44** -.30 .52** 
5. Visual memory comp.     1.00 .15 .46** .22 .49** -.35* .30 
6. Dorsolateral prefrontal 
functioning comp. 
     1.00 .40* .20 .23 -.06 .28 
7. Orbitobasal comp.       1.00 .01 .58** -.04 .53** 
8. ApBat repetition        1.00 .31 -.25 .10 
9. ApBat comprehension         1.00 -.30 .46** 
10. Speed of info. 
processing 
         1.00 -.06 
11. Verbal fluency           1.00 




Pearson Correlations Between Unawareness of Physical Deficits and the Cognitive Variables 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Unawareness of 
physical deficits 
1.00 .25 .39* .24 .37* .14 .48** .14 .37* -.03 .38* 
2. Language comp.  1.00 .42** .35* .33* .40* .58** .24 .50** -.09 .45** 
3. Visuospatial comp.   1.00 .48** .44** .30 .50** .20 .59** -.18 .41* 
4. Verbal memory comp.    1.00 .61** .32 .40* .22 .44** -.30 .52** 
5. Visual memory comp.     1.00 .15 .46** .22 .49** -.35* .30 
6. Dorsolateral prefrontal 
functioning comp. 
     1.00 .40* .20 .23 -.06 .28 
7. Orbitobasal comp.       1.00 .01 .58** -.04 .53** 
8. ApBat Repetition        1.00 .31 -.25 .10 
9. ApBat Comprehension         1.00 -.30 .46** 
10. Speed of info. 
processing 
         1.00 -.06 
11. Verbal fluency           1.00 















Pearson Correlations Between Unawareness of Cognitive Deficits and the Cognitive Variables 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Unawareness of 
cognitive deficits 
1.00 .08 .34* .07 .21 -.06 .03 .20 .13 -.07 -.16 
2. Language comp.  1.00 .42** .35* .33* .40* .58** .24 .50** -.09 .45** 
3. Visuospatial comp.   1.00 .48** .44** .30 .50** .20 .59** -.18 .41* 
4. Verbal memory comp.    1.00 .61** .32 .40* .22 .44** -.30 .52** 
5. Visual memory comp.     1.00 .15 .46** .22 .49** -.35* .30 
6. Dorsolateral prefrontal 
functioning comp. 
     1.00 .40* .20 .23 -.06 .28 
7. Orbitobasal comp.       1.00 .01 .58** -.04 .53** 
8. ApBat Repetition        1.00 .31 -.25 .10 
9. ApBat Comprehension         1.00 -.30 .46** 
10. Speed of info. 
processing 
         1.00 -.06 
11. Verbal fluency           1.00 













Pearson Correlations Between Unawareness of Mood/Behavioural Deficits and the Cognitive Variables 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Unawareness of 
mood/behavioural 
deficits 
1.00 .11 .14 -.04 -.14 .00 -.09 .18 .06 .07 -.14 
2. Language comp.  1.00 .42** .35* .33* .40* .58** .24 .50** -.09 .45** 
3. Visuospatial comp.   1.00 .48** .44** .30 .50** .20 .59** -.18 .41* 
4. Verbal memory comp.    1.00 .61** .32 .40* .22 .44** -.30 .52** 
5. Visual memory comp.     1.00 .15 .46** .22 .49** -.35* .30 
6. Dorsolateral prefrontal 
functioning comp. 
     1.00 .40* .20 .23 -.06 .28 
7. Orbitobasal comp.       1.00 .01 .58** -.04 .53** 
8. ApBat Repetition        1.00 .31 -.25 .10 
9. ApBat Comprehension         1.00 -.30 .46** 
10. Speed of info. 
processing 
         1.00 -.06 
11. Verbal fluency           1.00 













The Cortical and Subcortical Cognitive Correlates of Positivity 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant 165.84 103.42  1.60 .119 -44.82 376.49 
     Language composite -0.06 0.42 -.03 -0.13 .894 -0.90 0.79 
     Visuospatial composite -0.24 0.78 -.07 -0.31 .760 -1.82 1.34 
     Verbal memory composite 0.47 0.32 .32 1.46 .154 -0.19 1.13 
     Visual memory composite 0.18 0.47 .09 0.38 .708 -0.78 1.13 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning     
     composite 
-0.36 0.95 -.07 -0.38 .706 -2.30 1.58 
     Orbitobasal composite -0.64 0.05 -.17 -0.67 .505 -2.58 1.30 
     Prosodic repetition -0.64 0.50 -.24 -1.27 .212 -1.66 0.38 
     Prosodic comprehension 0.42 1.04 .10 0.40 .690 -1.70 2.53 
Step 2        
     Constant 162.59 116.02  1.40 .171 -74.36 399.54 
     Language composite -0.02 0.43 -.01 -0.04 .969 -0.89 0.86 
     Visuospatial composite -0.21 0.80 -.06 -0.27 .792 -1.84 0.86 
     Verbal memory composite 0.55 0.36 .38 1.52 .140 -0.19 1.29 
     Visual memory composite 0.09 0.50 .04 0.17 .866 -0.93 1.11 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning  
     composite 
-0.40 0.98 -.08 0.41 .688 -2.39 1.60 
     Orbitobasal composite -0.43 1.02 -.11 -0.42 .679 -2.52 1.66 
     Prosodic repetition -0.66 0.52 -.25 -1.28 .211 -1.71 0.40 
     Prosodic comprehension 0.43 1.10 .10 0.39 .697 -1.81 2.67 
     Speed of information processing -0.01 0.03 -.05 -0.28 .784 -0.07 -0.05 
     Verbal fluency -0.40 0.64 -.14 -0.62 .540 -1.70 0.91 






The Right and Left/Executive Cognitive Correlates of Positivity 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant 163.27 70.38  2.32 .026 20.53 306.01 
     Visuospatial composite -0.18 0.73 -.05 -0.25 .805 -1.66 1.30 
     Visual memory composite 0.41 0.40 .20 1.04 .307 -0.39 1.21 
     Prosodic repetition -0.53 0.46 -.20 -1.16 .256 -1.46 0.40 
     Prosodic comprehension 0.14 0.92 .03 0.16 .878 -1.73 2.01 
     Step 2        
     Constant 162.59 116.02  1.40 .171 -74.36 399.54 
     Visuospatial composite -0.21 0.80 -.06 -0.27 .792 -1.84 1.41 
     Visual memory composite 0.09 0.50 .04 0.17 .866 -0.93 1.11 
     Prosodic repetition -0.66 0.52 -.25 -1.28 .211 -1.72 0.40 
     Prosodic comprehension 0.43 1.10 .10 0.40 .697 -1.81 2.67 
     Language composite -0.02 0.43 -.01 -0.04 .969 -0.89 0.86 
     Verbal memory composite 0.55 0.36 .38 1.52 .140 -0.19 1.29 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite -0.40 0.98 -.08 -0.41 .688 -2.39 1.60 
     Orbitobasal composite -0.42 1.02 -.11 -0.42 .679 -2.52 1.66 
     Speed of information processing -0.01 0.03 -.05 -0.28 .784 -0.07 0.05 
     Verbal fluency -0.40 0.64 -.14 -0.62 .540 -1.70 0.91 




The Cortical and Subcortical Cognitive Correlates of Unawareness of Physical Deficits 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant -8.97 8.24  -1.09 .285 -25.74 7.81 
     Language composite -0.02 0.03 -.10 -0.51 .612 -0.08 0.05 
     Visuospatial composite 0.06 0.06 .18 0.94 .355 -0.07 0.18 
     Verbal memory composite -0.01 0.03 -.08 -0.39 .698 -0.06 0.04 
     Visual memory composite 0.03 0.04 .16 0.77 .445 -0.05 0.11 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning  
     composite 
-0.04 0.08 -.08 -0.46 .652 -0.19 0.12 
     Orbitobasal composite 0.15 0.08 .45 1.98 .056 -0.00 0.31 
     Prosodic repetition 0.03 0.04 .13 0.77 .447 -0.05 0.11 
     Prosodic comprehension -0.01 0.08 -.02 -0.07 .943 -0.17 0.16 
Step 2        
     Constant -8.38 9.11  -0.92 .365 -26.99 10.22 
     Language composite -0.02 0.03 -.13 -.066 .517 -0.09 0.05 
     Visuospatial composite 0.06 0.06 .17 0.87 .390 -0.07 0.18 
     Verbal memory composite -0.02 0.03 -.16 -0.73 .474 -0.08 0.04 
     Visual memory composite 0.04 0.04 .22 1.04 .307 -0.04 0.12 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning  
     composite 
-0.03 0.08 -.07 -0.39 .698 -0.19 0.13 
     Orbitobasal composite 0.12 0.08 .37 1.52 .138 -0.04 0.29 
     Prosodic repetition 0.03 0.04 .14 0.82 .418 -0.05 0.12 
     Prosodic comprehension -0.01 0.09 -.02 -0.10 .920 -0.18 0.17 
     Speed of information processing 0.00 0.00 .07 0.42 .675 -0.00 0.01 
     Verbal fluency 0.05 0.05 .21 1.06 .299 -0.05 0.16 





The Right and Left/Executive Cognitive Correlates of Unawareness of Physical Deficits 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant -13.52 5.70  -2.37 .023 -25.09 -1.96 
     Visuospatial composite 0.07 0.06 .21 1.14 .264 -0.05 0.19 
     Visual memory composite 0.04 0.03 .21 1.22 .231 -0.03 0.10 
     Prosodic repetition 0.00 0.04 .01 0.07 .943 -0.07 0.08 
     Prosodic comprehension 0.05 0.08 .14 0.69 .494 -0.10 0.20 
     Step 2        
     Constant -8.38 9.11  -0.92 .365 -26.99 10.22 
     Visuospatial composite 0.06 0.06 .17 0.87 .390 -0.07 0.18 
     Visual memory composite 0.04 0.04 .22 1.04 .307 -0.04 0.12 
     Prosodic repetition 0.03 0.04 .14 0.82 .418 -0.05 0.12 
     Prosodic comprehension -0.01 0.09 -.02 -0.10 .920 --0.18 0.17 
     Language composite -0.02 0.03 -.13 -0.66 .517 -0.09 0.05 
     Verbal memory composite -0.02 0.03 -.16 -0.73 .474 -0.08 0.04 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning  
     composite 
-0.03 0.08 -.07 -0.40 .698 --.19 0.13 
     Orbitobasal composite 0.12 0.08 .37 1.52 .138 -0.04 0.29 
     Speed of information processing 0.00 0.00 .07 0.42 .675 -0.00 0.00 
     Verbal fluency 0.05 0.05 .21 1.06 .299 -0.05 0.15 









The Cortical and Subcortical Cognitive Correlates of Unawareness of Cognitive Deficits 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant -5.80 5.32  -1.09 .284 -16.65 5.05 
     Language composite 0.00 0.02 .03 0.15 .880 -0.04 0.05 
     Visuospatial composite 0.09 0.04 .47 2.24 .032 0.01 0.17 
     Verbal memory composite -0.01 0.02 -.16 -0.77 .450 -0.05 0.02 
     Visual memory composite 0.02 0.02 .20 0.91 .369 -0.03 0.07 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite -0.04 0.05 -.15 -0.79 .435 -0.14 0.06 
     Orbitobasal composite -0.02 0.05 -.10 -0.42 .680 -0.12 0.08 
     Prosodic repetition 0.02 0.03 .17 0.93 .361 -0.03 0.08 
     Prosodic comprehension -0.04 0.05 -.15 -0.65 .521 -0.14 0.07 
Step 2        
     Constant -5.91 5.93  -1.00 .327 -18.02 6.20 
     Language composite 0.01 0.02 .06 0.28 .785 -0.04 0.05 
     Visuospatial composite 0.09 0.04 .48 2.25 .032 0.01 0.18 
     Verbal memory composite -0.01 0.02 -.10 -0.40 .690 -0.05 0.03 
     Visual memory composite 0.02 0.03 .14 0.60 .554 -0.04 0.07 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite -0.04 0.05 -.16 -0.83 .415 -0.14 0.06 
     Orbitobasal composite -0.01 0.05 -.03 -0.10 .925 -0.11 0.10 
     Prosodic repetition 0.02 0.03 .16 0.85 .403 -0.03 0.08 
     Prosodic comprehension -0.03 0.06 -.15 -0.62 .543 -0.15 0.08 
     Speed of information processing -0.00 0.00 -.08 -0.43 .669 -0.00 0.00 
     Verbal fluency -0.03 0.03 -.18 -0.84 .407 -0.09 0.04 






The Right and Left/Executive Cognitive Correlates of Unawareness of Cognitive Deficits 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant -6.93 3.58  -1.94 .061 -14.20 0.33 
     Visuospatial composite 0.07 0.04 .38 1.98 .056 -0.00 0.15 
     Visual memory composite 0.01 0.02 .10 0.57 .572 -0.03 0.05 
     Prosodic repetition 0.02 0.02 .16 1.00 .326 -0.02 0.07 
     Prosodic comprehension -0.05 0.05 -.20 -0.99 .330 -0.14 0.05 
     Step 2        
     Constant -5.91 5.93  -1.00 .327 -18.02 6.20 
     Visuospatial composite 0.09 0.04 .48 2.25 .032 -0.01 0.18 
     Visual memory composite 0.02 0.03 .14 0.60 .554 -0.04 0.07 
     Prosodic repetition 0.02 0.03 .16 0.85 .403 -0.03 0.08 
     Prosodic comprehension -0.03 0.06 -.15 -0.62 .543 -0.15 0.08 
     Language composite 0.01 0.02 .06 0.28 .785 -0.04 0.05 
     Verbal memory composite -0.01 0.02 -.10 -0.40 .690 -0.05 0.03 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning  
     composite 
-0.04 0.05 -.16 -0.83 .415 -0.14 0.06 
     Orbitobasal composite -0.01 0.05 -.03 -0.10 .925 -0.11 0.10 
     Speed of information processing -0.00 0.00 -.08 -0.43 .669 -0.00 0.00 
     Verbal fluency -0.03 0.03 -.18 -0.84 .407 -0.09 0.04 









The Cortical and Subcortical Cognitive Correlates of Unawareness of Mood/Behavioural Deficits 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant -57.55 46.93  -1.23 .229 -153.13 38.03 
     Language composite 0.15 0.19 .17 0.80 .432 -0.23 0.53 
     Visuospatial composite 0.40 0.35 .25 1.13 .268 -0.32 1.12 
     Verbal memory composite -0.02 0.15 -.03 -0.13 .899 -0.32 0.28 
     Visual memory composite -0.23 0.21 -.25 -1.10 .280 -0.67 0.20 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite -0.13 0.43 -.06 -0.30 .764 -1.01 0.75 
     Orbitobasal composite -0.33 0.43 -.19 -0.76 .451 -1.21 0.55 
     Prosodic repetition 0.18 0.23 .15 0.81 .426 -0.28 0.65 
     Prosodic comprehension 0.08 0.47 .04 0.18 .862 -0.88 1.04 
Step 2        
     Constant -34.44 52.06  -0.66 .513 -140.76 71.87 
     Language composite 0.14 0.19 .16 0.74 .468 -0.25 0.54 
     Visuospatial composite -0.25 0.22 -.27 -1.12 .270 -0.71 0.21 
     Verbal memory composite -0.07 0.16 -.11 -0.43 .668 -0.40 0.26 
     Visual memory composite -0.25 0.22 -.27 -1.12 .270 -0.71 0.21 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite -0.13 0.44 -.06 -0.30 .767 -1.03 0.77 
     Orbitobasal composite -0.32 0.46 -.19 -0.70 .492 -1.26 0.62 
     Prosodic repetition 0.17 0.23 .14 0.72 .480 -0.31 0.64 
     Prosodic comprehension -0.05 0.49 -.02 -0.09 .927 -1.05 0.96 
     Speed of information processing -0.01 0.01 -.18 -0.97 .342 -0.04 0.01 
     Verbal fluency 0.17 0.29 .13 0.58 .564 -0.42 0.75 






The Right and Left/Executive Cognitive Correlates of Unawareness of Mood/Behavioural Deficits 
Model 
Coefficients 
 95% CI 
b SE b β t p LL UL 
Step 1        
     Constant -35.55 31.07  -1.14 .260 -98.55 27.45 
     Visuospatial composite 0.36 0.32 .22 1.11 .277 -0.30 1.01 
     Visual memory composite -0.27 0.17 -.29 -1.57 .125 -0.63 0.08 
     Prosodic repetition 0.24 0.20 .20 1.18 .245 -0.17 0.65 
     Prosodic comprehension 0.03 0.41 .01 0.06 .950 -0.80 0.85 
     Step 2        
     Constant -34.44 52.06  -0.66 .513 -140.76 72.87 
     Visuospatial composite 0.40 0.36 .25 1.13 .269 -0.33 1.13 
     Visual memory composite -0.25 0.22 -.27 -1.12 .270 -0.71 0.21 
     Prosodic repetition 0.17 0.23 .14 0.72 .480 -0.31 0.64 
     Prosodic comprehension -0.05 0.49 -.02 -0.09 .927 -1.05 0.96 
     Language composite 0.14 0.19 .16 0.74 .468 -0.25 0.54 
     Verbal memory composite -0.07 0.16 -.11 -0.43 .668 -0.40 0.26 
     Dorsolateral prefrontal  
     functioning composite 
-0.13 0.44 -.06 -0.30 .767 -1.03 0.77 
     Orbitobasal composite -0.32 0.46 -.19 -0.70 .492 -1.26 0.62 
     Speed of information processing -0.01 0.01 -.18 -0.97 .342 -0.04 0.01 
     Verbal fluency 0.17 0.29 .13 0.58 .564 -0.42 0.75 
Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit. 
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Appendix N: Inter-Item Correlations for the Patient Control Groups 
 
Table N1 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Verbal Memory Composite and its Component Variables 
for MG Participant Data 
Composite Verbal learning Verbal memory Verbal recognition 
Verbal memory composite .95** .98** .58 
Note. Verbal memory composite = verbal learning, memory and recognition. 
** p < .001. 
 
Table N2 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Visual Memory Composite and its Component Variables 
for MG Participant Data 
Composite Visual learning Visual memory Visual recognition 
Visual memory composite .93** .96** .65 
Note. Visual memory composite = visual learning, memory and recognition. 
** p < .001. 
 
Table N3 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Functioning Composite and its 
Component Variables for MG Participant Data 
Composite Attention WM Abstract reasoning 
Dorsolateral prefrontal 
functioning composite 
.15 .93* -.01 
Note. Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite = attention, WM and abstract reasoning. 
* p < .01. 
 
Table N4 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Orbitobasal Composite and its Component Variables for 











.70 .86* .80* .90** 
Note. Orbitobasal composite = disinhibition and set shifting. 





Inter-Item Correlations Between the Verbal Memory Composite and its Component Variables 
for MVA TBI Participant Data 
Composite Verbal learning Verbal memory Verbal recognition 
Verbal memory composite .89* .98** .89* 
Note. Verbal memory composite = verbal learning, memory and recognition. 
* p < .01. ** p < .001. 
 
Table N6 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Visual Memory Composite and its Component Variables 
for MVA TBI Participant Data 
Composite Visual learning Visual memory Visual recognition 
Visual memory composite .92** .98** .99** 
Note. Visual memory composite = visual learning, memory and recognition. 
** p < .001. 
 
Table N7 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Functioning Composite and its 
Component Variables for MVA TBI Participant Data 
Composite Attention WM Abstract reasoning 
Dorsolateral prefrontal 
functioning composite 
.40 .90* .95** 
Note. Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite = attention, WM and abstract reasoning. 
* p < .01. ** p < .001. 
 
Table N8 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Orbitobasal Composite and its Component Variables for 











.80* .52 .52 .38 
Note. Orbitobasal composite = disinhibition and set shifting. 







Inter-Item Correlations Between the Verbal Memory Composite and its Component Variables 
for NP-SLE Participant Data 
Composite Verbal learning Verbal memory Verbal recognition 
Verbal memory composite .95** .99** .85* 
Note. Verbal memory composite = verbal learning, memory and recognition. 
* p < .01. ** p < .001. 
 
Table N10 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Visual Memory Composite and its Component Variables 
for NP-SLE Participant Data 
Composite Visual learning Visual memory Visual recognition 
Visual memory composite .99** .95** .76 
Note. Visual memory composite = visual learning, memory and recognition. 
** p < .001. 
 
Table N11 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Functioning Composite and its 
Component Variables for NP-SLE Participant Data 
Composite Attention WM Abstract reasoning 
Dorsolateral prefrontal 
functioning composite 
.60 .78 .78 
Note. Dorsolateral prefrontal functioning composite = attention, WM and abstract reasoning. 
 
Table N12 
Inter-Item Correlations Between the Orbitobasal Composite and its Component Variables for 











.90** .76 .63 .69 
Note. Orbitobasal composite = disinhibition and set shifting. 
* p < .01. ** p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
